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Abstract 
The present thesis re-assesses the utility of the theory of consociational democracy as a 
prescriptive conflict-regulation mechanism for plural societies, by re-examining the significance of 
the so-called causative/positive relationship between consociationalism and democratic stability. 
This re-assessment is based on a twin-fold examination of the internal constructs and logic of 
consociational theory, their political/economic procedural aspects and their societal manifestations. 
This examination is undertaken in two complex historical contexts, pre-war and post-war Lebanon. 
Mainly, the internal weaknesses of the theory have to do with its inherently flawed assumptions and 
the imprecise definitions of its main components, which make it problematic to analytically and 
empirically establish a causative link between consociationalism and democratic stability. Thus, to 
undertake a meaningful discussion of the ability of consociationalism to deliver on the promise of 
democratic stability, the thesis elaborates on the definitions of the main components and concepts of 
consociational theory (as they relate to the Lebanese context). It also examines their relations to 
democratic theory. Equally, starting with the observations that many countries of the world adopt 
consociational practices and mechanisms of rule and that consociational theory continues to receive 
significant scholarly attention, the continuous development and elaboration of the consociational 
model appear to be a way of alleviating the weaknesses of the theory and expanding its prescriptive 
power. Hence, particular emphasis is placed on an original elaboration of the definition, concept 
and representative scope of the grand coalition for two major reasons. First, this is so in the light of 
the centrality of the notion of elites and their role in consociational democracies (consociationalism 
being an actor-centered model). Second, this is the case in the light of the fact that executive 
decision-making power effectively lies within the ruling grand coalition. Based on the complex 
societal stage on which the thesis unfolds, (i. e., the Lebanese context), the findings of the thesis 
reveal that the consociational model of democracy is at times unable in very many ways to operate 
as the consociational theory of democracy suggests. Most importantly for the purposes of the 
present dissertation, the Lebanese experiments with consociationalism reveal that the model is 
unable at times to prevent the outbreak of communal conflict involving violence. Furthermore, it 
does not seem to work properly without a heavy dose of internal mediation and external arbitration. 
Additionally, it prevents the Lebanese state and social systems from reaching the political maturity 
necessary for stability. In other words, the Lebanese consociational structure of governance appears 
to work effectively at ensuring relative stability only if it is continuously assisted by additional 
mechanisms of conflict-regulation (those of mediation and arbitration). Indeed, the Lebanese 
consociational model functions relatively well when it borrows from the above-mentioned 
mechanisms provided by the literature on conflict regulation in plural societies. As such, 
consociationalism's so-called ability to deliver, alone, on the promise of democratic stability for 
Lebanon's plural society is seriously questioned. 
Vil 
'It is the Souvenir of the Past which constitutes the Nationality of a People', 
De Barante; 
quoted in "77ze Entente Cordiale in Lebanon", (Tyan Ferdinand, 1917). 
Chapter I Introduction 
A decade ago, McGarry and O'Leary cited genocide, forced mass-population transfers, 
partition and/or secession, integration and/or assimilation as methods for eliminating differences in 
plural societies. Also cited by these authors as being methods for managing differences were 
hegemonic control, arbitration (third-party intervention), cantonisation and/or federalisation, 
consociationalism or power sharing (McGarry & O'Leary 1993,4). The authors also referred to 
inter-community domination, communal divorce, expulsion, the suppression of violence, repression, 
and attempts to depoliticise conflicts between communities as being equally important in the 
literature of conflict regulation. One such conflict-regulating mechanism that this thesis proposes to 
look in detail at is that of the consociational device. In this respect, Dahl observes that 'one solution 
that has proved successful in several countries is "consociational democracy"' (Dahl 1989,256). 
Consociationalists, in particular the noted political scientist, Arend Lijphart, argue that the 
consociational model of democracy is a counteractive mechanism, able to prevent the outbreak of 
communal conflict, as well as create and maintain a stable democracy within a plural society. 
Consociationalism. has been credited with having 'acquired a unique characteristic of universality in 
terms of application to many fragmented polities of various types... ' (Falaiye 1990,1) and 'in the 
course of one decade ... has obtained its own domain in political theory, research, and engineering' 
(Van Schendelen 1984,30). 
This thesis re-examines and re-assesses the ability of the consociational model of democracy to 
prevent the outbreak of communal conflict, as well as to generate and maintain a stable democracy 
within multi-communal and unstable societies. It examines the appropriateness of the model for 
such societies and, by extension, the utility of consociational theory. The central argument 
developed herein, throughout the thesis, is that the consociational model fails, in many instances, to 
deliver on the promise of stable democracy for plural societies. Hence, the different chapters of this 
thesis will critically question the supposedly causative (i. e., positive) relationship between 
consociationalism and democratic stability. This will be done by looking at various aspects of 
consociationalism through the Lebanese lens. Indeed, taking the Lebanese political system as a 
critical case study appears pertinent to the purposes of this thesis, as Lebanon's mode of political 
organisation is thought to fit the description of the consociational model. Hence, by exploring and 
explaining the workings and manifestations of the Lebanese consociational model of democracy, 
this thesis will serve to shed more light on the internal logic and assumptions of consociational 
theory itself, and hence, its utility. 
Chapter 2 reviews and further develops the criticisms that were proffered against consociational 
theory, mainly in terms of the conceptual broadness and imprecision of the four components of the 
consociational model of democracy, as well as other key concepts of the theory. Chapter 2 also re- 
assesses the explanatory power of those favourable factors thought (by consociationalists) to assist 
and sustain consociational politics. Additionally, critical emphasis is placed in this chapter on the 
contention that consociational. theory explains what conditions elite co-operation and what 
determines power sharing and consensus within a given plural society. The examination of this 
contention is shown to question the internal logic of the theory, which relies heavily on elite 
accommodationist behaviour as a condition for system stability and for creating and maintaining a 
stable democracy. Hence, these issues will constitute the main discussion of Chapter 2, which deals 
with the internal weaknesses and shortcomings of the theory. Chapter 2 will also include a brief 
discussion of critical case studies (where relevant) that provide valuable analytical and empirical 
critiques of consociational theory. Towards the end of this chapter, the discussion will turn to the 
weaknesses and gaps in consociational literature. It will point to the need of the present study to 
undertake three important tasks for any meaningful discussion and assessment of the ability of 
consociationalism to deliver on the promise of democratic stability for plural societies. 
Unless more precise definitions are adopted, it is difficult to undertake an examination of the 
relationship of consociationalism to democratic theory, so as to determine whether the model 
succeeds in generating democratic stability. This is particularly the case because it is not clear from 
the consociational literature what is meant by the concepts to which consociational theory refers. 
Hence, Chapter 2 identifies the need to define more adequately the key concepts of consociational 
theory (a task undertaken in Chapter 3). Moreover, this thesis is guided by the pragmatically 
fundamental realisation that consociationalism is often resorted to because of the lack of any 
feasible alternative and in many instances, imposed by conditions of crisis. Thus, the point of 
departure of this thesis is that an elaboration of the key component of the consociational model (i. e., 
elite rule through the principle of grand coalition) is one way of enhancing the prospects for 
consociationalism generating and maintaining democratic stability, as well as prospects for the 
model operating in plural societies, and hence, promoting the utility of consociationalism. Hence, 
the various discussions undertaken in Chapter 2 point to the need for this thesis to introduce an 
elaboration of the consociational model (a task also undertaken in Chapter 3). 
Central to the notion of consociational democracy is the dominant role that the elite plays in ruling 
and decision-making. In order to succeed in showing the absence of a definite positive relationship 
between consociationalism and democratic stability, this thesis has to address the theories of elite 
behaviour in order to locate the impact and weight of the leaders of different communal groups on 
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the decision making process, and the implementation of the system. Thus, Chapter 3 first elaborates 
on the definitions of the key concepts of the theory as they relate to the societal stage on which this 
thesis unfolds. It provides/identifies a theoretical framework within which consociationalism 
operates (i. e., for the investigation of the operability of the model), and introduces/proposes a 
refinement of the theory to help alleviate the operational and procedural shortcomings of the model. 
Through a detailed examination of all four consociational principles, Chapter 3 examines the 
relations of consociationalism to democratic theory, highlighting the model's extremely elitist 
nature and its failure to generate democratic stability for plural societies. The links between 
consociationalism and democracy are critically examined, pointing to the undemocratic nature of 
the former and to the impact this has on prospects for democratic stability. Chapter 3 also points to 
the limitations of the model in many respects that are essential for modernisation, development and 
nation-building, and hence system stability. These limitations are best seen by looking at the 
procedural shortcomings of the consociational model in action. Chapter 3 concludes by looking at 
the alternative approaches for dealing with problems in the organisation of political rule that plural 
societies face, bringing out the similarities and differences between these and consociationalism, 
and assessing their significance for the present study. 
As regards the concerns of this thesis, it is important to note that the breakdown of the pre-war 
Lebanese political system in 1975 forms the basis upon which to evaluate the capacity of 
consociational theory to act as a conflict-regulation method in plural societies, and more 
importantly, as a system capable of generating and maintaining democratic stability. Consequently, 
an examination of the pre-war Lebanese experiment with consociationalism (undertaken in Chapter 
4) is necessary so as to determine the underlying causes of this breakdown and the failure of the 
consociational model on the promise of democratic stability for Lebanon's plural society. Such an 
examination requires a closer look at the 1926 Lebanese Constitution, the 1943 National Pact, the 
conduct of politics during the 1943-1975 period and the internal and external strains that operated 
on the system. Chapter 4 argues that the highly elitist nature of the model translated into a 
hegemonic system of government and failed to preserve the internal order within the country, 
ultimately leading to the outbreak of communal violence and the 1975-1990 civil war. Indeed, 
though power was shared by a narrow governing elite essentially composed of the Maronite 
Christian and Sunni Muslim community leaders, pre-war Lebanon was characterised by a Maronite- 
dominated hegemonic form of consociationalism. as a result of the substantial amount of political 
power granted to the office of the Presidency, itself controlled by the Maronite community. The 
examination illustrates in practical ways the fact that an elaboration of the model in terms of the 
executive grand coalition (introduced in Chapter 3) is much-needed as the pre-war consociational 
system in Lebanon shows how the narrow scope of the grand coalition, which conforms to the 
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concept as it is devised by Lijphart, has translated into a hegemonic presidential system of rule that 
led to the outbreak of the war, together with other factors. 
Chapter 4 examines consociational politics in Lebanon from 1943-1975, and their inability to 
prevent the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war, 1975-1990. This chapter examines consociational 
practices, their functions and how they operate. A brief historical review points to the birth of 
consociational principles, identified in an emerging tradition of elite accommodation based on 
shifting and temporary alliances of interests. The principal articles of the constitution point to the 
consolidation of consociational. principles. The elements of the pact, as well as the conduct of 
politics, later reveal significant procedural deviations from the consociational model in terms of a 
departure from consociational principles, as well as numerous violations of consociational politics. 
These deviations are treated as procedural manifestations of the consociational model, which 
ultimately manifested themselves when the latter came into operation. Chapter 4 also examines the 
particular nature of pre-war Lebanese society by looking at the considerably detrimental impact 
consociational politics had on the stability of the system where the latter no longer accommodated 
multiple converging (internal and external) strains. The argument that is made is that political 
instability (resulting from consociational politics) has had important effects on societal stability. 
Chapter 4 concludes by a recapitulative focus on the main research question of this thesis, the so- 
called causative relationship between consociationalism and democratic stability, i. e., for the 
purposes of Chapter 4, the nature of the link between pre-war Lebanese consociationalism and 
democratic stability. 
At this stage, it should be mentioned that a revised consociational formula was devised to meet 
regionally turbulent conditions of crisis and internally new realities. Such temporary conditions that 
brought about this revised formula were compelling enough so that in the end, the formula 
effectively provided a common (though minimal) entente ground to end the fifteen-year civil war, 
thereby giving credibility to consociational. theory and indicating the need for this thesis to examine 
the post-war Lebanese political system from 1990 onwards. The current second experiment with 
consociationalism that Lebanon is undertaking is one way of examining how the revised 
consociational. formula, which conforms to the proposed elaboration of the model suggested in 
Chapter 3, has so far not generated democratic stability for Lebanon's plural society, despite its 
relative stability since 1990. Indeed, the improved consociational. formula and its effective 
translation into action suggest that prospects for democratic stability have improved. While the 
previous pre-war formula, which conforms to Lijphart's highly elitist definition of the grand 
coalition, resulted in a hegemonic system of government, rather than a consociational one, the 
current formula, conforming to the elaboration of the notion of grand coalition developed in 
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Chapter 3, translates into a less elitist system of government, but one symbolised by the emergence 
of the troika rule, involving a significant amount of internal mediation and Syrian external 
arbitration. Indeed, post-war Lebanon is characterised by a consociational troika power-sharing 
system where the Maronite president, the Sunni prime minister and the Shi'i Muslim parliament 
speaker govern with internal as well as external assistance and support. Hence, it appears that the 
consociational model either translates into a highly elitist hegemonic system of political 
organisation where one communal group dominates, or takes the form of a consociational elitist 
system supported by excessive internal mediation among the various poles of power as well as 
outside intervention in the form of arbitration designed to maintain the stability of the system. 
Internal mediation refers to the truce-making and conflict-resolution efforts that government 
officials (ministers and parliamentarians... ) engage in to remedy to the political bickering among the 
three poles of power, while these elites should be in fact assuming their own functions and 
responsibilities (i. e., ministers handling their government portfolios and parliamentarians studying 
legislative reforms instead of acting as conflict-regulators). External arbitration refers to the 
constant impetus from the Syrian regime in assisting Lebanese elites in their governing of the 
country and making sure that the consociational constitution and consociational mechanisms of rule 
are applied. It would thus appear that the consociational model prevents the Lebanese state system 
and society from reaching political maturity, necessary for stability. 
In other words, the divisive societal context that consociationalism fosters coupled with the model's 
reliance on human institutions of governance (it being an elitist actor-centered model) makes an 
awareness among the elites (and the fragmented mass) as regards what constitutes national interest 
difficult to emerge. Hence, since this situation puts the stability and cohesiveness of the country at 
risk, it points to an insufficient level of political maturity. As a result, third parties, usually 
neighbouring countries, (whose security may be threatened), assist in the governance of the 
consociational country since local elites are unable to act in a politically mature fashion (i. e., in a 
responsible way, hence requiring outside supervision and control in the command and 
administration of the country). In this respect, this thesis introduces a new original dimension to the 
understanding of the failure of consociationalism to generate democratic stability, and points to the 
need to borTow additional conflict-regulating mechanisms from the literature on conflict-regulation, 
so as to assist the devices of the consociational model in preventing the outbreak of conflict and 
maintaining a relative degree of stability in plural societies. Otherwise, the system seems to 
translate into a hegemonic mode of political rule outlined in Chapter 4. 
A detailed examination of this revised consociational. framework, (the 1989 Ta'if Agreement which 
was subsequently formally incorporated in the Lebanese Constitution), is undertaken in Chapter 5. 
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One of the aims of this chapter is to examine how adequate the revised formula is, and in what 
respects it relates precisely to the consociational model, in order to determine its relationship to 
democratic stability. The chapter argues that the revised formula has so far not generated 
democratic practices and stability, a central concern of this thesis. The chapter describes in detail 
the Ta'if Accord, and explains the constitutional amendments undertaken. It further points to the 
drawbacks and inadequacies of the agreement. Additionally, the chapter examines the lingering 
political problems in the post-Ta'if era, and points to the impact of political instability on the long- 
term stability of the society. The discussion further addresses the inability of consociational politics 
under the Ta'if Accord framework to deal with the long-term problems of the polity. The 
unimplemented provisions of the Ta'if Agreement are very briefly highlighted in order to suggest 
the difficulties and obstacles that lie in implementing these provisions. This is because the 
consociational structure of government effectively blocks moves in that direction. The findings of 
Chapter 5 are outlined at the end and suggest that such a situation does not positively predispose the 
country towards reaching democratic stability, nor does it allow the state and society systems to 
reach political maturity, necessary for stability. 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, reviews and summarises the major findings of the thesis, and 
brings the threads of analysis together by assessing the validity of the interpretations that have been 
given in the various discussions, i. e., the conclusions regarding consociational theory, the 
implications of the present study and the effectiveness of the consociational model of rule for 
Lebanon. It also offers insights into the future prospects for Lebanon's stability, whilst examining 
what lessons Lebanon's political system offers for conflict management and the governance of 
plural societies other than Lebanon. Chapter 6, thus, sets the present study within the context of 
current research. 
This thesis acknowledges the valuable contributions of the considerable amount of literature on 
consociationalism and on Lebanon's political system. However, it is the contention of this author 
that this body of literature more often than not is concemed with the broad characteristics of 
Lebanese consociationalism and the general classification of Lebanon's system of rule. There is as 
yet no systematic study devoted exclusively to examine the various aspects of Lebanese 
consociationalism, its procedural manifestations in Lebanon's state and society and its realistic 
chances of success in delivering on the promise of democratic stability in the Lebanese context. It is 
hoped that the present study will throw some light on these issues by going into the details of 
Lebanon's brand of consociationalism, focusing on its most important feature, executive grand 
coalition decision-making, and the latter's relation to democratic stability. The assessment of the 
ability of consociationalism's effective institutions of rule, i. e., communal elites, to generate 
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democratic stability is critically examined and worthwhile, for it offers original insights as to 
possible elaborations of the consociational model, which suggest that an elaborated model has more 
chances to work as the theory suggests, hence enhancing the utility of consociational theory. 
The various discussions in this thesis draw upon secondary resources such as books, articles in 
journals and reviews, and daily articles in local and foreign newspapers, as well as online published 
material. Additionally, a limited number of primary resources, such as official governmental 
documents and official speeches, United Nations publications and local television interviews with 
decision-makers and economic analysts will be utilised. 
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Chapter 2 Lijphart's consociational theory 
In line with the main orientation of this thesis, (i. e., its focus on consociational theory and 
the latter's promise of stable democracy for divided societies), this chapter will introduce the model 
of consociational democracy, critically analyse the theory of consociationalism and evaluate the 
utility of this theory. In other words, the aim of this chapter is to assess the intellectual validity of 
consociational theory in order to end up with some judgement that is implied by the research 
question of this dissertation. Thus, these objectives call for this chapter to examine the internal 
constructs and logic of this theory, as well as the assumptions and implications contained in the 
theory and its consistency, before relating it to democratic theory and its utility in the Lebanese 
context in subsequent chapters. 
Lijphart's consociational democracy came about as a result of his belief in the necessity of 
identifying, elaborating and refining Almond's 1956 typology of democracies. He agreed with 
Almond that instability was to be expected in culturally heterogeneous societies, those 'divided by 
mutually reinforcing cleavages'. However, he pointed to the need for a new category within 
Almond's typology of democracies. One that he framed subsequently is as follows: the model of 
heterogeneous society/stable democracy. At first, Lijphart used the word 'politics of 
accommodation'. Later, in a 1968 World Politics article called "Consociational Democracy", he 
used the ten-n 'consociationalism'. The term was derived from Althusius' 1603 article in Politica 
Methodice Digesta, entitled "Concept of Consociatio". Althusius, a political theorist, defined the 
Latin term 'Consociatio' as 'a community of common destiny, cooperative' or 'to associate in an 
alliance' (Lijphart 1977 quoted in Sisk 1996). Lijphart points out that though Althusius 'coined' the 
term, 'Althusius was mainly an early federalist thinker and he cannot be regarded as a 
consociationalist'. According to the author, Lewis 'is clearly the intellectual originator of the 
theory' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). 
However, most literature on consociationalism refers to Lijphart as 'the most productive and 
imaginative I author' (Van Schendelen 1984,28) or the major contributor to the theory of 
consociational democracy: 'Although Lijphart is not the originator of the concept of consociational 
democracy, he is given much credit for its theoretical development. His contribution to the theory 
remains monumental, both in terms of its potential for replicability and as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution in plural societies' (Falaiye 1990,67). Indeed, a discussion of Lijphart's development of 
consociational theory is important not only because he is considered to be the major contributor to 
1 Emphasis added. 
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the elaboration of the theory, as Falaiye points out above, but rather because, as Halpern reveals, the 
theory departs from commonplace scepticism regarding the attainment of stable democracy in 
divided societies. Indeed, Halpern writes: 
In the twentieth century, the prevalence of subcultural conflicts based upon race, language, religion, and 
ethnicity have rendered this skepticism [the dangers that subcultural differences pose for democracy] 
commonplace ( ... ) the possibility of maintaining stable democracý in a subculturally 
fragmented state appeared 
to political theorists to be remote at best. For this reason alone, ý the publication of Arend Lijphart's theory of 
consociational democracy might have attracted attention: unlike its pessimistic predecessors, this theory purports 
to demonstrate how stable democracy can be maintained in divided states (Halpern 1984,1). 3 
Thus, in the light of Lijphart's significant analytical and empirical contributions to the introduction 
and development of consociational theory to the field of political science, this chapter will proceed 
to critically examine the model, as devised by Lijphart, in an attempt to determine whether it 
delivers on the promise of stable democracy, as he explicitly states. Whether the theory is 'overtly 
OptiMiStiC, 4 in its promise of stable democracy for divided societies (including deeply divided ones) 
will be discussed throughout the different chapters of this thesis in a series of steps. 
Numerous studies since the publication of Lijphart's 1968 article have focused specifically, and 
indeed critically on the internal constructs of the theory of consociational. democracy, thus limiting 
the utility of the model. The aim of this chapter is not to reiterate such criticisms. Rather, the 
examination of the internal constructs of the theory is useful for the purposes of this thesis because 
the vagueness and imprecision of the key components and concepts of the model as well as the 
theory's very broadly-defined elite tasks, will be shown to further impede the application of the 
model to the governance of the divided societies of the twentieth century. Indeed, whereas 
previously, democracy was considered in institutional and procedural terms, today current research 
emphasis appears to be based on the notion of governance. In the light of the extremely elitist nature 
of consociational democracy and thus, the centrality of the concept of the elites for the model and 
its validity, an examination of the internal flaws of the theory is bound to reveal additional 
constraints with regard to the utility of the model as a prescriptive conflict-regulation mechanism in 
today's divided societies. As such, a review of the internal constructs of the theory appears relevant 
to current research on the organisation of political rule and the governance of plural societies. 
2 Emphasis added. Van Schendelen argues similarly stating that Ujphart's original contribution to the political science 
literature has been ... his formulation of [the above mentioned] paradox.. 
' (Van Schendelen 1984,28). 
3 The author also notes that the influence of Lijphart's work is apparent 'not only in the marked rise ... in the interest of 
political scientists ... but also in the central place the theory 
has been afforded-in the many references to it ... in the 
numerous journal articles-and by its application to a plethora of cases... ' (Halpern 1984,3). 
4 In the words of Halpern, 'consociationalism is an expressly hopeful theory' (Halpern 1984,354). 
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A re-assessment of consociational theory would be incomplete if without critically examining the 
definitions of the four components, as well as the key concepts of the theory, the impact of the eight 
background conditions on the establishment of consociational practices and the ability of the elite to 
create and maintain consociational practices. First, the chapter will look at the imprecise and 
varying definition of the four components of consociational. democracy. Following this, it will 
address the problem of vagueness of the key concepts of consociational theory. Third, it will 
attempt to determine the explanatory power of the factors thought to sustain consociational politics. 
Fourth, it will critically examine the tasks of the elite in maintaining consociational practices, tasks 
that the consociational model prescribes as conditions for achieving a stable democracy in a divided 
society. The final section will point to the existing gaps in the literature on consociationalism, 
indicating the necessary tasks needed to fill them, and thus setting the agenda for the remainder of 
this thesis. 
A. The four components of consociational democracy 
Lijphart defines consociational democracy in terms of four basic principles. The two 'primary 
characteristics' are grand coalition (that is, the sharing of executive power) and group, or segmental 
autonomy. As to the two 'secondary characteristics' or what Lijphart sometimes calls 
supplementary principles, these are proportionality and mutual, or minority veto (Lijphart 2000b). 
The first principle, that of executive power-sharing, is a 'government by a grand coalition of the 
political leaders of all significant segments of the divided society' (Lijphart 1986,35). The second 
consociational principle, that of segmental or community autonomy, or a high degree of autonomy 
for the segments of the plural society, prescribes the delegation of as much decision-making as 
possible to the separate segments (Lijphart 1986,35). In other words, on all issues of common 
concern, decisions should be made jointly by the representatives of the main segments. Meanwhile, 
$on all other issues, decision-making should be left to each segment' (Ijjphart 1995b, 278) which, 
in effect, means self-government on issues of 'most profound concern' (McGarry 1994). The third 
consociational component is proportionality. This is considered 'the basic standard of political 
representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public funds' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). The 
objective of the principle is to guarantee the fair representation of minority segments, and its scope 
runs throughout the public sector. The fourth component is mutual or minority veto rights on vital 
issues and constitutional change. Mutual veto 'guarantees to each segment that it will not be 
outvoted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake' (Lijphart 1986,35). The concerns that 
were mainly raised over the conceptual broadness of these definitions point out that such broadness 
10 
makes it problematic to use the model to describe the political system of particular states, as the 
following sections will show. 
1. Defining a set of components 
First and foremost, a secondary but nonetheless important issue requires attention. That is, the 
number of the components of consociational democracy varied over time. Originally, the theory, as 
Lijphart conceived it, comprised the presence of five components, the fifth of which was a plural, 
deeply divided society, to use Lijphart's words. However, the author, in more recent work, defined 
the theory in terms of the four principles discussed earlier, and abandoned the fifth component. For 
instance, Lijphart writes that his definitions of consociational democracy in terms of the 
components: 
were conflicting over time. In my more recent work, I have tended to define it in terms of the four 
characteristics ... In earlier work, there was a fifth defining element, namely that of a plural, deeply divided, 
society. Fortunately, I think that the problems caused by these partly contradicting definitions ( ... ) can be 
remedied easily- by simply dropping the earlier definition ( ... ) Generally speaking, whenever there is a difference between earlier and later formulations, I stand behind the later and reject the earlier ones (Lijphart 2000a, 426). 
In this respect, three observations should be made. First, the lack of a precise defining set of the 
principles of consociational theory over time (from 1968 and onwards) and the ensuing confusion 
make it difficult for scholars studying the model to use it to describe the political system of a 
particular state. They also make it equally difficult to refute the nomination of particular cases as 
consociational. democracies, as the lengthy scholarly debate over the classification of the 
Netherlands as a consociational democracy suggests. 5 
Second, though Lijphart dropped the fifth element, he does not distinguish between plural societies 
and divided, or deeply divided societies. For him, a society that comprises plural segments is 
necessarily a divided, or deeply divided, society. He does not take into account the possibility of a 
plural but homogeneous society. Third, Lijphart's assumption that 'only the consociational model 
can remedy to the problems that plural and divided societies face' is not justified by sufficient 
evidence. These last two issues are discussed at length later in separate sections of this chapter. 6 
5 See section A. 3. in this chapter. 
6 See sections BA. and D. in this chapter. 
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2. Defining the four components 
The second problem identified by researchers on consociationalism relates to Lijphart's definitions 
of the four components of consociational democracy themselves. Their conceptual broadness makes 
it difficult to identify consociational characteristics in a given country, to argue that the latter's 
political system is consociational and consequently (and perhaps more importantly), to hold that it 
is consociational politics that can explain the stability of the system or in many cases, its 
breakdown. This last issue is of critical importance, as it is the central research question of this 
thesis. 
As Halpern points out, 'the problem of the disorderly consociational universe lies within the 
construction of the theory of consociational democracy and not within the cases that theory has 
been used to describe. An examination of the constructs of the theory reveals that the 
inconsistencies exhibited by the cases are attributable to the faulty and imprecise concepts upon 
which consociational theory is based' (Halpern 1986,181). In her doctoral thesis, Halpern 
elaborates on this point, writing that 'such concepts which impede the model from functioning at 
the lowest level of theory, that of classification, also prevent its application at any higher level' 
(Halpern 1984, Abstract). Clearly, this adds an element of confusion and incertitude to any attempt 
to classify the political systems of plural/unstable societies as consociational, hence, undermining, 
in some cases, the internal consistency of the consociational. model, and thus its utility. 
a. Grand coalition 
The first principle, that is, executive power-sharing, is a 'government by a grand coalition of the 
political leaders of all significant segments of the divided society' (Lijphart 1986,35). Lijphart does 
not specify the form it takes. Rather, he points out that a grand coalition may take a 'variety of 
institutional forms': 'The grand coalition can be a cabinet in a parliamentary system, or a coalitional 
arrangement of a president and other top-office holders in a presidential system of government' 
(Lijphart 1995b, 277-79). In later work, Lijphart defines grand coalition as not so much any 
particular arrangement as the participation by the leaders of all significant segments in governing a 
plural society. This definition can be seen as problematic in two important respects. 
First, Halpern makes the case that Lijphart's notion of grand coalition is 'a catch-all concept, 
describing any joint governmental or quasi-governmental activity pursued by segmental 61ites 
whether they undertake that activity as bloc representatives or not, or engage at all in "summit 
diplomacy"' (Halpern 1986,190). Halpern argues that 'since the essence of consociational 
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democracy is power-sharing, the site of the grand coalition would appear to be restricted to those 
legislative and executive institutions where governance is traditionally undertaken, institutions that 
enable the segmental leaders to govern together. As Lijphart conceives it, however, grand coalition 
is not lin-tited to particular institutional settings or even to governing bodies' (Halpern 1986,189). 
According to Halpern, failing to discern where grand coalition exercises governance leaves 
considerable freedom to the model: Me researcher using the model as a guide is thereby 
encouraged towards creativity, not exactitude- towards identifying grand coalition somewhere 
within the folds of a state's political fabric' (Halpern 1986,190). 
Second, particularly noteworthy and troubling in Lijphart's definition of the concept of grand 
coalition is his use of the word 'significant'. In the light of the important role of elites in the 
consociational model, and hence the centrality of elite governance as a determining factor in the 
operability of the model in a divided (and deeply divided) societal context, some questions that arise 
are as follows: What is not a significant segment of the divided society, and more importantly 
who/what decides what is not a significant segment of the divided society? What criteria determine 
significant segments as opposed to insignificant segments? Indeed, it can be said that there is a 
tension between consociationalism's emphasis on communal groups as the cornerstone of the 
divided society (rather than groups based on more fluid identities or individuals) and the use of the 
concept of 'significant' segments. If consociationalism is defined in tenns of an effective conflict- 
regulating mechanism and organisational structure of political rule between the communal groups 
of the divided society, the assumption/expectation is that all groups of the divided society are 
represented at the executive decision-making level. Furthermore, there is a tension between 
consociationalism's promise to secure the rights of minority groups (through the veto concept) and 
the use of the word 'significant'. Indeed, it is not clear how minority groups can exercise the veto 
right if they are not represented at the executive, decision-making level. 
This is particularly a cause of concern because of the existing interdependence between the four 
components of consociational democracy as a condition for the operability of the model. Indeed, the 
operability of the model is dependent not only on each component alone, but rather, on their 
interaction, which aims to organise a divided society into an acceptable manner to all its groups. 
Thus, in the light of the equally broadly defined three remaining components of consociational 
theory, the operability of the model is further restrained. In short, the lack of a precise definition of 
grand coalition engenders a broadness whereby consociational theory becomes stretchable, and can 
therefore'include many cases that do not exhibit consociational characteristics, displaying instead 
cooperation incentives at the governmental level. This in turn adds an element of vagueness and 
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inexactitude to the theory of consociational democracy, hence raising serious concerns over the 
utility and operability of the model in a divided societal context. 
b. Segmental autonomy 
The second consociational principle, that is, segmental autonomy, or a high degree of autonomy for 
the segments of the plural society, prescribes the delegation of as much decision-making as possible 
to separate segments (Lijphart 1986,35). According to Lijphart, 'it complements the grand coalition 
principle' (Lijphart 1987,137): On all issues of common concern, the decisions should be made 
jointly by the representatives of the segments. On all other issues, decision-making should be left to 
each segment (Lijphart 1995b, 277-8). Equally, it may be argued that there is a tension between the 
concept of a grand coalition and that of segmental autonomy. Though Lijphart cites the freedom for 
segments to run their own schools and other ideological instruments, Halpern notes that segmental 
autonomy is, like the other components of consociational democracy, 'informal. It suffers from an 
imprecision... ' (Halpern 1986,192). Indeed, it is very important to point to the problematic nature 
of the definition of segmental autonomy as conceived by Lijphart. 
Under the vague framework he designs, it is not clear which issues are considered to be of common 
concern and which ones are of group or community concern. Lijphart does not exactly specify 
which issues should be dealt with at the group level and which issues should be addressed by the 
elite cartel. He only mentions 'trifling issues' as opposed to 'vital interests' (Lijphart 1987,138). 
This is seen as problematic because it is sometimes the case that both 'common' and 'other' 
concerns, to use Lijphart's words, overlap, in the sense that they are at the same time common and 
group concerns. Hence, this makes it difficult for scholars to determine where decision-making lies, 
or should lie, at the group level or at the elite cartel level concerning some domestic issues, as well 
as regional and international matters. This is especially the case with those that may have domestic 
repercussions. 7 This becomes particularly problematic because the separatism of consociationalism 
indirectly encourages segments to seek outside support so as to foster their local presence and 
position within society. Hence, scholars studying the model face the difficulty of determining in 
which realm decision-making on crucial issues should lie. It is often the case that concerns are 
viewed as crucial at both the elite cartel level and the group level. Though there are other more 
important shortcomings of the theory, this inexactitude paves a way for different interpretations 
from researchers studying the model. 
7 Similarly, as will be illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the vulnerability of Lebanon's domestic scene to regional and 
international developments lends support to this argument. 
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c. Proportionality 
The third consociational component of Lijphart's theory is proportionality, and is considered the 
basic consociational standard of political representation, civil service appointments and allocation 
of public funds: 'As a principle of political representation, it is especially important as a guarantee 
for the fair representation of minority segments' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). Concerning elections, 
Lijphart suggests that 'proportional results in elections may be achieved by the various systems of 
formal proportional representation (PR) or by several non-PR methods... ' (Lijphart 1995b, 279). 
Commenting on this component, Halpern considers Lijphart's assumption when defining 
proportionality 'a faulty assumption. It would hold only where the party-system, as a reflection of 
the social system, is organised to articulate subcultural interests'. Halpern notes that 'party strength 
is not necessarily the same as subcultural strength' (Halpern 1986,191). Indeed, Steiner broadens 
the concept of proportionality by arguing that it seems 'meaningful to apply [it] to the political 
decision-making process as a whole' rather than using it only in connection with electoral law. He 
notes that 'in this broadened sense' proportionality denotes 'certain models of conflict regulation' 
(Steiner 1971,63). In this respect, it can be argued that the definition, as conceived by Lijphart, 
does not provide any exact formula for the allocation of power and seats to the different segments. 
This can easily lead to resentment between the different segments. 8 
d. Mutual veto 
Mutual or minority veto is designed to protect the vital interests of the minority segments. 'When a 
minority's vital interests are at stake, the veto provides essential protection' (Lijphart 1995b, 278): 
'The minority veto can be either an absolute or a suspensive veto, and it may be applied either to all 
decisions or to only certain specified kinds of decisions, such as matters of culture and education' 
(Lijphart 1995b, 279). Concerning this fourth component of consociational democracy, Halpern 
argues that Lijphart is again unwilling 'to prescribe the form and forum it should take' (Halpern 
1986,190-1). The author holds that there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning this component. 
Additionally, the above-mentioned imprecision of the concept of segmental autonomy has a direct 
bearing on the understanding of the ways that mutual veto should operate in practice. Essentially, it 
may be understood from Lijphart's definition of mutual veto that under such a framework, the 
interests of all communities, irrespective of their size, will be protected. Whereas this definition 
8 As the Lebanese case demonstrates. 
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seems satisfactory in theory, it might be that a specific mention of the ways that the mutual veto is 
designed to operate will help scholars understand the theory more clearly when consociationalism 
comes into effect, that is, in operation. 
In sum, concerning all four components of the consociational theory of democracy, it can be said 
that an elaboration on their definitions may help researchers use the model more adequately to 
describe the political systems of particular states. As it stands, the imprecise definition of the four 
components puts in question the internal consistency of the model, its operability and thus, its 
utility, as shall also be seen in the next section. Indeed, it should be said that the four components 
do not operate in a vacuum, but rather, they are complementary and interdependent. Therefore, the 
vagueness of each concept alone has a direct bearing on the operability of the model as a whole, 
thus limiting its utility. 
3. Case studies: The Netherlands and Switzerland 
Sometimes, critics have gone to length to cast doubt on the utility of consociational theory for a 
number of societies which Lijphart designated as consociations, but which did not always exhibit 
the four consociational components of the theory. For instance, Halpern, basing her arguments on a 
study of the political systems of the Netherlands and Switzerland, argues that the four components 
of consociationalism are not present in a number of countries that Lijphart considered to be 
consociational democracies. Fundamentally, Halpern argues that 'there are cases which have been 
designated as consociational democracies that do not meet the primary requirements of 
consociational theory: that they be plural, that is, non-intersecting societies' (Halpern 1986,187). 
As with Halpern, Carlson-Thies in his doctoral research on Dutch politics, argues against Lijphart's 
contention that the Netherlands is one of the founding cases of consociational democracy. He holds 
that the Netherlands is a pluriform, and not a consociational state system. By pluriform, Carlson- 
Thies means a 'democracy in which subculturally-rooted differences are affirmatively 
accommodated by the state' (Carlson-Thies 1993, v). 
Here, two important points require mention. First, Lijphart equates multiethnic societies and divided 
societies. As Steiner points out, Lijphart equates cultural diversity and subcultural segmentation. 
Second, he refutes the possibility that multiethnic societies can develop stable political systems 
without recourse to consociational practices. As shall be argued in the relevant section below, 9 this 
is partly because of the imprecise definition of key concepts of the theory. 
9 See section BA in this chapter. 
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As with Carlson-Thies, Halpern, taking the case of Switzerland and the Netherlands, argues against 
Lijphart's assumption of the presence of subcultural hostility: 'The apparent absence of subcultural 
conflict of sufficient force to require a consociational solution in certain states that have been called 
consociational democracies suggests that the model has been applied to states that are not riven by 
subcultural conflicts that in turn produce instability ( ... ) This conclusion throws into doubt both the 
ability of dlite accommodation to explain stability in divided states and the necessity of recourse to 
the politics of accommodation in the first place' (Halpern 1986,186). Arguing in similar vein to 
Carlson-Thies and Halpern, Barry criticises Lijphart's extensive work on the Netherlands, and 
maintains that elite behaviour in a consociational democracy was not necessarily responsible for 
stability of the country. Also using the Netherlands as an example, Barry demonstrates that elite 
behaviour could not account for the stability or peace in the country. He believes that Ujphart 
excluded the possibility or existence of a stable and fragmented society where consociational 
democracy or government by elite cartel did not exist in the first place (Lustick 1997,100). 
Van Schendelen also criticises Lijphart's classification of the Netherlands as a consociational 
democracy. Lijphart claims that only consociationalism saved the country, citing elite behaviour as 
central to the consociational model. Lijphart believes that Dutch politicians engaged widely in 
cooperative behaviour. However, Van Schendelen accounts for the structure of the electoral system 
'as creating incentive enough to explain cooperative behavior and the formation of large coalitions' 
(Lustick 1997,103). In other words, though Van Schendelen notes that politicians are inclined 
towards cooperation, he nonetheless points out that the Netherlands was peaceful 'before the 
consociational. model was said to have gone into effect' (Lustick 1997,104). The above discussion 
points to the problem generated by the imprecise definitions of the four components of the theory of 
consociational democracy. The vagueness surrounding the principles of the theory is responsible to 
a considerable extent for the ensuing confusion. It becomes increasingly difficult to classify the 
political systems of given countries. 
B. Key concepts of consociational theory- derinitions 
This section will deal with the imprecise definition of the key concepts of the theory. Whereas most 
critics questioned and criticised what Lijphart meant by democracy, consociationalism, fragmented 
culture, plural society and stable democracy, BarTy focused on the imprecise definition of the 
combined term, consociational democracy, without recourse to any alternative definition. This is 
not to say that other scholars did not provide other definitions of the combined term. However, 
these definitions did not differ in any respect from the definitions that Lijphart adopted. Here, it is 
important to note that only Hanf offered a different definition of the combined term, one that 
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departs significantly from Lijphart's definition. This section will deal with the definitions of the key 
concepts of consociational democracy that Lijphart conceived, the criticisms that were furnished 
against those definitions and the conclusion that may be drawn concerning the utility of the theory. 
1. The combined term (Consociational democracy) 
Lijphart defined consociational democracy as 'meaning government by elite cartel designed to turn 
a democracy with a fragmented culture into a stable democracy'. Over time, he used different words 
to refer to the same definition. Two definitions that Lijphart came up with, along with other similar 
ones, can be cited. The 1969 definition holds that 'the essential characteristic of consociational 
democracy as not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by 
the elites to stabilize the system' (Lijphart 1969,213). In the 1977 book, consociational democracy 
is defined in terms of the four components, but 'elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing 
feature of consociational democracy' (Lijphart 1977,1). Then, a consociational democracy is a 
&political community where elites make deliberate efforts to counterattack the immobilising and 
unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation' (Lijphart quoted in Banks, 1987,26). Similarly, 
'consociational democracy does not mean one specific set of rules and institutions. Instead, it means 
a general type of democracy defined in terms of four broad principles, all of which can be applied in 
a variety of ways' (Ujphart 1995b, 279). Clearly, Lijphart's recent definitions have added 
vagueness to the term (consociational democracy) and its meanings, as well as to the consociational. 
model. 
Commenting on these definitions, Van Schendelen is in agreement with BarTy and criticises 
Lijphart's typology as packed with 'too much unacknowledged theory' (Lustick 1997,104). Indeed, 
this new definition of Lijphart ignores the four components of consociational democracy upon 
which consociational theory is built, as well as the other background conditions or factors said to be 
conducive to consociationalism, thereby resulting in more ambiguity and vagueness. It is also 
important to mention that Lijphart used power sharing and consociational interchangeably, which 
resulted in confusion for the researchers who studied the model. However, he addressed this issue 
by writing that 'the term consociational worked well enough in scholarly writing but I found it to be 
an obstacle in communicating with policy-makers who found it to be too esoteric and polysyllabic; 
using power-sharing instead has greatly facilitated the process of communication beyond the 
confines of academic political science ... The two are now defined in terms of the same four criteria 
and are clearly synonymous' (Lijphart 2000a, 428). 
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Different scholars offered definitions of consociational democracy similar to the one provided by 
Lijphart without altering the basic meaning of the combined term. O'Leary's definition however, 
carried a reductionist dimension to the theory. In very simplistic terms, he defines consociation as 
6an association of communities' (O'Leary 1998). Banks provides a definition of consociational 
democracy similar to that of 1-ijphart's, although using his own terms. He writes that a consociation 
means 'deliberate cooperative actions taken by the rival elites to stabilize a highly polarised 
community' (Banks 1987, viii). Drawing on the societal context of his case study, Atlanta, Banks 
thinks a consociation 'results from biracial elite cooperation that is fostered by the elites' 
commitment to system stability and a supportive political culture' (Banks 1987,6). Though both 
definitions are very similar, it is worth mentioning here that Banks replaced the term "fragmented" 
with "highly polarised" and introduced the notion of a "supportive political culture". However, this 
does not introduce any significant change to Lijphart's original definition. 
For his part, Falaiye uses the definitions of consociationalism. that Apter provided. He writes that 
'by and large, consociationalism refers to the structures of societies in which deep primordial 
cleavages have been converted into instruments of effective pluralistic democracies'. Again, 
borTowing from Apter, Falaiye writes: 'As a social phenomenon, consociationalism implies the 
associating of groups in a way that maintains the distinctive characteristics of each of the 
constituents without inhibiting the pursuit of collective aims' (Falaiye 1990,66). Last but not least, 
Chryssochoou offers a similar definition to that of Lijphart. According to the author, 
'Consociational partnership is a system of cooperative subcultures based on the premise of joint 
government by what Dahrendorf called a cartel of elites, in the form of states, designed to 
accommodate a plethora of divergent interests and demands in order to achieve a goal of unity' 
(Chryssochoou 1994). 
As mentioned earlier, researchers focused more on the critique of the terms 'consociational' and 
'democracy' without giving great attention to the combined term. However, BarTy sought to 
criticise the combined term without for all that offering an alternative definition. Barry considers 
that the word consociation is: 
A more or less obsolete word meaning much the same as association and sharing with it the characteristic that it 
can be used both as an abstract noun and a concrete one. I do not suggest that words should not be redefined for 
scholarly purposes but it is very easy to run into formidable conceptual difficulties by doing so and we need to 
be aware of this. The problem is particularly great where, as here, an expression, consociational democracy, 
encapsulates a theory (Barry 1975a, 478). 
Barry argues that Ujphart's definition of consociational democracy is too overloaded to do any 
substantial explanatory work' (Lustick 1997,101). Though he did not offer an alternative definition, 
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it can said that his criticism is justified, since the definition provided by Lijphart is open to a wide 
arTay of interpretations, thereby involving ambiguity and vagueness in two respects. 
First, as Halpern argues, 'in almost every instance, cases can be simultaneously argued in and out of 
the consociational mode' (Halpern 1986,189). Second, also according to Halpern, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to use the model to describe the political system of a particular state and to use 
it to dispute the nomination of particular cases as consociational democracies. However, while 
Barry does not offer a radically alternative definition of the combined term, it should be pointed out 
that such is no easy task. Hanf's alternative definition illustrates the difficulties involved. Hanf, 
while commenting on the ongoing Lebanese experiment with consociational democracy, from 1990 
onwards, provides a different definition of the term to that of Lijphart. He defines consociational 
democracy as when syncretistic nationalism: 
seeks to institutionalize the existing communities and organize their coexistence. Communal identity is 
politically articulated, though channelled within a federation of communities that constitute a transcending, 
multifarious nation; this is known as ( ... 
) the neologism "consociation" (Hanf 1993,29). 
As is clear, this definition differs significantly from Lijphart's definition. Here, it should be 
mentioned that it is the context within which Hanf is writing that prompts his choice of words. In 
the book Coexistence in wartime Lebanon: decline of a state and rise of a nation, where the 
definition develops, Hanf, who argues that consociationalism is the most viable political system for 
Lebanon, devises a definition suggesting the ability of consociationalism to bring about an element 
of nationhood and cohesiveness for a plural society. In other words, it may be said that Hanf is 
writing in the context of "what ought to be" rather than "what is". Consequently, Hanf's definition, 
adds more "democratic assumptions", and therefore "challenges" to the theory, which alter 
Lijphart's definition. This definition suggests an increased capability of the theory to act as a 
successful conflict-regulation mechanism and consequently, aims at increasing the utility of the 
model. Here, special attention should be given to the terms that Hanf uses, namely 'nationalism' 
and 'transcending multifarious nation'. This choice of words is by no means coincidal or 
impressionistic. Rather, it is a clear departure from Lijphart's definition and can be considered as an 
attempt to overcome the weaknesses of the theory, in the light of its inability in bringing about 
stable democracy. 
In theory, this definition seems better suited to reducing intercommunal hostility, increasing 
prospects for nation-building, and therefore, strengthening the ability of consociational practices to 
generate a stable democracy. However, it is not entirely clear that this definition is operational in 
practice. As is seen in the previous and forthcoming sections, the constraints that the theory faces 
20 
once it enters into effect are substantial. Hanf's definition encompasses a greater realm of attributes, 
puts more responsibility and therefore challenges on the ability of consociationalism to generate 
stable democracy. These additional challenges come at a time when consociationalism in operation 
has implied that the original constraints are already difficult to overcome. Against this background, 
Hanf's theoretical definition adds a new dimension to the theory, with the new choice of words he 
introduces, and he undoubtedly attempts to strengthen and buttress the assumption that 
consociationalism generates democratic practices and stability. However, it is not entirely clear how 
operational it is. So far, this definition is not substantiated by evidence. 
2. Democracy and consociationalism 
Whereas the above section has discussed the critiques of the combined term, this section will 
present the critiques that were offered against the imprecision of both concepts (consociational and 
democracy). As with other scholars who studied the model of consociational democracy, Van 
Schendelen, in his critique of Lijphart's work, focuses on the imprecision and vagueness of 
Lijphart's terms, concepts, and definitions as well as on the various conditions said to be conducive 
to consociationalism. 'According to Van Schendelen, the theory can be criticised from three 
perspectives: the lack of conceptual clarity or the imprecision and mutability of key concepts, the 
difficulty of operating or measuring crucial elements of the theory and the absence of scientific 
attributes or qualities' (Falaiye 1990,95). Van Schendelen believes that this vagueness is 
responsible for a selective use of evidence, invalid case studies, the prevention of finding favourable 
factors, variables and indicators and the absence of empirical testing and evidence. 
Van Schendelen, however, is mostly concerned with the definition of democracy that Lijphart 
adopts. Lijphart holds that consociationalism is less than an ideal democracy but still a democracy 
nonetheless. Initially, in 1968, Lijphart defined democracy as 'simply a system of government in 
which the people have the opportunity to select their own leaders' (Lijphart 1968a, 71). Later in 
1977, in the words of Lijphart, democracy 'virtually defies definition ( ... ) It will be used here as a 
synonym of what Dahl calls "polyarchy" ' (Lijphart 1977,4). In this respect, Van Schendelen's 
strong argument holds that 'the concept of polyarchy, if strictly taken, is incompatible with the 
consociational model and that, indeed, Lijphart does not factually apply this concept. In a polyarchy 
competition between the elites is, more than anything else, essential; in a consociation basically the 
opposite, namely intense collaboration, is crucial' (Van Schendelen 1984,32). Furthermore, Van 
Schendelen criticises this typology saying that in that case, consociationalism should not be cast as 
a typological category of democracy, but as a variable. According to the author, a country in that 
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case may be consociational, but not necessarily democratic (Lustick 1997,105). Indeed, it can be 
said that Van Schendelen's critique of Lijphart's definition is compelling. 
3. Stable democracy 
Initially, Lijphart defines a stable democracy as 'one in which the capabilities of the system are 
sufficient to meet the demands placed upon it' with democracy meaning 'simply a system of 
government in which the people have the opportunity to select their own leaders' (Lijphart 1968a, 
71). In a later work, Lijphart's definition of stability 'is no longer the system's capability to meet 
the demands placed upon it, but now the system should also do this in a satisfactory way and it 
should be able to maintain itself' (Van Schendelen 1984,23). In his 1977 book, Lijphart, 
recognising the elusiveness of the concept of stable democracy, draws on the works of Eckstein and 
Hurewitz, arguing that political stability is a 'difficult and ambiguous term [and] stability will be 
used as a multidimensional concept combining ideas that are frequently encountered in the 
comparative politics literature: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness. These 
four dimensions characterise stable democracy'. Thus, his definition of democratic stability 
comprises (Lijphart 1977,4): 
"A high probability of remaining democratic. 
"A low level of actual and potential violence. 
" The degree of legitimacy that the regime enjoys. 
" The decisional effectiveness of the regime. 
Despite the centrality of this concept in the consociational literature, Lustick equated stability with 
political stability, thus ignoring the additional dimension of democratic stability that the 
consociational model refers to. He wrote that I "stability" or "political stability" will refer to the 
continued operation of specific patterns of political behaviour, apart from the illegal use of violence, 
accompanied by a general expectation among the attentive public that such patterns are likely to 
remain intact in the foreseeable future' (Lustick 1979,325). 
In this respect, Van Schendelen advances the notion of the elusiveness of this concept, and argues 
that though Hurewitz and Eckstein tried to define political stability, they have also warned against it 
in the same essay that Lijphart refers to, but in a different paragraph. Indeed while Hurewitz notes 
that 'the concept of political stability remains as elusive as other abstract concepts' and Eckstein 
warns that the four concepts that they have both provided were tentative and provisional ideas, 
Ujphart takes both conceptualizations for granted' (Hurwitz & Eckstein quoted in Van Schendelen 
1984,33). As Van Schendelen's observations suggest, it is clear that the definition of political and 
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stable democracy is vague, and leaves room for various interpretations, only adding vagueness to 
the model. 
Similarly, Halpern echoes such concerns, making the point that the definition 'is probabilistic ( ... ) 
unknowable ( ... ) relative, speculative, or impressionistic" 
0 and impractical because 'it is couched in 
comparative terms and provides no context within which these comparisons can be made' (Halpern 
1984,114): 'That stability is not defined in the theory contributes to the difficulty of determining if 
consociational democracy is extant, if it has been attained, and when movement from one type of 
regime to another is occurring' (Halpern 1984,118). According to Halpern, the concept of stable 
democracy 'is presented in such broad terms as to be rendered useless' (Halpern 1984,356). Indeed, 
in the light of the centrality of the concept in the theory and its importance for the internal 
consistency of the model, Lijphart's definition appears problematic because of its reliance on 
immeasurable concepts. 
4. Plural societies 
The concept of a plural society is crucial for an understanding of consociational theory, since it is 
the context within which consociationalism is designed to operate. Lijphart's initial definition of a 
plural society is as follows: 'political parties, interests groups, media of communication, schools, 
and voluntary associations tend to be organised along the lines of segmental cleavages [whether] of 
religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature ( ... ) The groups of the 
population bounded by such cleavages will be referred to as the segments of a plural society' 
forming 'clearly separate and easily identifiable segments' (Lijphart in Steiner 198 1 b, 340). 
In this respect, Steiner's criticism of this definition is the most notable. Steiner argues that it is 
difficult to distinguish between a plural and a non-plural society if relying on Lijphart's definition 
since Lijphart does not state in his analysis of plural societies when these societies stop being plural. 
In other words, he 'does not consider the time-period and does not define a time frame as a measure 
for assessing consociational democracy in these societies and for comparing these plural societies' 
(Steiner 1981b, 339-40). Most importantly however, Steiner argues that Lijphart confuses cultural 
diversity and subcultural segmentation. According to Steiner, 'the existence in a society of various 
languages or religions, for example, indicates only cultural diversity but not necessarily subcultural 
fragmentation ( ... ) Lijphart is obviously interested in subcultural segmentation but not in cultural 
diversity' (Steiner 1981b, 341). Indeed, Steiner's observation that Lijphart equates plural and 
10 Halpern borrows the term from Steiner who called Lijphart's method 'the impressionistic method' while at the same 
time acknowledging that Lijphart's 'broad knowledge of the literature is to be admired' (Steiner 1981b, 346). 
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divided has a considerable impact on consociational theory itself. Steiner points to the example 
where a country may have different spoken languages without the language index being a criterion 
responsible for the fragmentation of the country. The language index does not show how it divides 
the country. At the same time, this index might be responsible for dividing the country along ethnic, 
but not political cleavages. 
In short, Steiner argues that all of Lijphart's criteria and indicators are not sufficient in the first 
place, but are sometimes not interrelated, and not conducive to conclusions about whether a society 
is plural or not. He remarks that 'it is unclear in the literature whether segmentation along social 
class lines is relevant for consociational theory. When Lijphart defines segmental cleavages, he 
does not mention social class as a possible basis ( ... )I wish to go beyond the consociational theory 
in the sense that I am definitely also interested in conflicts among social classes' (Steiner 1981a, 
1247). 
Indeed, Steiner's criticism is valuable in the light of the application of the model of consociational 
democracy to many developing countries where class divisions and societal injustices play a crucial 
role in shaping the nature/fabric of society and thus, influence the stability of the polity. Particularly 
noteworthy, in terms of the present discussion, is the mention of the detrimental impact such social 
injustices and economic disparities have on the segmentation of society (along horizontal lines) and 
the outbreak of conflict. Similarly, the interaction of ethnicity, religion, and culture with socio- 
economic disparities is a frequent manifestation in such developing societies, making them prone to 
instability. Finally, because of the strong element of elite rule in consociational democracy, it often 
occurs that elites manipulate ethnic, religious and cultural differences among the groups so as to 
mask socio-economic disparities, themselves a result of poor governmental (or elite) performance. 
This diffuses the potential for the emergence of a widely supported class-based opposition. In later 
works, Lijphart addressed the criticisms of his original definition of a plural society and attempted 
to remedy to its shortcomings. Thus, in the 1985 book, he writes: 
I proposed that societal pluralism should be seen as a matter of degree and I suggested four criteria to 
determine whether a society is completely plural or deviates greatly from perfect pluralism: 1. Can the segments into which the society is divided be clearly identified? 2. Can the size of each segment be exactly determined? 3. 
Do the segmental boundaries between the different political, social, and economic organizations coincide? 4. Do 
the segmental parties receive the stable electoral support of their respective segments? (Lijphart 1985,87). 
However, on the same page, he immediately recognises that these criteria: 
define the concept of plural society more clearly but of course are not completely precise. The degrees of 
pluralism are still not exactly measurable, and a judgment of the extent to which a given society satisfies each of 
the criteria is necessarily "impressionistic"- but unfortunately no better method is available in the current stage 
of development of the social sciences (Lijphart 1985,87). 
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Again, one of the major problems of working with the theory is the variation, over time, of the key 
words and concepts of the theory and the difficulty in deciding whether particular societies fit the 
description of the model. Basic concepts were given slightly different definitions in Ujphart's 
articles over a span of thirty years, from 1968 onwards. For instance, Lijphart sometimes used the 
term plural society and at other times, he used the word divided or deeply divided society. It was 
not until 1995 that he acknowledged this and pointed out that he would be using both terms as 
synonyms: 'I shall use the terms deeply divided society and plural society as synonyms' (Lijphart 
1995,276). Clearly, the above-mentioned critiques only re-affirm the difficulty that researchers face 
when attempting to classify different political systems as consociationalism. As noted above, this 
casts doubts on the utility of the theory. 
5. Crosscutting cleavages 
As with the concept of a plural society, the notion of crosscutting cleavages is crucial for an 
adequate understanding of the theory. Consociationalism is essentially a mechanism designed to 
work in societies characterised by a number of cleavages. In this respect, Farah argues that there is a 
lack of understanding and also discrimination when using the concept of crosscutting cleavages. In 
his words, 'the crosscutting cleavage proposition has been invoked frequently ( ... ) in a variety of 
circumstances and with a lack of discrimination. Many times, it is used by two writers attempting to 
explain diametrically opposed phenomena' (Farah 1975,6). Secondly, the author holds that there is 
a 'lack of a definitive definition of the term' (Farah 1975,8). Thirdly, he points out that the concept 
suffers from theoretical/typological problems and should be 'refined by further typological 
elaboration' (Farah 1975,10). Lastly, Farah points to an empirical problem. He identifies a lack of 
empirical testing, and argues that 'the researcher wishing to use cleavage as an analysis tool ( ... ) 
faces the problem that few works have tested the crosscutting proposition empirically' (Farah 1975, 
10). Against this background, the essential concepts treated by the theory of consociational 
democracy appear to be vague and misleading. This leads Halpern to argue that: 
The model of consociational democracy lacks a serviceable set of defining characteristics. This has resulted in 
the model's impracticable compass and its inability to resolve disputes of categorical composition (Halpern 
1986,188). 
In the light of the wide scholarly consensus over the difficulty faced in defining the key concepts of 
the theory of consociational democracy and their resulting vagueness, it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that caution should be applied in any attempt to attribute consociational characteristics and 
practices to any given country thought to fit the model. In this respect, Steiner argues that Lijphart 
uses the impressionistic method to satisfy the validity of consociational theory, 'to deten-nine 
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whether a country is predominantly competitive or consociational' and that in consequence, 'it is no 
longer fruitful to continue the discussion at this level'. Consequently, he suggests that 'the time has 
come for a fundamental change in research strategy, a change which would allow us to go beyond 
consociational theory toward a more general theory of political decision making' (Steiner 1981a, 
1242). He argues that this would alleviate some of the weaknesses of the theory in its present form. 
As shall be argued in the following section, not only do the key principles and concepts of 
consociational democracy suffer from imprecision and vagueness, the background conditions which 
are thought to sustain consociational politics have also been subject to increasing criticism in this 
respect, pointing to their inability, alone, to preserve consociationalism. The discussion will involve 
a case study of Malaysian politics whose examination suggests that the background sustaining 
conditions alone cannot, in fact, explain the presence and maintenance of consociationalism. within 
the country. 
C. Background conditions for consociational democracy 
In addition to the four components of consociational theory, Lijphart identified a list of what he 
initially called 'favourable factors' or background conditions for the establishment and successful 
operation of consociational democracies. Lijphart's list of factors can essentially be seen as an 
attempt to clarify consociational theory and alleviate the weaknesses of the four components by 
specifying the conditions under which the model is supposed to operate. This section will seek to 
determine whether these conditions can actually be said to constitute favourable factors for 
sustaining consociationalism. More importantly however, the discussion will investigate the high 
expectations that these factors put on the nature of consociationalism's plural society. In 1968, 
Lijphart specified six background factors, and these were changed to eight in 1969, nine in 1977 
and finally eight in 1985. These are: 
" The absence of a majority segment and segments of roughly the same size. 
"A relatively small number of segments (ideally between three and five). 
"A relatively small total population. 
" Foreign threats (that are perceived as a common danger). 
" The absence of large socio-economic inequalities. 
" Geographical concentration of the segments. 
" Pre-existing traditions of political accommodation. 
" Overarching loyalties (that counter-balance the centrifugal effects of segmental loyalties). 
Numerous political researchers have examined the importance and significance of these factors or 
background conditions for the establishment and sustainability of consociational, democracies. The 
most important critiques came from Bogaards, Halpern, Steiner, Dew, Hoppe, Pappalardo, Hudson, 
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Schneckener, Van Schendelen, Lehmbruch and O'Leary. The different criticisms that they offered 
will constitute the major discussion of this section before further criticism is raised. There is no 
consensus among critics concerning the ability of the favourable factors to sustain consensual 
accommodationist, or consociational, politics. Some have viewed them as being able to sustain 
consociational politics, while others have considered them as mere helpful factors and a third group 
refuted their ability to act as sustaining conditions of consociationalism. Each perspective will be 
examined alone. 
1. Explanatory power of the background factors 
Dew and Hoppe argue in a positive fashion. They treat Lijphart's factors as favourable conditions 
and account for their capability to sustain consociational politics. Contrary to Lijphart himself, they 
hold that these factors or background conditions form 'a cumulative index of stability' of 
consociational democracies' (Bogaards; 1998,488). For example, Dew uses the presence of some 
favourable factors to explain the success of the consociational regime in Surinam. However, Hoppe 
later uses the absence of other favourable factors to explain its failure. Hence, it may be argued that 
this selective use of evidence over a span of years points to two problematic issues. First, this 
selectivity points to the lack of evidence in the eight factors that can account for the smooth running 
of consociational. politics. Second, it questions whether the factors can be classified as 'favourable'. 
Lijphart himself, Bogaards and Steiner belong to the second group, and thereby adopt a cautious 
approach concerning the ability of the factors to act as favourable conditions. Although the designer 
of the factors, Lijphart is quick to note that these factors are helpful conditions. He states that they 
should not be regarded as either necessary or sufficient. In his words, the presence of all or most of 
them does not lead to consociationalism, nor does their absence prevent it: unfavourable factors do 
not make consociational democracy impossible or less plausible, and favourable factors do not 
make it possible or more plausible. Lijphart warns that his list of factors is meant to be 'illustrative 
rather than exhaustive'. As he himself points out, 'neither separately nor jointly do these conditions 
ensure the presence or success of consociationalism' (Bogaards 1998,477). 
Lijphart's approach is justified to a large extent when he notes that it is always up to the policy- 
makers to make the most out of these factors and to engineer them to allow consociation to result 
from their efforts. While this is true to a considerable degree, since consociational theory is an 
extremely elitist form of democracy, this idea is not firmly substantiated by evidence and will be 
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discussed in the next section dealing with elite role. " However, Lijphart's stance on favourable 
factors is echoed by many other scholars, including Bogaards. Bogaards makes the case that the 
favourable factors or conditions 'are not derived deductively from consociational theory but 
inductively from the experience in consociational democracies' (Bogaards 1998,476). He therefore 
concludes that while acknowledging the significance of these factors for consociationalism, their 
importance is relegated to that of a mere factor. Similarly, Steiner supports Bogaards' position, 
thereby arguing that the reasons for the significance of these factors 'are not sufficiently 
interrelated, because they are not deducted from a common set of assumptions' (Steiner 1981b, 
351). 
The last approach that will be discussed in this paragraph adopts not only a cautious but also critical 
perspective. Hudson criticises the relevance and significance of the background conditions. 
However, contrary to all the above-mentioned arguments, Hudson links his criticism directly to the 
model itself. He establishes a direct relationship between these factors and consociational theory, 
arguing that Lijphart's addition of a number of favourable conditions to the four components of 
consociational democracy is by itself a weakness: 'They no doubt add verisimilitude but the more 
there are, the less powerful and applicable the theory becomes' (Hudson 1988,232). As with 
Hudson, Van Schendelen presents a compelling critique of the significance of the factors, arguing 
that these factors bear important consequences on the relevance and significance of consociational 
theory. He holds that these 'so-called favorable conditions' are 'empty' because they cannot be 
'tested in a practical way' and that Lijphart 'seems to be more concerned about the application of 
his theory than about its validity' (Van Schendelen 1984,30,34). Van Schendelen concludes that 
Lijphart thought consociationalism should be applied to any society or country facing political 
instability stemming from inter-group conflict, irrespective of other variables in consideration 
(Lustick 1997,107-8). 
Similarly, Pappalardo too claims that 'it is unwarranted to speak of conditions when factors are 
neither necessary nor sufficient' (Bogaards 1998,487) and since 'the [identified] conditions ( ... ) 
often fail to satisfy one or more criteria that test their reliability' (Pappalardo 1981,365). In a 
critical article about the logical and empirical power of the background conditions, Pappalardo's 
investigation reveals that only two conditions (stability among subcultures and dlite predominance 
over a deferential and organisationally encapsulated following) are important, as they 'have 
withstood a difficult test' while this does not mean that 'the others do not count at all' (Pappalardo 
1981,387). Similarly, Schneckener adopts the same approach in his analysis of the favourable 
11 See section D. in this chapter. 
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factors that make power-sharing work. He concludes that 'all actor-oriented factors seem more 
important than structural conditions' (Schneckener 2000,17). While this reveals the determining 
impact of the strong element of elite rule and mass passivity as conditions for the operability of the 
model, this is not always substantiated by evidence, as the case study of the Nigerian experiment 
with consociationalism will reveal. 
Finally, Eckstein, in a challenging position, contrary to the above-mentioned scholarly efforts, 
contends that it is 'those calamitously improbable combinations of circumstances which actually 
make democracy work' (Khazen 1987,71-2). He does not account for the eight favourable factors 
in sustaining democracy. Hence, it is becoming increasingly clear from the above-mentioned 
critiques that these factors fail to explain more clearly the conditions under which consociationalism 
operates. Therefore, it is doubtful whether they can be considered favourable. Consequently, it is 
uncertain whether the conditions that Lijphart set forth can explain the presence of consociational. 
practices. Best, the words of du Toit, 'these conditions have been widely criticized for failing to 
establish a causal relationship between elite behavior and consociational devices in plural societies' 
(du Toit 1987,422). 
As regards the implications contained within the formulation of these background factors, it may be 
said that they cast doubt on the ability of the consociational model to deliver on the promise of 
democratic stability. If consociationalism purports its ability to regulate conflict in divided/deeply 
divided/plural societies, then the implication is that such societies are likely to manifest a number of 
cleavages, discussed above, that threaten stability. Hence, ljjphart's advocacy of the absence of a 
majority segment, segments of roughly the same size, a relatively small number of segments 
(ideally between three and five), the absence of large socio-economic inequalities and the presence 
of overarching loyalties (that counter-balance the centrifugal effects of segmental loyalties), as 
helpful factors, indicates that such societies are no longer characterised according to him as plural 
ones. Rather, such characteristics that Ujphart states seem to approximate the attributes of a 
relatively stable society and polity. In other words, the implication in Lijphart's factors is that 
consociationalism seems suitable to better work in stable societal contexts. Hence, the applicability 
and utility of the consociational model for plural societies are seriously questioned, as are the 
consociationalism's internal assumptions and logic. 
2. Quantification of the background conditions 
In an effort to rely on precision and measurement, Lijphart recently attempted to quantify the 
background factors. In 1985, he conceived of a five-point scale for classifying factors, ranging from 
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-2 to +2 whereby -2 is considered very unfavourable and +2 very favourable. Having assessed and 
weighted all factors equally when measuring democracy in a given country, Lijphart warns against 
the scores he derives. First, he suggests that these factors are not always similarly assessed and rated 
by different scholars: the same factor might get different ratings by different experts. Second, 
Lijphart, when devising scores, assumed that each of the factors is of approximately the same 
importance. He therefore stresses that various experts could tightly allocate unequal weight to each 
factor. While Ijjphart's attempt to quantify these factors was largely a response to a number of 
critiques and objections raised against the imprecision and inexactitude of the theory, this attempt 
did not yield or give way to a more precise understanding of the functioning of the factors and of 
the theory itself. Mainly, it can be said that the attempt at quantifying the factors did not provide 
exact ways to account for the presence/absence of consociational practices, and to explain the 
stability/breakdown of consociational democracies, two major issues with which this thesis is 
concerned. Briefly, the factors that Lijphart conceived do not seem able to ensure, alone, a 
favourable background or environment for the conduct of smooth consensual politics, as shall be 
seen in the case study of the Malaysian experiment with consociationalism. 
3. Case study: the MaIaysian Federation 
Case, in his doctoral study of consociationalism in Malaysia, seeks to identify what practices 
account for the conduct of smooth consociational politics in the country (a federation divided along 
ethnic religious lines). Case finds that the factors that are believed to operate as favourable or 
helpful conditions fail to explain and account for the maintenance of consociational practices in 
Malaysia. Each factor will be examined separately. One of the factors that Lijphart initially came up 
with but later dropped is the expected positive relationship between small country size and 
consensual politics. This hypothesis was taken up by Steiner, who argues that 'the smaller political 
systems are, the greater their tendency to regulate conflicts on proportional principles' (Steiner 
1971,65). While commenting on the nature of this relationship, Case argues that nor does the 
small size of a national elite assure consensual elite unity and stable democracy. As is empirically 
clear, a small country may as easily produce a disunified elite dominated by an unchecked and 
ruthless national leader' (Case 1991,66). 12 Consequently, small country size cannot be said to 
promote consensual elite behaviour. The second factor under examination is the geographical 
concentration of the segments, that is, segmental isolation, believed to reduce hostility and conflict 
between them. In this respect, Case observes that though Malays and Chinese are residentially 
separate, they 'were in sufficiently frequent contact in village market places to garner mutual 
12 The Lebanese case lends support to this argument: the collapse of accommodationist elite politics in Lebanon, a small 
country (10452 Square KiIometres). 
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disrespect' and 'would thereafter return to their respective rural and urban milieus to unkindly 
characterize one another' (Case 1991,64). 
The third factor under examination is the presence of overarching loyalties that counter-balance the 
centrifugal effects of segmental loyalties. Again, Case maintains that in Malaysia, 'social cleavages 
generally reinforce one another and intensify ethnic distinctions' (Case 1991,61). Therefore, 
according to the author, there was no room for overarching loyalties that could reduce the divisive 
effects of segmental loyalties. As a conclusion, the author argues that crosscutting cleavages cannot 
explain the emergence of consociationalism in Malaysia. A fourth factor that Case puts under 
examination is the absence of large socio-economic inequalities between Chinese and Malays. In 
this respect, he observes that 'coinciding with these social differences are political and economic 
inequalities' (Case 1991,61), therefore putting more strain on the stability of the system. In sum, 
Case finds that the above-mentioned factors cannot explain the adoption of consociational politics 
in Malaysia. He argues that it is the role of the elite that can effectively account for the maintenance 
of consociational practices in the Malaysian federation. According to him, the political elite has 
played a crucial role in maintaining a stable democratic regime. To account for the stability of the 
system, the author views elite behaviour, in terms of elite interaction and elite choices, as the central 
factor for the explanation of regime change and continuity. Here, it is important to note that Case 
argues there were no pre-existing traditions of political accommodation in the country, a last factor 
presumed to account for the conduct of consociational practices. The author argues as follows: 
'British colonialism did not universally implant the elite traditions and accommodation necessary 
for stable democracy' (Case 1991,76). However, he also argues that 'the most important condition 
for this consensual unity has been the tradition of elite accommodation, most commonly provided in 
developing countries by British rule ( ... ) Colonial tutelage ( ... ) was itself not enough: Native elites 
in decolonized states still had to choose to perpetuate the tradition of accommodation' (Case 1991, 
79-80). In sum, the author asserts that although there were no stable entrenched traditions of 
political accommodation, British rule helped establish a pattern of consensual, elite behaviour: 
British colonialism effectively predisposed native elites to unify consensually within and across ethnic segments. 
Although these elites have not as yet constructed a genuinely "consociational democracy", they have nonetheless 
been disposed to cooperate in important ways and to share power in accordance with a set of formal and informal 
rules of the game (Case 1991,54). 
After contrasting the model of consociational democracy to the Malaysian political, social, ethnic, 
religious, economic and cultural system, Case argues that the most important factor accounting for 
the relative stability of Malaysia was elite behaviour. The author concludes: 'Hence, the 
maintenance of elite accommodation and a stable democratic regime after independence has 
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depended on a favorable confluence of elite choices and capacities, assisted by simple good fortune' 
(Case 1991,79-80). Here, an argument may be advanced against the contention that 
consociationalism would emerge from 'simple good fortune', as Case holds. Moreover, the author's 
argument runs counter to the wide scholarly consensus that the British colonising empire actually 
followed a divide and rule policy, contrary to what Case has suggested. Indeed, Case affirms that 
British rule most commonly provided a tradition of elite accommodation to developing countries. 
This was not the case in the Near East and in the Middle East. 
4. Genetic versus sustaining factors 
A rather similar attempt to that of Lijphart's background conditions can be found in the works of 
Rustow and Lehmbruch. Their attempt to distinguish between genetic and sustaining factors can be 
considered as an endeavour to curtail the vagueness the theory of consociational theory and improve 
its explanatory power. The idea finds its origins in the recent literature on democratisation, which 
points out that 'the process of democratic transition is different from that of democratic 
consolidation with different requirements for success' (Bogaards 1998,484). Against this 
background, Rustow holds that 'the factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that 
brought it into existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and 
genesis' (Rustow 1970,346). Having differentiated between both, Lehmbruch argues that when it 
comes to consociational democracy, 'the distinction between establishment and maintenance has 
received little attention' (Bogaards 1998,484). Therefore, Lehmbruch advocates distinguishing 
between 'genetic conditions conducive to the take-off of consociational democracy and sustaining 
conditions conducive to its maintenance' (Bogaards 1998,484). According to Lehmbruch, the most 
important internal conditions that contribute to the probability of a consociational take-off are: 
" Some basic national symbols are accepted by all elite groups in the system. 
" Past violence among the subcultures is perceived as a traumatic experience; therefore conflict 
management by violence is regarded as non-profitable to all the groups. 
" Due to the existence of strong "conciliar" traditions, cooperative strategies are already strongly 
internalized by the elites as norms of conflict resolution. 
" Among top elites there exist intense informal communications across subcultures which may be 
closed to interference from non-elites. The probability of this is greater in smaller countries. 
No compact majority group exists which is able to govern by a zero-sum strategy. 
Both Lijphart and Bogaards, refute Lehmbruch's contribution. For instance, Bogaards argues 
contrary to this distinction, claiming that the genetic factors are most of the time sustaining factors, 
and that sustaining factors are also genetic ones. Hence, according to Bogaards, the distinction 
between both loses much of its meaning. Similarly, Lijphart argues, alongside Bogaards, as follows: 
'Generally a factor that is favourable for the establishment of a consociation will also be a positive 
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condition for its maintenance' (Bogaards 1998,484). To sum up, the first standpoint maintains that 
a distinction between both factors is possible, whereas the second perspective argues against the 
possibility of such a distinction. Here it is argued that the idea of favourable factors in itself is 
highly debatable. The discussion above has pointed out that it is problematic, and sometimes 
misleading, to consider these factors as either favourable factors or helpful conditions. Rather, it 
was concluded that they cannot explain either the creation or the maintenance of consociational 
democracy. Therefore, it is questionable whether a distinction should be drawn between genetic and 
sustaining factors when it is not entirely clear that the factors are favourable in the first place. 
Hence, whether there should be a distinction between both brings an element of senselessness into 
the discussion. However, efforts at clarifying the vagueness of the theory of consociational 
democracy were not limited to the two endeavours discussed above. They involved two more 
attempts, to which the discussion now tums. 
5. Consociational engineering and coercive consociationalism 
In the light of the strong element of elite rule in consociationalism, numerous scholars sought to 
understand and determine ways by which the elite would intervene for the purpose of creating and 
maintaining consociational politics. For instance, O'Leary developed the concept of 'consociational 
engineering' whereby the elite and policy-makers attempt to engineer and maintain factors said to 
generate consociational democracy when faced with unfavourable factors. He defines 
consociational engineering as 'leadership attempts at the purposeful creation and maintenance of a 
consociational democracy' (Bogaards 1998,485). He argues that the relationship between the 
factors and elite behaviour could work in two ways, not one way only as it was believed. According 
to him, policy-makers could engineer such factors. However, O'Leary is quick to find that these 
factors are not malleable, but rather, have inflexible characteristics. Denoeux advances this point 
too, arguing that 'while the political engineering associated with consociationalism may not always 
be a solution to the inherent instability of plural societies, its chance of success will be heavily 
influenced by the quality of the political class' (Denoeux 1993,107). 
Hence, O'Leary introduces the concept of 'coercive consociationalism, whereby. a common external 
threat forces consociational features in a multi-communal society' (Bogaards 1998,485). In this 
respect, as argued above, elaborating on factors which fail to account for the conduct of smooth 
consociational politics and do not always ensure the maintenance of such a system, does not help to 
buttress the explanatory power of the theory. Moreover, in this respect, it is important to point to the 
risk involved in adopting O'Leary's approach. In divided societies, especially deeply divided ones, 
there is often disagreement as to what constitutes 'commonly perceived foreign threats'. 
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For different reasons, Lijphart argues against O'Leary's concept of 'coercive consociationalism'. 
He holds that 'consociationalism can never be imposed from the outside without an internal 
constituency' (Bogaards; 1998,486). This is not to say, however, that Lijphart does not overestimate 
the power of consociational engineering. On the contrary, his prescription of consociational 
engineering to policy makers in divided societies is noteworthy. In the words of Halpern, Lijphart's 
4 prescription is offered not only as an available policy option, but as the best- if not the sole- 
strategy for attaining stable democracy in divided states' (Halpern 1984,38). Bogaards argues along 
the same lines, pointing out that 'even if all the favourable factors are indeed favourable, 
consociationalism. will not come about unless the political elites desire it. Consociationalism is not a 
product of the environment, but an act of will of the political elites' (Bogaards 1998,486). 
It can be said that as with ljjphart's attempt to quantify conditions and Lehmbruch's attempt to 
distinguish between genetic and sustaining factors, O'Leary's two attempts point to the difficulty 
researchers face in attempting to deten-nine what accounts for the maintenance of consociational 
politics in a deeply divided society. However, consociationalism. having essentially stressed the role 
of the political elite as central to the success of consociational democracy, the next section will 
discuss the role of the elite in accommodating differences so that stable democracy results from its 
efforts. 
D. Elite role in consociational democracy 
So far, what was argued in the previous section points to the weak predictive value of Lijphart's 
factors in sustaining consociational practices: 'In this elite-centered approach, the favourable factors 
are conditional variables on elite decisions, not on consociational democracy itself' (Bogaards 1998, 
488). This section will seek to determine whether the four elite tasks, as expressed by Lijphart, can 
explain elite decisions and behaviour under the consociational framework. Since the model under 
study is an elitist one, it is important to take into account the impact and weight of the 
representatives of different groups on the decision-making process and the implementation of such 
decisions. Du Toit's argument that 'consociational theory cannot explain what conditions elite 
cooperation and what determines power sharing and consensus' (du Toit 1986,419) will be 
examined. It will be argued that while the elite plays a central role in the stability of the system, 
other factors that come in play may neutralise elite efforts at engineering consociational. practices. 
Here, it will be suggested that these factors are not always variables dependent on elite consensual 
efforts. Rather, they operate independently. It will also be pointed out that Lijphart's four elite tasks 
are not clearly designed and do not specify what constitutes coalescent elite behaviour, as opposed 
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to non-consensual elite behaviour. With regard to the strong element of elite rule in consociational 
democracies, Seaver writes: 
Social scientists have argued that elite willingness to compromise is a better explanation for stable democracy in 
plural societies than are consociational devices and that the determinants of elite cooperation are consequently 
more important in explaining stability than specific political mechanisms. Thus, elite willingness to cooperate 
may be the only necessary condition. If this is the case, scholars should focus on identifying the sources of elite 
cooperation rather than on the effects of certain political mechanisms that may not even be necessary for stable 
democracy or on a myriad conditions that do not even achieve the status of necessary conditions (Seaver 2000, 
254). 
In other words, since consociational theory is essentially an elitist form of democracy, it is expected 
that greater attention should be attributed to a precise elaboration of elite tasks. A practical 
illustration of these problems will be provided through a case study of Nigerian elite relations, the 
examination of which introduces a new dimension to the theory. Contrary to the general assumption 
that the accommodationist role of the elite is a sufficient condition for sustaining smooth 
consociational politics, the case study seems to suggest (though not adequately) that the latter also 
requires a favourable economic situation. 
1. Elite tasks 
In the light of the heavy reliance of the model and its operability on the role of the elites, Iijphart's 
vague conception of how consociationalism operates in practice lends considerable support to the 
argument that the model's elite tasks are not adequately defined. Moreover, in the light of the 
centrality of the concept of the elites, Lijphart does not elaborate on the definition of the term (i. e., 
who are the elites, who do they represent, in what capacity are they representing people and what 
are their individual motivations, as opposed to their duties as representatives of the mass? ) 
Though he heavily stressed the role of the political elite in engineering consociational democracy, 
and in light of the reliance of the theory on accommodationist elite behaviour so as to maintain a 
smooth political environment conducive to stable democracy, Lijphart only conceived four elite 
tasks. For him, consensual elite behaviour guarantees the success of consociational democracies. 
He adopts a voluntaristic stance: 'Politicians can change the course of a country if they so desire'. 
He argued that decision-makers' behaviour is central to the success of consociational democracies. 
Moreover, according to him, the elite is able to understand the dangers of a heterogeneous society, a 
contention not always satisfied, as shall be seen in the Lebanese case. Therefore, for Lijphart, the 
elite is able, if it wishes, to stabilise democracy by building institutions, fostering policies and 
constraining forms of democratic conditions. 11jphart launched his programme on 'how elite choice 
and consociationally structured political institutions could produce stable democracy'. Ijjphart held 
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that multi-communal states were doomed to be unstable if it was not for the role of the elite. 'There 
is a variable that can account for their stability: the behaviour of the political elite'. Despite tension, 
instability and competition among them, the elite leaders can produce stability by making 
'deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilising and unstabilizing effects of cultural 
fragmentation'. At first, Lijphart used the ter7n 'elite cartel' rather than the term 'grand coalition', 
varyingly characterising the behaviour of the elites over the years as 'spirit of accommodation, a 
grand coalition, specific rules of the game, and prudence' (Van Schendelen 1984,37) and thus 
adding to the confusion for researchers studying the model. It was only afterwards that the term 
'grand coalition' started appearing in articles as a substitute for 'elite cartel'. However, it should be 
mentioned that both terms are used interchangeably. Concerning elite tasks, Lijphart identifies four 
requirements that the elite cartel has to meet (Lijphart 1969,216): 
* The ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures. 
* The ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures. 
*A commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. 
* An understanding of the perils of political fragmentation. 
Though Lijphart's concept of what came to be called in the consociational literature 
"prudent/alert/flexible leadership" as a condition for stable democracy was not as contested as his 
concept of the 'helpful' factors, his insistence on the consensual role of the elite as a guarantee for 
system stability in divided societies indicated the need for an approach that had strong explanatory 
power for elite behaviour. Critics did not consider the elite tasks that Lijphart put forward as having 
enough predictive power, for two reasons. 
The first weakness relates to the lack of a precise definition of elite behaviour and tasks. In this 
respect, Halpern, commenting on the four requirements that Lijphart has specified concerning the 
role of the elite, considers elite behaviour as ill-defined: 'There are no rules for the classification of 
mixed patterns of behaviour ( ... ) The model provides no criteria 
for distinguishing between the two 
modes of behaviour [adversarial and coalescent]' (Halpern 1986,193). A closer look at Lijphart's 
four elite tasks substantiates Halpern's critique. First, the tasks set by Lijphart seem vague, and 
framed in general terms. Second, since they do not enclose clearly stated suggestions as to what he 
considers consensual or non-consensual, they can be understood and interpreted differently by 
different readers. Therefore, not only do they not offer definitions of non-consensual or coalescent 
politics, they leave freedom to the reader in interpreting subjectively what he refers to as 'ability, 
6 commitment' and 'understanding'. This broadness is problematic because consociational 
democracy involves a strong element of elite rule, relying centrally on consensual elite behaviour 
for the attaining and maintaining of stability/stable democracy. Accordingly, failing to discern 
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between modes of elite behaviour makes it difficult for researchers to use the model to characterise 
the political system of divided societies/polities, especially where the central role of the elite is 
linked to pre-existing traditions of political accommodation (themselves difficult to discern). 
The second weakness is identified by Bogaards; who, in a compelling critique, goes one step further 
than Halpern. Though Bogaards fundamentally agrees with Lijphart, he indicates the necessity of 
stressing leadership autonomy and theories about what motivates leaders in their choices, rather 
than voluntarism, as Lijphart does. He argues that if elite behaviour is important in plural societies, 
there is a need to develop an elite centered approach to explain and predict the choices made by the 
political elite (Bogaards 1998,490-2). He writes: Ujphart does not specify what he means by 
"ability", but most likely is referring to both willingness and opportunity. It is clear that the four 
requirements or prerequisites ( ... ) have little prediction or explanatory force' (Bogaards 
1998,489). 
While Bogaards' critique is understandable, this increasing reliance on the central role of the elite 
might undermine important democratic practices that also necessary for the maintenance of a 
system of stable democracy. Bogaards' contentions do not seem to ensure that all democratic 
practices are given attention. More central to this discussion is the following observation: Lijphart's 
elite tasks do not identify a precise pattern of elite behaviour, whether consensual or non- 
consensual, nor do they determine what regulates elite behaviour. 
For instance, Pappalardo wams that 'such optimism has its costs, especially if one relies on the 
voluntaristic, rational and intentional aspects of human behavior when inquiring into the future of a 
political system, which in fact risks giving merely presumptive answers' clarifying that 'to over- 
emphasize the ability of the 61ites makes the formulation of logically binding deductions 
impossible. If so, such an over-emphasis risks making the theoretical content and practical utility of 
the consociational model empty from a predictive point of view ( ... ) Hence, voluntarism and 
optimism dominate... ' (Pappalardo 1981,366). For the author, Lijphart's insistence on the good will 
of the 61ites and his claim that 'consociationalism can be brought into being simply by the free 
choice of the 61ites ( ... ) contains a good deal of wishful thinking' 
(Pappalardo 1981,387). Similar 
concerns were raised by various scholars such as the following criticism: 'the omnipotent, positive 
role it [consociational theory] attributes to elites may be exaggerated and too simplistic' (Obler, 
Steiner& Dierickx 1977,40). 
Du Toit notes that 'what the [consociational] theory cannot explain is under what conditions grand 
coalition (and other consociational devices) do in fact produce power sharing and consensus 
decisions. Furthermore, it fails to describe and predict the power relations and decision modes 
within such coalitions' (du Toit 1987,419). Interestingly, du Toit notices that 'bargaining about 
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bargaining is the first and most important stage 13 in the process of consociational conflict 
settlement. Only after all parties to a conflict have agreed to bargaining as a means of conflict 
settlement can it be expected that consociational devices such as grand coalitions will produce 
power sharing and consensual governing' (du Toit 1987,423). He also stresses that 'bargaining 
power is the key variable in determining the outcome of a bargaining process' (du Toit, 1987,426). 
Du Toit's observations are very important for a discussion of the mechanisms and the procedures 
that regulate elite behaviour in consociational democracies. The author's comments relating to the 
bargaining power that each segmental elite holds and its impact on the bargaining process and 
outcome are useful for an understanding of the complex context (i. e., the divided/deeply divided 
society) within which consociational mechanisms are designed to operate. Indeed, even with the 
presence and implementation of institutionalised measures of government rule (such as the 
executive grand coalition and the mutual/minority veto), it is often the case that the bargaining 
power each leader holds will affect the outcome of the bargaining process. A common 
manifestation of divided societies is the presence of a multitude of groupings of unequal size and 
power. As such, the procedural aspects of consociationalism differ considerably from the 
institutional mechanisms the model prescribes. 
2. Case study: Nigeria 
Along with other aims, Falaiye, in a doctoral study of Nigerian elite relations, seeks to investigate 
the failure of consociationalism in Nigeria. Falaiye argues that Nigeria did not adopt consociational 
practices by chance but that it was the result of a 'thoughtful and often determined effort... [that] 
had been motivated largely by the desire to overcome the peril of incessant confrontational politics 
that underlay ethnic jockeying for political power' (Falaiye 1990,555). In other words, the author 
implies that the political elite had an understanding of the perils of political fragmentation. 
Moreover, according to him, the elite was aware that consensus could be achieved by bridging the 
gaps between the main segments, and solving disputes in a consensual climate. Hence, it may be 
said that the Nigerian political elite meets one of the four elite tasks that Lijphart specified. 
Following this, Falaiye argues that the Nigerian experiment with consociationalism was not 
successful. He holds that it did not fundamentally re-order its politics. First, he argues that it did not 
'provide for the institutionalization or regularization of an orderly political change or succession'. 
Second, he notes that it did not 'depoliticize ethnic politics either in the direction of harmonizing 
13 Emphasis added. 
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the basic interests or ideologies of the "cartel of elites" representing the various political parties or 
ethnic interests or, as an effective catalyst of resolving inter-ethnic conflicts' (Falaiye 1990,555). 
Lastly, the author argues that it did not 'serve as an accommodationist instrument or framework for 
all the basic interests of the polity' (Falaiye 1990,556). 
To explain why the Nigerian consociational experiment failed to deliver the above-mentioned 
objectives, Falaiye blames the low quality of political entrepreneurship of the Nigerian elite: 'This 
includes the inability to promote inter-group harmony among the Nigerian multi-national entities, 
the failure to instil a shared sense of political direction to the country and of commitment to one 
another, the unwillingness to play by the rules of the political game and to develop a workable 
framework of accommodation and compromise in politics as a means of governing their disparate 
socio-political entities' (Falaiye 1990,567). 
Here, Falaiye's argument concerning the elite 'unwillingness to play by the rules of the garne... ' 
(p. 567) should be distinguished from his earlier statement that the elite had the 'desire to overcome 
the peril... ' (p. 555). In other words, the author differentiates between the desire to engage in 
consensual behaviour and the willingness to do so. Therefore, it can be argued that Lijphart's 
second elite task, that is, a commitment to maintaining the system and to the improving of its 
cohesion and stability, was by and large absent. Similarly, the third and fourth elite tasks are also 
absent. These are the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures 
and the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elite of rival 
subcultures. Consequently, according to the sketch that the author presents, the Nigerian political 
elite meets only one of the four elite tasks that Lijphart specified. 
Falaiye argues that 'in addition to the behavior of the elite ( ... ) the consociational disposition alone 
cannot ensure political stability in plural societies unless, at the same time, there is conscientious 
husbandry of the economic resources to sustain the political process' (Falaiye 1990, ii). The author 
holds that an efficient management of the economy is essential for the stability of the Nigerian 
political system as well as for strengthening the legitimate claim of the elites to rule (Falaiye 1990, 
566). This argument is sustained by Chahine, who writes that 'development must precede 
democracy in order for consociationalism to succeed in maintaining a peaceful multiethnic society' 
(Chahine 1998,61). As a conclusion, Falaiye deduces that consociationalism cannot solve all of 
Nigeria's problems including its problem of political instability. 
From the above, it is obvious that the author's inadequate assessment of the elite disposition for 
consociationalism. resulted in imprecise conclusions: the Nigerian political elite met only one of the 
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four elite tasks specified by Lijphart, as Falaiye notes. Consequently, it would be inadequate to 
conclude that 'consociational disposition alone cannot ensure political stability in plural societies 
unless, at the same time, there is conscientious husbandry of the economic resources to sustain the 
political process'. 
While it may be true that the success (attainment and maintenance) of consociationalism requires a 
favourable economic situation, this cannot be asserted in the Nigerian case for two reasons. First, 
the political elite was shown to meet only one of the four elite tasks. Second, a cause and effect 
relationship between a favourable economic situation and stable consociational politics was not 
substantiated by evidence. As stated above, this is not to say that consensual elite behaviour alone is 
able to generate stable democracy. For instance, Sisk points to an important issue: 
'Consociationalists have been criticized for the assertion that elites can effectively regulate conflict 
in divided societies' (Sisk 1996). However, drawing on the Anglo-Irish Accord of 1985 and the 
1990 failure of the 1987 Meech Lake Accord, Sisk argues that 'even though political elites may 
agree on a formula for accommodation, peace cannot endure without grassroots backing' (Sisk 
1996). 
To sum up, this section first pointed out that consociational theory fails to identify a precise pattern 
of consensual elite behaviour. Second, it highlighted that it is rather difficult to determine what 
dictates elite behaviour under the consociational framework conceived by Lijphart. Consequently, 
in the light of the theory's vaguely defined four elite tasks, it may be said that Lijphart's framework 
allocates substantial reliance on the role of the elite in ensuring smooth consociational politics, and 
more so than the theory can handle, to validate its internal logic and consistency. It becomes 
problematic to determine whether consociational mechanisms are able to generate stable 
democracy, and more importantly, to affirm that such an outcome is the result of elite efforts. 
E. Recapitulation 
In the 1980s, there was a decreasing interest in consociational. theory. First, scholars doubted that 
the elite would prefer accommodationist behaviour as opposed to confrontational or non-consensual 
conduct. Second, partisans of democracy were dissatisfied with a notion of democracy requiring 
low levels of popular participation. Third, the collapse or transformation of some "exemplary" 
consociational democracies created confusion about the explanatory power of the favourable 
factors, the key concepts and definitions. In response to these changes, Lijphart developed the 
concept of consensus democracy to broaden the theory while, at the same time, supporting his 
consociational model. 
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'The concept of consensus democracy grew out of my efforts to define and measure consociational 
democracy more precisely' (Lijphart 2000a, 429). In consensus democracy, 'every aspect can be 
expressed in quantitative terms' (Lijphart 2000b). Consensus democracy was first defined in terms 
of eight characteristics ( ... ) and subsequently ten characteristics (... ) that overlap but do not coincide 
with the four elements of consociational democracy. Lijphart argues that consociational democracy 
and consensual democracy are closely related, and that 'both can be used for empirical as well as 
normative purposes' (Ujphart 2000a, 425). He specifies that in a majoritarian democracy, the 
majority of the people 'do the governing', while in a consensus democracy, it is 'as many people as 
possible' as it 'seeks to maximise the size of these majorities' (Ujphart 2001,90). 
Two major criticisms of the concept of consensus democracy can be identified in the comments of 
Lustick, Kaiser and Andeweg. For instance, 'Lustick argues that so much stretching has happened 
that the entire enterprise has become meaningless' (Lijphart 2000b). Similarly, Kaiser writes that 
'the difference between consociational and consensus is not completely comprehensible' (Kaiser 
1997,432). Andeweg, for his part, notices that 'consensus democracy has not replaced 
consociational democracy: the debate over consociationalism has continued without reference to 
consensus democracy and Lijphart himself has continued to apply the concept of consociationalism 
separate from that of consensus government' (Andeweg 2000,514). Here, it can be said that 
contrary to consociational democracy, consensus democracy did not move the debate about 
democracy further, and thus, the model of consociational democracy continued to dominate the 
debate about power-sharing democracy, as opposed to majoritarianism. At the same time, while 
acknowledging the points of both Lustick and Andeweg, it should nonetheless be pointed to the 
difficulty of using exact measurement in the social sciences. This attempt by Ujphart was followed 
by his later rejection of precision and measurement in 1985 where he writes: 
Precise quantitative measurement is usually very difficult if not impossible to achieve ( ... ) It is much better to use 
a simple, rough, and indeed "impressionistic" twofold or threefold classification of the variables ( ... ) and to relate 
these variables to each other than to spend all of one's time in a probably futile effort to find exact 
measurements. Methodological perfectionism is extremely debilitating for political theory and practice (Lijphart 
1985,87-8). 
Lijphart holds that 'consociational democracy has been amply defined and nothing needs to be 
added to it' (Lustick 1997,109). Contrary to the approaches of Van Schendelen, Barry and 
Nordlinger, he stresses the impressionistic nature of the social sciences where evidence and/or logic 
are inconvenient. He reinforces his argument by referring to the researchers who supported his 
work, the various studies of the model in different countries, and the positive attention accorded to 
his theory of consociational theory. 
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Especially noteworthy is Lijphart's mid-1990s essay on India, where he classifies India as a 
consociational democracy. He argues that India was witnessing a period of instability because it had 
abandoned consociational practices. In this respect, Lustick considers that this essay reaffirms the 
impressionistic nature of the theory, the vagueness of its terms and definitions, the elasticity of its 
concepts and its wide selectivity. However, Lustick did not attempt to remedy the shortcomings of 
the theory, contrary to both Nordlinger and Daalder, whose contributions will be examined. For his 
part, Nordlinger 'anticipated most of the withering criticisms of Lijphart's work that would come in 
the mid-1970s and early 1980s- critiques of the imprecision of his terms, the awkwardness of his 
typology, and his mischaracterization of key cases' (Lustick 1997,99-100). 'He [Nordlinger] tried 
to define terms [ ... I and specify propositions of consociationalist theory precisely enough to 
stipulate the empirical claims that were made and then distinguish those supported by available 
evidence from those that would have to be rejected or left for further study' (Lustick 1997,99). For 
instance, in the words of Lustick, he advocated eliminating normative elements, searching the 
histories of countries cited as examples of consociationalism, specifying conditions needed for 
consociationalism success or failure and investigating the tension between democracy and elite 
accommodation present in the idea of consociational democracy itself. 
Indeed, Nordlinger's approach was an attempt to remedy the uncertainty of the theory and to 
increase its explanatory and predictive power, as well as to unveil the undemocratic nature of 
consociational democracy. Similarly to Nordlinger, Daalder criticised Lijphart's theory as 
imprecise. Consequently, he went a step further and proposed the following research tasks (Daalder 
1974,616-20): 
Investigating the differential effects of political culture on prospects for consociational regimes. 
Exploring boundaries between democratic and nondemocratic consociationalism. 
Explaining the decline of consociationalist structures in the Low Countries. 
Analyzing the impact on consociationalist systems of cultural and ideological trends in the 
international arena. 
Evaluating the capacity of consociationalist elites to absorb greater demands for participation from 
their constituencies. 
The research tasks that Daalder put forward are clearly aimed at strengthening the utility of 
Lijphart's theory and increasing the use of the model to describe different political systems. While it 
is important to point out that this involves great difficulty, it is seen as a clear departure from 
theoretical contemplation. Against this background, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
theory suffers from serious inconsistencies that reduce its explanatory and predictive power. As 
suggested, the empirical inconsistencies within consociational theory are irremediable since, as 
Halpern points out, the confusion does not stem from the cases but from the construction of the 
model (Halpern 1986,184). Hence, Halpern concludes: 
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The consociational universe is a random universe. It is confused by contradictions between the theory, and 
construction of the model, of consociational democracy as well as by theoretical imprecision ( ... ) we cannot test for consociational democracy, confirm its existence, or track its development. Lacking this competence, we are 
without a demonstrable basis upon which to assert, in our capacity as political scientists, that there actually exists 
something called consociational democracy (Halpern 1986,194-5). 
Lijphart's latest defence to such criticism runs as following: 
An especially valid and serious criticism is that its key concepts have been very hard to define and measure 
precisely. I have come to the conclusion, however, that this is an insoluble problem and that we shall simply 
have to live with concepts that have very important theoretical and policy significance but that cannot be 
measured precisely ( ... ) The substantive problem is that the basic characteristics of consociational democracy are inherently stretchable: they can assume a large number of different institutional forms (Lijphart 2000b). 
While Lijphart is right to point to the difficulty in defining key terms and concepts, it remains 
problematic to deduce that this is an 'insoluble problem and that we shall simply have to live with 
concepts that have very important theoretical and policy significance but that cannot be measured 
precisely', to use Lijphart's words. As Halpern rightly points out, 'the problem of conceptual 
broadness is not confined to the model of consociational democracy nor is it new to the study of 
politics' (Halpern 1986,189). Therefore, contrary to what Lijphart advocates, this does not point to 
the impossibility of refining such key concepts to strengthen the consistency of the theory of 
consociational democracy and to enhance the utility of the model. 
Indeed, while the findings of Chapter 2 limit the utility of the model, they do not, however, 
undermine the importance of the theory. Lijphart's consociational theory continues to receive 
significant scholarly attention and justifications for the application of the model to divided societies. 
Indeed, power-sharing mechanisms are instrumental in regulating rule in divided societal contexts. 
As such, the continuous development and elaboration of the consociational model appear to be a 
way of alleviating the weaknesses of the theory and expanding its prescriptive power. Indeed, this 
author adheres to the following view: 
Power sharing and consensus politics do not have to be justified only by the negative consequences of their 
alternative but on a more positive basis as well. Power sharing among societal groups can be justified 
because of the mutual dependence of these groups upon each other and because of their lack of alternative 
sources of scarce values ( ... ) Consociational engineering, aimed at achieving the elusive 
14 goal of elite 
cooperation, should not just concentrate on drawing up constitutional coalitions, mutual vetoes, proportionality, 
and segmental autonomy, but should also adopt a wider perspective and concentrate on institutional mechanisms 
which create, maintain, and reinforce mutual dependence between societal groups (du Toit 1987,426). 
Hence, in line with the main orientation of this thesis, the major weakness of the theory appears to 
be the unsubstantiated attainment and maintenance of stable democracy under the consociational. 
framework of rule devised by Lijphart. It therefore appears from the literature review undertaken in 
14 Emphasis added. 
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this chapter that there is a need to elaborate the model to better meet the needs and peculiarities of 
divided (and particularly, deeply divided, i. e., plural) societies, thus echoing Steiner's and du Toit's 
suggestions to go beyond consociational theory. Indeed, the discussions undertaken in Chapters 4 
and 5, which draw on the Lebanese experiments with consociationalism, reveal that the model fails 
in many instances to deliver on the promise of stable democracy unless accompanied by a 
considerable dose of internal mediation and external arbitration. Against this background, the 
proposed elaboration of Lijphart's consociational theory (suggested in Chapter 3) will be shown to 
appear as one way of somehow reducing the need to the substantial internal mediation and external 
arbitration that consociationalism involves. Chapter 4 will practically show in what ways the 
consociational model, as it stands, failed on the promise of democratic stability for pre-war 
Lebanon. As such, it will practically point to the shortcomings of the consociational model and to 
the need of introducing an elaboration to it. Chapter 5 will examine the significance and advantages 
(as well as the shortcomings) that this elaboration has on prospects for democratic stability in post- 
war Lebanon. As such, this thesis has raised a number of questions that seem particularly relevant 
within the context that this research operates in. It is hoped that the attempted answers of this thesis 
will be useful for the study of divided societies elsewhere than Lebanon. 
However, to achieve this aim and the tasks of Chapter 4 and 5, some of the findings of this chapter 
(the imprecise, and broadly-defined definitions of the four components and of the key concepts of 
consociational theory) are useful in that they indicate the need to adopt more precise definitions. A 
meaningful discussion of consociational democracy as it operates needs more elaborate definitions. 
This calls the need to exan-dne, define clearly the relation of consociational democracy with 
democratic theory. In other words, consociational theory would need to be located within 
democratic theory in order for elaborate and precise definitions to be devised. 
Hence, this chapter introduced the theory of consociational democracy, analysed the criticisms that 
were offered against it (picking out on the central points as they relate to the context of the present 
research and assessing the real value of each contribution) in a series of steps towards evaluating the 
utility of the model and identifying the problems of working with the theory. However, to address 
in great detail the institutional and procedural aspects of consociational democracy, the next step of 
this thesis will attempt to define more adequately the key concepts of consociational theory. It is 
this author's contention that defining the key concepts as they relate to the Lebanese context (i. e., 
using Lebanon as a case study) will bring greater clarity to the model. This contention stems from 
the observation that Lebanon's successive experiments with consociationalism offer valuable 
clarifications and insights into the institutional and procedural aspects of consociationalism and 
thus, are a helpful testing field of the operability of the model in practice. Hence, the definitions 
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adopted will be based on the Lebanese societal context. Particular focus will be placed on the 
definition of the grand coalition in the light of the centrality of this principle of executive-decision 
making for the theory of consociational democracy, for the operability of the model and in the light 
of the important dimension elite rule takes in consociational theory. Additionally, an attempt to shed 
more light on the definition of the grand coalition will help alleviate the confusion that surrounds 
the concept, as devised by Lijphart, which limit the operability of the model and the utility of the 
theory. These tasks will be undertaken in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 Consociationalism and democratic theory 
As mentioned previously, the central question under examination in this thesis is the 
allegedly positive/causative relationship between consociationalism and stable democracy. 
However, the confusion surrounding the imprecise definitions of the four components and key 
concepts of consociational theory (highlighted in Chapter 2) suggests that it is difficult to accept 
that consociational politics (i. e., consociational structures of rule) can explain the stability of the 
divided society. In turn, this makes attempts to discuss the relations of consociationalism to 
democratic theory, to locate consociationalism within democratic theory and to examine the 
institutional and procedural aspects of the consociational model (in order to investigate the above- 
mentioned causative relationship) difficult and problematic. In consequence, this chapter will 
suggest more appropriate/relevant definitions, i. e., definitions that relate to the divided societal 
context within which consociationalism is designed to operate. It is the contention of the present 
study that only elaborate definitions can provide the possibility of re-examining the supposedly 
causative relationship between consociationalism and stable democracy. 
The definitions that will be adopted will be based on the Lebanese societal context given that 
Lebanon provides a typical case study of consociationalism in operation. This results from its 
successive, relatively prolonged, and multi-faceted experiments with consociationalism. In other 
words, Lebanon presents a very rich field to test the operability of the model and to test the theory's 
promise of stable democracy. In the final analysis, Lebanon belongs to the classification of a plural 
society, and as such, examining the operability of consociationalism using Lebanon as a case study 
will shed more light on various aspects of the model. 
After defining the major concepts that this thesis refers to, the discussion will delimit the scope of 
this study, thereby highlighting the various forces in play (i. e., in operation) within a divided society 
and the way in which they impact on the form of government that such a society finds itself with, 
and on the ensuing stability of the system. Subsequently, the discussion will focus separately on 
each of the four consociational principles and their relations to democratic theory. Finally, in the 
light of the many questions that this chapter will raise in regard to the causative relationship 
between consociationalism and stable democracy, the last section will point to the need of this 
thesis to look more closely at Lebanon, one of the most relevant, controversial and interesting case 
studies of consociational democracy in operation. 
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A. The study design 
1. Definitions 
From the outset, it should be indicated that the definitions used here are based on the societal 
context that this thesis is restricted to, and hence, do not conform to any prescriptive model. The 
literature review undertaken in the previous chapter traced the general area within which this thesis 
operates, namely a plural (i. e., deeply divided unstable) societal context. Hence, this section will 
first define what it is meant by a plural society. Lijphart's latest conceptualisation equates plural and 
deeply divided societies, i and this thesis will follow the same conceptualisation, i. e., plural and 
deeply divided societies will be interchangeably used as synonyms. However, when it comes to the 
definition of a plural society, the concept, as it is used here, refers to an unstable society where such 
instability is a direct consequence of that society's multi-faceted fabric (the multi-communal or 
multi-ethnic state) 2 and where such multi-faceted aspects remain highly politically salient (i. e., they 
have to do with class divisions). Indeed, it is important to point out that a society can be divided in 
many different ways, thus becoming a deeply divided society. Though it is difficult to determine 
where the dividing line between divided and deeply divided societies lies, 3a distinction which 
Lijphart's consociational theory fails to provide, the present chapter aims to shed more light on this 
distinction, so as to account for factors that lie beyond Lijphart's immediate focus. 
Hanf notes that 'to grasp the reality of the social and political systems of multi-communal states, it 
is necessary to examine both their horizontal dimensions, that is, their socio-economic stratification 
and class structure, and their vertical dimensions, that is, their fissures or cleavages along 
communal lines as well as the linkages between them' (Hanf 1993,21). Indeed, the factors in play 
in such societies that may cause tensions are not only limited to religious, cultural, ethnic, linguistic 
and racial differences, as Lijphart argues. This is because the world, social values and belief 
systems are constantly changing, and such differences do not eternally keep groups cohesive. This 
1 Indeed, for purposes of clarity, most researchers on consociationalism, such as Lustick and others, chose to use the 
concept of a deeply divided society as a synonym to that of a plural society. However, their definition of the concept is 
limited to vertical segmentation and fails to include the dimension of the horizontal class cleavages. For such limited 
accounts, see Ian Lustick, 'Stability in deeply divided societies: consociationalism versus control'. World Politic 
(April), Vol. 3 1, No. 3, p. 325,1979. 2 To borrow Hanf's expression. For more on the wide usage of the concept of ethnicity and multi-ethnic states, see 
Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in wartime Lebanon: decline of a state and rise of a nation. London: Centre for Lebanese 
Studies [hereafter CLS] with I. B. Tauris & Co, p. 14 and p. 21,1993. 
3 Partly because, as Johnson points out in his detailed discussion of the manifestations of the plural society under 
examination in this thesis, Lebanon, there is 'a lack of any detail census information on class and confession in 
Lebanon... [hence making it] impossible to provide a definitive account of the relationship between the two variables' 
(Johnson 2001,193). For more details on the analysis of the features of Lebanon's plural society, and the impact of the 
interplay between class and ethnicity on Lebanese stability, icluding a discussion of major works relating to this issue, 
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thesis acknowledges that culture and identity are part of the nature of a person. Indeed, the culture 
that a person has is created through a process of socialisation. It becomes a part of the cognitive 
aspects of that person, and is a means for people to differentiate themselves from other people. 
However, the cultural, religious and other distinctions raised by Lijphart are not the only influence 
on individuals as they are not in a static state, are highly nuanced, and do not always pervade 
individuals' lives. Rather, there are often wider aspects to their lives that determine their actions. 
Thus, echoing Steiner's suggestion of including differences of a socio-economic nature (that are 
bound to remain if one looks at the course of history), this thesis argues that the factors causing 
tensions among communal groups in societies are also related to class and social injustices. In all 
countries, there is a sort of hierarchy of class (poor at bottom, generally unskilled service workers, 
semi-skilled workers, skilled workers, professional workers, business, commerce, trade and 
enterprises classes, etc). The point is that their position (as well as perceived position) in society is 
also in association with the income that they receive. In ethnically homogeneous societies, socio- 
economic differences are a potential threat to the stability of the system. However, as it relates to 
the context of a plural multi-ethnic society, the concept of class requires a more sophisticated 
analysis as it has multi-dimensional manifestations and hence, this increases the quotient of threat to 
the stability of the society in question. 
Indeed, a first reminder is that social injustice, in and of itself, is a threat to the stability of the 
multi-communal society, irrespective of communal sensitivities. Furthermore, a second observation 
is that a cursory look at plural societies reveals that the latter tend to manifest a broad line of class 
differentiation among communal groups. For instance, in the pre-war Lebanese context, one can 
probably speak in general terms of Christian groups being socio-economically better off compared 
to their Muslim counterparts (particularly the Shi'is). Thirdly however, within cultural and religious 
differences, there are also cleavages of a social and class nature. As Johnson points out, 
It is not always the case that one community is predominantly "upper" and another "lower" class in ethnic 
disputes; and even where there is some overlap between class and ethnicity as there was in Lebanon, explaining 
a consequent conflict in such terms as "poor Muslims" fighting "rich Christians" is an over-simplification. The 
ethnic or confessional fighters in the Lebanese wars were largely recruited from the poor and lower-niiddle-class 
members of the Muslim and Christian communities (Johnson 2001,197-8). 
Indeed, in relation to Lebanon, one can also speak of poor Christians within Christian groups and 
poor Muslims within Muslim groups (for example the Maronites of rural Mount Lebanon being less 
well off as compared to some the urban Orthodox and Catholics living in the coastal cities and 
see Michael Johnson, All honourable men: the social origins of war in Lebanon. Oxford: CLS in association with I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, pp. 190-204,200 1. 
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Sunni Muslims of the coastal cities being better off than Shi'i Muslims living in the suburbs of pre- 
war Beirut). Fourthly, one can also speak of poverty among individuals within the same sect (for 
example, poor Maronites within the Maronite community, poor Shi'is within the Shi'i community 
and so on so forth). 
In society as a whole, for example the Lebanese one, these communal and class cleavages tend to 
cut across each other in complicated ways. Indeed, modem society is quite complex, is divided in 
different ways, and benefits accrues in different ways to different parts of that society. Within any 
grouping of peoples, one finds only a limited degree of homogeneity. In groupings, one also often 
finds that subcultures exist within a dominating culture. Within all cultures, there is a multiplicity of 
identities with varying intensity. Hence, it is the contention of the present study that when looking 
at communal groups, the sensitive issues among them do not appear to be solely religious, cultural, 
linguistic, and racial. Rather, they are also connected with the spoils of the economy, power, and 
rights. In other words, issues that are essentially political. As such, the concept of a plural society 
includes differences of a socio-economic nature and refers to an unstable society whereby such 
instability stems from the interaction and interplay between class and ethnicity. 
This is so because in some plural societies, access to political representation and the allocation of 
economic resources are encapsulated in a confessional system of representation and patronage. 
Therefore, demands from poor and underprivileged citizens for a better allocation of resources 
within this society cannot be channeled and effectively articulated on class-based terms. These 
demands can only be channeled through the confessional system of political representation and the 
confessional patronage distribution system of economic resources. In other words, individual 
demands from poor citizens can only be articulated through communal groups, i. e., through 
communal leaders. Hence, ethnicity becomes the channel through which class cleavages are dealt 
with. In societies where class cleavages are clearly identifiable with one communal group being 
socio-economically better off than the other, the degrees of fragmentation and division are easier to 
discern, and perhaps, class cleavages are easier to be dealt with. However, in the plural society 
under examination in this thesis, class cleavages cut across communal groupings, making the 
society fragmented in a multitude of ways, hence making it more difficult to discern class division 
patterns between and among communal groupings. As a result, it is more difficult for the state to 
deal with class cleavages. Hence, ethnicity becomes for each communal grouping and sectarian 
leader, an effective channel to address the class cleavages within that grouping. This is so for 
mainly two reasons. Within a confessional system, the individual citizen is not allowed to exist and 
lobby for his immediate interests/rights on class-based terms. By extension, for the sectarian leader, 
ethnic identity is one effective channel or tool to articulate the interests of that citizen (and the 
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latter's perceived feeling of deprivation). As a result, the sectarian leader manages to build a 
support base (i. e., a clientele), through the confessional patronage system that keeps him in power. 
Likewise, the concept of 'ethnic group' is used in consociational literature and in literature on 
ethnic relations as a synonym of communal group, as Lijphart notes (Lijphart 1995a, 854). 4 This 
thesis will follow this conceptualisation, but will use the term communal group whenever possible, 
for the purposes of clarity. Lijphart defines an ethnic group as 'a group of people who see 
themselves as a distinct cultural community; who often share a common language, religion, kinship, 
and/or physical characteristics ( ... ); and who tend to harbor negative and hostile feelings towards 
members of other ethnic groups' (Lijphart 1995a, 853). However, in the Loebanese context, 
Lijphart's concept has many limitations. In Lebanon, the apparent broad line of differentiation 
(apart from the underlying subcultures existing within each group and driven by socio-economic 
interests) takes on a religious character, thus making it more appropriate to speak of religious 
ethnicity. Thus, a communal group will be taken to mean a relatively cohesive group of people who 
see themselves as a distinct uniform religious community, sharing a common belief system and 
lifestyle, kinship-blood ties, cultural-linguistic, psychological, physical, territorial and national 
characteristics that provide a sense of belonging and attachment within a hostile societal context. 
Concerning the concept of the elite, it is commonly understood that elites are the holders of power 
and influence. However, considering the central role of this concept in this thesis, this paragraph 
will elaborate on this general definition. In the Lebanese context, this conception of elites includes 
both the political and financial (i. e., economic) dimensions of power and influence. Indeed, 
Ddkm6jian stresses the 'uncommon degree of overlapping between the economic and political elite' 
in Lebanon observing that 'the political elite might be viewed as an extension of the economic 
elite'. In 1975, drawing on the composition of the political elite, he notices that 'political power 
[cabinet office] came after the acquisition of economic power and apparently because of it although 
there have been instances where the sequence has been reversed' (D6km6jian 1975,22-3). 5 
Similarly, Khalifah notes that 'in a country [Lebanon] where economic and political powers are 
one, success in business is a prelude to political life' (Khalifah 1997,12). Indeed, it is difficult to 
disengage political power from the economy of the country in which power resides in a 
comparatively small number of persons (a class of merchants, traders, financiers, landed and 
notable elites, both Christian and Muslim). Confessionalism provided a way for elites to manage the 
direction of affairs in order to secure their own interests and favourable accommodation among the 
4 Indeed, he makes the point that 'the Christian and Muslim sects in Lebanon are commonly referred to as ethnic 
roups. They differ from each other in religion... ' (Lijphart 1995a, 854). 
The situation he describes is pretty much the same today in post-war Lebanon. 
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elites themselves. In other words, good economic cooperation among them was an important base 
for political unity because the presence of mutual economic interests was a very important incentive 
to cooperate on the political side. By extension, societal instability and conflicts had a detrimental 
impact on these mutual business interests. As a result, the interests of the nation were bounded up in 
the consociational confessional system of rule. Thus, the conception of elites refers to the holders of 
political and economic power, unless otherwise specified. 
The concept of democracy, additionally, is crucial in order to understand the nature of politics and 
political theory. Scholars continually indicate the necessity of further reading with regard to 
democratic theory, and a more complete understanding of democracy as forming the basis for 
further developing theories. Political scientists have sought to provide different definitions of 
democracy. As a result, democracy is seen as a relatively elusive, contested concept. Democracy 
'nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague endorsement of a 
popular idea' (Dahl 1989,2). In this regard, Johnson and Onuf argue 'there is a lack of agreement 
on the specific content of the democratic idea' (Johnson and Onuf 1995,184): 'the word is used too 
freely and inclusively to make most answers possible' (Johnson and Onuf 1995,179). However, for 
the purposes of this thesis, and because democracy is an important part of the rhetoric of politics, 
any meaningful discussion of democracy should specify and provide a clear idea of what is meant 
by the term. As Sartori observes in The theory of democracy revisited: 'we characteristically live, 
then, in an age of confused democracy. That "democracy" obtains several meanings is something 
we can live with. But if "democracy" can mean just anything, that is too much' (Sartori 1987,6). 
The procedural aspects of democracy, which point to an element of elite rule in societies (including 
plural ones), restrain democratic assumptions. This has the effect of confining the democratic 
assumptions, and delimiting the definition of democracy. Hence, Lincoln's 1863 definition of 
democracy as 'government of the people, by the people, for the people' is clearly not applicable. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the works of Schumpeter and others help to illustrate a more relevant 
definition of democracy. In this regard, it is important to point to the following distinctions. 
First, many political scientists have stressed the elite nature of democratic rule. Lasswell, Lerner & 
Rothwell comment that 'as James Bryce and many other political analysts have remarked, 
government is always governed by the few, whether in the name of the few, the one or the many' 
(Lasswell, Lerner & Rothwell 1971,15). Similarly, Lipset concludes his article entitled 'The social 
requisites of democracy revisited', that 'whether democracy succeeds or fails continues to depend 
significantly on the choices, behaviors, and decisions of political leaders and groups' (Upset 1994, 
18). Indeed, this argument points for the need of this thesis to draw a clear distinction as to the 
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institutional form or structure of democracy and the procedural aspects of democracy. The 
procedural aspects of democracy reveal more adequately how democracy works than do the 
structural aspects. Looking at the procedural aspects of democratic rule, what is often seen as 
democratic rule of and by the people is actually rule by an elite. Thus, the argument advanced by 
classical elite theorists concerning government by the few is considered particularly relevant here. 
Concerning the second distinction, it is important to look at Prewitt and Stone's argument that 'if it 
is no longer possible to have government by the people, the goals of government of and for the 
people are still within reach' (Prewitt and Stone 1973,186). In this respect, the procedural aspects 
of democracy suggest that this argument is applicable to divided societies, with the distinction that 
democracy in a divided society takes the form of a government of and for the communal groups (as 
mentioned above, broadly defined in terms of religious groups, but each of these, primarily bound 
by common political interests). In stable (and usually prosperous) societies, democracy is seen as 
government of, and for groups, bound by more fluid identities, i. e., not based on ethnic 
characteristics, driven by various secular and ideological interests and motivations, and where the 
structure of politics allows, despite a strong element of elite rule, the effective articulation of such 
group interests in non-ethnic terms and the lobbying for such interests with government agencies, 
legislators and in the electoral process. Moreover, constitutional rules in stable societies allow for 
such articulation of group interests, while in the plural societies under examination in this thesis, 
constitutional arTangements place restrictions on the articulation of group interests in non-ethnic 
terms. 
However, in plural societies (above-defined as unstable), the ethnic/communal dimension that 
defines groups thus giving a communal shape to any given society stems from a situation where 
people seek to organise their living with others in the same society in ways that will allow them to 
benefit in/from this relationship. The role and political saliency of ethnic identity develops through 
the following scenario: one group has particular ethnic convictions, and in some way feels that their 
status and well-being are threatened by other groups. Indeed, as Haddad notes, 'although an 
individual has many identities, those perceived to be threatened tend to increase in salience' 
(Haddad 1985,8). Enough of them feel this threat to identify with each other through common 
interests. They also are able to identify themselves through their ethnic belief systems and their 
conception of social order. Thus, Schumpeter's notion that the average man is motivated basically 
by self-interest and that particular interests tend to aggregate and organise themselves as interest 
groups is relevant for the purposes of this thesis. Hence, Schumpeter's view that democracy is 
essentially a way of dealing with group interests is applicable to the societal context that this thesis 
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operates in. So far, democracy will be taken to mean government by the few, of and for the 
communal groups. 
Third, it is crucial for this discussion to take into consideration another of Schumpeter's arguments. 
In the words of Bachrach, Schumpeter proposed ' "government approved by the people", instead of 
the concept, "government by the people" ' (Bachrach 1967,20), pointing out that people only have 
the option to accept or reject the few who will rule them. Schumpeter's definition is of importance 
to this thesis, provided that the government is approved by the communal groups (rather than 
groups based on fluid non-ethnic identities) through periodic, free, honest and competitive 
elections. Periodic elections refer to regularly scheduled elections. Free and competitive elections 
imply that all eligible citizens are allowed to present their candidacy and compete among each other 
for votes (thus leading to bargaining among groups). Finally, honest elections imply the existence of 
supervisory governmental and non-governmental bodies able to contest election results in an 
efficient manner (based on justifiable claims about the lack of transparency or dishonesty of the 
proceedings of the elections). Therefore, in light of the above definitions and in the context of 
divided societies within which this thesis is located, democracy may be defined as follows: 
Government by the few, of and for the communal groups, approved by the communal groups 
through regular, competitive, free and honest elections. 
The concept of stable democracy itself requires definition. When it comes to the definition of the 
concept, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that a considerable amount of confusion surrounded the 
notion of stable democracy. This section will present a somewhat different definition, in order to 
alleviate the confusion surrounding the concept. A first observation to be made is that if 
consociational. theory succeeds in the causative relationship between the adoption of consociational. 
devices in a divided societal context and stable democracy, this implies: the attainment and 
maintenance of stable democracy. A second observation is that researchers on consociationalism 
have used concepts of stable democracy as a synonym for democratic stability, stability and 
political stability. Such concepts have been used interchangeably. Hence, for the purposes of clarity, 
and equally to avoid confusion when referring to the work of researchers in the consociational 
literature throughout the various chapters of this thesis, this common, interchangeable use of the 
notion of stable democracy will be adhered to in this research. 
More importantly, however, it should be stressed that for the purposes of this thesis, the most 
significant dimension of the whole notion is the terin "stability", which is the dependent variable 
under examination in this thesis. First, because this thesis has already stressed the limitations of the 
concept of democracy, (shown from the procedural aspects of democracy), the notion of stability 
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increases in importance and the need for a more adequate definition takes on an unprecedented 
significance. Second, the various chapters of this thesis, through a discussion of the consociational. 
model in operation in Lebanon, will stress the failure of the model preventing the outbreak of 
communal conflict, and delivering on the promise of stability, let alone democratic stability. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that it would be unwarTanted to speak of democratic stability when the 
model in operation fails, in many instances, to provide minimal conditions for stability. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it seems more useful to re-define the concept of stability when it comes to 
the discussion of Lebanon. 
Looking at societies, all of them demonstrate some degree of instability and crime. However, it may 
be said that stability exists where society is able to maintain and reproduce itself. There is a degree 
of civil order that allows this to happen and a system of rule that can be said to have legitimacy, and 
which can effectively supply the needs of its peoples. Civil wars, needless to say, indicate a 
breakdown of order. Similarly, national security breaches and political incidents (such as political 
assassinations, crackdowns on peaceful protests and the closure of media establishments for 
political reasons) indicate that the security situation in a given country may be volatile, and that the 
country remains a potential arena for conflicts to be played out. Such incidents threaten peace, 
indicate a blow to the security of society and have a saliency at a political level, thereby threatening 
political stability. More importantly, the inability of the national army and security apparatuses to 
preserve, on their own (such as the presence of foreign troops on national soil) the stability of 
society, is seen as a potential indicator of volatile stability. Most importantly, the inability of the 
political system as a whole, for instance the government and the key political actors and leadership, 
to effectively manage alone the internal political and economic stability of the society is seen as a 
major indicator of latent instability. For instance, the inability of Lebanese elites alone to maintain 
internal political and economic stability is such an example. The recourse to excessive internal 
mediation and external arbitration so as to regulate internal conflicts and to solve internal politically 
and economically salient disputes in Lebanon is a case in point. As a result of this, stability, when 
refer-red to in the Lebanese context, will be taken to mean the ability of local elites alone to maintain 
political, social and economic stability within the divided society. 
2. Scope of study 
Having defined the major concepts to which this thesis refers, it is now important to elaborate more 
on the societal context within which this thesis is located. Crucial to this discussion are the issues of 
group consciousness in a suspicious and hostile environment, the interplay between the various 
factors that make up the fabric of a plural society, the forces and actors in operation in a plural 
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society and the latter's impact on stability. The study of the impact that political leadership has on 
the stability of the plural society is crucial for the purposes of this thesis, as it is concerned with 
consociational. democracy, which is an actor-centered model of rule. Insofar as this thesis takes 
Lebanon as a case study, the concept of ethnurgy advanced by Hanf is of unprecedented relevance. 
Despite Khalidi's argument that 'at the philosophical and metaphysical levels, it [the issue of 
identity] probably will never be resolved [as) humans have spent centuries contemplating the 
mysteries of the essences of things' (Khalidi 1989b, 379), it remains necessary for this thesis to 
shed more light on the nature of ethnic identity. In his article 'Ethnurgy: on the analytical use and 
normative abuse of the concept of 'ethnic identity', Hanf writes :6 
Ethnic identity exists, and it is more than a transitory phenomenon ( ... ) [but] it is neither a natural nor an historical law. Rather, it can be fabricated and manipulated (Hanf 1995,46)... On their own, one-dimensional 
economistic or culturalistic approaches are inadequate analytical instruments to deal with this phenomenon [the 
conscious fabrication and politicisation of ethnic identity- and its attendant circumstances]. It is necessary to 
combine them ( ... ) Multi-dimensional analyses have to take account of both stratification [horizontal class 
segmentation] and cleavage [vertical segmentation]. Stratification and cleavage are politically relevant only if 
people who share common distinctive characteristics also share a common awareness of their distinctiveness 
(Hanf 1995,43)... The political leadership is always tempted to exploit such situations [socio-economic 
inequality] to raise the group's self-esteem, on the one hand, and to gain or retain popularity by aggressively 
articulating the sense of deprivation, on the other (Hanf 1995,44)... Politicising ethnic distinctions shifts the 
struggle from divisible goods to indivisible principles. It becomes very difficult to regulate conflicts ( ... ) [Ethnic 
groups] fear the loss of freedom or identity, and even their very existence (Hanf 1995,45)... Ethnurgy is a highly 
efficient means of aggregating political interests, provided that the retention or acquisition of power, prestige or 
material advantage can be linked to ethnic group membership ( ... ) Ethnurgy is most likely when a group believes it will derive benefits from it. There is no such thing as ethnicism for ethnicism's sake: ethnicism is always an 
ideology to legitimise power and privilege or to vent frustration (Hanf 1995,47). 
This thesis subscribes to the approach adopted by Hanf .7 Indeed, it recognises the existence of 
ethnic identity. Hence this author's argument is that communal identity and consciousness become 
activated in the advent of salient political issues, related to the uneven distribution of economic 
resources within society and the willingness of political leaders to maintain themselves in power. 
As Lijphart notes, 'from the 1970s on ( ... ) there has been a remarkable resurgence of ethnic 
demands and conflict in the most modem parts of the world ( ... ) Ethnic 
loyalties in most developing 
countries have persisted in spite of strong nation-building efforts' (Lijphart 1995a, 855). Ehrlich 
argues similarly by observing that 'as the world becomes more globalized, the world's citizens have 
shown a tendency towards reaffirming their own identities' (Ehrlich 2000,46 1). 
6 The particular suitability of Hanf's conception of ethnic identity for the Lebanese case will be presented at the 
beginning of the next chapter, before this thesis embarks on an examination of Lebanon's successive experiments with 
consociationalism. 
7 Banton provides a similar account of ethnicity writing that 'ethnic differences do not cause conflicts, nor do two 
individuals come into conflict with one another simply because they differentiate themselves ethnically. Conflict groups 
have to be communities, that is, groups differentiated on several dimensions and with a sense of identification. Ethnicity 
is one mode of identification. Group organization implies a set of priorities and sets of this kind express what is 
distinctive about the groups' (Banton 1986,14-15). 
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These scholarly observations take on an unprecedented importance when considering that most of 
the world's countries today belong to a multi-communal category. 'Although the nation-state is seen 
as the dominant form of political organization in modem history, in fact true nation-states are 
exceedingly rare' (Haddad 1985,5). Hanf observes that 'at the end of the [twentieth] century, the 
culturally homogeneous nation-state has become the exception while the multi-communal state is 
now the rule' (Hanf 1990,49). 8 Similarly, Lijphart comments as follows: 'Saying that most 
countries in the world are ethnically divided may in fact be an understatement. It is more accurate to 
state that almost all of them belong to the multiethnic category. That this is so becomes especially 
clear when we try to think of examples of countries that are completely homogenous and that have 
no ethnic diversity at all' (Lijphart 1990,491). 
Kymlicka, Connor and Haddad provide a statistical overview. For Kymlicka: 'according to recent 
estimates, the world's 184 independent states contain over 600 living language groups and 5,000 
ethnic groups. In very few countries can the citizens be said to share the same language or belong to 
the same ethnonational group' (Kymlicka 1995,1). Similarly for Haddad, 'of the approximately 150 
sovereign states active today, perhaps a dozen could legitimately be called nation-states' (Haddad 
1985,5). 'Approximately 8 states out of 10, existing now in the world, are composed of groups that 
distinguish themselves from each other by their religion, language or ethnicity' (Connor cited in 
Hanf 1990,49). 9 
Equally important however is the existence of class cleavages in almost all societies, since 
communal identity does not automatically translate into communal hostility or societal 
fragmentation along ethnic lines. For instance, Hadenius argues that 'now, the fact is that states 
which are more ethnically and linguistically fragmented in general are characterized by a lower 
degree of economic and social development' (Hadenius 1992,116). More importantly, however, if 
most of the world's countries are multi-communal and most of the world's countries are also 
developing countries, where socio-economic inequalities and class cleavages are the most acute, the 
interplay between communal and class cleavages appears to be a highly important factor in 
operation (or driving force) in a divided context, especially when bearing in mind that communal 
and class cleavages cross-cut considerably, as Harif notes. 
This description of the forces operating in a plural society takes on an unprecedented significance 
for the purposes of this thesis as the procedural aspects of democracy point to the important notion 
of elites in democratic rule, and precisely because the theory under investigation is an actor- 
8 Translated from French. 
9 Translated from French. 
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centered theory. Indeed, in the light of the elite nature of democratic rule as noticed by classical 
elite theorists, and because consociational theory explicitly prescribes a dominant role of elites in 
the rule of the multi-communal societies, the politicisation and manipulation of communal identities 
are a mechanism that elites, often, though not inevitably, resort to. As such, the politicisation of 
communal identity in a society riven by class cleavages plays an important role in destabilising 
peaceful communal coexistence and hindering stability and prospects for a stable democracy. As 
Hanf writes, 'politics in communal states, like politics everywhere, is about the distribution of 
power and wealth' (Hanf 1993,32). Thus, the competition for scarce material benefits in such a 
divided societal context often results in elite efforts (most of the time successful ones) to politicise 
communal identity, a situation to which elites usually resort to maintain their power, and which they 
nourish through clientelism with members of their respective communities. In this way, the latter 
become a fragmented, dependent mass. With elites blocking any manifestation of national power 
through the manipulation of communal identity and the clientelistic: network, this situation 
perpetuates divisions within society, and a national component to politics is continually lacking, 
thus damaging prospects for cooperation and stability. 
It would be safe to say that the above observations point to the importance of the presence and 
politicisation of ethnic identity in a class-tom society, as well as their impact on the form of 
government that this society is likely to find itself with. It is argued here that the interplay between 
vertical and horizontal compartmentalisation and the actor-centered forces operating in such a 
society remain crucial for an understanding of the form of government that the latter is likely to 
adopt. It seems that such a context has a constraining impact on the creation and maintenance of 
democratic institutions and stable democracy. In the words of Mill and Lijphart, ' "although 
democracy does not require a completely homogeneous society, it does require a minimum of social 
and political unity and consensus". The degree of unity and consensus in multiethnic societies is 
generally below this necessary minimum' (Lijphart 1995a, 854). In similar vein, Lijphart argues 
that in divided societies, 'deep ethnic and other societal divisions pose a grave problem for 
democracy, and that ceteris paribus, it is more difficult to establish and maintain democracy in 
divided than in homogeneous societies' (Lijphart 2000b). Likewise, Monshipouri writes: 4social 
heterogeneity and inequality will adversely affect democratic institutions and values' (Monshipouri 
1995,38), and Dowty notes that 'ethnic and religious cleavages clearly make the achievement of 
democracy more difficult... ' (Dowty 1999,169). Lijphart further points to the fact that 'the problem 
of ethnic and other deep divisions is greater in countries that are not yet democratic or not fully 
democratic than in the well-established democracies... ' (Lijphart 2000b). This observation takes on 
an unprecedented importance since most of the world's countries are in the process of creating and 
establishing rather than consolidating democratic practices and institutions. 
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In addition, Dahl's treatment of ethnicity goes into greater detail and makes it clear that 'in most 
countries, there exist a number of different lines of cleavage, and the intersection of these cleavage 
lines has produced a pattern of conflictive pluralism... ' (Dahl 1978,192). More specifically, Dahl 
addresses the impact of ethnic identity on the form of government that a divided society is likely to 
adopt pointing out that 'members of a subculture will strongly oppose any settlement on terms that 
fail to ensure the preservation of their subcultural heritage' (Dahl 1989,255). Such observations 
point to the persistent danger of communal conflict and system breakdown in many parts of the 
world, most of which are developing countries still in the process of creating and/or consolidating 
democratic institutions and practices. Hence, peaceful communal coexistence and stability in plural 
societies (which are usually characterised by the presence of more than two communal segments) 
are difficult to achieve, and therefore require counteractive or corrective mechanisms. 
3. Consociational democracy 
Set against this background, consociationalists purport consociational theory to be able to deliver on 
the promise of stable democracy/democratic stability in plural societies. The remainder of this 
chapter will critically examine this contention. Having set the societal stage on which this thesis 
unfolds, it is now necessary to examine consociationalism's relation to democratic theory, in an 
attempt to shed more light on the allegedly causative relationship between consociationalism and 
democratic stability. Deegan argues that 'the development of the consociational model of 
democracy provides a variant of liberal democracy' (Deegan 1996,56-7) and that it 'moved the 
debate about democracy one stage further' (Deegan 1993,13). As stated previously, one 
manifestation of divided societies is the persistent danger of the outbreak of communal conflict, 
possibly leading to instability and system breakdown. One such mechanism has manifested itself as 
a possible remedy, namely, the purposeful attempt to reach compromise between the communal 
groups, chiefly undertaken by the political representatives of the divided society and strengthened 
by specific institutions. However, this should not be regarded as a successful solution. Rather, the 
consociational device appears to be a more appropriate remedy when compared with other 
corrective mechanisms (the immorality of genocide and expulsion and the frequent unfeasibility of 
partition, sometimes for economic reasons, and assimilation). It is argued in this thesis that such a 
mechanism is the more likely form of government that a plural society will find itself with. Indeed, 
the form of government that a society develops is related to a large extent to the particular 
circumstances within that society. 
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B. Grand coalition and elite rule 
A closer look at one of the fundamental principles of consociational democracy, grand coalition and 
elite rule (i. e., at consociational theory's reliance on elitist politics), as defined by Lijphart, is bound 
to reveal the many shortcomings of the model in delivering on the promise of democratic stability 
for divided societies. This section of the chapter will point to the inappropriateness of the concept of 
"grand coalition", as defined by Lijphart, for plural societies and will suggest how elaborating this 
definition better suits the particular aspects of plural societies, and thus, the needs of such societies, 
for which the model was chiefly designed. Following this, the issue of elite dominance in the 
decision-making process in divided societies will be examined. 
1. Grand coalition 
As Lijphart notes, executive power sharing takes the form of a 'government by a grand coalition of 
the political leaders of all significant segments of the divided society' (Lijphart 1986,35). The 
author specifies that the institutional set up of the grand coalition can take various forms: 'The most 
straightforward form is that of a grand coalition cabinet in a parliamentary system. In presidential 
systems, the principle may be achieved by distributing the power of the presidency and other high 
offices among the different segments. These arrangements may be strengthened by broadly 
constituted councils or committees with important coordinating and advisory functions' (Lijphart 
1995b, 277). However, the author does not specify whether these councils or committees are part of 
the grand coalition. What are these councils or committees? Who do they include? Who do they fail 
to include? What is the nature of the "important coordinating and advisory functions"? Are these 
functions of a binding nature? Are these committees and councils part of the executive-decision 
making process? If they are, what significance does this have if their functions are only 
coordinating and advisory? How can they latter be important if they are only "coordinating and 
advisory"? What regulates the relationship of the grand coalition constituents to each other? Indeed, 
how is this relationship structured, and how are they related to each other? What is the basis for the 
relations among the grand coalition? Is it the power that is held by each coalition leader? Where 
does the power lie? The discussion below will attempt to clarify such issues of controversy. 
In plural societies, the danger of the outbreak of communal conflict is reduced if all segments 
(ethnic groups) of society are represented at the decision-making level. The prospects for peaceful 
communal coexistence may be enhanced if the leaders or representatives of all the segments, rather 
than the significant segments, of the divided society share executive power. For instance, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Lijphart does not specify who is not a significant segment of the divided 
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society, and more importantly who/what decides who is not a significant segment of the divided 
society. Thus, a legitimate question to raise might be: What criteria determine significant segments 
as opposed to insignificant segments? It should be kept in mind that the model is designed to 
operate in deeply divided societies, 10 in the sense that there is a considerable number of minority 
segments/groupings among the majority segments, oftenly with unequal size. Thus, if the model 
fails to provide them with equal power at the cabinet decision-making level, a clear problem of lack 
of representation (group exclusion) will manifest itself. Additionally, it is not clear how these 
"insignificant" segments will be able to use the constitutionally preserved consociational principle 
of mutual veto to protect the vital interests of their community if they are not represented at the 
executive level where mutual veto lies. Judging from the way Lijphart designs the concept of grand 
coalition, it appears that minority groups will always be dissatisfied, thus implying reduced chances 
for the prospects of democratic stability. Indeed, the problematic nature of group exclusion 
engendered by the model in that specific respect is important. Where divided societies are 
concemed, group exclusion at the decision-making level and the ensuing competition, are 
undesirable, as it does not appear to enhance the chances of democratic stability. 
For instance, Prewitt and Stone argue that 'if elites can be made to be representative of the masses, 
then the democratic principles are not lost despite the unequal division of political power in 
society... Although rule might always be in the hands of a tiny fraction of the population, 
arrangements can be devised to insure that these few will represent the true interests and welfare of 
the people. Thus, if it is no longer possible to have government by the people, the goals of 
government of and for the people are still within reach' (Prewitt and Stone 1973,186). Prewitt and 
Stone's points raise an issue central to the concerns of the divided society and to the concerns of the 
consociational. model of democracy, that is, the issue of adequate wide representation. In a primarily 
elitist context, such as that of consociational. theory, the further failure of the model to ensure 
representation wide enough to encompass all segments at the decision-making level is particularly 
troubling. As such, consociationalism, especially when looking at its procedural aspects, appears to 
be extremely elitist. 
Indeed, the prospects for democracy are enhanced if a government is composed of decision-makers 
that are truly representative of society. This raises the point of the unequal division of power within 
the cabinet. Not only does the model fail to provide all segments, irrespective of their size, with 
representation at the cabinet level, but it also fails to take into account the relative power of each 
segmental leader within the cabinet. Looking at the procedural aspects of consociationalism, it may 
10 As the Lebanese case demonstrates. 
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be said that within communal groupings, there is considerably diversity in views and interests 
which cannot be effectively articulated unless through narTow communal channels. Despite the 
guaranteed representation in the cabinet of significant sectarian groupings, the questions that arise 
are: Within each grouping, what is being guaranteed in the process and to whom is it being 
guaranteed? How are individual rights dealt with? What individual rights exist and how are they 
protected? Additionally, and bearing in mind the relative power and influence of the various 
significant segments (as plural societies are characterised by groupings of different size and power), 
despite their equal representation at the cabinet level, individual rights may not be protected 
similarly among the different groups. This seems to perpetuate divisions within the plural society, 
and hinders prospects for democratic stability. 
Additionally, the grand coalition can be viewed as constraining in case of the absence of a qualified 
representative within a certain ethnic group. In this case, the chosen representative will be the most 
qualified among his grouping but not necessarily a sufficiently qualified representative. " Against 
this background, the failure of the model to include all segments, rather than significant ones, 
appears as a substantial impediment to the achievement and maintenance of democratic stability. 
Thus, the prospects for creating and maintaining a mood of cooperation (instead of competition), 
and hence, democratic stability will be improved by widening the scope of representation at the 
grand coalition level to include all segments of the society irrespective of their size. Indeed, a re- 
defined all-inclusive scope of representation within the grand coalition is central to the utility of 
consociational theory, as it significantly enhances the prospects for democratic stability and thus, 
increases the successful operability of the model. 
Finally, some argue that the multiplicity of groups 12 hinders the applicability of the model, and 
hence, while the present study's suggestion to widen the scope of representation of the grand 
coalition may put further loads on the system in terms of ensuing deadlock and immobilism, it is 
important to say that this is not really the case. First, the representation of all segments at the 
decision-making level is one way of appeasing communal resentment. As such, the immobilism that 
may manifest itself is preferable to persistent societal dissatisfaction and unrest. Second, though it 
may appear that the power and influence of a "significant" group representative will overrule the 
rest, this is not so because all groups have the mutual veto power at their disposal. Additionally, if 
executive power is broadly shared by all groups, this may encourage the forming of intra-coalition 
11 As the case of the appointment of ministers in Lebanon indicates. 12 For writers who notice that the multiplicity of groups hinders the applicability of the model, see Michael Hudson, 
'The problem of authoritative power in Lebanese politics: why consociationalism failed'. In Nadim Shehadi and Dana 
Haffar Mills, eds. Lebanon: a history of conflict and consensus, London: CLS with I. B. Tauris & Co, p. 233,1988 and 
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alliances based on the identification of mutual interests. This may translate into the willingness to 
preserve and protect the latter and the effective ability to do so. As such, widening the scope of the 
grand coalition is seen as a way to counterattack the power and influence of significant groups 
within the coalition. 
However, the role that the constituents of this coalition, the elites, play in creating and maintaining 
a stable system is also crucial. Executive decision-making in a consociational democracy rests in 
the hands of a ruling elite. As seen by Lijphart, consociational democracy is a 'government by elite 
cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented culture into a stable democracy'. Again, 
consociational. democracy is a 'political community where elites make deliberate efforts to 
counterattack the immobilising and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation' (Lijphart quoted 
in Banks, 1987,26). This discussion will now turn to elite rule. 
2. Elite rule 
For the purposes of this discussion, Lijphart's definition of consociational democracy, provided in 
1969, is seen as significant. Here, he describes 'the essential characteristic of consociational 
democracy as not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by 
the elites to stabilize the system' (Lijphart 1969,213) or 'as overarching cooperation at the elite 
level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system' (Lijphart 
1968b, 21). This definition best illustrates the highly elitist character of consociational democracy, 
given that the institutional set up of the model and more importantly, the stability of the country, 
hinges solely on the elites. Furthermore, Lijphart's definition raises serious concerns in regard to the 
internal logic of the theory. Before examining this particular issue, a few observations should be 
made. 
First, the discussions undertaken in the above section pointed to the problems of representation and 
lack of legitimacy of the grand coalition. The latter, in effect, the institutional set up of elite rule, 
was shown to be a highly elitist institution. Hence, when speaking of consociational politics in 
terms of elite rule/consensus (the main feature of the consociational model), the scope of 
representation of the grand coalition and thus, its legitimacy, appear weak. While theoretically, the 
grand coalition is intended to represent the interests of the various communal groups, thus failing to 
represent the interests of the entire country and of "insignificant" groups, the procedures point to 
another shortcoming. This is because, as often happens, such elites appointed as communal 
As'ad Abukhalil, The politics of sectarian ethnicity: segmentation in Lebanese societ . Doctoral Thesis, p. 274,1988, USA: Georgetown University. 
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representatives serve their own interests and those of their associates. In societies riven by class 
cleavages, this appears particularly problematic, as the competition over scarce resources often fails 
to allow such elites to serve the interests of their own communities, let alone those of the wider 
population. Hence, the scope of representation and legitimacy of the grand coalition is called into 
question in the eyes of the entire country and the communal groups, thus leading to permanent 
societal fragmentation and the absence of a sense of nationhood. Needless to say, this puts into 
question the ability of the consociational model of democracy to generate democratic stability. 
At this stage, a reminder of the definition of democracy as is used in this thesis, is useful for the 
purposes of discussing elite rule. As argued in the section dealing with the definition of the notion 
of democracy, this thesis subscribes to the view of classical elite theorists, namely that democratic 
rule of and by the people is actually rule by an elite. It was pointed out that this is best seen by 
looking at the procedural aspects of democracy. Indeed, as Evans notes, classical elite theorists 
challenge the 'key premises of most Western liberal assumptions about politics... ' highlighting the 
'irrationality of liberal democracy... ' (Evans 1995,228-9). For instance: 
Classical elitists ... set out to show that the notion that the people or a majority of the people ruled was a chimera, 
and that whatever the form of government, the effective rulers constituted a narrow elite. Majoritarian 
democracy in any strict sense of the term was, in their view an impossibility, confirmed by the experience of 
history (Parry 1976,141). 
Numerous scholars share this conviction, such as Parry, who writes that 'the elitist argument is a 
much stronger one' (Parry 1976,31) and Evans, who points out that 'elitism still provides a focus 
for the work of political scientists and political sociologists... and has presented a compelling 
critique of the liberal democratic model' (Evans 1995,246). This thesis acknowledges the argument 
that 'elites, their connections and struggles, are of prime importance in shaping, threatening or 
changing democracy' (Etzioni-Halevy 1993,1). More specifically for the concerns of the divided 
societal context within which this thesis operates, according to classical elite theory, 'the nature of 
any society- whether it be consensual or authoritarian, dynamic or static, pacifist or totalitarian, 
legitimate or illegitimate- is determined by the nature of its elite' (Evans 1995,228). 11 Mosca 
addresses the notion of minority control of the majority, arguing that: 
In all societies- from societies that are very meagrely developed and have barely attained the dawnings of 
civilization, down to the most advanced and powerful societies- two classes of people appear- a class that rules 
and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes 
power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed 
and controlled by the first (Prewitt and Stone 1973,3). 
13 Emphasis added. 
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Similarly, while Dahl argues that 'in a collective decision, the good of all persons significantly 
affected by the decision should be taken into account' (Dahl 1989,298), he is quick to note that 
'this question has always been troublesome to advocates of democracy. While exclusions are 
invariably said to be justified on the grounds that the demos includes everyone qualifled to 
participate in ruling, the hidden assumption dispatched to the shadow theory of democracy is that 
only some people are competent to rule' (Dahl 1989,4). As stated earlier, this thesis, in its attempt 
to define democracy in divided societies, borrows from the work of Schumpeter, a major designer 
of democratic elite theory. Schumpeter's narTowing of the public realm, in order to bring the 
definition of democracy to realistic standards, best fits the form of government that divided 
societies are most likely to adopt. In the words of Parry, Schumpeter's book, Capitalism, socialism, 
and democracy, 'made a major impact on democratic theorizing. It has been regarded as the chief 
contribution to redefining democracy so as to accommodate an elitist situation' (Parry 1976,144). 
Schumpeter argues that: 
rational individuals demand democratic governance and they want badly that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions, in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people's vote (Schmitter 1995,129), 
However, he also remarks that: 
democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms 
"people" and "rule". Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the 
men who are to rule them (Hadenius 1992,15). 
This thesis argues that Schumpeter's definition clearly delimits the realm of control that groups 
have over decision-making. Parry comments on Schumpeter's definition noticing that it 'avoids any 
connotation of direct democracy in which the people rule directly- a conception seemingly too 
"idealistic" or out-moded for twentieth century use. This definition recognizes, as Schumpeter 
points out, the vital role played by leadership in modem "democracies" ' (Parry 1976,144). The 
conception of democracy provided by Schumpeter is particularly relevant in the light of the 
explicitly stated strong element of elite rule in consociational democracy. Such scholarly 
observations are invaluable for understanding the particular form of government that a society 
develops as the consociational model of democracy best fits the description of elite rule provided by 
classical elite theorists: When it comes to the successful operability of the consociational model of 
democracy, Lijphart rests this on the premise of the awareness of the elite of the dangers of 
communal conflict, their willingness and their ability to preserve the stability of the system. Each 
contention and its relations to democratic theory will be critically examined. 
64 
First, 'consociational solutions assume that sectarian or ethnic leaders are enlightened enough to 
realize that the societies in which they live are prone to destabilization and that caution must be 
exerted at the elite level to preserve stability' (Denoeux 1993,105). This assumption made by 
consociationalists, in this case, Ujphart, concerning the enlightened elite who is aware of the 
inherent dangers of the divided society and who is able to counterattack the latter, needs to be 
critically approached. The distinction between the elite and the mass in this specific respect, of 
awareness, does not seem particularly clear. For instance, what does it mean to be 
aware/enlightened enough of the dangers of communal conflict? What criteria distinguish the level 
and nature of this awareness between different individuals? Among the elites, some may be more 
aware than others of such inherent dangers of communal conflict. In such a case, and bearing in 
mind that elites are first chosen according to their confessional/communal affiliation, how can less 
enlightened elites protect the interests of their respective communities adequately if they are less 
aware than other elites? What criteria of awareness determine the appointment of elites in the grand 
coalition and the election of others to parliament? Additionally, if the first criteria for the 
appointment/election of elites is communal affiliation, with awareness being only the second 
criteria, can it be said that this does not put the stability of the plural society first? If the 
consociational model is essentially designed to generate stability (and democratic stability), would 
it not be more appropriate to speak first of awareness of the elites as a primary condition, rather 
than their communal identity? Also, as mentioned previously, within a certain grouping, there may 
be no qualified representative. In this case, the chosen representative will be the most qualified 
among his grouping but not necessarily a sufficiently qualified representative. Can it be said that 
this will affect the prospects for the generation and maintenance of stability? Needless to say, this 
brings the discussion to the original questions: what does it mean to be sufficiently enlightened and 
how is this enlightenment achieved? 
Additionally, this becomes more problematic when looking at the second contention made by 
Lijphart's consociationalist theory, which requires leaders 'capable of creating solutions to the 
political problems of their countries' (Horowitz 1985,573 quoted in Yagcioglu 1996). For instance, 
Lijphart argues that 'politicians can change the course of a country if they so desire'. A question 
that arises is: What if the communal leaders are collectively aware enough of the dangers of these 
problems, have the desire and willingness to overcome them, but are incapable of doing so? In 
plural societies, that is unstable societies torn by acute class inequalities, this is often the case (as 
the Nigerian case study in Chapter 2 reveals). In such cases, how can the stability of the system be 
maintained? 
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The third contention made by consociationalists relates to the willingness of the elites to preserve 
the system. According to Lijphart, the consociational model is viable because the elites play a 
crucial role in the creation and maintenance of democratic stability. That may very well be the case, 
only if the elites wish to play that role. What if they do not play that role? In that respect, the 
procedural aspects of democracy suggest that this may very well happen. Even if the elites are 
sufficiently aware of the dangers of communal conflict, and even if they have the ability to 
counterattack the latter, they are not likely to do so and protect the survival of the system unless 
they think there are common interests and benefits to derive from their relationship with the other 
elites and unless they manage to benefit effectively from this relationship. As such, the nature of 
elite rule in consociational democracy suggests that there is a structural problem in the organisation 
of political rule. This questions the so-called consensual role of the elites, and hence the alleged 
ability of the model to generate democratic stability. 
3. Political constraints 
The procedural aspects of the grand coalition and elite rule have significant political implications on 
the realm of control that the mass finds itself with. Consequently, it has significant implications on 
the substantial amount of societal unrest as a result of mass exclusion from politics. Earlier 
discussions of democracy pointed out that in stable societies, democracy allows citizen participation 
beyond the vote, and the structure of politics allows for the effective articulation of group interests 
in non-ethnic terms, and the ensuing lobbying of such interests in various institutional means. In 
plural societies however, the elites' politicisation and manipulation of ethnic/communal identity 
leads to the nearly perpetual fragmentation of society, thus hindering prospects for the emergence of 
a class-based group, effectively able to lobby for its interests on class-based, non-ethnic terms. In 
this respect, Pinkney observes that 'the exclusion from power of a social class is thus seldom total' 
(Pinkney 1993,12). As argued earlier, the structure of politics and constitutional regulations under 
the consociational system of rule does not allow for an effective articulation of group interests 
based on non-ethnic terms. While there often exists a number of groupings driven by secular 
motivations, the system does not allow their interests to be represented in meaningful terms, as the 
basis of effective representation allowed by the system remains on communal terms. As Steiner 
argues, 'the more conflicts in political systems are regulated by proportionality [as opposed to the 
majority model], the greater the tendency for ordinary citizens to have no functional channels for 
the articulation of dissent at their disposal' (Steiner 1971,68). As a result, what often happens is a 
loss of mass democracy and a fragmentation of society, where the constituents of the various 
communal groups are forced to resort to the dependent clientelistic relationship. As such, the 
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politicisation of ethnic/communal identity keeps the elites in power, thus accommodating the 
common interests of the elite cartel. 
Against this background, consociationalism, chiefly concerned with the alleged ability of the elite to 
create and maintain democratic stability, significantly fails to take into account the substantial 
amount of societal unrest that emerges from such a situation. This hinders prospects for stability. 
Indeed, consociationalists argue that in an effort to generate stability, citizen participation is neither 
necessary, nor indeed desirable. For Lijphart, the elitism of consociationalism 'should not be 
compared with any ideal of equal power or citizen participation' (Deegan 1993,13). Put more 
adequately in the words of Halpern, one of the strongest critics of consociationalism, consociational 
theory holds that divided societies can be stable if 'the conflicting subcultural groups are kept apart, 
and their elites are given the necessary latitude to govern together in a coalescent manner' (Halpern 
1984,2). This view seems to fit closely with the observations of elite theory, namely that 'the 
political passivity of the great majority of the people is not regarded as an element of democratic 
malfunctioning but on the contrary, as a necessary condition for allowing the creative functioning of 
the elite' (Bachrach 1967,32) and that 'the mass is typically "atomized". Its members are not 
organized for concerted political action' (Parry 1976,54). 
Indeed, the situation of the mass described above which results from the structure of rule of 
consociationalism justifies the observation by elite theorists that the mass is fragmented. It becomes 
increasingly apparent that the consociational model suggests that the necessary, sufficient 
conditions for the creation and maintenance of democratic stability rest on the formation of an elite 
cartel. Beyond any doubt, the internal logic of the theory and the model's ability to generate 
democratic stability are seriously questioned, as the theory fails to take into account the 
fragmentation of the real constituents of the plural society, the mass. As Deegan observes, 'the 
action basis and manoeuvrability of citizens is curbed to elections' as 'consociationalism is not 
chiefly concerned with an ideal of equal power or citizen participation beyond the vote' (Deegan 
1996,57). It would seem pertinent to argue that social unrest is substantial in a situation where 
citizen participation in politics is restricted to such an extent and more importantly, the grand 
coalition and elite rule sometimes fail to adequately represent the interests of the population and to 
protect their interests, at both the inter-and intra-group levels. 
Most importantly, consociational theory assumes that the mass is deferential and has low levels of 
interests in politics. This may be so as the model was originally devised by Lijphart from his 
observations of the Low Countries, in which the mass has relatively low levels of interest in 
politics. However, this questions the operability, and thus, the utility of the model for other 
67 
societies, where interest in politics is high, mainly because the plural society is significantly torn 
apart by class cleavages. Hence, it should be said that the internal logic of the theory is put into 
question as it would be simplistic to assume that the mass would prefer passivity to high interest in 
politics. It would be simplistic to assume that the mass is unaware that consociationalism's 
emphasis on deference and passivity among citizens is 'desirable to consociational elites and 
theorists; because it enables elites to conduct their political affairs with considerable freedom from 
public scrutiny and involvement' (Banks 1987,150-1). In other words, if the mass is fragmented 
and forced to resort to the clientelistic network (as a result of the politicisation of communal 
identity), this does not mean that it is unaware that the excessive room for manoeuvre for the elites 
comes at its own expense. This also brings to mind the argument above of the "enlightened enough" 
and "aware enough" elite. The elites are obviously chosen from the mass, which is allegedly 
unaware, deferent and passive. As such, how can they be aware and enlightened enough of the 
dangers of communal unrest? 
Numerous critics of consociationalism emphasise the "undemocratic" nature of decision-making, 
involving only elites of various segments, with a resultant loss of mass democracy. 14 The present 
discussion has dealt with the most important critiques advanced in this respect. Similarly, the issue 
of accountability of elected officials to citizens in a consociational democracy should be raised. 
Consociationalism perceives accountability as undesirable. As Farah notes, consociationalists; argue 
that 'apart from undermining the outcome of coalescent elite behavior, extensive accountability and 
its control may even upset the coalescent elite behavior in a more fundamental, procedural sense, by 
turning it into adversarial behavior... ' (Farah 1975,13). Again, it would be safe to argue that the 
amount of social unrest at the mass level would be significant when citizens are unable to 
effectively hold the elites accountable for their actions. Especially in plural societies, where the 
various communal groups may harbor hostile and suspicious feelings against each other, the desire 
to hold representatives of other communal groups accountable for their actions is particularly 
strong. The elites may not always be able to restrain their followers. Similarly, it is often the case 
that elites do not keep playing a consensual role within the elite cartel, as conflicts at the elite level 
are frequent. In such cases, the consociational model may be said to be too simplistic to expect 
14 For such accounts, see Sue M. Halpern, Consociational democracy and the dangers of politics as science. Doctoral 
Thesis. Oxford: University of Oxford, 1984, p. 120; Timothy Sisk, 'Power Sharing in multiethnic societies: principal 
approaches and practices'. In Gail Lapidus with Svetlana Tsalik, eds. Preventing deadly conflict. Strategies an 
Institutions. Proceedings of Conference in Moscow, Russian Federation, 14-16 August 1996, [A Report to the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, free of charge], 1996. www. ccRdc. orgZpubs/moscow/moscow4. htm, [accessed in 
July 2002]; Dimitris Chryssochoou, 'Between decisional efficiency and responsible government: the EC in search of a 
balancing act'. [Unpublished conference proceedings quoted with kind permission from the ECSA General Secretary]. 
Paper presented at the Second ECSA World Conference, "Brussels 5-6 May 1994". 
www. ecsanet. orp-Iconferences/ldn. htm [accessed in November 2002] and Brenda M. Seaver. 'The regional sources of 
power-sharing failure: the case of Lebanon'. Political Science Quarterly (Summer), Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 253,2000. 
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passivity and restraint from the followers. Finally, and as argued previously, the scope of 
representation of the grand coalition has been shown to be highly elitist, thus always leaving 
minority groups unsatisfied. 15 Again, and in short, the model appears too simplistic to assume 
mutual restrain from raising accountability concerns between the elites/mass and within the elite 
cartel itself. Against such a background, this puts into question the internal logic/assumptions of 
consociationalism and its ability (i. e., the elites' ability) to generate democratic stability for plural 
societies. Wantchekon, in his critique of consociationalism, pertinently doubts the consociational 
'peace'. Best phrased in his words, 'this model of democracy can make electoral outcomes so 
predictable and so meaningless that it could hinder accountability, good governance and ultimately 
political stability' (Wantchekon 2000,340). 
As noted previously, the form of government that a society develops, in this case an elitist one, is 
determined by the nature of this society and the various forces at play within it. Just as the 
consociational model comprises political (allegedly corrective) devices aimed at preserving stability 
in a divided society, it also prescribes social counteractive mechanisms designed for the same end. 
The following discussion is an attempt to assess the appropriateness of the model's social 
counteractive devices for such societies. 
C. Segmental autonomy 
The second consociational principle, that is segmental autonomy, or rather, a high degree of 
autonomy for the segments of the plural society, prescribes the delegation of as much decision- 
making as possible to the separate segments (Lijphart 1986,35). In other words, on all issues of 
common concern, the decisions should be made jointly by the representatives of the segments. 'on 
all other issues, decision-making should be left to each segment' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). While 
Chapter 2 pointed to the many problems associated with the practical operability of this 
consociational principle (because of its vague definition), this section of the thesis will deal with the 
impact this principle has on the plural society, i. e., its permanent fragmentation. 
For Lijphart, segmental autonomy means the freedom of 'clearly separate and easily identifiable 
segments' [the characteristic of the plural society according to Lijphart] to run their own affairs: 
&political parties, interests groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations 
tend to be organised along the lines of segmental cleavages... [whether] of religious, ideological, 
linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature' (Steiner 1981b, 340). The underlying 
15 As the Lebanese case demonstrates. 
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assumption of consociationalists is that the danger of the outbreak of tensions and conflicts will be 
reduced if there is a minimal level of contact between the different "atomised" individuals, and that 
this can be achieved when the state recognizes and gives guaranteed rights to the different groups to 
preserve their distinct cultural heritage, traditions and belief systems through ideological tools such 
as communal schools and communication medias and even through political parties and interest 
groups. 
A first critique that can be offered is that such an organisation of society effectively politicises and 
manipulates communal identity, thereby hindering the emergence of class-based consciousness 
among individuals of different communal groups who share the same socio-economic status. 
Indeed, the extent and nature of communal decision-making that the consociational model allocates 
to the different groups Suggests that consociationalists consider the notion of ethnicity as a static 
and immutable force, a contention rejected in this thesis. Rather, this thesis points to the saliency of 
socio-economic and political (power and influence) forces in play in any given society. In fact, two 
central features of the consociational model, horizontal and vertical communication, (discussed 
below), illustrate consociationalists' static view of the notion of ethnicity. The consociational 
scenario in this respect can be said to foster the permanent fragmentation of plural societies. Indeed, 
the description provided by elite theorists of society appears very pertinent: 
Horizontal contacts between members of the society break down and are replaced by vertical contacts between 
atomized individuals and the elite (Parry 1976,55-6). The public is best understood as an atomized and 
fragmented mass, capable only of responding to the leadership of superior elements in society. Only the elite can 
transcend their own milieux and develop a vision of a different society. The masses are trapped in their milieux, 
and depend on the visions provided to them by an elite (Prewitt and Stone 1973,2 1). 
Clearly, the pertinent description of society provided by elite theorists fits the situation that a 
society will find itself with under the consociational framework of rule. The following sections will 
critically examine the so-called detrimental impact of subcultural contact (horizontal 
communication) on the stability of divided societies and the so-called counteractive device (vertical 
communication) that consociational theory prescribes as a remedy. Deegan, referring to the 
principle of segmental autonomy, notes that this 'strong characteristic of consociationalism, the 
separate autonomy awarded to each sect' would contribute 'to a certain degree' in containing 
societal fragmentation (Deegan 1993,13). This contention will be critically examined. 
1. Horizontal contacts versus vertical contacts 
First, consociationalists prescribe minimal contact between the members of the various communal 
groupings. The internal logic of such a prescription deserves to be critically approached. A question 
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that arises is the following: how would one go about decreasing the contacts between confessional 
groups? As it is, through the normal process of working, living in society, joining the military and 
the national universities and schools (a very common manifestation in plural societies tom by socio- 
economic crises since such public institutions are free of charge), etc subjects the ordinary citizen to 
considerable contact with other people, i. e., people from other communal groups. Thus, the intemal 
logic of this contention does not appear particularly sound. 
'For Lijphart, 'in case of low integration ... political stability can be enhanced by deliberately 
reducing the volumes of transactions. He further suggests that amalgamation itself is a strong 
generator of transactions and should therefore be reduced' (Farah 1975,17). It should be said that a 
number of political researchers share consociationalists' prescription of minimal subcultural 
contact. For instance, Deutsch and Etzioni's descriptions of the so-called detrimental impact of 
subcultural contact on a divided society are particularly useful. According to Deutsch, 'the number 
of opportunities for possible conflict will increase with the volume and range of mutual 
transactions, because these transactions throw a burden upon the institutions for peaceful 
adjustment or change' (Farah 1975,17). Etzioni similarly proposes that 'until nationwide education 
produces shared values, separation of groups adhering to incompatible values helps preserve even 
the small amount of unity existing in many new nations... If communication is developed more 
rapidly than education, the tension level in these societies may increase' (Farah 1975,7). While the 
argument that education serves as a medium for bridging gaps between the members of the various 
communal groupings in cases of low integration is somehow convincing, it is not clear how such a 
unity would come about if the members of the communal groupings attend their own communal 
schools and only interact with members of their respective groupings, as consociationalism 
prescribes. As such, the model appears to encourage divided societies to remain divided. 16 
Additionally, the way that segmental autonomy prescribes the undesirability of horizontal 
communication also prescribes that vertical communication (that is, elite/masses contact) be more 
important and effective. As such, members of different groups are therefore forced to rely on their 
respective representatives in order to safeguard and preserve their political, economic and social 
rights. The basis of political, social and economic advancement of any group thus depends on its 
leader. Looking at the procedural aspects of the elite/constituency relationship and bearing in mind 
the somehow dependent clientelistic network in existence, the politicisation of communal identity 
manifests itself frequently. It thus fosters the permanent fragmentation of society. Beyond any 
doubt, this questions the ability of the principle of segmental autonomy to generate democratic 
16 As the Lebanese case, examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 reveals. 
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stability. In other words, the dependence of the members of the various groups on their 
representatives puts them in a passive state, whereby they are unable to challenge/change such a 
situation. However, mass impotence and passivity should not be regarded as societal stability. 
Rather, such a situation suggests latent unrest, likely to manifest itself in due course if socio- 
economic conditions worsen. 
2. Communal groups versus interest groups 
More important in terms of this perspective of society is the emphasis on communal groups that the 
consociational model fosters. This emphasis on communal groups as the sole constituents of society 
significantly hinders the emergence of non-political interests groups who are not lobbying for any 
political rights in the first place, but are trying to effectively channel their various secular ideas and 
their views on civil society and personal status codes. 17 According to the consociational model 
when it relates to the principle of segmental autonomy, the state exists to promote the cultural rights 
of communal groups. 18 As such, it can be said that the theory goes to the extreme of ignoring the 
rights that individuals are entitled to, especially if they wish not to affiliate themselves to any of the 
ethnic groups. 
Indeed, though this thesis prescribes to the idea that democracy is best seen as a way of dealing with 
group interests, when talking about segmental autonomy, which deals with communal affairs that 
do not have political saliency, individual rights should be taken into consideration in a more 
significant and extensive way. While consociationalism views individuals as belonging primarily to 
their respective communal groups, this does not always pervade their lives and they may very well 
have different inclinations, that consociationalism does not seem to take into consideration. Indeed, 
consociationalism seems to ignore the fact that religious consciousness and religiosity belong to the 
private realm of a person and may not always be the driving force behind a person's activities. 
When it comes to individuals who are atheists, consociationalism appears to prevent their social 
advancement as their interests are only catered for in ethnic terms. Additionally, when it comes to 
individuals who consider religion as a private element of their lives, and do not wish to affiliate 
themselves with their respective communal groupings, consociationalism fails on the advancement 
of their cultural and social values. This is best seen when looking at issues like personal status codes 
(such as marriage, inheritance and the like). Indeed, the inexistence or ineffectiveness of civil status 
17 Such as the failed attempt by secularly driven Lebanese politicians, such as the President of the Republic, to introduce 
a law allowing optional civil marriage. 18 For a very pertinent comparison between the ways group and individual rights are dealt with in liberal democracies 
and consensus systems of government, see Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf, 'The diverse modes of conflict- 
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codes and of secular civil courts in many countries suggests that consociationalism, through the 
principle of segmental autonomy, does not recognise the existence of such individuals and fails to 
cater for their needs. As such, they are forced to affiliate with their group, thus compromising their 
own principles, in order to bring an element of order and legitimacy to their lives (such as marriage 
and inheritance). In other words, segmental autonomy allows for the heavy involvement of religion 
into personal private life, thus leading to personal frustration for individuals. 
3. Socio-cultural constraints 
It is now important to highlight the constraints that the principle of segmental autonomy imposes on 
the advancement and social modernisation of plural societies. While this consociational device 
increases each group's sense of security by maximising its control of its own destiny, it is 
problematic to argue that it contributes in creating and maintaining a system able to generate a 
stable democracy. Indeed, this thesis subscribes to the view that cultures are not fixed eternal 
entities, while consociationalism is not positively responsive to cultural changes that occur in 
society. Consociationalism does not cope adequately with the dynamics of cultural change. Cultures 
are always changing, usually slower than other changes that are occurring in societies. Societies, 
through the logic of the concept, contain cleavages. However, they also have commonalities within 
them. Societies are not tribes. As modem societies change, there is a tendency for commonalities to 
increase. When faced with similar criticisms that the consociational model appears discriminatory 
(in this respect as well as other respects that will discussed later), Lijphart developed his concept of 
self-determination, as opposed to the concept of pre-determination, and set out to extend it to all 
four consociational components: 'all the consociational principles can now be instituted on the basis 
of self-determination' (Lijphart 1995b, 282). 
As regards the definition of the concept of self-determination, Lijphart argues that it 'refers to a 
method or process that gives various rights to groups within the existing state- for instance, 
autonomy rather than sovereignty- and it allows these groups to manifest themselves instead of 
deciding in advance on the identity of the groups' (Lijphart 1995b, 275). More clearly, 'it is to set 
up a system in which the segments are allowed, and even encouraged to emerge spontaneously- and 
hence to define themselves instead of being pre-defined' (Lijphart 1995b, 280). Concerning the 
definition of the notion of pre-determination, Lijphart explains that 'like self-determination', his 
concept of pre-deternýiination 'refers to an internal process but in contrast with self-determination, it 
means that the groups that are to share power are identified in advance' (Lijphart 1995b, 276). 
regulation in deeply divided societies'. International Journal of Comparative Sociolo&Y [Editor: K. Ishwaran], Vol. 33, 
No. 1-2, p. 33,1992. 
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Briefly, he states that in most cases, 'unless there are compelling reasons to opt for pre- 
determination, the presumption should be in favor of self-determination' (Ujphart 1995b, 2834). 
He bases his preferences on the fact that 'pre-detern-iination is inevitably discriminatory- in favor of 
the groups that are included, and against groups, especially smaller groups, that are not recognized'. 
Finally, he holds that pre-determination 'entails the assignment of individuals to the specified 
groups, which may be controversial, offensive, or even completely unacceptable to many citizens. 
It also means that there is no place for individuals or groups who reject the premise that society 
should be organized on an ethnic or communal basis' (Lijphart 2000b). 
While Lijphart's elaboration on the model in this respect is salutary, it may be argued that the 
concept of self-determination is at odds with the widely accepted argument (from consociationalists 
as well as its critics) that the chances for the success of consociationalism increase with the 
presence of a relatively small number of segments, ideally between three and five, as advocated by 
Lijphart. Likewise, the chances of consociationalism breakdown increase with the presence of a 
relatively large number of segments. Numerous scholars have recognised the causal relationship 
between small group number and chances of success. 19 Clearly, this puts a strain on the practical 
operability of the model. Therefore, since the self-detern-ýnation concept encourages 'groups, 
especially smaller groups, that are not recognized' to emerge and define themselves, this is seen as a 
possible threat to the stability of the system, and runs against the background conditions established 
by Lijphart for the creation and maintenance of a stable democracy. Rather, it may be argued that 
encouraging the emergence of such groups may be salutary to the operability of the model if the 
theory prescribes at the same time, the simultaneous dismantlement of the rigid structure of the 
communal groups and a shifting of loyalties from narrow communal interests to more secular and 
ideological motivations. However, as Lijphart's concept of self-determination stands at present, it 
does not seem to promote democratic stability and hence, renders the operability of the model more 
problematic. 
Additionally, numerous critics of consociationalism argue that the consociational model keeps 
divided societies more divided in many respects that will be presented here. First, central to this 
argument is the observation many scholars make concerning the role that the elite plays in that 
respect. For instance, 'Tsebelis suggests that consociational institutions may provide incentives for 
politicians to foment conflict along group lines in order to bolster their own bargaining position vis- 
A-vis other groups at the political center- what he terms "elite-initiated conflict" ' (Tsebelis 1990 
quoted in Sisk 1996). In similar vein, Horowitz advances the notion of elite-initiated conflict and 
19 For instance, see As'ad Abukhalil, The politics of sectarian ethnicity: segmentation in Lebanese societY. Doctoral 
Thesis. USA: Georgetown University, p. 274,1988. 
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writes: 'There is no reason to think automatically that elites will use their leadership position to 
reduce rather than pursue conflict' (Horowitz 1990 quoted in Sisk 1996). This critique is consistent 
with the assumption advanced by Mosca and Michels that 'the elite cultivates its coherence and 
consciousness whilst adopting towards the mass a policy of "divide and rule" ' (Parry 1976,55-6). 
This scholarly consensus as to the role that the elite plays in keeping divided societies more divided 
takes on an unprecedented importance in light of the classical elitist argument outlined above and in 
light of the substantial reliance of the consociational model on elite behaviour. Beyond any doubt, 
elite-initiated conflict (best viewed when looking at the procedural aspects of elite rule) regarding 
social/communal issues related to lifestyles, shared values, traditions and belief systems hinders 
prospects for democratic stability. 
Second, a number of researchers argue that the consociational principle of segmental autonomy 
fosters ideological, national and territorial separatism rather than integration. In this respect too, the 
role of the elite is seen as a major factor in downplaying notions of unity, civic consciousness and 
nationalism. For instance, elite theory argues that 'the mass is able to act as a single unit only when 
it is integrated from outside by the elite. Leadership can transform the mass from an aggregation of 
isolated units into a solid, unified group. But this unity is entirely artificial. It does not arise 
spontaneously from within the mass' (Parry 1976,55). In this respect, it is important to point to the 
advantages of liberal democracy that 'fosters civility, namely, a common domain of values, 
institutions and identify, at the expense of communalism. It equates nationalism with citizenship 
and the state with civil society' (Smooha and Hanf 1992,33). 
Third, many researchers argue that the consociational model underestimates the consequences that 
mass fragmentation can have on the stability of the system and overestimates the capacity of elite 
accommodationism to stabilise the system. Seaver points to a related issue, arguing that 'a number 
of social scientists moreover, assert that consociational devices increase friction in plural societies 
because many socioeconomic problems are ignored to avoid intersectarian conflicts' (Seaver 2000, 
252). More specifically related to the above point, Horowitz 'questions the consociational focus on 
accommodation at the elite level, and is concerned that consociational arrangements reinforce the 
importance of ethnic or religious cleavages' (Grofman and Stockwell 2001). Indeed, Farah observes 
that 'subcultural hostility remains significant at the mass level' (Farah 1975,15). Seaver's 
observation that 'social scientists have argued that consociational democracy may exacerbate, rather 
than ameliorate, intercommunal tensions' (Seaver 2000,252) is particularly relevant. 
Consociationalism can be said to encourage the emergence of a differentiated culture. Against this 
background, it is not entirely clear how and when a system of shared values, as Etzioni argues 
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above, will emerge. Approaches similar to Etzioni's may be criticised for their reductionist 
understanding of human beings, and for assuming that individuals are fixed social structures. 
In this respect, Kabbara identifies one major problem with the consociational argument as 'its limit 
and reductionist understanding of the process of formation and construction of social identities, its 
attempt to fix social differences, and the methods used to implement this' (Kabbara 1991,353). In 
sum, though the consociational device of segmental autonomy is aimed at assisting the model in 
safeguarding stable consensual politics, it is safe to say that the many drawbacks, among them the 
risk of separatism (discussed below), are detrimental at the mass level, especially if socio-economic 
situations worsen and also on the long run. 
When it comes to separatism, numerous scholars point out that consociational theory exhibits a 
static character in an important number of aspects: the theory fails to discern that societies are 
constantly in a process of transition and modemisation. For instance, Prewitt and Stone point to the 
static character that elite theory exhibits where 'the basic challenge to society is not to reform itself 
but to keep from disintegrating' (Prewitt and Stone 1973,22): 'It might be thought that elite theory 
cannot account for social and political change, and indeed, this criticism has often been voiced' 
(Prewitt and Stone 1973,21). It is safe to say that segmental autonomy both retards and exacerbates 
the modernisation process that divided societies, just like other societies, go through. Without any 
doubt, and contrary to Lijphart's contention, this restricts the ability of the device to contribute to 
creating and maintaining a system capable of generating stable democracy. Here, Pinkney 
appropriately questions whether liberal democracy is 'something to be valued... because it provides 
a relatively peaceful means of responding to changing pressures and ideas in society' (Pinkney 
1993,17). 
Finally, this section will address whether the consociational device of segmental autonomy fosters 
tolerance (the attitude) and toleration (the practice) among ethnic groups, a somewhat essential 
requirement for it to contribute in generating stable democracy. Walzer puts forward the notion that 
'tolerance today more than ever is not only a philosophical notion but also a political principle' 
(Kareh 1999,126) . 
20 He argues that 'in practice ... the nation-state is now the more likely regime of 
toleration' (Walzer 1997,24) because 'toleration in nation-states is commonly focused not on 
groups but on their individual participants who are generally conceived stereotypically first as 
citizens then as members of this or that minority' (Walzer 1997,25). Walzer has more faith in 
toleration for nation-states rather than consociations. He argues that with its focus on groups rather 
20 Translated from French. 
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on individuals, consociational theory does not promote toleration and tolerance between all 
segments of society and their constituents: 
It is the fear of disturbance that breaks up consociations [such as] Social or demographic change.... Suddenly, 
one of the parties looks dangerous to all the others. Mutual toleration depends on trust not so much in each 
other's good will as in the institutional arrangements that guard against the effects of ill will. The resulting 
insecurity makes toleration impossible. What is the danger that I fear? That the consociation will be turned into 
an ordinary nation-state where I will be a member of the minority looking to be tolerated by my former 
associates who no longer require my toleration... (Walzer 1997,24). 
However, while Walzer's argument suggests that the consociational model, at the level of 
communal interaction does not encourage toleration and tolerance, he also writes that 'individual 
members of the different communities need not accommodate each other except when they meet 
and bargain in the marketplace. In fact, consociation is probably easiest when the communities 
don't have much to do with one another, when each of them is relatively self-sufficient and 
inwardly turned' (Walzer 1997,54). This points to a contradictory standpoint on the issue of 
tolerance and toleration and brings to mind the critical arguments that the previous discussion 
undertook in regard to Etzioni's conflictual standpoint. Indeed, it is not readily apparent how both 
notions can be fostered within a plural society if Walzer advocates minimal subcultural contact. In 
short, it is safe to say that the consociational model in the respect of the consociational device of 
segmental autonomy does not appear to be able to generate democratic stability for plural society. 
Hence, it can be said that the consociational device of segmental autonomy does not help to foster 
tolerance and toleration among the segments of a divided society. Rather, it helps cultivate a feeling 
of suspicion and hostility between individuals and increased dependence on the elites as a basis for 
the advancement of the group and its members. Therefore, it is problematic to argue (like 
consociationalists do) that it contributes in creating and maintaining a system able to generate 
democratic stability as the internal logic of consociationalism' view of segmental autonomy was put 
into question and its operability was shown to indicate a permanent fragmentation of society, where 
there seems to be no sense of a national element in the nature of society. This puts into question its 
ability to generate democratic stability. Having dealt with the two primary principles of 
consociational democracy and their relations to democratic theory, the discussion will now move to 
an examination of the secondary principles of the model (proportionality and mutual veto) and 
determine their relations to democratic theory. 
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D. Proportionality 
Consociationalists argue that the complex social fabric of divided societies makes it difficult to 
prescribe majoritarian models of democracy in the context of divided societies and that 
counteractive mechanisms are needed in order to maintain a system of stability. This section will 
explain the third consociational device, proportionality, designed to operate as a stabilising 
mechanism. It will look at the procedural forms that proportionality takes and critically examine its 
appropriateness for plural (heterogeneous and unstable) societies. Proportionality is considered as 
'the basic standard of political representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public 
funds' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). As devised by Lijphart, its objective is to guarantee the fair 
representation of minority segments: 'there are two extensions of the proportional rule that entail 
even greater minority protection: the over-representation of small segments and parity of 
representation (when the minority or minorities are over-represented to such an extent that they 
reach a level of equality with the majority or largest group)' (Ujphart 1995b, 278). This may be 
referred to as qualified proportional rule rather than proportional representation. More specifically, 
'proportional results in elections may be achieved by the various systems of formal proportional 
representation (PR) or by several non-PR methods' (Lijphart 1995b, 279). 21 As with all three 
consociational principles, this fourth principle aims to counteract the inherent dangers in divided 
societies by reducing the risks of the outbreak of communal conflict. This is achieved through a 
(theoretically) just distribution of political power and public office representation among the 
different ethnic groups of the divided society, as well as a just distribution of the economic 
resources available to the state. Hence, the underlying assumption is that the risk of instability will 
decrease. However, looking at the procedural aspects of this three-fold consociational principle, 
(i. e., the three-dimensional elements of political representation, civil service appointment and 
allocation of public funds in operation), this contention needs to be critically evaluated. 
1. Political representation 
It is important to note here that there is a wide scholarly consensus as to the inappropriateness of 
majoritarian models of democracy for divided societies. For consociationalists, group exclusion in 
terms of political representation (in divided societies) within the state apparatus is not desirable. 
Lijphart refers to the dangers of majoritarianism writing that 'majority-control democracy spells 
majority dictatorship instead of genuine democracy' (Lijphart 1985,102): 'this meaning of 
democracy is violated if significant minorities are excluded from the decision-malcing process for 
21 As an example, Lijphart mentions 'Lebanon's method of requiring ethnically balanced slates in multi-member district 
plurality elections' (Lijphart 1995b, 279). The institutional form of proportionality will be examined in later chapters. 
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extended periods of time' (Lijphart 1997a, 144). Again, the use of the notion "significant 
ininorities" is problematic. Indeed, it may be said that there is a tension between the words, 
it significant" and "minorities" and brings the discussion to who is a significant minority and what 
criteria detemiine a significant minority. As this debate has been addressed in previous sections, the 
discussion will move forward. In connection with the argument about the inappropriateness of 
majoritarianism in divided societies, Nordlinger writes that orthodox democratic theory, which 
presupposes altemating or shifting majorities, is readily not applicable to divided societies 
(Nordlinger 1972,34-5). Similarly, commenting on the impact of majoritarianism on divided 
societies, Sisk emphasises that 'the scholarly consensus recognizes the principle's limitations in 
multiethnic societies' (Sisk 1996). Of greatest significance is Sisk's illustration of the inadequacy of 
the concept of majority rule for heterogeneous and unstable societies. He writes: 
Scholars of comparative politics tend to agree that simple forms of majoritarian government contain special 
problems for multiethnic societies. Minorities in particular in such societies do not equate democracy with 
freedom or participation, but with the structured dominance of adversarial majority groups... For minority 
groups, losing an election is not simply a matter of losing office, but of losing the means for protecting the 
survival of the group... Advocates of power sharing in divided societies agree on the dangers of 
majoritarianism... Without an assurance that the electoral system will not lead to permanent exclusion, why 
should a minority group that perceives a threatening environment be willing to accept the inherent risks of 
electoral competition? (Sisk 1996). 
Numerous scholars on consensus and power-sharing forms of rule share this view. 22 While this 
thesis subscribes to such an approach (i. e., the inadequacy of majoritarian models of democracy for 
divided societies), procedural aspects of the twin concepts of political representation and civil 
service appointment reveal that the implementation of the consociational principle of 
proportionality, irrespective of the various forms it may take (parity and the like), is not in and of 
itself an indicator that prospects for democratic stability will be furthered and that prospects for 
communal outbreak will be reduced. It is argued in this thesis that adequate, fair, just or qualified 
proportional political representation within the state apparatus and civil service does not 
automatically translate into adequate, fair, just or qualified political representation of the various 
communal groupings. Indeed, even if political representation within the state apparatus (the various 
state bodies such as parliaments, consultative parliamentary committees, ministries' employees, and 
all other governmental agencies) and the civil service is distributed among the various communities 
in a fair and adequate way, the degree of power and influence that each representative enjoys tells a 
different story. For instance, looking at parliaments, it may be said that though the interests of 
22 For researchers who argue in similar vein to Lijphart, Sisk and NordIinger, see Hans Keman, 'Political stability in 
divided societies- a rational-institutional explanation'. Australian Journal of Political Science (July), Vol. 34, No. 2, 
p. 257,1999; Akintola Olarewaju Falaiye, Consociationalism and the Nigerian political system. 1960-1988 fvolumes 
and 111. Doctoral Thesis. USA: University of Kansas, pp. 68-69,1990 and Michael Hudson, 'The problem of 
authoritative power in Lebanese politics: why consociationalism failed'. In Nadirn Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds. 
Lebanon: a history of conflict and consensu , pp. 224-39. London: CLS with I. B. Tauris & Co, p. 233,1988. 
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peasants, unskilled and semi-skilled workers may be represented, they are represented in a way that 
is different from the way the interests of the business class are represented. A person who is in the 
business class may only have the same single vote as a peasant, but he/she will have considerably 
more influence on the issues under consideration in this section, politically salient issues. Thus, 
adequate political representation among the various communal groupings in the state apparatus does 
not necessarily translate into adequate protection and representation of the rights of these various 
groupings. Though in a consociational democracy, there is guaranteed representation in the political 
system of communal groupings, questions that arise are: What is being guaranteed in the process 
and to whom is it being guaranteed? Within each communal group, how are individual lights dealt 
with? Among the groups, are not individual rights dealt with differently depending on each 
grouping's socio-economic status? Does this perpetuate divisions within societies? Is not the 
representation of socio-economic groups a better way of organising a plural society? 
For instance, in a study concerning the claim that PR systems (deriving from Lijphart's theory) are 
more effective at engendering support for political system among ethnic minorities, Norris points 
out that 'consociational theory makes strong claims for the virtues of PR in plural societies' as her 
study 'finds no evidence for the proposition that PR party list systems are directly associated with 
higher levels of support for the political system among ethnic minorities: 'There is little direct 
evidence about the impact of electoral systems on cultural attitudes, such as satisfaction with 
democracy and support for the political system' (Norris 1999). 23 
Finally, it is important to return to the notions of pre-determination and self-determination, as 
introduced in the previous section. 24 Lijphart observes that 'in systems of pre- determination, there 
is a strong tendency to rigidly fix shares of representation on a permanent basis. 25 He argues that 'in 
contrast, self-determination can be entirely non-discrirnýinatory, neutral, and flexible' (Lijphart 
2000b): 'It is naturally and continually self-adjusting' (Lijphart 1995b, 285). The notion of self- 
determination touches on all four consociational principles. In the case of proportionality, it is seen 
as an attempt to allow for smooth adjustments. This comes as a response to immobilism, which may 
result from demographic or other changes in the divided society. As such, Lijphart's notion of self- 
determination is seen as an attempt to strengthen consociational institutions, with the purpose of 
enhancing prospects for peaceful communal coexistence, by allowing minority groups to define 
23 For details of Norris' study, see Pippa Noff is, 'Ballots not bullets: testing consociational theories of ethnic conflict, 
electoral systems and democratization'. Paper prepared for the International Conference on Institutional Design, 
Conflict Management and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, 9-11 
December 1999. 
24 See section C. 3. in this chapter. 
25 He gives the example of 'the [arbitrary] 6: 5 Christian-Muslim ratio in pre-war Lebanon' (Lijphart 2000b). 
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themselves on ethnic/communal terms, or on the basis of non-ethnic, secular and more fluid 
identities 
However, as argued above, the concept of self-determination is at odds with the widely accepted 
observation (from consociationalists and its critics alike) that the chances of success of 
consociationalism increase with the presence of a relatively small number of segments, ideally 
between three and five (as advocated by Lijphart). Likewise, its chances of breakdown increase 
with the presence of a relatively larger number of segments. Indeed, as Lijphart argues, the process 
of self-determination 'is to set up a system in which the segments are allowed, and even encouraged 
to emerge spontaneously- and hence to define themselves instead of being pre-defined' (Ijjphart 
1995b, 280). This self-determination process, indeed, encourages more groups to define themselves 
in terms of fluid, as well as ethnic identities. While advocating the emergence of newly defined 
groups to share power on non-ethnic terms appears salutary for the operability of the model, this 
thesis argues that unless this is simultaneously accompanied by a process of dismantlement of 
groupings based on communal identities, the applicability of the model is still further hindered. 
Indeed, this thesis argues that Lijphart's introduction of the principle of self-determination is a 
significant, and interesting elaboration of the consociational model, as it implicitly recognises and 
admits that the politicisation of communal identity has a detrimental impact on the stability of the 
plural society. As such, it is seen as a clear and salutary move away from Lijphart's view that ethnic 
identity pervades an individual's life, a contention rejected in this thesis. Hence, if accompanied by 
the dismantlement of ethnically-based groupings, such an elaboration of the model is welcome at a 
theoretical level. However, it remains to be seen how such a process of self-determination will 
unfold in procedural terms. 
The discussion in the above paragraphs points to two important distinctions. First, the arguments 
presented emphasised the inadequacy of the majoritarian model of democracy for divided societies. 
However, they also suggested that adequate proportional political representation does not translate 
into adequate protection and preservation of the political rights of the various groupings. Rather, the 
procedural aspects reveal that the unequal power and influence of the various representatives is a 
better indicator of how real representation and preservation of rights takes place. Thus, the 
consociational principle of proportionality in terms of political representation does not seem to 
guarantee the ability of the model to generate democratic stability. Second, the debate concerning 
the system of pre-determination as opposed to self-determination, suggests that the application of 
the latter might hinder consociational "peace" (though this remains to be seen). Since this section 
has pointed to the important role that power and influence play in determining the preservation of 
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political rights of the various groups, the following discussion will focus on the second twin of 
proportionality, the allocation of public funds. 
2. Allocation of public funds 
As mentioned earlier, the principle of proportionality is three-dimensional, in that it touches upon 
the distribution of political power and civil service appointments as well as economic power within 
the state. Again, the underlying assumption advanced by consociationalists is that the danger of the 
outbreak of communal violence will be reduced if all segments of the divided society are equally 
accommodated within state institutions, fairly represented within the state apparatus, and enjoy 
equal economic rights in the distribution of funds available to the state. This conception takes on an 
unprecedented importance and significance for two reasons. First, it can be said that a just 
distribution of material benefits (through the principle of proportional equality) among segments of 
the divided society (usually a developing country) contributes more or less to the stability of the 
system, without however necessarily increasing the prospects for peaceful communal coexistence. 
At worst, it reduces the danger of the outbreak of hostilities. Second, it is safe to say that the 
alternatives are less attractive, a contention examined below. 
The notion of economic freedom advanced by advocates of liberal democracy has been subject to 
criticism from different scholars, mainly Marxists. Marxist theory contends that the liberal notion of 
economic freedom is inconsistent with the principle of equality, a cornerstone of liberal democratic 
theory. For instance, Pinkney notes: 'A frequent criticism of liberal democracy is that it merely 
allows political competition between nominally equal citizens without taking into account the 
unequal resources that citizens possess' (Pinkney 1993,10-1). Indeed, Marx, alongside other 
scholars, notes that resources should not be considered to be a criterion for the definition of 
democracy, since the world's distribution of resources is unequal (North/South, West/East). As a 
result, this makes the representation of the public biased. According to the Marxist view, the 
democratic ideal of equal consideration is violated. Moreover, Marxists, neomarxists and other 
liberal political theorists argue that modem capitalism, with the don-iination of the large corporation, 
produces a 'defective and impaired form of democracy'. Lindbolm, for instance, views the 
capitalism-democracy relationship in pessimistic terms: 'The large private corporation fits oddly 
into democratic theory; indeed it does not fit' (Almond 1995,260). Similarly, Weber argues that 
'the advance of bureaucratic organisation was an inevitable component of the growth of capitalism 
and had underrr-ýined the efficacy of the liberal democratic model' (Evans 1995,232). 
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For divided societies, most of which are developing third world countries, the interaction of ethnic 
identity with economic inequality (class cleavages) is bound to significantly increase the risks of the 
outbreak of social violence. This puts a strain on consociational "peace", and as such, is neither 
necessary nor desirable. Against this background, the consociational principle of proportionality is 
seen as a safer option. Whereas Pinkney agues that 'in rejecting crude majoritatianism, 
consociationalism may go to the other extreme of giving minority groups influence and enabling 
them to retain resources disproportionate to their size' (Pinkney 1993,12-3), consociationalists are 
quick to point out here that the requirements of social peace and order must be given greater priority 
than the issue of minority over-representation, since they form an attempt to prevent the outbreak of 
hostilities, which might lead to the breakdown of consociational "peace". However, the procedural 
aspects of the state's allocation of public funds paint a different picture, to which the discussion will 
now turn. 
3. Socio-economic constraints 
As indicated in the section dealing with political representation, procedural aspects of 
consociationalism suggest that power and influence hold greater explanatory power in determining 
how group socio-economic rights are dealt with. It should be noted that representatives of the 
communal groups within consociational democracies often act as an elite cartel bound by the 
mutual interests and benefits they derive from their interaction with each other. While in stable 
societies which adopt power-sharing arrangements there are ample resources to cater for the socio- 
economic needs of the various groupings, this is not the case in developing societies tom by socio- 
economic inequalities. Rather, the competition over the scant material resources available to the 
state often results in the elites failing to cater for the needs of their followers. As such, the 
politicisation of communal identity and the development of a clientelistic dependent relationship 
between communal representatives and their followers are common manifestations. However, 
socio-economic inequalities remain. While they cut markedly across communal cleavages, elites' 
politicisation of communal consciousness and the scarcity of material benefits result in the lower 
ranks of each communal group often perceiving themselves as more deprived than other communal 
groups. Hence, the interaction of both forces (communal and class consciousness) in play in plural 
societies leads to significant societal unrest. For instance, Obler, Steiner and Dierickx argue that 
'advocates of the consociational theory not only exaggerate the part played by elites in resolving 
conflicts, they also neglect the importance of relative deprivation as a source of subcultural 
hostility. The degree to which scarce resources are, or are perceived to be, 26 allocated inequitably 
26 Emphasis added 
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among subcultures may be more significant than the degree of elite accommodation in explaining 
variations in the level of hostilities' (Obler, Steiner & Dierickx 1977,41). 
This scenario suggests that mass resignation to such a situation should not translate into societal 
peace. Rather, societal unrest is latent, and bound to manifest itself in very different ways (such as 
impasses and immobilism at the decision-making level due to conflicts over the allocation of scarce 
development projects) should the economic situation worsen. Finally, it should be noted that the 
consociational principle of allocating equal economic funds to the different groupings may impede 
the efforts that Lebanon is making to integrate its economy into the world economy and join 
competitively in the globalisation process. Indeed, such significant global changes in the world 
today in the nature of the flows of both capital and labour fail to take account of communal 
sensitivities. Rather, the principle of equally preserving the economic rights of the various 
communal groupings appears to impede and hinders the dynamic globalisation process. Hence, the 
secular nets of globalisation 27 do not take into account the complex needs of plural societies. 
Having discussed procedural aspects of the three-dimensional principle of proportionality in divided 
societies, the discussion will now address the last consociational component, that of mutual veto. 
Combined with the other three consociational principles, mutual veto is seen mainly as an attempt 
to preserve minority rights through constitutional provisions. The following section will critically 
investigate this contention. 
E. Mutual veto 
The fourth consociational component is mutual, or minority veto. It is designed to guarantee 'to 
each segment that it will not be outvoted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake' 
(Ujphart 1986,35). The importance of the mutual veto manifests itself when vital interests of a 
minority are at stake rather than when issues of general interest are concerned. In the former case, 
'the veto provides essential protection' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). Lijphart notes that mutual veto 'is 
usually based on informal understandings rather than formal legal or constitutional rules' (Lijphart 
1995a, 857). Here, it is important to point out that while in the Westminster model, minority rights 
are protected by constitutional rights, the latter can be altered by legislature, contrary to the 
consociational model where minority rights are formally institutionalised in the system. in 
Lijphart's words, 'the minority veto on constitutional or other vital matters contrasts sharply with 
the unwritten constitution in the Westminster model of democracy, which gives the majority the 
right to change even the most fundamental rules of government, limited only by morality and 
27 To borrow Georges Corm's term. 
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common sense' (Lijphart 1995a, 857-8). Briefly, the underlying assumption is that the rights of 
minorities are preserved by the constitution, thereby reducing the risk of minority resentment or 
frustration and instability. Crucial to the maintenance of a stable system is the guarantee that the 
rules of the political game cannot be changed in a way that discriminates against minority groups. 
This points to the importance of constitutionalism in divided societies. 
1. Constitutionalism 
Particularly for divided societies, the notion of constitutionalism takes unprecedented significance 
since it is a device that ensures the protection of minority rights. For instance, Leca observes that 'if 
there is no constitutional guarantee for the minority, "the real world implication" as Giovanni 
Sartori puts it, "is that a part of the people becomes a non-people, an excluded part", which 
mutilates the population and thus destroys the very basis of democracy' (Sartori in Leca 1996,58). 
With reference to this matter, Reinkowski, quoting Dahrendorf, argues similarly: 'The 
heterogeneous nation-state as a civic nation must create constitutional and democratic institutions if 
it wants to live in peace whereas the homogeneous nation-state can do it' (Reinkowski 1997,493). 
However, although the principle of the minority veto is protected by constitutional rights and 
formally institutionalised in the system, it should be pointed out that informal elite agreements, 
mostly conducted by very few "significant" actors, can alter constitutional provisions and therefore, 
the rights of minorities. For divided societies, this can have a significant impact on the stability of 
the system. Notably here, it is crucial for this discussion to focus on the destabilising nature of such 
pacts. The discussion below will reveal the ideological content of constitutions, which limits the 
kind of legislation that can be enacted, because of the underlying established rules of the political 
game under which such legislations are enacted. 
2. Pacting 
It is important for this section to address the notion of political pacts and their impact on system 
stability since they touch on all four consociational principles. For instance, O'Leary points out that 
6a consociation can be created without any explicit consociational theory to guide it- indeed that has 
often happened. More often consociations are the outcomes of bargains or pacts between the 
political leaders of ethnic or religious leaders. This agreement is the product of tacit and explicit 
consociational thought, and of bargaining, or of what is sometimes called "pacting" ' (O'Leary 
1998). In similar vein, Lijphart observes that 'there is also the general difference, applicable to all 
four consociational principles, between laying down the basic rules of powcr-sharing in formal 
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documents- such as constitutions, laws or semi-public agreements- and relying on merely informal 
and unwritten agreements and understandings among the leaders of the segments' (Lijphart 1995b, 
279). In this respect, Lijphart raises the following question: Should consociational rules be laid 
down in formal documents or rely on merely informal and unwritten agreements and 
understandings among the leaders of the main groups? He argues that 'informal rules generally 
work better because they are more flexible- but perhaps also because they reflect a higher level of 
trust among groups and group leaders. When sufficient mutual trust is lacking and inter-group 
relations are highly contentious, there is probably no alternative to formal constitutional and legal 
rules to govern power sharing and autonomy in deeply divided societies' (Lijphart 2000b). 
Lijphart's arguments indicate the necessity of the present discussion to address the notion of 
political pacts. The discussion will begin with a definition of political pacts. In connection with this, 
O'Donnell's writes that a political pact is 'an explicit but not always publicly explicated or justified 
agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better to redefine) rules governing 
the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the "vital interests" of those entering it. 
At the core of a pact lies a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to forgo or underutilize 
their capacity to harm each others' corporate autonomies or vital interests' (Leca 1996,49). 
Particularly noteworthy here is the detrimental impact of such pacts on the stability of divided 
societies, since it often happens that the success of such informal agreements depends solely on elite 
compromise. Therefore, the number of actors included is mostly limited to the representatives of the 
major or most powerful segments (such as their demographic strength or politico-economic power) 
of the divided society. This situation often leads to resentment and frustration within the less 
powerful ethnic groups. In this respect, Und points to an important distinction, arguing that 'in 
some cases the deviations may be unjustifiable. In other cases, though, the concessions may be 
reasonable and legitimate- particularly if the alternative to an idiosyncratic constitution is not a 
simpler, more majoritarian constitution, but secession or other kinds of civil strife' (Und 1999). 
Similarly, Salam6 refers to the importance of 'informal pacts' in their 'common use as a means to 
avoid civil wars or institutional chaos' (Salam6 1996a, 3). 
Accordingly, the conditions leading to such pacts sometimes occur when the security of different 
segments is threatened. Dahl for instance refers to political pacts in extremely pluralistic societies as 
6a set of understandings or engagements not always codified into formal constitutional provisions, 
that provide a relatively high degree of security to the various subcultures' (Dahl 1971,118). 
Therefore, under such conditions, it is safe to say that the need for security, which often leads to 
pacts, is the lowest (minimal) common denominator that the representatives of the society share. 
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The necessity of reaching a solution through compromise takes unprecedented importance. 
However, this can lead to resentment and frustration on the part of followers. For instance, Gill 
points out that 'this is a major problem for pacts and those who design them: agreement may result 
in widespread opposition, alienation and disillusionment among the followers' (Gill 2000,55). 
3. Legislative constraints 
Thus, it is safe to say that while minority rights are preserved through constitutional provisions, it is 
often the case that the few actors involved in such pacts alter such constitutional provisions in an 
attempt to reach a compromise, thereby violating minority rights. This results in frustration and 
resentment on the part of the masses, and is therefore detrimental to consociationalism, which relies 
on elite/followers vertical communication for its success. Hence, this reduces the prospects for 
consociational stability. Additionally, looking at the procedural dimensions of such informal pacts, 
it often appears that they have to deal with a shared set of interests through which communal 
representatives are willing to inter-relate, thus putting in danger societal peace. For instance, 
O'Donnell and Schmitter observe that 'there is a paradox about pacts: they move towards 
democracy by undemocratic means. They are negotiated by a few actors, they reduce 
competitiveness and accountability, and they attempt to structure the agenda of policy concerns and 
they distort the principle of citizen equality' (Gill 2000,53). 
Thus, though the principle of mutual or minority veto is designed to Protect vital interests, the 
discussion of pacting reveals that pacts often have to deal with the vital interests of the most 
powerful elites, and regulate the rules of the political game between them, thereby increasing 
resentment at the mass level. Against this background, the widening of the scope of the grand 
coalition to include representatives of all the groups of the plural society appears to be one way of 
constructing a political arrangement, in which, even though it may be in a limited way, minority 
groups of the plural society can contribute to the decision-making process, and at the same time, 
retain a decent degree of protection. 
F. Recapitulation 
The various discussions in this chapter suggest that the consociational model, in terms of its four 
devices, does not necessarily generate democratic stability. The discussion of the procedural aspects 
of consociational rule casts doubt on the ability of the model to promote the creation and 
maintenance of a system capable of generating democratic stability. However, for the purposes of 
this thesis, the present discussion would be incomplete if it did not closely examine the remaining 
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procedural shortcomings of the consociational model in generating democratic stability for the 
divided societies it is designed to operate in. This section will briefly present the remaining 
limitations of the model in this respect. It will also discuss the relevance of the alternative approach 
proposed by Horowitz, namely his notion of integrative democracy, as the discussion in later 
chapters will address it in the Lebanese context. Finally, the discussion will set the agenda for the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. 
1. Consociationalism in operation 
While this chapter emphasises the undemocratic nature of consociationalisin within the pragmatic 
definition of democracy that this thesis adheres to, this section will point to the consequences this 
has on the stability of the system. For instance, Halpern makes the point that Ujphart admittedly 
subscribes to the school of democratic thought that emphasizes stability over democracy' (Halpern 
1984,119). However, the following discussion will show that even if democratic institutions are 
6 modified to promote stable outcomes', the model is still incapable in many instances of promoting 
stability. 
a. Immobilism 
One of the strongest criticisms to which consociational theory is subjected is the deadlock and 
immobilisation in decision-making that might manifest itself at the elite level due to the theory's 
elitist nature, and hence, due to the elites' unwillingness to compromise even if this puts threats on 
the stability of the system: 'in consensual democracies rules are institutionalized which force all 
relevant political actors to come to compromises or, alternatively, to leave issues undecided' 
(Kaiser 1997,433). 28 Indeed, Kaiser's choice of words is very pertinent here as the procedural 
aspects of consociationalism reveal that the elites are many instances unwilling to force themselves 
to cooperate, hence leaving issues frozen at the expense of system stability. This is particularly 
troubling when it comes to socio-economic issues that generally require fast and effective decision- 
making free of political considerations. For instance, when it comes to dynamic globalisation 
opportunities and challenges, the role that political considerations and conflicts of interests play in 
delaying political accord are particularly problematic. Numerous scholars have pointed to the 
deadlock that frequently manifests itself under consociational structures of rule, and the ensuing 
political and societal instability. 29 Yagcioglu pertinently observes that 'if the elites are not willing to 
28 Emphasis added. 
29 For similar comments see Heather Deegan, The politics of the Middle East and Africa. London: Routledge, p. 57, 
1996; Arend Lijphart, Democracy in plural societies. London: Yale University Press, pp. 53-55,1977 and Robert 
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make the system work, consociationalism breaks down, leading usually to violent interethnic 
conflicts' (Yagcioglu 1996). 30 
The drawback that the likelihood of immobilism puts on the ability of consociationalism to generate 
a stable democracy was recognised by ljjphart. In one of his most recent works, Lijphart refers to 
this matter and writes: 'When power is broadly shared, the critics argue, it will be difficult or even 
impossible to make decisions; the result is immobilism, deadlock, and, in the end, democratic 
breakdown' (Lijphart 2000b) .31 Against these critiques, Lijphart's line of argument runs as follows: 
There are also clear cases where power-sharing has worked successfully in ethnically divided countries- 
Switzerland since 1943, Belgium since 1970, Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, Malaysia from 1955 to 1969, Surinam 
from 1958 to 1973, and the Netherlands Antilles from 1950 to 1985- as well as in three countries with deep 
religious-ideological cleavages- Austria from 1945 to 1966, the Netherlands from 1917 to 1967, and 
Luxembourg during the same period of about half a century. In addition, there are three more countries which I 
also regard as power-sharing cases but that are more controversial- Colombia from 1958 to 1974, India ever 
since 1947, and South Africa since 1994. Czecho-Slovakia was a power-sharing democracy from 1989 until its 
amicable partition in 1993. During 1999, two new power-sharing systems were set up: in Fiji and Northern 
Ireland (Lijphart 2000b). 
Hence, it would be safe to argue that consociational arrangements are 'under serious challenge to 
liberalize'. From the above, three conclusions can be drawn. First, Ujphart's argument suggests that 
immobilism in a consociational regime will ultimately manifest itself at some point. Most of the 
countries that Lijphart refers to (except for Switzerland and India) have adopted consociational 
practices for relatively short-lived periods before system breakdown. The second conclusion 
suggests that consociationalisin has not stood the test of time and therefore, cannot be considered a 
viable long-term system able to generate democratic stability (a central issue in this thesis) for 
divided societies. Whereas the consociational model seems adequate in preventing the outbreak of 
ethnic conflict for short-lived periods, the many cases of system breakdown suggest that it fails to 
promote long-term stable democracy. For instance, drawing on some cases of consociational 
countries, it can be argued that the model (in operation) seems to go through periods of relative 
communal stability interTupted by cyclical crises (a matter discussed further below) and that it is 
often seen as the only resort when compared with less human and economically feasible solutions, 
such as ethnic cleansing and partition. Third, it may be said that broadening the representation 
scope of the grand coalition is one way of counter-attacking deadlock. 
Contrary to the assumption that broadly shared power will result in deadlock, it is argued here that it 
is the fierce competition among the "significant" group representatives which effectively enables 
Pinkney, Democracy in the Third world [Issues in Third World politics]. Buckingham: Open University Press, p. 12, 
1993. 
30 Emphasis added. 
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them, because of their power and influence and because they are the only constituents of that 
coalition (extremely elitist character), to refuse to compromise, hence the resulting deadlock. The 
absence of other minority groups enables them to carry out executive decision-making in such an 
extremely elitist way. Thus, broadening the grand coalition is one way of encouraging the formation 
of intra-coalition alliances among the group representatives. This restrains the fierce competition 
between the significant groups, allows minority groups to use the veto power, and allows for 
effective decision-making, hence avoiding deadlock. 
b. External threats 
Another factor that seems to contribute considerably to societal unrest is one of the background 
conditions that Lijphart identifies as a favourable factor for the creation and maintenance of 
consociational democracy. According to Lijphart, 'external threats have a unifying effect only when 
they are perceived as a common danger by all segments' (Lijphart in Bogaards, 1998,479), and 'are 
conducive to democracy, with the distinction that 'it is not meant to imply that external threat 
causes integration within a nation' (Farah 1975,19). This contention can be seen as problematic in 
a number of respects. It is not readily apparent how a system of rule that fragments the communal 
groupings, and hence society, and politicises ethic identity will unify the country. 
First, in divided societies, segments and their members adhere to different belief systems, 
sometimes involving the existence of incompatible perceptions relating to sensitive matters such as 
religion, culture, race, tradition, etc and hence, what constitutes an external threat is often 'a 
function of sectarian affiliation' (Abukhalil 1988,281). In other words, perceptions of political 
threats and socio-cultural issues depend to a large extent on ethnic belonging, and thus, this puts 
strains on the stability of the system. Closely related to this subject matter is the fact that ethnic 
groups enjoy a high degree of subcultural autonomy in running their multiple ideological 
instruments, and this leads to the emergence of distinct, separate value systems. Third, 
consociationalism. encourages a minimal contact between the subcultures thereby widening the gap 
between the different groups and increasing the potential for disagreement as to what a foreign 
threat is. Therefore, it is expected that the likelihood of agreement as to what constitutes a foreign 
threat will be greatly reduced. 32 Hence, this challenges the assumption made by Lijphart and other 
consociationalists concerning one of the favourable factors of consociational democracy: 'foreign 
threats that are perceived as a common danger enhance the chances of success for consociations'. 
Under the consociational framework that fosters ideological, territorial and national separatism, it is 
31 Emphasis added. 
32 As the Lebanese case suggests (an issue discussed in later chapters). 
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likely that the perception of foreign threats to the system will vary among the different ethnic 
groups of the divided society. This hinders the model's ability to generate democratic stability, a 
central issue with which this thesis is concerned. 
c. Stability 
Stability in divided societies is difficult to achieve and communal peace can be disrupted in a 
number of ways. First, the extremely elitist nature of consociationalism and the flawed assumption 
that the elite will/can cooperate undermine the risk that popular resentment can put on the stability 
of the system. It is problematic to argue that high (or increased) levels of vertical communication 
(leaders/followers) in which the elite dominates will adequately prevent the risk of the outbreak of 
ethnic conflict. Whereas the elitist picture suggests that atomised individuals are driven by leaders, 
popular dissatisfaction as a result of high levels of inter- and intra-elite compromise can easily 
disrupt the consociational peace as socio-economic interests are ignored. This is especially true 
because the model advocates low levels of mass commitment to the preservation of society (what 
Lijphart calls moderate nationalism), as opposed to widely accepted strong notions of nationalism 
and nation-building. In this respect, Sisk argues that 'consociationalism overestimates deference by 
communal groups to their leaders and underestimates the power and role of popular dissatisfaction 
with intergroup compromise' (Sisk 1996). Indeed, as argued previously, informal pacts are a 
frequent manifestation of consociationalism, and place limitations on the kind of legislations that 
can be discussed. A situation in which popular resentment can disturb communal peace can emerge 
for instance as a response to elite 'uncodified agreements' or informal pacts (a feature of 
consociationalism discussed above). 
Second, though the four consociational principles act to a large extent as counteractive devices, they 
also carry limitations that may disrupt communal peace. For instance, Sitnikov summarises the 
reasons that endanger the stability of consociational democracies. He writes that 'the greatest 
criticism concerns the failure of consociational democracy to bring about and maintain political 
stability: first, government by a grand coalition is slow-pace process. Second, mutual veto involves 
the further dangers of complications in decision-making. Third, proportionality is achieved often at 
the expense of administrative efficiency. Fourth, segmental autonomy is expensive' (Sitnikov 
1997). 
Third, whereas Sisk offers a comprehensive account of the dangers of instability, Sousa focuses on 
the inability of the elite to prevent the outbreak of conflict and sometimes the breakdown of 
consociational politics. She argues that 'the central problem of this theory is therefore how to 
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maintain stability in the penTianent tension of elites' interests. The leaders are always trying to 
conciliate the preservation of the system with the interests of the groups they represent' (Sousa 
2001). In that respect, Lijphart's contention that 'politicians can change the course of a country if 
they so desire' seems problematic. Even if the "enlightened" elite realise that the societies in which 
they live are prone to destabilisation and that caution must be exerted at the elite level to preserve 
stability, the outbreak of elite fighting (frequently as a result of economic and private conflicts of 
interests) is always possible, hence disturbing the "democratic peace". With regard to this, it should 
be pointed out that consociationalism has not stood the test of time. For instance, Lijphart notes that 
consociationalism's 'chief problem is not its "undemocratic nature" but its "potential failure to 
bring about and maintain political stability" ' (Deegan 1993,13) therefore bringing an element of 
uncertainty to the model and its democratic assumptions without however undermining the 
importance of the theory. Perhaps Seaver's conclusion best illustrates the relation between the 
consociational model and stable democracy. She writes: 'Political scientists have emphasised that 
power-sharing devices have not consistently yielded peace and stable democracy, and that the 
connection between consociational democracy and stability has not been sufficiently demonstrated' 
(Seaver 2000,252). 
d. Cyclical crises 
Lastly, critics argue that consociationalism goes through periods of relative stability interrupted by 
crises. Indeed, the various discussions in this thesis suggest the inability of the consociational model 
of rule to deal with the long-term problems of the polity. As a political system, consociationalism is 
prone to collapse. For instance, Rabushka and Shepsle argue that 'consociational stability is only 
temporary and such democracies may develop instability sooner or later' (Chahine 1998,60). 
According to them, 'consociationalism would automatically turn to authoritarian rule or outright 
civil war' (Chahine 1998,164). Indeed, it should be said that consociational solutions arc often 
chosen because of a lack of other alternatives and they are often reverted to, despite the failure of 
previous consociational experiments within countries. In short, it may be argued from the above that 
the consociational model in terms of the four components of the theory has numerous limitations 
and shortcomingý as far as creating and maintaining a system capable of generating democratic 
stability is concerned. 
2. Plural-elitism- the integrative approach 
The scholarly debate conceming the applicability and operability of the model of consociational 
democracy has contributed to the development of the "inclusive or integrative model of 
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democracy". For the purposes of the present chapter, a discussion of the concept of integrative 
democracy proposed by Horowitz is important, since the model is a power-sharing mechanism (for 
divided societies) based on consensus. Additionally and more importantly, Horowtiz's concept of 
integrative democracy is a fair account of an alternative approach to the rule of plural societies, 
notably for the concerns of this thesis, Lebanon. The gradual deconfessionalisation of politics, 
suggested by Horowitz's concept, seems particularly relevant for Lebanese society. Additionally, 
Horowitz's concept fits well with Lijphart's recently developed notion of self-determination, which 
has received substantial attention in this thesis and will be discussed when relating to the Lebanese 
context in later chapters. 
However, Horowitz's approach differs from the consociational model in some respects that will be 
discussed below, (after presenting the points of similarity that both models share). As with the 
consociational model, the integrative approach is elitist in nature, with the elite playing a dominant 
role, not only in ruling society, but also in fostering a compromise between the various segments 
(political engineering). More importantly, as Sisk points out, what unites both consociational and 
integrative approaches 'is the belief in coalescent democracy as an alternative to the adverse effects 
of majoritarianism and the assumptions that support a rejection of majoritarian practices. 
"Coalescent" decision making is argued to be a better prescription for the ills that plague deeply 
divided societies than the adversarial pattern associated with majoritarian democracy' (Sisk 1996). 
As distinct from the consociational model, the integrative power-sharing approach 'seeks to deal 
with ethnic conflict potential through fostering political arrangements that will lead to bridging or 
transcending ethnic group differences' (Grofman and Stockwell 200 1). 33 Hence, while the objective 
continues to be the ability to reach compromise between the various ethnic groups, this is seen as 
best achieved if the political arrangements do not foster separatism and an inward-oriented outlook 
for communities, as prescribed by consociationalism. Indeed, the integrative approach attempts to 
integrate groups within the system rather than institutionalise separatism, as in the consociational 
model, which 'merely re-enforces the isolation of one societal block from another' (United Nations 
Development Programme [hereafter UNDPJ 1999). In addition, the integrative approach relies on 
moderate politics as opposed to extremist political activity within the consociational framework. 
Both the notions of integration and moderation will be discussed here. 
Lijphart's consociational approach differs from that of Horowitz who 'argues that political 
institutions should encourage or induce integration across communal divides' (Sisk 1996). For 
33 Emphasis added. 
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instance, Sisk, one of the major researchers on the integrative approach, presents the point that 
'ethnic conflicts will be easier to manage if the participants perceive their differences to be socially 
constructed, rather than innate and immutable. Conflicts will be less severe when there is some 
social, cultural or economic overlap between the groups' (Glaser 1998). This is seen as a clear 
deviation from the assumptions of consociationalists who, like primordialists (culturalistic 
approaches) argue that ethnicity is 'an inherited characteristic and if not permanently fixed, at least 
very difficult to change' (Lijphart 1995a, 855), a contention rejected in the present thesis. Sisk 
subscribes to the constructivists' view (economistic approaches) that sees ethnic identity as "made", 
a contention also rejected in this thesis. Indeed, it was pointed out that ethnic identity exists, is more 
than transitional but can be manipulated. Thus, the integrative notion allows for the emergence and 
effective channelling of a genuine and spontaneous fluid class and cultural consciousness that may 
counterattack the disintegrative forces of the politicisation of ethnic identity, which some elites will 
undoubtedly practise. However, it would be simplistic to assume that elites always attempt to foster 
the transcendence of communal identity. Rather, bearing in mind the dominant role of elites in the 
integrative approach, and if one looks at the procedural aspects of elite rule, it is safe to say that 
elites may very well attempt to politicise communal identity, especially if the fierce competition for 
the scare material resources leads to unrest and resentment at the communal level. The integrative 
approach, just like the consociational one remains an elite/actor-centered model. In theory however, 
the assumptions of Horowitz, and consequently the integrative model, seem more capable of 
fostering integration in divided societies than is the case with the consociational model. 
Second, when it comes to moderation in politics, the integrative approach relies on moderate 
politics: ' "consociational institutions rely on constraints against immoderate politics, such as the 
mutual or minority veto, as opposed to incentives for moderation" ' (Horowitz 1991,154-60) that 
are prescribed by the integrative approach. According to Horowitz, 'for effective democratic 
governance in a divided society, moderates must be rewarded, extremists sanctioned' (Sisk 1996). 
Clearly, as Sisk points out, 'this differentiates Horowitz's prescriptions from those of 
consociationalism' (Sisk 1996). The integrative model, plural-elitist in nature, relies heavily on elite 
efforts at ' "political engineering" to mitigate conflicts in divided societies' (Sisk 1996). For 
example, 'the contributions by Polsby and Sartori are examples of such sophisticated pluralist 
analyses: they adhere to the notion of pluralism, yet assign elites a more central role in a democracy 
than pluralists were wont to do before' (Etzioni-Halevy 1997,152). However, while such efforts 
appear salutary to remedy to the shortcomings of the consociational mode, it is safe to say that a 
problem of lack of representation will manifest itself if not all segments of the plural society are 
represented at the elite decision-making level. Indeed, this thesis has previously suggested the 
elaboration of the model in terms of the notion of the grand coalition by offering to include within 
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this institutional body all members of the plural society, irrespective of their size. While this thesis 
pointed out that representation in and by itself is not an indicator of "real and effective" 
representation, since power and influence appear more explanatory in regulating elite relationships, 
this thesis argues that it would still be undesirable to exclude extremists from representation. First, 
this will lead to resentment. Second, precisely because such groups are extremist, the impact that 
such resentment resulting from group exclusion may have on the stability of the system remains 
significant. Rather, a more desirable approach would be to allow such groups representation within 
the system, as this may partly be a way of containing the social unrest resulting from their 
exclusion. Indeed, as pointed out in previous sections, the process of including groups not based on 
ethnic-terms should be simultaneously accompanied by a process of dismantling those based on 
ethnic-terms, and for that matter, the extremist ones as a start. However, the integrative approach 
does not suggest the process of including non-ethnic-based groups in the decision-making level but 
only speaks of removing extremist blocs that rely on ethnic politics. Also, the integrative approach 
speaks of political elite-initiated engineering designed to curb ethnic politics. Thus, looking at the 
procedural dimensions of elite rule, it was pointed out (above) that it would be simplistic to assume 
that the elite politicisation of communal identity will not occur. Thus, in this respect, the integrative 
approach does not seem particularly able to generate democratic stability for plural societies. 
Ultimately however, Sisk argues convincingly by striking a middle way between both approaches 
and attempting to solve the dilemma of having to decide on an appropriate formula for divided 
societies: 
Scholars differ over whether the consociational power-sharing approach ... leads to better relations among ethnic 
groups in multiethnic societies than ... an integrative 
(or pluralist) approach... Neither approach can be said to be 
the best in all circumstances. Rather, the two approaches should be seen in contingent terms... The challenge is 
not to develop a singular model of conflict-regulating practices, but rather a menu of conflict-regulating practices 
from which policyrnakers can choose and adapt to the intricacies and challenges of successfully regulating any 
given ethnic conflict (Sisk 1996). 
Indeed, it may be asserted that Sisk's suggestion is pertinent as the present study has already 
pointed out that resorting to consociationalism is more often than not a result of a lack of better 
alternatives. In this sense, amalgamating various power-sharing devices depending on the particular 
contexts and peculiar needs of plural societies may very well be one way of improving the 
governance of the latter. 'Sartori... admits that a variety is immense. Every single country has to 
elaborate its own version, has to choose its own way for the establishment of democratic institutions 
based of their own political culture, heritage of their own statehood, willingness of the society and 
all major social forces and institutions to contribute to the stability and process of creation' 
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(Sitnikov 1997). In terms of the Lebanese context, the relevance and applicability of the integrative 
approach will be discussed in later chapters. 
3. Absence of workable alternatives 
The various discussions in this chapter raise legitimate questions: What is the utility of the model 
for plural societies? Why should one prescribe this model as a conflict-regulating mechanism in 
such divided societal contexts if it fails on the promise of democratic stability (and sometimes 
stability)? Answers to such questions lie in the observations made by Dahl, Deegan and Baaklini. 
While commenting on the prospects of consociationalism in divided societies, Dahl argues that the 
'development of the beliefs, skills and incentives among political elites is helped by... the 
conviction that the alternative to consociationalism is a fearful Hobbesian struggle with disastrous 
consequences; and traditions within the elite culture favoring conciliation, mutual accommodation 
and compromise' (Dahl 1989,258). Similarly, Deegan notes that 'the consociational model even 
with all its deficiencies may create a climate more conducive to the persistence of a system of 
democracy, after its denýiise' (Deegan 1993,14). Most importantly for this discussion, Baaklini's 
observation that 'the classical idealized conception of liberal democracy has failed to produce 
viable and stable democracies in divided societies' (Baaklini 1999,652) is pertinent. Against this 
background, but also in the light of the limitations of the consociational model highlighted in this 
chapter, it may be argued that an elaboration of the consociational model seems a useful tool to 
meet the peculiar needs of plural societies and enhance the utility of consociational theory. 
Additionally, it may be said that such claims are strengthened by the oft-made observation 
regarding the utopian aspect of liberal democracy. For instance, Bachrach notes that 'viable 
democratic theory can hardly be built upon a dream that has not the remotest chance of being 
realized' (Bachrach 1967,6). Commenting on classical democratic theory, he writes: 'To continue 
to advocate such a theory in today's world, it is argued, is bound to foster cynicism toward 
democracy as it becomes evident that the gap between the reality and the ideal can not be closed' 
(Bachrach 1967,8). Against this background, despite the many limitations of the consociational 
model, an elaborated version (i. e., introducing a change in the theory as this chapter attempted) of 
the latter takes unprecedented importance for divided societies, thus giving credibility to the theory. 
For instance, Sisk writes that 'while the institutions of consociational decision-making vary, its 
advocates argue, the principles are rediscovered time and time again as societies seek solutions to 
the existence of intense ethnic politics and methods to harness ethnicity for constructive purposes' 
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(Sisk 1996). Therefore, despite all the limitations of consociationalism discussed in this chapter, an 
elaboration of the model may well improve the intricate governance processes of plural societies. 
Chapters 3 pointed out that an elaboration of the theory would be salutary to the successful 
operation of the model and presented this elaboration, mainly in terms of the broad all-inclusive 
scope of the grand coalition (to avoid group exclusion). A typical description of such a scenario, the 
breakdown of the fragile consociational order, as a result of group exclusion from effective 
decision-making (as well as other factors), can be found through an examination of the first 
Lebanese experiment with consociationalism (1943-1975). In that sense, this period (examined in 
Chapter 4) provides a rich field to test the operability of the model and hence, to shed more light on 
the theory. 
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Chapter 4 Consociationalism and the pre-war Lebanese political system 
In pre-war Lebanon, the various communal groups are unequal in size and power, and this 
makes Lebanese society complex in nature. Consociationalism purports to be able to work out a 
democratic system of governance and an orderly peaceful way of managing the coexistence of 
plural societies, such as Lebanon's, creating and maintaining democratic stability. This chapter 
examines why the consociational model failed to deliver on this promise in pre-war Lebanon. To 
this end, the chapter will look at the institutional framework of the Lebanese political system and 
how the translation of the consociational structure of rule into practice, and the detrimental impact 
of "consociationalism in action", impacted upon the form of society that pre-war Lebanon 
manifested, and hence, on the stability of the system. The chapter will determine in what respect the 
first pre-war Lebanese political system relates to the consociational model of democracy. It will 
look at the Lebanese experiment with consociationalism in its initial phase, 1943-1975. Indeed, an 
assessment of the Lebanese experiment with consociationalism in its initial phase is central to the 
present thesis. First, adopting consociational. practices for more than three decades forms the basis 
on which to evaluate the capacity of the consociational model to act as an efficient mechanism able 
to generate and maintain democratic stability in a plural society. Second, the breakdown of the 
consociational system in 1975, with the advent of the Lebanese civil war 1975-1990, questions the 
capability of the model to act as a conflict-regulation method within plural societies. 
The chapter will begin with a concise historical chronology of key events prior to the 1975 war, 
briefly outlining the pre-war confessional set up and the ways in which its embodiment in a 
consociational structure of rule impacted on the stability of the system during the pre-1975 period. 
Then, it will consider the classification of the political system from a theoretical point of view, as 
based on the 1926 Lebanese Constitution. The discussion will then move to an examination of the 
1943 National Pact, which institutionalised consociationalism. Subsequently, the discussion will 
focus on the procedural manifestations of consociationalism. The chapter will then deal with the 
constraints that the operation of consociationalism put on the nature of Lebanese society and on the 
stability of the system. Though the allegedly positive relationship between consociationalism and 
democratic stability is being addressed throughout the present chapter, the final section of the 
chapter will focus specifically on this issue by summarising the main reasons why the pre-war 
consociational model failed to generate democratic stability for Lebanon, and ultimately led to the 
collapse of the system. Equally, this last section will briefly mention the various stages of the 1975- 
1990 civil war and indicate why the next chapter will deal with an examination of the post-war 
Lebanese rule system. 
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A. Historical chronology 
Since independence, Lebanon has been a multi-communal state, with eighteen plural ethnic 
groups/denominations that can be narrowed down to seven major communities, all of which are 
minorities in themselves. All are Muslims and Christians, originating mainly from the different 
civilisations, religions and cultures that settled in the Near East. The Muslim community mainly 
represented in the confessional system, consists of Sunnis, Shi'is, Druze, Ismd'ilis, Alawites 
(Winslow 1996,298) and lately, in mid-2002, Kurds. The Christian community represented in the 
confessional system comprises Maronites, Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, 
Roman Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Old Syrians (Jacobites), Syrian Catholics, Chaldean 
Catholics and Protestants (Winslow 1996,299). As Khazen points out, 'the number of groups in 
relation to the size of the population [and the territory for the matter] is relatively high' (Khazen 
2000,32). Hence, Lebanese society takes a vertically segmented character, with most communities 
providing 'their members with a distinct identity, a network of institutions, mutual-help 
associations, neighbourhoods and a marriage pool' (Smooha & Hanf 1992,3 9). 
By looking at the complex historical processes of change during the nineteenth century, it may be 
said that these complex processes have impacted on the nature and stability of the territory of what 
became Lebanon in its present borders. Indeed, the modernisation processes underway politically 
reshaped community relations along religious lines. This was the result of a noteworthy interplay 
between the traditions of what was to become Lebanon and the Ottoman government, with western 
imperialism deeply involved in the process and hence producing as a consequence sectarianism, as 
may be seen today. The Lebanese confessional system evolved considerably from the millet system 
under the Ottoman Empire, which may have been the origin of the confessional groupings. Ottoman 
govemance structures and practices can be said to have brought about the consociational model in 
the country. Thus, these practices will be outlined, as no meaningful classification of the pre-war 
Lebanese political system can be undeilaken without locating the discussion in the context of 
Lebanon's political and social environment and its history. This is because democracy takes many 
forms that depend upon these particular historical experiences and the social structure of the society 
in question. Thus, this section will highlight the economic, political, historical and social factors 
that brought about consociational democracy in Lebanon. As Lehmbruch and Faour note: 
The Lebanese system goes back to the Ottoman tradition of autonomy of the religious communities (millets)... 
(Lehmbruch 1974a, 93). When Lebanon was under Ottoman rule, the "millet systern" classified Ottoman 
subjects according to their religious sect. Muslims and Christians of various confessions became aware of their 
distinctiveness because it carries with it certain political and social obligations (Faour 1998,56). 
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While this vertical communal compartmentalisation should not necessarily translate into communal 
hostility, the existence of marked horizontal socio-economic differences that cut across communal 
distinctiveness has brought about a significant degree of societal instability. Indeed, as Chapter 3 
explained, Lebanon is divided along socio-economic class cleavages, obscured by the fact that the 
political and socio-economic struggle for power takes the form of a communal conflict as a result of 
a process of manipulation and politicisation of communal identity to serve the interests of the 
foreign players and local ruling class. For instance, Salam6 questions whether the struggle of 
identities in Lebanon is 'merely tribal, religious, confessional or nationalist'? He argues that 
'Lebanon suffers also from a class struggle so difficult to discern in this unbelievable entanglement 
of interests and identities' (Salam6 1986,11). Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century, Lebanese 
politics has fluctuated between periods of peace and periodic attempts to change the system so as to 
have a more equitable distribution of political benefits and positions among the confessional groups. 
The involvement of the west did little to change this unstable situation, and class divisions persisted 
to a significant extent. 
Against this background, Hanf's treatment of ethnicity is of crucial relevance for the deeply divided 
Lebanese society under investigation in this thesis. Indeed, the elites' manipulation of communal 
distinctiveness and sectarian identities emerges as an institutionalised structure of rule (through the 
confessional system in place) as well as a procedural feature of pre-war and post-war Lebanese 
consociational politics and its impact on the cohesiveness Lebanese society has been of great 
significance, judging by the permanently fragmented character of the latter. ' Finally, an additional 
source of societal separatism and instability stems from regional and international contexts. 
Lebanon is not only a deeply divided society, but is a very complex one, existing in a region with 
complex politics. It is an internally unstable insecure environment, existing in an externally unstable 
insecure environment. Needless to say, both dimensions are inter-linked as external (regional and 
international) events have direct repercussions on the domestic scene. As Roberson points out, 
Lebanon is 'a particularly good example of the complexity of governance, where the diversities and 
responses are extreme and where the complex interplay of external and domestic forces has a 
dramatic effect on the dynamics of social and political processes within the country and upon 
regional and external relations' (Roberson 1998a, 1). The impact of the plural character of Lebanese 
society on the stability of the system has been significant, especially when it is acknowledged that 
the manifestation of a number of socio-economic struggles took the form of a communal sectarian 
1 For more details, see Sami Adeeb Ofeish, Sectarianism and change in Lebanon: 1843-1975 (conflict. elite. national 
aa! aj. Doctoral Thesis. USA: University of Southern California, 1996; Sami A. Ofeish, 'Lebanon's Second Republic: 
secular talk, sectarian application'. Arab Studies Quarterl Vol. 21, No. 1, (Winter), 1999, p. 99 and Elizabeth Picard, 
'Political identities and communal identities: shifting mobilization among the Lebanese Shl'a through ten years of war, 
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conflict. For instance, Owen has provided a relatively accurate account of the peasant's challenges 
to muqataji rule which: 
soon assumed the aspect of a communal struggle between groups of Maronites and Druzes. This was partly a 
result of a growing tendency to think and act in religious or confessional terms ... Worried by signs of peasant 
restiveness in their own villages in the south, disturbed by reports of Maronite purchase of arms, the Druze 
leaders did their best to protect their own class position by stressing the need for communal solidarity in the face 
of outside attack, thus giving the dispute a directly religious character' (Owen 1981,162). 
Such a situation points to the importance of looking at Ottoman practices of rule. The birth of 
consociational principles can be traced to the Ottoman practices of the nineteenth century (contrary 
to the argument by most scholars which trace Lebanese consociationalism to 1943 when Lebanon 
gained its independence). As Norton reveals: 'in point of fact, the modalities of the political system 
were well established long before 1943. For example, in 1841, Bashir III organized a confessional 
council of ten members (three Maronites, three Druze, one Greek Catholic, one Greek Orthodox, 
one Shi'i, and one Sunni) that represented the country's divergent social [read communal] 
identities' (Norton 1987,6). Similarly, the 1861 R6glement Organique (Organic Law) that followed 
the 1860 peasant revolts and massacres is a power-sharing arrangement which 'provided for the 
establishment of a [twelve-member] Administrative Representative Council to consist of two 
representatives of each major confessional community' 2 whereby the six major communities were 
the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Catholic, Druze, Shi'a, and Sunni Muslim. 
Moreover, Norton reveals that in 1864, grievances with the Organic Law led to the readjustment of 
representation on the council, 'to give greater numerical representation to the Maronites, Druze, and 
Greek Orthodox, but here again, confessional diversity was recognized. While the ratios changed 
from time to time, the formula remained' (Norton 1987,6). Thus, it may be said that a power- 
sharing arrangement that conformed to an extent with consociational theory existed in pre- 
independent Lebanon. This was revised in 1864 when it no longer adhered to the consociational 
principle of proportional communal representation, in the view of the dominant or "significant" 
communal groups. These successive power-sharing arrangements may thus be seen as an embryonic 
form of consociational practice that would evolve later on with the drafting of the 1926 Lebanese 
Constitution and would be systematically institutionalised with the advent of the confessional 
system, embodied in the 1943 so-called National Pact and the independence of Lebanon. 
1975-1985. In Dennis L. Thompson & Dov Ronen, eds. Ethnicity. politics. and develoPment, pp. 159-78. Boulder 
jColorado]: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 159,1986. 
Norton reveals that following the 1860 rebellion, 'under pressure from the British, Russian, French, and Austrians- 
each of which had their own Lebanese confessional client- the R6glement Organique of 1861 was acceded to by the 
Ottomans, the ostensible imperial power' (Norton 1987,6). 
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The end of Ottoman rule and the period of the French Mandate over Lebanon, 1920-1943, also 
witnessed power-sharing arTangements, with the existence of the Central Administrative Council. 
Moreover, as with the consociational principles of grand coalition and proportional representation 
(consisting of a broad-scope council which was however procedurally brought to reflect the 
proportional and powerful dominance of Druze and Maronites over the remaining sectarian 
groupings), the principle of segmental autonomy was addressed as early as the 1920s. As Hourani 
remarks, Articles 6 and 8 of the Mandatory Agreement over Lebanon addressed the issue of 
segmental autonomy: 
Article 8 states the necessity of guaranteeing the most complete liberty of conscience and worship; the equal 
treatment of all inhabitants irrespective of differences of race, religion, language; and the right to maintain their 
own schools. Article 6 requires the Mandatory Power to respect the personal status and religious interests of the 
different sections of the population (Hourani 1946,18 1). 
Thus, the sense of communal distinctiveness brought about by Ottoman rule was strengthened by 
the French divide and rule policy. Indeed, both articles seem to encourage communal groups to 
view/perceive themselves differently, thereby fostering inter-communal separatism and planting the 
historical seeds of perpetual societal fragmentation along religious sectarian lines. As to the Central 
Administrative Council in place, Chalouhi reveals that the French abolished it when it 'called for a 
larger, independent Lebanon with a democratic government with rights for all minorities'. 
However, 'a new council was formed in 1926 and this succeeded in adopting a constitution which 
called for the establishment of a legislature made up of both a Senate and Chamber of Deputies' and 
in effect 'the legislature combined all the country's groups and gave the new state a constitution' 
(Chalouhi 1978,54-5). The moves towards the drafting and adopting of the constitution were 
preceded by an emerging trend towards elitist rule, which effectively impacted on the rules of the 
game laid down by the constitution. Indeed, Khazen reveals as follows: 
In post-1920 Lebanon, a distinct pattern of elitist politics began to take shape: this was particularly the case of a 
new Christian elite, mostly Francophile, drawn from the ranks of an increasingly influential Christian 
bourgeoisie... Muslim leaders, particularly those who were initially reluctant to identify with the newly-created 
Greater Lebanon, were co-opted into the system by a policy of patronage, which attracted traditional leaders and 
other politicians from established notable families (Khazen 1993,54). 
As such, what it often mistakenly referred to as being an emerging tradition of political/elite 
accommodation 3 towards the peaceful governance of Lebanon backed by the French appears to be 
a convergence of economic interests, power and influence among external players and local 
3 For instance, Messarra and Lijphart often refer to Lebanese politicians as having genuinely invented consociational 
rules to promote peaceful communal coexistence, giving evidence for their arguments by relying and in effect 
misinterpreting what actually is an the interest-based relationship that existed among the political and economic elite in 
Lebanon. Both scholars argue that elite efforts to engineer such consociational practices stem from their desire to 
promote peaceful structures of governance for Lebanese society, while in fact the underlying reasons for cooperation 
appear to lie precisely within mutual interests that such traditional feudal and feuding elites shared in common. 
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traditional influential politicians. Such a situation finds its origins in patronage and the sharing of 
common economic and power interests. Hence, during the period of the French mandate over 
Lebanon 1920-1943, this complex unstable situation continued to exist as French rule worked at 
preventing the emergence of a unifying nationalist ideology among the various confessional groups 
and of traditions of political accommodation among the elites (apart from one based on economic 
interests) that would make communal coexistence peaceful. As many researchers reveal, 'in both 
Syria and Lebanon, the French employed divide-and-rule tactics to exacerbate religious and ethnic 
tensions in order to frustrate the emergence of unified, mass-based nationalist movements' (Bill & 
Springborg 2000,170) with colonialism transforming 'the social, political and economic 
significance of religion into a reified order wherein decontextualized religious identities alone 
defined individuals' (Makdisi 1996,24). Similarly, Ayoub recalls that 'intercommunal tensions 
were more the byproduct of the manipulation of communal identity and loyalties to serve the 
ideological, political and geopolitical ends of various internal players and external powers- 
especially the colonial powers' (Ayoub 1994,24 1). 4 As such, with the establishment of a political 
economy heavily dependent on the West, the interests of external powers coincided with the 
interests of local confessional elites and traditional notables who formed the political and economic 
elite of the newly emerging country and who procedurally realised that one way of ruling the 
country and furthering their interests was to play on the communal distinctiveness of the various 
confessional groups, a situation largely made possible by the installation of the Ottoman 
confessional millet system. 
With the advent of independence in 1943, Lebanon witnessed a period of stable consensual politics 
under Bishara al-Khoury (a Christian Maronite and the first President of independent Lebanon) and 
Riad al-Solh (a Muslim Sunni and the independent country's first Prime Minister) until 1952. The 
Camille Chamoun term (1952-1958) was, by all means, less stable as it witnessed two crises. 
Though the 1952 crisis (explained in detail below) was quickly resolved, its causes were not, and as 
such, the 1952-1958 period was, for many reasons, a period of latent instability, that degenerated 
during the 1958 crisis (also explained below in detail). During President Chihab's term in office 
(1958-1964), a programme of reforms, better known as Chihabism, aimed at making the economy 
more socially centered and insulating it from the control of the political elite allied to powerful 
merchants. 5 Hanf notices that the Lebanese state functioned best during the Shihabist era, when the 
4 For similar accounts, see Muhammad Faour, The silent revolution in Lebanon: changing values of the youth. Beirut: 
American University of Beirut, 1998, p. 56. 
5 In the words of Ajami, 'He was the first President of Lebanon who realized that the "merchant Republic" Of ruling 
oligarchs and feudal chieftains had to come to terms with the dispossessed, that its chaotic life had to be organized in a 
new way. Lebanon's wild capitalism, Shihab understood, had to incorporate ideas of social responsibility, had to accept 
taxation. He wanted to increase the power of the state vis-A-vis the warlords' (Ajan-ý 1986,87). For an account of 
Chihab's redistributive social policy and attempt to establish a welfare state, see Khalifah, Bassem, The rise and fall of 
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state installed its power by promoting a greater measure of economic and social justice (Hanf 1990, 
66 9). Indeed, the state became more powerful during Chihab's term and in the early years of 
President Helou's term in office (1964-1970), as a result of Chihabism's attempts to build the state 
structures and institutions necessary for nation-building and move the Lebanese confessional 
system from an actor-centered model to an institution-centered model. However, it should be said 
that the response of traditional politicians to Chibabism somehow illustrates the resilience of the 
strong linkages that have long existed (and currently still exist) in Lebanon among traditional 
politicians and powerful business groups. Indeed, 'traditional leaders of the various confessions 
mobilized against Shihabism ... and defeated it in the 1970 election' 
(Bill & Springborg 2000,200). 
Additionally, the latter years of Helou's presidency witnessed militant Palestinian activism that 
impacted on the stability of the system and suggested latent social instability. 
President Franjiya's term in office (1970-1975) witnessed a return to pre-Chihabist consociational 
practices of rule among a select association of political and economic elites dominating a weak 
state. Additionally, the dismantlement of Chihabist state structures (such as the Deuxi6me Bureau 
or Moukhabarat) made it impossible to control Palestinian militant activism. The influx of Shi'i 
migrants from the turbulent South of Lebanon to Beirut deprived them of both the Southern and the 
Beiruti patronage system. This exclusion drove them to turn to an alliance with some Lebanese 
radical groups such as the Communist Party and other leftist groups that proliferated on the 
Lebanese scene. Hence, a pattern of Muslim resentment, as a result of their exclusion from the 
political system (and their feelings of deprivation), began to take shape. With the radicalisation of 
Shi'is and Palestinians (who were also excluded from the Lebanese consociational formula), the 
consociational system broke down. Consensus among the traditional elites over the need to preserve 
the stability of the system was shattered, especially when their inability to do so was facilitated by 
the emergence of new sectarian leaders able to channel class discontent along communal and 
narrow sectarian lines. The various civil wars of the 1975-1990 will be mentioned in the section of 
this chapter dealing with the causes of the war. 7 
B. The 1926 Lebanese Constitution 
According to Dahl, Lebanon is a 'full-polyarchy inaugurated before independence' (Dahl 1971, 
197). With the emergence of the "democracy with adjectives" phenomenon, a more contemporary 
Christian Lebanon. Toronto: York Press Limited, pp. 121-29,1997. For a detailed examination, see Nawaf Kabbara. 
Shehabism in Lebanon. 1958-1970: the failure of a hegemonic projec . Doctoral Thesis. United Kingdom: University of 
Essex, 1988. 
6 Translated from French. 
7 See Section F. in this chapter. 
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classification of the Lebanese political system would label Lebanon a sectarian "democracy". 
However, to be able to classify this sectarian system of democracy in more detail, it should be 
determined how the pre-war Lebanese political system relates to the model of consociational 
democracy. As a first start, the most important articles of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution (i. e., the 
ones that are useful for the purposes of this thesis) will be examined in order to locate 
consociational constitutional principles. 
As a start, Article 9 recognises the freedom of conscience, the freedom and respect of religious and 
general belief and the respect of personal status affairs: 
Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the State respects all creeds and 
guarantees and protects their free exercise, on condition that they do not interfere with public order. It also 
guarantees to individuals, whatever their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their 
religious interests (Bustros 1973). 
Article 10 acknowledges the right of different religious communities to run their own schools and 
teaching practices as long as this does not harm public/civil order and provided this respects moral 
values and religious sanctity and holiness of all religions: 
Education is free so long as it is not contrary to public order and to good manners and does not touch the dignity 
of creeds. No derogation shall affect the right of communities to have their schools, subject to the general 
prescriptions on public education edicted by the State (Bustros 1973). 
Clearly, these two articles conform to the above-mentioned articles of the Mandatory Agreement 
over Lebanon. By allocating a high degree of autonomy to the segments of the plural society to run 
their own affairs, both articles conform closely to the definition of segmental autonomy and foster 
it. While the aim is to institutionally allow each communal group the capacity and laxity to preserve 
its own cultural heritage, value system and religious belief, such an organisation of society lends 
support to the argument that societal separatism is likely to occur. Additionally, it may be said that 
this organisation of society has led many Lebanese people to pride themselves on the plethora of 
communal institutions that the Lebanese state allows. This often undermines the detrimental impact 
this has had on their ability to perceive the crosscutting class cleavages as unifying factors across 
communal groups. Needless to say, this has had a detrimental impact on societal stability and on the 
stability of the system overall. 
Indeed, by giving every community the false sense that it is particular, unique and distinctive, this 
article has contributed to procedural separatism within Lebanese society and has prevented the 
emergence of a unifying and common education system among all Lebanese people, irrespective of 
their sect. Indeed, segmental autonomy has manifested itself in the existence of different religious 
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courts to regulate personal status, as well as a plethora of schools, welfare organisations, charities, 
newspapers and other mediums of ideological dissemination to cater for the needs of the various 
communal groups, and further foster societal separatism. To the Lebanese elites, playing on the 
perceived communal, distinctiveness nourished the clientelistic relationship they entertained with 
their followers. To the Lebanese people, this false, exaggerated sense of distinctiveness has made 
elite manipulation easier. While a number of researchers into Lebanese politics argue that this 
situation (coupled with the somehow geographical isolation of communal groups) reflects an effort 
by the political elite to prevent or reduce the risk of the outbreak of communal conflict, it can be 
said that it is part of the strategy of traditional notables to keep the groups separate, and make them 
suspicious of each other. Indeed, this situation has prevented the emergence of class-based 
consciousness. Instead, the elites have been able to market their own nationalist versions that have a 
narrow dimension and a divisive effect on society as a whole, and on social stability. 
When it comes to communal representation in the political system and civil service recruitment, 
Article 95 reads as follows: 
Temporarily, and in deference to equity and accord, the various sects shall be equitably represented in public 
offices and in the formation of Cabinets, barring any detriment to the interests of the State (Hoss 1984,74). 
This article touches on the political as well as economic aspects of the Lebanese system of rule, 
since all communities shall receive a fair proportional share of the political power and economic 
resources available to the state (administration and government). As Halpern stresses, this touches 
on 'all civil service positions, [even] including teaching at the national university, 8 [which] were to 
be (and were in fact) apportioned proportionally by sect' (Halpern 1984,15-60). As such, it is 
consistent with the three-dimensional consociational principle of proportional representation, which 
speaks of political representation, civil service appointments and the allocation of public funds. 
However, a number of points arise from the above. First, the fact that such an organisation of 
communal representation and allocation of economic power, i. e., the confessional one, was made 
temporary seems to indicate that it may have a number of shortcomings, but more importantly, that 
it is not so readily possible to have a better organisation. Second, one point that should be stressed 
is that such an organisation of political representation and civil service recruitment may and often 
does harm the interests of the state and the nation: this approach to confessionalism is embodied in 
proportional communal representation, especially at the civil service level. It often limits the ability 
aA situation which has led, according to the current Culture Minister Ghazi Aridi, to nepotism being 'rife at the state- 
run Lebanese University' which is 'full of nests of chaos, nepotism and sectarianism' (Daily Star Online [hereafter 
DSO], 21 July 2003). 
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of the state to cater effectively for the needs of the population, irrespective of sensitive communal 
considerations. This may force it to recruit more state, army and education officials than needed, in 
order to meet representational criteria. Third, the provisions of Article 95 conform to the 
consociational principle of proportionality, which, like Article 95, does not specify exact formulas 
for the allocation of political representation and economic power, but only of adequate and fair 
criteria. However, the sensitive, complex character of such an issue seems to indicate that there will 
generally be communal resentment as to what constitutes fair, equitable criteria, as the scenario 
presented by Norton, discussed above, reveals. Hence, communal resentment over such an issue 
may well harm the stability of society, and may lead to communal conflict and a reduction in the 
prospect of democratic stability. Moreover, a real procedural problem of representation may 
manifest itself, and this is even more likely to endanger the stability of the system. Thus, there 
seems to be an inbuilt tension within the provisions of Article 95 itself. 
As to the communal or minority right to mutual veto, Halpern reveals that the mutual veto 'is 
assumed in the Lebanese system by the existence of grand coalition and proportionality' (Halpern 
1984,161). Indeed, as Picard has put it, Article 57 guarantees the use of the veto right by the 
minority. Until 1990, it has protected the country against any drift towards authoritarian practices 
by the hegemonic group, the Maronite community. Picard however warns that yet although the 
article was frequently a source of paralysis, this veto has been then a key factor for democratic 
functioning in pre-war Lebanon (Picard 1997,644). 9 
C. The 1943 National Pact 
In 1943, Lebanon gained its independence and consociational politics began to be applied. Before 
this section elaborates in great detail on the 1943 National Pact, it will offer an account of its main 
provisions and conventions. Briefly, the main convention of the pact states that the Maronites 
relinquish French protection while the Sunnis give up on their demands for union with Syria in 
return. As of its provisions, the pact reserves the presidency for the Maronite community, the 
Premiership for the Sunni community, the speakership for the Shi'i community and the office of the 
deputy Prime Minister for the Greek Orthodox community. In addition, the pact speaks of 
proportional representation for each sectarian grouping in government and in parliament (that of 
which is set on a six to five ratio favouring Christians). 
9 Translated from French. 
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Most researchers argue that the 1943 National Covenant 'was not, in fact a formal constitution [as 
in it did not replace the constitution] but [was] rather an addendum to the constitution' (Deegan 
1993,106) or that it was a 'para-constitutional implicit pact' (Salam6 1996a, 2-3). However, it is 
important to point out that the pact is the actual translation of the constitution in procedural terms. 
As such, it constitutes a testing field for the operation of the consociational model, more so than the 
constitution, since the former reflects the dominant position of some communal groups in Lebanese 
society, and illustrates how such a dominant position significantly excludes other communal 
groups. For instance, Suleiman calls the pact the 'unwritten constitution of Lebanon' (Suleiman 
1967,21) while Hudson refers to it as 'an act of creative statesmanship by two liberal politicians' 
and 'Lebanon's "real" constitution' (Hudson 1995,733). Salibi agrees with the above-mentioned 
argument that the pact was to 'supplement the formal Constitution of the country', but he is also 
quick to note that it was to 'have equal effectiveness' (Salibi 1988,185). As Rondot aptly puts it, 
the constitution is the 'pays l6gal' while the pact 'is the Constitution of the pays r6el' (Farah 1975, 
page 51). 10 Indeed, the pact represents a turning point in the pre-war Lebanese political system, 
because it put into practice the constitution in a way that proves crucial to any understanding and 
evaluation of pre-war Lebanese consociational politics and of their failure to bring about democratic 
stability. The pact thus explains much more about consociational politics than the constitution 
does. In short, the National pact is the procedural institutional design of rule that regulates the 
conduct of politics and the distribution of effective power, influence and executive decision- 
making. Hence, a detailed evaluation and assessment of the pact are crucial for the purposes of the 
present study, since the pact regulates executive decision-making in procedural terms. 
It is useful here to recall the main contention of this research, namely that the main feature and 
determining dimension that allows researchers to test the successful operability of the 
consociational model rests within the concept, form and scope of the grand coalition (i. e., elite rule). 
It is effectively within the grand coalition that executive decision-making lies, and where the ability 
of the model to deliver on the promise of democratic stability can be meaningfully tested. As such, 
while the constitution tends to reflect the general rules of the game that organise the governance of 
Lebanon, the pact is in effect the actual translation of these rules into action and in that sense, it 
reflects the structure of politics in Lebanon. Indeed, the pact unveils the dominant, hegemonic 
dimension of pre-war consociational politics, rather than what Messarra refers to as their consensual 
character. Hence, this thesis considers the pact to be the grand coalition in pre-war Lebanon and 
treats the agreements of the pact and their translation into practice as the effective procedural elite 
10 For a comprehensive account and commentary of what has been written about the importance of the pact as opposed 
to the constitution and the constitutional dimension the pact took in procedural terms, see Bassern el Jisr, Mithaq 1943: 
limatha. kan wa hal saqat2 [2d Edition]. Beirut: Dar An-Nahar lil Nachr, 1997, pp. 312-323. 
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behavior against which one may evaluate the operability of "consociationalism in action". Indeed, 
as Halpern writes, Ujphart points to the Lebanese National Pact which apportioned legislative 
seats and executive positions on the basis of religious affiliation ... as an example of the institutional 
expression of the concept of grand coalition' (Halpern 1984,68). When the pact entered into effect, 
it resulted in a hegemonic system of rule, instead of promoting a consensual pattern of politics, 
contrary to what consociational theory holds as per the ways in which the model is supposed to 
work. 
The pact, or the Gentlemen's Agreement was an 'uncodified understanding' (Salam6 1996a, 2-3), 
an unwritten verbal agreement concluded in 1943 between Khoury and Solh, with the involvement 
of external players. It should be said that Khoury was in close family association with Michel 
Chiha, a prominent Catholic banker, as well as other prominent personalities that can be described 
as the pre-war banking-financial elite (which was predominantly Catholic). Therefore, such 
associations raise questions whether Khoury can be said to be the representative of the Maronite 
community. As of Solh, he represented the mercantile-commercial elite of the coastal cities, which 
was predominantly Sunni and Orthodox. It may be said that together, Khoury and Solh had an 
interest in preserving the stability of the system so as to safeguard their business interests. 
Habib writes that the pact is considered to be 'an essential [if not the essential in this author's view] 
consociational element in the Lebanese system' (Habib 1995). Indeed, Kabbani observes that 
'although the Constitution permits other forms of government, the 1943 National Pact 
institutionalised consociational democracy as a constitutional reality' (Kabbani 1986,95). 11 This 
makes it more useful to look at the pact in detail for the purposes of the present study. There is a 
certain degree of confusion surrounding the much-talked about pact, and it seems there will be no 
final word as regards many of the events that brought it into being. Some aspects of the pact on 
which scholarly consensus exists are, the fact that the pact 'was produced behind closed doors' 
(Khatib 1994,69), that it 'was never officially presented to Parliament and voted upon as such' 
(Mallat 1987,130) and that it was 'presented to the people as a fait accompli' (Makdisi 1996,25). 
As regards the two-fold dimension of the pact, it should be noted that it contains two main aspects, 
an internal one and an external one. When it comes to the external one, a compromise that speaks of 
the national identity and foreign policy of independent Lebanon, there is no scholarly consensus as 
to when and how it was made public. While Barak argues that it 'was immediately made public', 
Khazen notes that 'Solh's ministerial declaration on 7 October 1943 is considered to be the first 
11 Translated from French provided. 
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verbal enunciation of the National Pact' (Khazen 1991,38). He does not specify, however, whether 
the internal aspect, dealing with the proportional representation in the various institutions of the 
state, was also made public on that occasion. For instance, Barak holds that it 'was not publicly 
announced', noting however that 'time has shown that it was no less binding than its first [i. e., the 
pact's external] part' (Barak 2000,3). 
As to the oft-heard claim that the pact was conducted between Khoury and Solh alone, Khazen 
reveals that 'to be sure, the Pact was not as spontaneous as it appears to have been. The groundwork 
was done prior to the Solh-Khoury agreement in the summer of 1943. A well-structured distribution 
of political offices along sectarian lines was devised, once again, with the assistance of outsiders' 
(Khazen 1991,36). Indeed, referring to the 6: 5 parliamentary representation ratio of Christians to 
Muslims, the author points out that 'this confessional arTangement in government office was the 
outcome of negotiations involving Lebanese and Egyptian leaders, as well as British General Spears 
and French General Catroux' (Khazen 1991,36). As such, the attempt for the pact to create a set of 
institutions that would respond somewhat to the needs of the various Lebanese communal 
groupings and recognise the balance of power that exists among them seems to have involved 
outside powers. This suggests the difficulty that local elites face in engineering consociational 
practices without a heavy dose of external involvement. Against this background, Lijphart's claim 
that Lebanese politicians invented consociational rules in 1943 seems to be problematic. Indeed, 
consociationalism appears to be a method that is often resorted to with the significant involvement 
in the form of external arbitration and internal mediation/negotiation, rather than a genuine, 
spontaneous choice of governance. These peculiar aspects of the grand coalition embodied in the 
pact point to the many medium-term and long-term shortcomings that such structures of rule entail. 
Indeed, while the Lebanese parties to the pact are Solh and Khoury, the external parties are more 
numerous, suggesting that consociational structures of rule often emerge as a result of a 
convergence between external and internal interests among very few players (who do not hold 
legitimacy as they cannot be said to be representative of the population). 
The pact is effectively an agreement between the representatives of the two most powerful, and 
hence "significant" communities in Lebanon. As such, it conforms closely to the definition of the 
concept of the grand coalition, as provided by Lijphart's consociational theory. Indeed, the Sunnis 
and the Maronites make up a large majority of the Lebanese population, are the significant groups, 
and their somehow dominant and powerful position compared to the remaining groups explains the 
scope of the pact. Hence, its highly elitist nature and more importantly, the translation of this highly 
elitist dimension in practice may offer an explanation as to why the system was characterised by 
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governmental paralysis (i. e., at the executive decision-making level), 12 witnessed crises involving 
violence twice in the 1950s and completely collapsed in the mid-1970s with the outbreak of the 
Lebanese war. Indeed, the collapse of the system points out that there is a structural problem with 
the organisation of political sectarian rule, which is based upon wealth and power and strategic 
alliances. Though the pact was a deal between the leaders of the most important or significant 
groups in Lebanese society, Bishara and Khourt, its translation into practice brought some 
accommodation of the confessional groups to the dominant hegemonic political position of the 
Maronites, and to a lesser extent, the Sunnis. Indeed, Barak writes that for the elites who launched 
the pact: 
Consociational democracy was not just a means to accord every ethnic community its due share in the 
government so as to avoid internal strife, but also an instrument to preserve the existing political and 
socioeconomic order and their own predominant position in their state, that is, to lay the foundations that would 
enable them to manage its affairs for decades to come (Barak 2000,21-2). 
Johnson reminds us, moreover, that the Sunnis 'saw independence not simply as a means for 
removing the hated French patrons of the Christians, but also as a change for expanding the 
opportunities of Muslims in the state bureaucracy and the economy' (Johnson 1986,127) and 
Makdisi stresses that 'the national pact, itself a result of elite compromises, essentially legitimated a 
system of patronage and a division of spoils among the elites of the new nation-state, thus betraying 
the inability to locate a genuinely national base' (Makdisi 1996,25). Similarly, for Khalifah, 'the 
Pact also gave a strong basis for the common interests of the Maronite and Sunni establishments to 
become the main holders of power among all the Lebanese sects. Hence the multi-sectarian balance 
took a dual form, the balance between the Maronite President and what he represents, and the Sunni 
Prime Minister and the forces and interests he represents... Yet the exclusion of the other minorities 
did not always mean that the interests of these two confessions were always in balance and 
harmony' (Khalifah 1997,10). 
Khazcn, neither endorses nor rejects such comments, but presents the leftist view of many scholars 
who saw in the pact a 'capitalist confessional deal aimed at promoting the interests of some 
segments of Lebanese society at the expense of others'. Khazen elaborates on such an approach to 
the pact by citing Daher, who argues that the pact 'reflects an overlap between confessional and 
economic (class interests)' and leading Khazen to argue that such an interpretation 'creates a 
situation of total economic dependency on the imperialist West' (Khazen 1991,4). Indeed, the pact 
reflects that the interests of Bishara and Khoury converged in the materialisation of the pact. 
12 For example, Mot writes that 'confessionalism also became institutionalized in the executive, often paralyzing the 
ill 
The scope of representation of the pact is a clear illustration of consociational principles. It has a 
highly elitist scope of representation of the grand coalition as prescribed by Lijphart, elite 
dominance, a central role that the dominant elites play in the creation of a system of governance for 
a plural society and in governing the latter and finally, the group exclusion it entails. Likewise, the 
provisions of the pact (both its internal and external dimensions) are a clear manifestation of the 
system of governance that is likely to result from this grand coalition, i. e., a confessional system of 
rule based on a coalition that is limited in scope and intemally unequal in power and influence. 
Indeed, as Owen writes, 'there was widespread elite support for a political system based on the 
principle of sectarian representation' (Owen 2000,166). 
Before discussing the narrow scope of the grand coalition, its structure (i. e., the components of the 
grand coalition) and more importantly the rules that define the relationships among these 
components, the discussion will address the undemocratic, unbalanced nature of the pact. This lack 
of balance explains the detrimental, destabilising impact it has had on the conduct of politics for the 
three decades to follow. It has also affected the organisation of Lebanese society and the stability of 
the system as a whole, thereby contributing to its breakdown in 1975. Here, one should return to 
the critical discussion of pacting, undertaken in Chapter 3. This is because pacting is a frequent 
feature/manifestation of consociationalism, and it is particularly useful to shed more light on the 
undemocratic aspect of pacts, such as the one under examination in the present chapter. It may be 
said that the chief failing of the pact can be attributed to the paradoxes that it has entailed, and that 
such uncodified agreements normally engender. 
Lijphart himself echoes such concerns, arguing that power-sharing 'is not sufficiently democratic 
[as] this charge is based on the importance of compromises negotiated often behind closed doors by 
the leaders of the various groups in power-sharing systems' (Lijphart 1995a, 860). Clearly, such an 
observation conform to the secretive character that the pact's negotiations took. For instance, Picard 
argues that 'it would be abusive to speak of consociational democracy in the case of Lebanon and 
to compare it to the Swiss and Dutch systems since it is obvious that the Lebanese populations were 
not consulted', and concludes that the pact 'is a consensus with which only the elite is concerned' 
(Picard 1988,119). Similarly, Khazen speaks of two faulty assumptions that the pact was based on 
and that will be treated separately in the present discussion. The first faulty assumption, according 
to the author, is an internal one, based on the belief that elite consensus reflects grass-roots 
communal support. I 
regular activities of the latter' (Kliot 1986,33). 
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As argued earlier, consociationalism is essentially an elitist form of democracy with a significant 
loss of mass involvement and participation in the political process. Moreover, Chapter 3 has shown 
that democracy tends to be essentially a way of dealing with group interests. Consequently, it is 
debatable whether the Lebanese populations would be consulted under the consociational 
framework where the elite role is central to the model, which is in effect an actor-centered model. 
Accordingly, Picard and Khazen's arguments in this respect are not applicable. It would be 
simplistic to assume that the negotiations leading to the pact would involve some sort of popular 
referendum as to the populations' acceptance of the structure and decisions of the pact. Indeed, this 
would be defeating the purpose of the pact, which aims to establish an elitist form of rule and to 
maintain the Lebanese population 'within the communitarian framework under the control of 
traditional notables, heads of clans, landowners and clerical authorities', as Picard notes. This is 
especially true when considering the fact that the Lebanese elites, particularly the Maronites, have 
been unwilling to conduct a population census (though the first and last one was conducted in 1932, 
i. e., 11 years before the pact), due to the sensitivity of this issue. This is because such a census 
would reveal the numerical strength/weakness of each of the communal groups. Indeed, it should be 
noted that it would not have been possible for the pact to materialise had there been a popular 
consultation as to its acceptance by the people, and had it involved members of the remaining 
Lebanese communal groups. 
Second, a problem related to the scope of the pact is in terms of the parties involved in it, as it is a 
'pact between the two most powerful for significant] communities (Maronite and Sunni) rather than 
one between all communities', hence making it 'more adequate to speak of a communitarian pact 
rather than of a national pact' (Picard 1988,119). 13 For Picard, such a narrow dimension has 
translated into the breakdown of the system: 'it would also be more reasonable to look within these 
two distinctions, for the principal source of dramatic failure of this consensus system' (Picard 1988, 
119). Indeed, the major remaining communities, the Christian Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim Shi'ite 
and the Druze communities, were not parties to the pact, and this has contributed significantly to 
communal resentment and frustration. However, this is not to say, as Abukhalil contends, that the 
pact 'should not be regarded as a form of what consociational theorists call a grand coalition, as 
what ljjphart considers an evidence for the Lebanese version of consociational democracy' 
(Abukhalil 1988,54). Contrary to Abukhalil, the present study argues that the pact was a clear 
manifestation of the concept of the grand coalition in action, as the Maronite and Sunni 
communities together formed the significant groups of Lebanon's plural society, and enjoyed a 
13 Translated from French. For similar views, see Farid el-Kha*zen, The communal pact of national identities: the 
making and politics of the 1943 National Pact, (Papers on Lebanon 12). Oxford: CLS, 1991, p. 5 and As'ad Abukhalil, 
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political position in society significantly dominant as compared to other groups. A significant 
amount of communal and societal instability that the narrow-scope pact generated resulted from the 
exclusion of other communal groups from it. This is best illustrated by Khalidi's account of the pre- 
war, duopolistic character of the Lebanese political system. As Khalidi writes: 
The Sunni-Maronite partnership in the formulation of the Covenant gave rise to a situation in which the leaders 
of the two communities at the highest level and with few exceptions looked upon the entire Lebanese scene 
through a bisectarian prism. This prism tended by the same token to be exclusivist and somehow able to block 
from view the existence of other sects, Christian and Muslim alike (Khalidi 1989b, 380). 
Khalidi's observations as to communal group exclusion and its impact on the system as a whole are 
crucial for an understanding of the collapse of the system. As discussed earlier, group exclusion 
from decision-making is highly detrimental to the stability of a plural society. Thus, the group 
exclusion inherent in the consociational principle of grand coalition brings about significant 
communal frustration and resentment, and in this sense, can hardly be considered able to protect the 
interests of the various communal groups and a successful conflict-regulation mechanism. Rather, 
although the model and the concept of the grand coalition are supposed to generate and maintain 
democratic stability in theory, in practice, it results in a somewhat modified form of amicable 
majoritarianism or consensual duopoly at the elite level, especially when looking at their procedural 
aspects (as the use of the word significant seems to suggest). Hence, the applicability and 
operability of the consociational model of rule for plural societies may be questioned. 
Indeed, Karl wams that successful pacts 'should be comprehensive, including virtually all 
politically significant actors' and that 'only if all such actors are included can vital interests be 
protected' (Karl quoted by Gill 2000,54). However, he notes that in practice, pacts 'restrict the 
scope of representation so as to reassure traditionally-dominant elements that their vital interests 
will be respected... ' (Karl quoted by Gill 2000,54). The National Pact is a case in point. By 
restricting the scope of representation to the two most powerful or significant communities, it did 
not preserve and protect the other communities' vital interests. Rather, as Karl suggests, the pact 
merely reassured the traditionally dominant Maronite and the Sunni communities that their interests 
would continue to be respected. 
A further issue to be addressed regarding the scope of representation of the pact is Leca's 
observation conceming the insecure, unstable aspect of political pacts in the West, and especially in 
the Arab world. He questions how such compromises might be durable between ' "parties" that are 
not self-contained units, like states or armies but whose various salient identities... are not ranked 
The 12plitics of sectarian ethnicity: segmentation in Lebanese societ . Doctoral Thesis. USA: Georgetown University, 
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according to stable functional criteria but according to subtle situational shiftsT (Leca 1996,50), 
concluding that 'even members of the so-called "stable democracies" were never reduced to the 
identity quartet: citizenship, occupational group, religious or ideological affiliation, party affiliation. 
[However], still, there the identity and substance of parties can be ascertained more securely than in 
the Arab world' (Leca 1996,50). The unclear and misleading enunciation of the identity of 
Lebanon in the pact, (Arab and Western) and the vague outline of national and foreign policies, that 
is, the non-alignment policy stated in the pact, played an important role in moving it further away 
from being a stable conflict-regulating mechanism and hence, prevented it from generating 
democratic stability. The materialisation of the pact was made possible because of the temporary 
convergence of interests between the Maronite and Sunni confessional elites and because of their 
mutual willingness to structure and organise this partnership in more concrete terms. Nonetheless, 
when this partnership no longer seemed strategic or of mutual benefit and when other factors 
challenged it, the pact could no longer serve as an effective conflict-regulating mechanism, as the 
main or "significant" beneficiaries of this relationship no longer benefited from the latter. As such, 
the pact points to the structural flaws and problems associated with the organisation of political 
sectarian rule. 
A final issue to be addressed regarding the scope of representation of the pact is expressed in the 
words of Khazen. While pointing out that this was/is not unique to Lebanon, Khazen argues that 
the fact that 'communal leaders were willing to reach a vague compromise was no guarantee of its 
acceptance by the people they theoretically represented' (Khazen 1991,39). Indeed, even among 
the Maronite and the Sunni communities, those significant, major and dominant groups within 
Lebanese society whose dual relationship was supposed to have been regulated by the pact in a 
satisfactory manner, the conclusion of the latter did not seem to generate widespread support. For 
instance, Makdisi writes that 'whereas compromises between the elites were meant to divide power 
among different communities, they in fact divided power among the elites of various communities 
at the expense of the divided and disenfranchised majority' (Makdisi 1996,26). Indeed, this 
situation is because, as well as the pact having been an expression of Lijphart's consociational 
principle of grand coalition, the provisions of the pact also touched on the principle of proportional 
representation. In this sense, the pact elaborated on Article 95 of the 1926 Constitution (discussed 
above) and procedurally gave it an effective shape. The remaining paragraphs of this section will 
elaborate on the consociational principle of proportionality embodied in the pact. 
1988, p. 74. 
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In the words of Tueni, 'in constitutional terms, Lebanese democracy moved from the doctrine of 
separation of powers to the notion of the distribution of powers among the communities, a strange 
and most unpractical form of partition... ' (Tueni 1991,21). Indeed, among the Sunni and the 
Maronite communities, even though the pact did not, and could not have engendered group 
exclusion as they were both represented in the grand coalition, the pact arrangements continued to 
reflect the dominant political position of the Maronites in Lebanese society as compared to the 
Sunnis in an indirect manner, i. e., by procedurally carrying out that obviously dominant position to 
another level, the level of proportional representation in the state apparatus. Such consociational 
mechanisms appear to be increasingly unable to regulate peaceful communal coexistence in plural 
societies, in that their procedural manifestations continue to reflect the real situation on the ground, 
rather than any a higher ideal. In this sense, it is debatable whether consociationalism realises the 
promise of democratic stability for plural societies. 
For instance, judging from the treatment and handling of the interests of the various communal 
groups (significant and less significant alike) and their position in society, it can hardly be said that 
the consociational model was concerned with the equal treatment of groups. Under the pre-war 
Lebanese consociational model, there was no attempt at equality among groups. Rather, one group, 
the Maronites, predominated. They sought to arrange matters to their own satisfaction and interests 
based on its actual political power and influence in Lebanese society in relation to the remaining 
groups. Against this background, the consociational model cannot appear to have succeeded in 
establishing a framework of governance concerned with the equal treatment of groups. Rather, it 
has created tensions among the significant groups in society and has perpetuated divisions among 
all the communal groups in society, which does not positively predispose the country to peaceful 
communal coexistence. 
Second, it should be said that the 1943 National Pact offered an example of status inequity between 
the sects. This inequity is best seen when looking at the internal dimension of the pact in terms of 
the 6 to 5 Christian/Muslim representation ratio. In this respect, Picard raises the following 
question: 'Isn't it significant that at the time when the pact was concluded, it gave preponderance to 
Christians over Muslims while the demographic equilibrium benefited the latterT (Picard 1988, 
119). 14 Indeed, the pact can clearly be seen as a procedural manifestation of the failure of the 
consociational model to conform in practice to the consociational principle of proportionality. 
Abukhalil, meanwhile, notes that the pact violated the proportionality principle: 'the lack of 
proportionality in the allocation of benefits was a major cause for anti-govemment resentment and 
14 Translated from French. 
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protest, in both pre-1975 and post-civil war Lebanon' (Abukhalil 1988,280). In fact, this internal 
provision of the pact was a clear compromise to the Maronite community in the light of its 
politically dominant position within Lebanese society. As a result, it failed to respond to the needs 
of the various communal groups, including the Sunni community, despite it being the second 
significant group. Against this background, the procedural dimensions of the consociational model 
seem to suggest that the application of the theory to plural societies may involve internal in-built 
structural flaws that cause societal resentment. 
A discussion of the translation of these constitutional consociational features into practice, i. e., into 
executive decision-making through the practice of consociational politics is now necessary. Such a 
discussion starts with an examination of consociational politics during the 1943-1975 period and is 
bound to reveal significant departures from the model that are treated in this thesis as procedural 
manifestations of consociationalism, and more precisely, violations of consociational principles. In 
other words, the model does not work as the theory suggests and hence was unable to deliver on the 
promise of democratic stability for Lebanon. The next section will highlight the contradiction 
between textual statements and grand coalition pacting practices. It will show that constitutions tend 
to reflect the structure of power and dominance in society. Indeed, it should be said that the practice 
of pre-war Lebanese consociationalism was different from the consociational 
constitutional/institutional design embodied in the 1926 Constitution and the 1943 National Pact. 
As Steiner wams, 'it is not sufficient to look at the institutional setting of a country' but rather 
$necessary to look beyond the institutional arrangements and to inquire how a political system 
operates in concrete decision-making situations' (Steiner 1981b, 347). 
D. Consociational politics 1943-1975: deviations from consociational theory 
'So long as everyone in Lebanon was satisfied politically, socially, and economically, democracy prevailed and 
consociational mechanisms worked smoothly. But when some players in the political system began to feel that 
power was slipping from their grasp or being snatched away by their rivals ... almost nothing- neither formal and informal institutions, shared values nor respect for laws, norms, and rules of the game- deterred them from 
resorting to whatever means they could use to regain what they believed was rightfully theirs from time 
immemorial... or to defy the existing political order' (Barak 2000,24-5). 
This quote illustrates how the consociational model works in ways that are different from those 
described by consociational theory. The conduct of consociational politics in pre-war Lebanon 
shows how the consociational model deviates from consociational theory once it goes into 
operation. Indeed, when it comes to pre-war Lebanese consociational politics, they deviated from 
consociational theory in two important respects, exemplified by a procedural deviation from 
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accommodationist understandings (which are born out of a consociational spirit of rule) and another 
set of procedural deviations from consociational principles. 
1. Deviations from accommodationist understandings 
As a reminder to this discussion, the external dimension of the pact is a twin-fold elite 
accommodationist understanding based on mutual guarantees. It is difficult to determine the 
character of these understandings, and to say that they are consociational in the strict sense of the 
term. However, it is safe to say that they had an accommodationist or consensual dimension bom 
from a consociational spirit of rule based on compromise. These understandings were subject to 
violations that came about as a consequence of the limited scope of both the constitution and the 
pact. In the words of Khazen, the pact is 'Lebanon's communal approach to Realpolitik... [It] is the 
quintessential example of political pragmatism: the lowest common denominator shared by the 
independence leaders' (Khazen 1991,5). 15 However, it is argued in this thesis that these violations 
are a likely manifestation of the Lebanese political system because of the in-built flaws in the 
internal logic of consociational theory, to which the constitution and the pact adhere. In this sense, 
they are treated as natural deviations of the consociational model from consociational theory, once 
it goes into action. 
The emergence and institutionalisation of a tradition of political accommodation was defined earlier 
in terms of highly elitist (i. e., dominated by a Maronite and a Sunni) politics based on a situational 
convergence of interests. This shifting and situational character was reflected in pre-war Lebanese 
consociational politics in terms of elite behaviour, and compromises based on temporary and 
strategic alliances of interests. Indeed, the first aspect of the external dimension of the pact is 
concerned with Lebanon's foreign policy. It states as follows: 'no resort on the part of the 
Christians to soliciting western protection; no attempts on the part of the Muslims to pull Lebanon 
into a larger Arab unit' (Waterbury, 1996,38). In this regard, George Naqqash's well-known 
comment that "the pact was based on two negations and that two negations do not make up a 
nation" and Salem's analysis of this matter are particularly relevant. Salem notes that this 
nonalignment policy 'left many questions unanswered' (Salem 1994a, 71): 'substate foreign policy 
orientations do not make life any easier for the central government; given the related problem of 
outside don-ýination, the state's difficulty in formulating and implementing foreign policy is readily 
understandable' (Salem 1994a, 73). Indeed, as Abukhalil aptly put it: the pact 'specified what 
15 For similar views, see Hani A. Faris, 'The failure of peacemaking in Lebanon, 1975-1989'. In Deirdre Collings, eds. 
Peace for Lebanon? From war to reconstructio , pp. 17-30. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 18. Kamal 
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should not be done, not what had to be done' (Abukhalil 1988,68). As such, the government's 
policy of avoidance when it comes to controversial and sensitive issues that have sectarian 
ramifications lies at the heart of an understanding of the failure of the government to deal 
effectively in its foreign relations (which were not perceived similarly among all the communal 
groupings because of sectarian considerations) and hence, the failure of pre-war consociational 
politics. Against this background, the consociational model appears to be unable to bring about a 
sufficient amount of internal domestic unity over foreign matters, which would translate into the 
ability of the grand coalition to govern and conduct its foreign affairs on the basis of national 
interest, since it is difficult for the latter to come about within the sectarian communal framework of 
rule and the organisation of society. Hence, Lijphart's argument (treated in previous chapters) that 
foreign threats that are perceived as a common danger tend to facilitate consociational politics lacks 
internal consistency as the former are often not perceived as a common danger under the 
consociational framework of rule. 
Faris, meanwhile, illustrates how the governmental policy of avoidance affected the stability of the 
system: 'when independence was achieved, the continued success of this policy of avoidance was 
predicated on two conditions being met at all times. Namely, that the Lebanese refrain from 
invoking their differences over fundamental issues and that regional and international powers 
refrain from exploiting these differences as a means to influence the country's foreign policy 
orientations or internal make-up. By the mid-1970s, both conditions were being seriously violated' 
(Faris 1994,18). Indeed, it should be noted that, under the consociational structure of rule, the 
representatives of the different communal groups do not appear able to confront regional and 
international powers' intervention, partly aimed at influencing local orientations. Rather, in varying 
degrees and depending on each community's position (as well as perceived position) within society, 
such foreign interventions are perceived by community leaders as welcome, appear to them as 
having a protectionist character, and are hence invited, if not sought. This includes their ideological 
and somehow detrimental impacts on the stability of the system, and demonstrates all in an effort of 
the various communal leaders to buttress their local presence. Indeed, as Namani sums up, different 
sects 'sought sponsorship of external actors, and, conversely, external actors manipulated their 
Lebanese clients' (Namani 1982, Abstract). 
Chalouhi elaborates on this issue while commenting on the orientations of the Maronite President of 
the Republic and the Muslim Sunni bloc respectively: 'Chamoun's identification with the West 
through the Western Pact and the Moslems' identification with Nasser and the Arabs was in essence 
Joumblat shares similar views to Khazen. For Jounblat's commentary on the pact, see Bassem el Jisr, Mithaq 1943: 
limatha kan wa hal sagat? [2d Edition]. Beirut: Dar An-Nahar lil Nachr, 1997, p. 328. 
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a violation of the spirit of the National Pact upon which Lebanese consociationalism was built' 
(Chalouhi 1978,136). Hence, procedurally speaking, the consociational model appears unable to 
bring about the necessary amount of elite consensus that would allow the system to reach political 
maturity and later on, to generate stability. Indeed, as Chalouhi argues, the unilateral decisions 
Chamoun took were 'a violation of both the principles of Agreement to disagree and of summit 
diplomacy. Elite cooperation on the fundamentals of national policy was violated ... Chamoun's 
decisions were not a result of elite cooperation' (Chalouhi 1978,135). The Maronite President's 
attempt to bypass the consociational accommodationist understandings of the pact suggest that the 
internal logic of consociational theory is flawed in terms of its simplistic assumption that the elites 
will play according the rules of the consociational game. When the model's ability to bring about 
democratic stability rests on the ability and willingness of the elites to play by such rules, the 
internal logic of the theory may be seriously questioned. In short, the lack of a clear national foreign 
policy (a result of governmental avoidance) in the reciprocal guarantees of the pact was subject to 
procedural internal violations and outside intervention. 
A second accommodationist understanding, i. e. the second aspect of the external dimension of the 
pact, was intended to compromise between diverging perceptions among the different sects. It was 
concerned with the vague and somewhat ambiguous description of the identity and spirit of the 
country, and stated that Lebanon was a country with 'an Arab character' rather than an Arab 
country. In this respect, Salem classifies the contention that Lebanon is 'a bridge between East and 
West' as an unclear policy. The consequences of such a vague orientation left the country with no 
point of reference: 'the ideological void was filled in various stages by Arab nationalism, Syrian 
nationalism, revolutionary Marxism, Nasserite socialism and Islamic fundamentalism' (Salem 1993, 
26). Another detrimental consequence is found in the words of Chalouhi: 'As one French 
newspaper commented: "A Lebanon quite intoxicated with Arabism and where 45 percent of 
Lebanon declined to be Lebanese is not a viable Lebanon' (Chalouhi, 1978,60). Indeed, such 
vagueness has had a detrimental impact on the stability of the system and the cohesiveness of civil 
society, and has prevented the emergence of a unifying nationalist feeling able to effectively carry 
within it the necessary elements of societal stability. This in turn casts doubt on the ability of the 
model to generate democratic stability. 
2. Deviations from consociational principles 
The most widespread scholarly perspective argues that the pre-war Lebanese political system was 
consociational. However, given the significant deviations from consociational principles, and 
therefore departures from the model, Hudson argues that Lebanon was consociational on the whole 
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in the post-1943 era except for the Shehabist period, which he considers a para-military regime. 
Arguing against Salem's belief that in the 1943-1975 period, 'despite the considerable amount of 
partnering and power-sharing inherent in the arrangement, the system remained a predominantly 
presidential one' (Salem 1998,14), Hudson notices important deviations from the consociational 
model but 'not enough to justify claiming that Lebanon did not actually undergo a consociational 
experiment' (Hudson 1988,230). On the other hand, Abukhalil shares Salem's view, according to 
which the 1943-1975 Lebanese political system was presidential. 
The main argument of this section is that the Lebanese political system departed from 
consociational principles of rule precisely because the procedural aspects and manifestations of the 
model do not allow it to function as consociational theory suggests. Hence, whether these 
procedural aspects of the model are treated (by different scholars on Lebanese politics) as violations 
or departures is not the main discussion. Rather, the present section argues that these manifestations 
are a result of inherent flaws in consociational theory. In other words, this author argues that the 
procedural aspects of pre-war consociational politics make it reasonable to equate the latter with 
presidential systems of rule. Put simply, the pre-war Lebanese consociational politics in action 
resulted in a presidential system of rule as a result of the extremely elitist scope of the executive 
grand coalition. Halpern describes the Lebanese political system as follows: 
The National Pact ... establishes the Lebanese executive as a grand coalition... the allocation of executive offices 
to particular sects on a permanent basis satisfies the essential requirement of grand coalition- joint governance by 
leaders of the major subcultures. In the Lebanese Cabinet ... grand coalition 
is also the rule... (Halpern 1984,153). 
However, Halpern also notes that the system was presidential, pointing out that: 
Power was concentrated in the hands of a President who was not accountable to the legislature that appointed 
him... Together, the President and the Cabinet had authority to dissolve Parliament. Presidential power was 
further solidified by the fact that the six-year presidential term was non-renewable, thereby removing the 
President from the influence and demands of the electorate (Halpern 1984,150). 
It is important to point out that, as Halpem rightly argues, the allocation of Cabinet portfolios did 
meet consociational principles of sectarian representation. However, Cabinet members (i. e., 
confessional communal leaders) were not always in a position to check on the power of the 
President. This therefore suggested the existence of a structural problem of rule, as exemplified by 
the politically dominant position of the Maronites and the translation of this position in procedural 
terms. Indeed, as Krayem notes, 'the constitution gave the Maronite President ultimate executive 
authority while not providing a mechanism for presidential accountability, especially since 
Parliament could question the Cabinet, but not the President' (Krayem 1997,412). As a result, as 
Abukhalil observes, grand coalition, one of the major components of consociational democracy, 
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was not a feature of Lebanese political life: 'the concentration of power in the hand of a President, 
whose sectarian affiliation was not subject to alternation, left no room for a grand coalition. On the 
other hand, had a grand coalition type of government been really practised in Lebanon, it would 
have led to more moderation and accommodation' (Abukhalil 1988,278). For the purposes of the 
present discussion, the 1952 and the 1958 crises constitute a case in point as to the dominant role 
that the President of the Republic played in pre-war Lebanese politics. This case suggests how the 
scope of the grand coalition was procedurally reduced to fit the representation of the upper strata of 
the Maronite community, i. e., the President, his immediate family relatives and his close associates 
as well as, to a limited extent, a few traditional confessional notables, who did not always enjoy the 
support of the communities they allegedly represented. 
The 1952 crisis refers to an event where Khoury, the first President of the Republic, 'used his clear 
parliamentary majority to suspend the nonrenewal clause in his particular case in order to present 
himself for re-election... The Constitution had been easily circumvented by the ruling clique' 
(Hudson 1985b, 105): in the end, 'this failure was quickly repaired with a minimum of damage but 
the causes of the failure remained' (Hudson 1985b, 108). This crisis illustrates the fact that the pre- 
war system tended to take a presidential character. Indeed, the presidential race was a major source 
of competition and conflict because of the patronage system that the presidency entailed. As a 
result, the pre-war system (i. e., the electoral and governmental systems) induced intra-elite 
competition that threatened stability. Similarly, the 1958 crisis confirms Abukhalil's contention that 
a substantial amount of power was concentrated in the hands of the President. Indeed, President 
Chamoun, the second President serving in office after Khoury, who tried to undercut the power of 
traditional notables 'conveyed the impression that he would try to do what his predecessor had done 
a decade earlier (succeed himself)' (Hudson 1985b, 108). Such a move, coupled with the 
President's identification with the Western pact, ushered in instability and violence, mainly in terms 
of Muslim societal resentment and unrest. In both cases however (1952 and 1958), the fact that the 
confessional system allocated the post of the presidency to a Maronite meant that the race for the 
presidency took the form of an intra-Maronite competition, which impacted on stability for many 
reasons. Additionally, the 1952-1958 period (i. e., the Chamoun presidency) witnessed the support 
of the Sunni street for Nasserism, Sunni discontent with Chamoun's policies, and the latter's 
violation of the 1943 National Pact. Hence, the situation exploded into the 1958 war. 
Indeed, with regard to this Muslim dissatisfaction with Maronite political predominance, Hudson 
writes that 'this complaint was an important cause of the 1958 civil war, and one of the results of 
that crisis was the equalizing of administrative and Cabinet post allocations between the two 
religions' (Hudson 1985b, 23). Indeed, after the conflict that broke out (in which there was external 
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involvement) was settled, the solution of this conflict allowed the Muslims to feel that they had 
somehow secured equality for their community. However, the detrimental impact this process had 
on the stability of the system (mainly the amount of casualties involved and foreign military 
involvement), suggests how consociationalism in operation failed on the promise of stability for 
Lebanon. In other words, the 1958 crisis clearly illustrates how the unwillingness of some elites 
(who are in a dominant position within society) to cooperate affects the stability of the whole 
country. Indeed, commenting on the 1958 crisis, Chalouhi argues that 'the cohesiveness and trust 
between members of the elite- essential for the effective operation of the system- was breaking 
down, as it became evident that Chamoun had no regard for elite cooperation and the need for 
compromise decisions' (Chalouhi 1978,135-6). Chalouhi concludes that the 1958 conflict 'shook 
Lebanon's brand of consociationalism to its foundations. Practically, all of the basic tenets of 
consociationalism were broken' (Chalouhi 1978,134). Hence, the procedural aspects of 
consociationalism suggest that consociational theory is based on optimistic assumptions. 
In short, both the 1952 and the 1958 crises indicate that the President of the Republic in pre-war 
Lebanon was granted an amount of power that was not commensurate with the powers granted to 
the other top office holders or representatives of the remaining communal segments of Lebanese 
society. In the words of Lijphart, 'until the constitutional changes of 1989, the Presidency was by 
far the most powerful of the offices distributed among the ethnic groups' (Lijphart 1995a, 856). Nor 
was this amount of power commensurate with the demographic size of the Christian Maronite 
community, of which the President of the Republic was, and still is, the top office representative. 
Accordingly, both the 1952 and the 1958 crises can be considered two of the most serious 
manifestations of the failure of the consociational model to work as consociational theory suggests. 
For example, Chamoun's identification with the western pact and Muslim identification with 
Nasserism suggest how difficult it is for a common perception of threats and a common nation- 
building vision to emerge between groups under consociational structures of rule. Regional factors 
are seldom, as consociationalism suggests, perceived similarly between the communal groups, as 
threats to the stability of the system. Hence, the ability of consociationalisin to sustain itself is often 
seriously challenged by regional factors. This has domestic repercussions that shake the stability of 
the country. 
Having dealt with the procedural aspect of the grand coalition of pre-war Lebanese consociational 
politics and its impact on the stability of the system, the present discussion now turns to the 
procedural aspect of the consociational principle of proportional representation and its impact on 
the stability of the system. While some authors argue that the pre-war Lebanese system conformed 
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to the consociational principle of proportional representation, 16 it should be made clear again in 
relation to this matter that the pre-war political system departed procedurally from the 
consociational model in this particular respect as it did not confonn to the consociational principle 
of proportional representation that requires a fair representation of the segments. While the theory 
of consociational democracy does not specify exact quotas for the distribution of power (political 
representation, civil service appointments and allocation of public funds) among the different 
communities, the principle of proportionality, as defined by Lijphart, is 'especially important as a 
guarantee for thefair representation of minority segments' 17 (Lijphart 1995b, 278). 
It would be safe to assume that the system of proportional representation in practice was not fair to 
the different segments. The allocation of power was not proportionally representative of the 
constituents of Lebanese society, i. e. the various communal groups, in terms of their demographic 
strength. Rather, it reflected the strength of the influence and power that some traditional 
confessional notables enjoyed. As Chalouhi notes, 'intemally, the principle of proportionality was 
being violated' (Chalouhi 1978,137). In other words, representation of each sect was not 
commensurate with the demographic size of the sect. Rather, it was based on and reflected the 
politically dominant position of the Maronites. The violation of the principle of proportionality 
from 1943 -to 1975 may be traced back to the departure of the 1943 National Pact from 
consociational principles in terms of proportionality, discussed above. First, a reminder of Picard's 
observation is noteworthy: 'isn't it significant that at the time when the pact was concluded, it gave 
preponderance to Christians over Muslims while the demographic equilibrium benefited the latterT 
(Picard 1988,119). 18 Indeed, Khalaf's response is that 'the ratio agreed upon, 6: 5 in favor of 
Christians, did not reflect demographic realities of the time' (Khalaf 2002,286). 
Second, over a span of thirty years, this misrepresentation was to have an extremely destabilising 
impact on the stability of the system. The first reason for this was that earlier efforts to redress this 
imbalance were ignored. Continuing demands by the Muslim communities for a greater share of 
power commensurate with their demographic strength were not met satisfactorily, and in particular, 
the amendments following the 1958 crisis did not meet adequately Muslim resentment. This ratio 
dwas always biased in favour of the Christian sects much to the chagrin of the Muslim community. 
Between 1943 and 1975, the Christian sector always rejected any demands for a more equitable 
distribution of seats' (Deegan 1993,13). Additionally, 'Muslim demands for a new census, which 
were voiced already in the mid-1940s, only elicited Christian counterdemands that members of the 
16 For such an account, see Heather Deegan, The Middle East and problems of democracy [Issues in Third World 
politics]. Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993, p. 13 and p. 104. 
7 7 Emphasis added. 
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Lebanese diaspora living abroad - most of whom were said to be Christians - be counted as well, 
and the result was a mutual veto' (Horowitz 1985 cited by Barak 2000,7). 19 
Moreover, this situation was further exacerbated by the changing demographic balance between the 
major Lebanese sects, exemplified in the significant increase of the demographic presence of the 
Muslim communities. As Faris puts it, 'as demographic changes radically altered the sectarian 
proportions of the Lebanese population, the 1926 arrangements for sectarian representation became 
outdated. Gradually, the sectarian political system became less fair and less representative; its 
legitimacy eroded as it held stubbornly to old formulas' (Faris 1994,19). Similarly, Stoll argues as 
follows: 'The subsequent demographic shift of the Lebanese population undermined the stability of 
ethnic relations and was to have devastating results in 1975 when ethnic demands could no longer 
be resolved inside the consociational framework established in 1926' (Stoll 2000). 
It would be simplistic to assume that demographic strengths are not be subject to change and that 
such a variation will not have a destabilising effect on the system. For instance, Tueni argues that 
'the covenant, because of the laxity of the leadership responsible for implementing it, would prove 
especially impervious to the demographic and social changes visiting Lebanese society... ' (Tueni 
1993,50). However, more important is McDowall's observation: 'it is questionable whether, even 
had these proportions remained static, the constitutional arrangements made could have withstood 
both external and internal pressures indefinitely' (McDowall 1986,12). 
Consequently, ' "Lebanon was governed by a consortia of interests and power brokers that reflected 
the composition of the political establishment but not necessarily the electoral" ' (McDowall quoted 
in Rigby 2000,171). A fourth factor contributed to further exacerbate this inequity. As Kliot holds 
'the distortion in parliamentary representation was the over-representation of the rural areas and the 
clear under-representation of the urban areas because of massive migration from the rural to the 
urban areas' (Kliot 1987,65). A fifth impeding factor related to more or less significant waves of 
Christian migration outside the country carried a destabilising effect. In general terms, the Christian 
communities in Lebanon had a special disposition towards migration. Though there are no exact 
estimates, Christian migration outside Lebanon, especially within the Maronite community, was 
relatively more widespread than Muslim migration. At the end, the demographic reality 'remained 
so sensitive an issue that no government dared carry out another census. In short by the mid-sixties, 
most Lebanese recognized that the fine confessional balance in politics was based on a myth. It was 
18 Translated from French. 
19 Today, the situation is very much the same. See Section D. 2. in Chapter 5. 
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inevitable that those who felt disadvantaged by the myth should begin to clamour for a fairer slice 
of the cake, though the political establishment was reluctant to listen' (McDowall 1986,12). 
Here, it is essential to stress the argument that 'consociationalism did not allow for a flexible 
representation that could accommodate demographic shifts and changes' (Chahine 1998,172). 
Clearly, this violation finds its origins in the "laxity" of the signatories of the pact, to use Tueni's 
words. It is true that it was not remedied to because the pact 'contained no mechanism for the 
adjustment of the proportionality among the communities that were enshrined in it' (Doumit 1988, 
232). However, as Picard observes, 'nothing was devised to adapt this power sharing to the 
country's demographic evolution' (Picard 1988,119). In other words, not only was this a violation 
that the pact could not redress, but a deliberate disregard of the need to "fine-tune" proportional 
representation based on the new demographic reality. This disregard was possible because of the 
unequal power that the various communal groups enjoyed. The violation of the consociational 
principle of proportionality was one of the major factors leading to the breakdown of 
consociationalism and consensual elite behaviour in 1975 with the outbreak of the civil war. 
In drawing on the pre-war Lebanese consociational model (1943-1975), Chalouhi points to the 
immobilisation of the decision-making process on important political issues. He finds that there was 
respect and toleration with regard to ideological and political differences when it came to issues that 
Gwere not pressing' (Chalouhi 1978,14). However, when it came to issues that could not be 
resolved, the author observes that they were 'usually frozen ... and left unresolved' (Chalouhi 1978, 
15). This policy of governmental avoidance when it comes to dealing with sensitive issues suggests 
that the model is incapable of working as the theory suggests, and prevents the components of the 
system of the consociational country from reaching political maturity. Indeed, this is best seen by 
looking at the behaviour of the elite in pre-war Lebanon, since the major institutional components 
of consociational theory are the elites. 
In consociational democracies, the role played by the elite is a major determinant in the stability of 
the system. Consensual elite behaviour is a necessary condition for the creation and survival of a 
stable system. Put differently, 'in divided societies, political elites make up for the missing links 
between state and society' (Khazen 1993,53). It may be said that Lebanon's pre-war elites played 
a two-fold role, i. e., a consensual accommodationist one as well as a confrontational adversarial 
one: 'the dual role played by Lebanon's political elites from independence in 1943 to the outbreak 
of war in 1975 constituted the basis of much of the political stability that the country enjoyed in 
non-crisis situations' (Khazen 1993,53). A general point to be made is that pre-war traditional 
elites were able to compromise and maintain the relative stability of the system on relatively trivial 
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(i. e. non-vital) issues that did not prompt a significant accommodationist role, and that did not 
directly threaten the stability of the system. As regards political decision-making over highly salient 
political and economic issues that required substantial compromises in order to avoid crises and 
maintain the stability of the system, the performance of elites suggests that it is difficult for the 
consociational model to work as consociational theory suggests. More importantly, when the mutual 
interests and strategic alliances among the major players within the system stopped converging, the 
elites were no longer as committed to the stability of the system. In a sense, with no economic 
incentive to cooperate, there was insufficient motivation for the creating and maintaining of the 
political consensus and cooperation necessary for the system to be stable. This is not to say, 
however, that the main reason for the collapse of the pre-war consociational system rests solely on 
the role of the elites. Indeed, this thesis subscribes to Hudson's view that 'it would be wrong to 
blame the mishap wholly or even mainly on personal leadership failings. The confessional system 
itself- as the embodiment of a consociational model- was the root of the problem' (Hudson 1976, 
114): the real causes 'were systemic: the Lebanese confessional solution was no longer adequate to 
the loads and demands of the present situation. The situation was beyond the rational management 
of the leaders' (Hudson 1976,117). In other words, this thesis argues that it would be inadequate to 
blame solely the theory of consociational democracy or solely the Lebanese confessional system for 
the collapse of the system. This is because consociational theory, despite its inherently flawed 
assumptions, does not operate in a vacuum. 
When it came to communal clashes, it should be noted that pre-war traditional elites attempted to 
solve conflicts that resulted from the outbreak of communal violence. Indeed, Denoeux, while 
commenting on the consensual behaviour of traditional leaders as prevailing in Beirut, makes the 
point that 'they strove to prevent sectarian feelings from degenerating into armed confrontations 
among members of the lower classes... Cooperation at the elite level was preserved and it usually 
proved effective in maintaining order and stability in the city' (Denoeux 1993,79). Similarly, in the 
words of Chalouhi, 'there was a deliberate effort by the elite to stabilize the system as it was 
apparent that the alternative to this arrangement was intergroup strife' (Chalouhi 1978,14). 
However, in this specific respect (communal hostility), a distinction should be made between 
traditional politicians and new sectarian leaders who attempted to rise to power. 
For instance, the role played by new sectarian leaders conforTns in many instances to the notion of 
elite-initiated conflict discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3. While commenting on 
consociationalism, Tsebelis notes the frequent situation where elites 'foment conflict along group 
lines in order to bolster their own bargaining position vis-A-vis other groups at the political center' 
(Tsebelis 1990 quoted in Sisk 1996). Indeed, a number of new elites attempted to manipulate (and 
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effectively did manipulate) communal identities in order to acquire a dominant position within the 
confessional system. Hence, when such divisive policies degenerated into communal violence and 
clashes, traditional elites sought to stabilise the situation, but could not always do so. Hence, this 
challenges the theory of consociational democracy in that respect (elite ability to maintain stability). 
As Dekmejian notes, 'the cartel politicians sought foreign support to defeat their opponents. The top 
politicians used unconstitutional means to defeat the opposition and the local zu'amas exacerbated 
intersectarian conflict for political ends' (Dekmejian 1978,255). Hence intra-sectarian elite 
competition (between traditional elites and new sectarian leaders of the same sect) and the ensuing 
divisive confessional speech among them also point to the inability of the existing elites to maintain 
stability, despite efforts. This is illustrated through the efforts of the first two Presidents of the 
Republic to renew their mandate. This also challenges the assumptions of consociational theory, in 
that it suggests that traditional and "aware" elites can be sucked into a sectarian discourse to defeat 
their opponents (of the same sect). Indeed, both the 1952 and the 1958 crises illustrate the structural 
problem of the consociational system in terms of the flawed internal consistency of consociational 
theory which breaks down when the elites refuse to cooperate, when intra-elite competition 
produces a pattern of confrontational politics among and within the same sect and when regional 
factors and events challenge the ability of consociationalism to sustain itself. 
For example, drawing on intra-elite behaviour, it may be said that elites did not develop proper 
mechanisms to counteract the destabilising effects of the struggle for power on the part of their 
clienteles and local zu'amas. As Denoeux argues, 'the elite cartel had little control over their 
henchmen and could not prevent them from fighting with other combatants at the expense of losing 
their leadership within their sect. Also, the willingness of some small zu'amas and militiamen to 
rise to top positions could not be prevented' (Dekmejian 1978,256). At the same time, it should be 
noted that if pre-war elites managed many times to prevent the outbreak of full-scale communal 
conflict, they did not and in some instances, could not, promote consensus and cooperation among 
them. As Entelis remarks, 'over the years, Lebanese elites have demonstrated a remarkable capacity 
for minimizing inter-sectarian conflict although they have been less successful at sustaining, both 
formally and informally, inter-elite cooperation' (Entelis 1974,3). For instance, some traditional 
elites had to adopt some ideological stances that would prevent them from losing their clientele. The 
recourse to an ideological rhetoric entailed a confrontational inter-elite relationship and communal 
hostility. Hence, traditional elites could not always seek to prevent communal clashes, as this meant 
losing their leadership position. In other words, it may be said that they did not always work at 
creating and maintaining a system of democratic stability. Hence, the allegedly positive (i. e. 
causative) relationship between consociationalism and democratic stability is questioned. 
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Accordingly, the elite could not cope with the demands being placed on the system, and this refutes 
Lijphart's contention that the elite is able to understand the dangers of a heterogeneous society. It is 
crucial to recapitulate on Lijphart's contentions concerning the role of the elite in consociational 
democracies. Consociational theory holds that provided the elite is able to both understand and 
neutralise the inherent dangers of a plural society, it can, if it wishes, play a central role in the 
creation and maintenance of a system capable of generating stable democracy. More specifically 
however, Lijphart holds that the elite is able to understand the dangers of a heterogeneous society. 20 
Drawing on the above discussion of Lebanon, this contention is not always satisfied. The second 
voluntaristic stance rests in Lijphart's contention that 'politicians can change the course of a 
country if they so desire' .21 Drawing again on the Lebanese case, 
it is safe to say that other factors 
that come in play may sometimes counteract elite efforts in engineering consociational practices 
(such as the deteriorating regional situation in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the influx of 
Palestinian refugees and Palestinian militias to Lebanon). 
At the same time however, it is debatable whether elite cooperation would have remained 
coalescent had the regional situation been calm or calmer and/or had the economic situation been 
more favourable. By the early 1970s, it was obvious that the internal strains converging on the 
system were more than the latter could afford to absorb. This was further exacerbated by the 
destabilising constraints that the mobilisation of Lebanese society along sectarian lines placed on 
the system. This was in itself a result of the consociational structure of rule that fosters the 
manipulation of communal identity (especially when socio-economic conditions worsen). It may be 
said that consociational theory assumes that elites are more aware than non-elites of the fact that 
heterogeneous societies are prone to instability. However, consociational theory does not account 
for the fact that external players are often able to manipulate elites themselves, that such elites 
(supposedly the safeguards of the system) are prone to intra-elite instability and that, even if 
external manipulation is non-existent, the system itself that consociationalism puts in place makes it 
difficult for elites to cooperate and realise that their behaviour leads to societal and system 
instability. Denoeux, Khalidi and Khalaf describe such manifestations of consociationalism among 
elites as follows: 
At times of crisis, sectarian or ethnic prejudices can always resurface at the elite level. This was shown in 1958, 
1975-1976 and repeatedly ever since (Denoeux 1993,107). If there is such a thing as learning the rules of the 
game ... which enables leaders to acquire the knack of consensual politics in open but divided societies, there is 
also a process of unlearning these rules (KhaIidi 1979,97). The forces which motivate and sustain harmony, 
balance, and prosperity are also the very forces which on occasion pull the society apart and contribute to 
conflict, tension and civil disorder. The ties that bind, in other words, also unbind (Khalaf 1997b, 369). 
20 Emphasis added. 
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E. Consociational politics 1943-1975: manifestations of Lebanese society 
Lebanese society has particularistic features. However, the impact of the conduct of consociational 
politics has been somehow detrimental to societal stability, and on system stability as a whole. In 
other words, consociational politics during the pre-war period have worked to exacerbate such 
particularistic features, rather than improving them. Political instability has had a significant impact 
on economic and social stability. Drawing on procedural manifestations, i. e., the features of pre-war 
Lebanese society, it would be difficult to say that consociationalism generates and maintains 
democratic stability. The following section will briefly address the particularistic features of 
Lebanese society and the impact of the conduct of consociational politics on the former, and hence 
on system stability. 
1. Crosscutting cleavages/Communal consciousness and extreme pluralism 
Perhaps most damaging to the stability of Lebanon is the class cleavage that pre-war Lebanese 
society suffered from. Indeed, socio-economic inequalities, were a major reason for the outbreak of 
the civil war, although they were somehow hidden under the confessional banner. For example, 
Suleiman points out that 'the emphasis on religious-ethnic divisions in the Lebanese society 
obscures the very clear fact that the Lebanese definitely constitute a class-divided society... In 
Lebanon, class tension has been "concealed" so to speak, buried under political-ideological issues 
and religious hostilities' and 'if there was no overriding politico-religious conflicts, economic issues 
would be the recognized "dividers" of the population' (Suleiman 1967,275-6). Though it is 
generally acknowledged that the Christians were better off in terms of political and economic 
power 22 than Muslims (particularly the Shi'a) '23 
it is safe to say that socio-economic inequalities in 
pre-war Lebanese society cut across communal groups to a large extent. Indeed, Winslow points out 
that 'while much has been made of Lebanon's sectarian dilemmas, the special difficulty for 
Lebanese society has been the "double trouble" it engenders; class barriers run parallel to religious 
divisions' (Winslow 1996,295). However, one manifestation of the extremely elitist pre-war 
structure of consociational politics was the successful way in which confessional elites (particularly 
new leaders who wanted to build a clientele to rise to power) manipulated communal identities and 
sectarian loyalties so as to prevent the emergence of a class-based movement that would challenge 
the existent system and the dominant position of these elites within this system. As a result, class 
cleavages manifested themselves in a religious and sectarian way. Hence, despite the fact that class 
21 Emphasis added. 22 For example, see Rodney Wilson, The economies of the Middle East. London: MacMillan, 1979, p. 165. 
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divisions cut across religious and sectarian groups, new leaders were able to channel class 
discontent along narrow sectarian lines. Indeed, this can be best seen by looking at the recent civil 
wars. 24 For recent examples as to the intra-sectarian character the civil wars took (for example 
Maronites fighting Maronites and Shi'a fighting Shi'a), numerous researchers note, alongside 
Collings, that 'prolific intrasectarian fighting ... resulted in more deaths than intersectarian warfare' 
(Collings 1994b, 294). 25 
Successive pre-war Lebanese consociational governments failed to deal satisfactorily with the 
socio-econornic cleavages within society. As Salibi points out, 'successive regimes and 
governments left the development of the country to unbridled capitalist initiative. 26 On the 
occasions when planning was implemented, private interests applied pressures to make the plans 
ineffective' (Salibi 1988,190). Indeed, the material and economic resources available to the 
Lebanese state were channeled so as to satisfy the demands of the various elites and their close 
associates, hence the notorious clientelistic network. It should also be noted that one way for the 
elites to bypass addressing the socio-economic problem was to play on the sectarian and in some 
cases, intra-sectarian loyalties of the various communal groups as this, by the same token, allowed 
the elites to conduct their business interests free from mass involvement and protest, as the latter 
was fragmented along communal lines rather than class lines. Humphrey has remarked that 'one 
expression of the weakness of the Lebanese state was the pervasiveness of the clientelist system 
which helped to segment society along confessional and regional lines undermining the possibility 
of broader class movements' (Humphrey 1989,14). Hence, the Lebanese state has been dominated 
by elites and clientelism. 
As a result, its notorious weakness and reluctance to play even a minimal role in reducing socio- 
economic inequalities is readily apparent. Dekmejian notes that state performance in terms of 
economy and poverty alleviation was very poor. He provides examples of the tendency for bribery 
and a disregard for unemployment, compensation and social security problems (Dekmejian 1978, 
23 For Shi'i disenfranchisement, see Michael Walzer, On toleratio . New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 57. 24 For similar comments relating to the religious character that the expression of soci-economic cleavages took, see 
Arild Schou, 'The breakdown of conflict management in Lebanon'. Bulletin of Peace Proposals (June), Vol. 20, No. 2, 
pp. 193-204. London: Sage publications, 1989, p. 200; Samir Khalaf, 'From a geography of fear to a culture of tolerance 
in Lebanon'. In Paul Salem, eds. Conflict resolution in the Arab World: selected essays, pp. 354-83. Beirut: American 
University of Beirut, 1997b, p. 360 and 361 and Ussama Makdisi, 'Reconstructing the nation-state: the modernity of 
sectarianism in Lebanon'. Middle East Repor (July-September), No. 200, pp. 23-6,1996, p. 24. 25 For instance, see Amine Gemayel, Le Liban: construire Favenir. Paris: Hachette, 1992, p. 39 and As'ad Abukhalil, 
The politics of sectarian ethnicity: segmentation in Lebanese societ . Doctoral Thesis. USA: Georgetown University, 1988, p. 274. 26 Shehadi calls it a laissez-aller as well as a laissez-faire economic policy (Shehadi 1987,8) and Hudson addresses it at 
length in Michael C. Hudson, 'The Lebanese crisis: the limits of consociational democracy'. Journal of Palestine 
Studie Vol. 5, No. 3-4, pp. 109-22. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, p. 115. 
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257). Equally, Chalouhi cites that 'by and large, the government had neither the capability nor the 
desire to intervene in the economy' (Chalouhi 1978,173). The reluctance of the state to play an 
active role in the economic life of the country can be traced back to the vision held by Chiha, a 
prominent banker who is the major writer and the leading interpreter of Lebanon's Constitution, 
often considered the father of the Lebanese Constitution (Abukhalil 1988,61). Chiha's influential 
(though detrimental) vision of the state as a merchant Republic, which satisfied the interests of the 
few and was heavily dependant on the west, materialised in 1943 in the advent of independence. It 
can be summed up as follows: 
Chiha argued that the state had little to do with the functioning of a healthy Lebanese economy (Gates 1998,84). 
Economic liberalism 
... was part and parcel of an overall ideology which permeated the 
Lebanese political system. 
It was a consistent and general ideology best represented by the ideas of Michel Chiha ... He was credited with being the first to mention that jobs in the state be divided along "confessional lines"... In matters of foreign policy 
and monetary questions as well as in those relating to the structure of the economy, the experience of the country 
27 seems to have followed a path that he had outlined (Shchadi 1987,8). 
A consequence of such a vision rests in the notorious weakness of the Lebanese state and its quasi- 
absent role in regulating the political economy of the country. Needless to say, such a vision of the 
state had its critics. Notably, Salibi referred to this merchant system "consortium rule", i. e., 'the 
alliance between a business oligarchy and politicians' (Shehadi 1987,11) and Gates stressed that 
'the development of Lebanon's economic order was greatly influenced by the material interests of 
its dominant elite', which 'broadly consisted of a socio-economic class of merchants and financiers 
and the politically and confessionally based zu'amas' (Gates 1998,1). More importantly, 
'Lebanon's power brokers placed a premium on a minimalist non-activist state with few 
interventionist powers' (Gates 1998,84) and as a result, 'Lebanon's open service-oriented economy 
furthered the interests of the dominant elite but it was less successful in contributing to nation- 
building and to constructing a socio-economy that met the needs of the majority of the population' 
(Gates 1998,150). Therefore, with the institutionalisation of a policy of minimal or non-existent 
state intervention, the state became a symbol of weakness and consequently was all the more 
reluctant and unable to intervene in the economic life of the country to redress or curb socio- 
economic inequality. Coupled with the many other cleavages (to which the discussion will now 
turn) that Lebanon suffers from, which in fact constitute significant forces in play in this plural 
society, it should be said that procedural manifestations of consociational rule did not conform to 
consociational theory. As such, they were unable to generate stability for the sort of society that the 
theory was designed for. 
27 For a recent commentary on Chiba's ideological vision of Lebanon and its impact on the Lebanese political system, 
see Fawwaz Traboulsi, Silat bila wasel: Michel Chiba wal ideologiya al Loubnaniy . 'Interrupted 
links: Michel Chiha 
and the Lebanese ideology'. Beirut: Riad el-Rayyes books, 1999, Chapters I and 6. 
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Much has been written about strong parochial tendencies, the hierarchical family structure, the 
rigidity of blood, family and kinship ties, and the binding loyalty to the nuclear and extended family 
in Lebanese society. Comments have been made such as 'undoubtedly, it [the family] is the most 
important institution with which people identify' and the realisation that 'despite their [sectarian 
loyalties] importance to the Lebanese, sectarian loyalties do not supersede family ties' (Faour 1998, 
63) . 
28 However, Khalaf, Khatib and Abul-Husn's treatment of blood ties (through the linking to 
politics that they establish), are the most notable contributions. Indeed, Khalaf argues that the 
pervasive pattern of blood ties 'has far-reaching implications for the political life of the country' 
(Khalaf 1987,105). Khalaf remarks that 'in more than one respect, the whole political history of 
Lebanon, without undue exaggeration, can be described in terms of not more than a handful of 
leading families- families competing to reaffirm their name, power, and privilege in their respective 
regions... ' (Khalaf 1987,107). Indeed, political power was, and continues to be limited to 
traditional notables and leaders who are commonly regarded as Lebanon's spiritual families. 
Indeed, a prevalent feature of Lebanese political life is what Barakat and Khatib refer to as 
'familism' and Khalaf calls 'inherited leadership' (Khatib 1994,122). As Khatib observes, familism 
is common in both executive and legislative branches of government: 'By Westem standards, this 
may seem peculiar but by Lebanese standards, anything else would be' (Khatib 1994,135). 29 
Similarly, Abul-Husn's treatment of Asabiya and particularly, the significant impact it has on elites, 
merits attention. Indeed, it may be said that as distinct from most writers on the topic, Abul-Husn 
cites the lack of awareness of some elites of the divisive impact of communal consciousness at the 
elite level. It may be seen that some elites are not immune to the divisive impact of communal 
consciousness, and remain unaware of its detrimental impact on the stability of society and intra- 
elite cooperation. While Abul-Husn argues that 'these tendencies are inevitable in pluralist 
societies', he also points out that the Lebanese system [in procedural terms, the Lebanese elites] did 
not develop the adaptive mechanisms and strategies necessary to contain destructive responses' 
(Abul-Husn 1998,171). Thus, communal consciousness has had a significant impact on decision- 
makers and hence, the stability of the system as a whole. This brings the discussion to the 
consequences of acute communal consciousness at the elite level. From the above illustration, group 
consciousness may be seen to strike at both elite and mass levels. A general elite (especially the 
intra-sectarian elite) awareness was somewhat absent in pre-war Lebanon. In some ways, this 
28 For scholarly treatment of family and blood ties in Lebanon, see Caroline E. A. Knight, 'Traditional influences upon 
Lebanese politics'. Journal of Social. Political and Economic Studies (Fal-Win), Vol. 17, No. 3-4, pp. 327-343. USA: 
Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1992, p. 327; David Mcdowall, Lebanon: a conflict of minorities. Minority 
Rights Group International [Report]. London: Manchester Free Press, 1986, p. 7 and Samir Khalaf, Lebanon' 
p-! Ldigament. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 104-7. 
"9 Khatib conducts an insightful survey of the inheritance of seats in Parliament, Prime Ministership and Cabinet from 
independence until 1994. For more details, see Hassan al-Khatib. (1994), The general factors for the collapse of 
democracy in Lebanon. Hassan al Khatib Eds and Halim Barakat. Lebanon in strife: student preludes to the civil war. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977, p. 19 1. 
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contributed to the breakdown of peaceful communal coexistence. Hence, it may be problematic to 
argue, alongside Lijphart, that the elite is aware of the dangers of heterogeneous societies. This is 
further exacerbated by the difficulty of 'overarching loyalties that counter-balance the centrifugal 
effects of segmental loyalties' to emerge under the consociational framework of rule, as assumed by 
Lijphart. Indeed, Lijphart assumes that such overarching loyalties can emerge under the 
consociational structure of rule. However, drawing on the procedural aspects of consociationalism, 
best seen by looking at the societal manifestations of the latter at the mass level, it is difficult for 
such loyalties to emerge, as Lijphart argues. Hence, this questions the successful operability of the 
consociational model versus consociational theory. 
Finally, Khazen points out that 'in many plural societies, especially those with functioning 
democracies like Belgium and Switzerland, communal transformations have reached a significant 
degree of maturity. Conflicts are less generated by the emerging consciousness of supposedly 
quiescent groups than by occasional tensions caused by regional, political and cultural differences. 
These conflicts are either resolved or contained through the democratic process' (Khazen 2000,33). 
In contrast, in most other deeply divided societies, especially recently established countries such as 
Lebanon for instance, in the process of creating democratic institutions, group consciousness is 
usually in the process of being defined, and therefore, tends to acquire an acute character. This 
makes it susceptible to inter-communal hostilities and tensions, even over minor issues of 
disagreement. Against this background, the successful operation/operability of the consociational 
model is further hindered, and hence its applicability or prescription to developing countries are 
questioned. 
One further issue that should be addressed is consociationalism's advocacy of a relatively small 
number of segments (ideally between three and five) as a sustaining factor for the applicability of 
the model. In the case of pre-war Lebanon, there are many sub-communities, seventeen as a whole. 
This leads Khazen to state that while 'in most plural societies... two or three major groups are 
mobilised politically and are prone to conflict', 'Lebanon has a large number of communities that 
are politically active, some of whom have distinctly communal agendas' (Khazen 2000,32). 
However, consociationalism purports to deliver on the promise of democratic stability for plural, 
i. e., deeply divided societies. Thus, it would be simplistic to assume that such societies will be made 
up of only three to five groups. In that case, it is difficult to determine where the dividing line 
between divided and deeply divided societies lies and useless to prescribe the consociational model 
for plural societies. Additionally, with the significant amount of segmental autonomy that 
consociationalism prescribes and encourages, this primary consociational principle will lead to the 
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emergence of distinctly communal agendas. - Thus, the internal logic of consociational theory comes 
under question again. 
Furthermore, consociational theory also advocates, alongside other background factors, the absence 
of a majority segment and segments of roughly the same size as helpful conditions for the 
establishment and maintenance of consociationalism. In this sense, pre-war Lebanese society 
conformed to the first but not to the second consociational condition. For example, Khazen points to 
the fact that in Lebanon, 'there is no numerically dominant group... Indeed no one group makes up 
more than 50 per cent of the total population' (Khazen 2000,32). However, it may be argued that 
Lebanese groups are unequal in size in the light of Muslims demographic predominance. Against 
such a background, it appears that Lijphart's helpful conditions put strains on the applicability of 
the model, since it seems that these additional conditions he puts on the sort of society that 
consociationalisin is supposed to operate successfully in, expect, in the final end, the plural society 
to be neither divided nor deeply divided. Indeed, Lijphart's consociational theory, in its attempt to 
deal satisfactorily with the governance of plural societies, does not take into account all the complex 
processes, factors and forces in play in such societies. Hence, the distinction between plural and 
non-plural loses much of its significance. Moreover, it seems more adequate to look at and bear in 
mind the power of each group in any attempt to devise a conflict-regulating mechanism for the 
governance of plural societies. Indeed, in terms of the procedural aspects of plural societies such as 
Lebanon, the relative power of each group, as set against its size, seems a more significant indicator 
of the sort of rule system that will result in that society. Indeed, while consociationalism purports to 
foster the preservation of political, social and economic rights of communal groups, this is not the 
case procedurally, looking at pre-war Lebanese society. 
The rights of the communal groups were not catered for effectively and equally by the various 
communal leaders, precisely because they were unequal in power. Hence, this leads to a permanent 
fragmentation of the plural society, and casts doubt on the way the consociational model can 
generate and maintain democratic stability. In sum, both issues debated in the present discussion 
bring into mind Lijphart's own warning that neither separately nor jointly do the background 
conditions ensure the presence or success of consociationalism. Hence, the consociational model 
proves increasingly unable to deal with the particularistic features of plural societies, though the 
theory was originally devised and elaborated for that specific end, i. e., conflict-regulation and 
democratic stability in plural societies. 
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2. Lebanon's history and its artificial creation/Distrust and high interest in politics 
The modem history of what was to become Greater Lebanon illustrates how the complex 
modernisation processes underway were unable to reduce the fragility of the Levant territories. For 
instance, Nagel points out that 'at least some of Lebanon's instabilities in the 1970s can be traced to 
the 19'h century, when European powers cultivated relationships with individual sectarian groups as 
a means of gaining a foothold in the region' (Nagel 2002,719). Conn, meanwhile, writes that 'the 
religious communities upon which the modem political existence of the country was built, belong, 
since centuries ago, to their own networks of politico-religious, regional and intemational powers' 
(Corm 1998a, 15) . 
30 Habib, too, elaborates on the ways in which, long before independence, 
various communities always sought outside intervention to buttress their local presence as follows: 
The Maronites, for instance, welcomed the Crusaders in 1099 A. D., established a union with Rome in the course 
of the twelfth century, and sought French protection in 1860 (Steward and Suro 1984 quoted in Habib 1995). 
Similarly, the Shiites, the Druzes, the Orthodox and the Sunnis sought protection respectively from Persia, 
Britain, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. All communities compete to strengthen their positions in the Lebanese 
polity (Habib 1995). 
Likewise, foreign powers have been said to intervene on behalf of the different communities to 
serve their own interests. As a result, the various communities did not succeed, at least at the time 
of independence, to establish the strong and common basis that would allow them to forge a 
peaceful communal coexistence among each other. Rather, mutual suspicion and communal (and 
even intra-sect) distrust were at the time of independence (and still until the present day) common 
features of Lebanese society. The Druze slaughter of significant numbers of Maronites during the 
Maronite peasant uprisings, for example, contributes to communal distrust. As Khatib put it, 'these 
memories help to explain the unusual cohesion and suspicious outlook of the communities today 
which makes the allegiance of the citizens not to the state but to their sects; the past continues to 
form much of the present' (Khatib 1994,8). Hudson, too, writes that 'not only is there chronic 
suspicion between Christians and non-Christians; there is also incessant rivalry among the various 
sects within each of the two religions' (Hudson 1985b, 5): 'Mutual insecurity results in incessant 
competition for power- the scarcest and dearest value; political tension is the final product' and 
'ethnic security is a higher-priority issue ... [as] ... every sect 
has memories of historical periods of 
subservience... ' (Hudson 1985b, 22-23). 
In 1920, the French authorities proclaimed Greater Lebanon, which comprised the inclusion of the 
coastal cities of Tripoli, Sidon, the Beka'a, Tyre and the city of Beirut to Mount Lebanon, a 
separate entity till then. This inclusion was undertaken without the consultation of the peoples of the 
30 Translated from French by this author. 
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area. Hence, when the French artificially created Greater Lebanon, it may be said that the latter, as a 
country, unified territory and state were very much 'a contested and unresolved issue' (Hauge 
1997). Indeed, Lebanon, like most Middle Eastern countries is an artificial state with artificial 
boundaries. As Dekmejian observes, 'Lebanon exemplifies the tenuousness and artificiality of the 
nation-building process in the Middle East' (Dekmejian 1978,363). Again, 'Lebanon is a case 
study in the porous, arbitrarily-drawn borders resulting from European imperialism [as] negotiations 
between Britain and France following World War I resulted in the inclusion of formerly Syrian 
territory occupied by Sunni Muslim Arabs in the French mandate' (Stoll 2000) . 
31 For instance, 
Halpern comments that the creation by the French of Greater Lebanon 'was not in the interest of 
equity, but in order to enhance French economic and territorial power' (Halpern 1984,136). 
Additionally, Khatib reveals that 'it took about ten years of the Lebanese Republic's existence 
before the Muslims started to reconcile themselves to the Lebanese political system' (Khatib 1994, 
60). Furthermore, at the time of independence, the underlying reasons which brought the Lebanese 
together seem to have hinged on situational and temporary economic reasons, which proved to be 
an important short-term incentive that prompted political consensus among the leaders of the major 
communities over the need for independence. For example, Johnson reveals that the Sunnis 'saw 
independence not simply as a means for removing the hated French patrons of the Christians, but 
also as a change for expanding the opportunities of Muslims in the state bureaucracy and the 
economy' (Johnson 1986,127). However, as the modernisation processes underway naturally 
altered the temporary strategic alliances among the major internal and external players, political 
compromise could not last long, when economic interest was lost and hence no longer an incentive 
to promote the former. 
A direct consequence of the above-mentioned features of Lebanese society is that the consociational 
system of rule widened the gap between the different communities, thereby preventing the 
emergence of a strong unified basis that will encompass the state and society and hence, generate 
stability. This was manifested in the emergence of a whole range of differentiations between the 
segments of Lebanese society, most basic and notorious of which is 'a fundamental disagreement 
among Lebanese over the historicity of their country' (Habib 1995). Indeed, Abukhalil argues that 
'what is important in Lebanese historiography is that there really is no such thing as "a Lebanese 
history". Instead, there are sectarian interpretations of the history of Lebanon that reflect the 
peculiar sectarian attitudes of Lebanese confessional communities towards the historical events that 
31 Ghassan Tudni (one of Lebanon's most distinguished statesmen and writers) however claims that 'contrary to popular 
belief, the present "natural" boundaries of the Republic- which were consecrated by the Versailles Conference and later 
by the League of Nations- were first drawn in December 1918 by the [Central] Administrative Council under Habib 
Pasha al-Sa'ad' (Tudni 1993,47). The author argues that these boundaries were later officially proclaimed by the 
French. 
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have shaped the formation of modem Lebanon' (Abukhalil 1988,263-4). This lack of agreement as 
to the country's history and state-idea prevented the emergence of an "overarching loyalty", 
prescribed by Lijphart's model, which aim is to temper segmental loyalty within each community. 
Indeed, in such a situation, it is highly debatable whether consociational structures of governance 
can allow for the emergence of overarching loyalties. As will be argued later, this was to have a 
drastic effect on national identity and national integration, as well as state building. For instance, 
Beydoun notes that as early as the summer of 1919, the report of the King-Crane Commission (sent 
by the American President Woodrow Wilson) and the Yale supplement 'emphasized the dominance 
of sectarian differences in the formulation of political options' (Beydoun 1993,16). With the 
advents of the artificial creation and independence of Lebanon, consociationalism furthered such 
sectarian differences. 
For example, commenting on Ubanon's confessional confrontational setting in which 'any gain for 
one is perceived as a loss to the others, and increased security for one group is therefore an 
increased threat to others' (Haddad 1985,10-1), Haddad argues that 'the lack of trust forces groups 
to redefine their objectives in very demanding terms and increases their rigidity' (Haddad 1985,12). 
It can be expected that the manipulation of communal consciousness and the institutionalisation of 
sectarianism as a way of life (features that manifest themselves under the consociational structure of 
rule) would lead to feelings of suspicion among the different Segments and naturally, affect the 
behaviour of their representatives. Consequently, it is clear that within such a hostile environment, 
peaceful coexistence between the different communities and democratic stability are difficult to 
achieve. Again, the emergence of an 'overarching loyalty', necessary to ensure a minimal degree of 
national entente and peaceful communal coexistence, was impossible in the light of mutual 
suspicion. Under such circumstances, the consociational model cannot be expected to procedurally 
bring about stability, especially when the pervasiveness of the sophisticated patron-client 
relationship makes politics a highly salient issue for most individuals. Indeed, it may be said that 
clientelism entails high interest in politics at the mass level, as the daily lives of individuals and of 
communal groups as a whole depend on their communal leader and how well and how much the 
latter can secure for his/her respective communal group or sect. 
3. Political parties and clienteIisnVNational disintegration 
Compared to the substantial amount of political freedom and tolerance that pre-war Lebanon 
enjoyed and that the political system afforded, the experience of the country with political parties 
and their role in the political life of the country may be said to be deficient or as Sa'egh has 
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described it unachieved and incomplete (Sa'egh 2000,124). 32 From a historical perspective, 
different, and often contradictory parties and party ideologies were emerging in the Middle East and 
in the Arab world and were able to rally wide popular and class-based support around them. In this 
respect, the Lebanese experiment with political parties and party life was incomplete in comparison 
to the neighbouring countries. Indeed, Halpern's argument that it is significant 'Lebanon, which 
(between 1943 and 1975) had a number of ad hoc parties, had no party system' (Halpern 1984,175) 
and Nasr's observation that 'party representation on the council's level is weak' (Nasr 1998) 
illustrate the above statements. It may be said that the structure of consociational, i. e., extremely 
elitist politics has prevented the emergence of secular, nationalistic and non-community based 
political parties and has equally prevented the contribution of existing parties to political life and to 
the lobbying for socially-centered issues. As Tachau observes, 'the domination of Lebanese politics 
by traditional blocs [kutal] led by zu'ama' has prevented organized or formal political parties from 
achieving significant development' (Tachau 1994,300). At the same time, party leaders themselves 
have not been able to transcend narrow-based sectarian interests and rally wide popular support as a 
result of their sectarian and separatist agendas. For instance, Khatib observes that the existing 
parties are 'so indifferent to a bigger national existence that they can easily generate political 
separation... Neither politicians nor factions have been able to rise above their personal rivalries to 
33 tackle effectively the public affairs of the nation' (Khatib 1994,118). Political parties in Lebanon 
cater for specialised communal groups and are restricted in their own constituency, and are 
sometimes restricted to geographical areas. In other words, they actually contribute to the 
segmentation and permanent fragmentation of Lebanese society along sectarian lines, hence making 
it difficult for democratic stability to emerge. Indeed, it may be said that parties and their 
contribution to political life are one feature of democracy. As to the origins of such a situation, few 
people would disagree with the following contention that 'the sociopolitical structure of Lebanon 
opposes the formation of non-confessional political parties and encourages the establishment of 
local sectarian parties. The most powerful parties have no actual support or power except in certain 
34 regions. These are local parties' (Sleiman 1994,84). Additionally, the manipulation of the 
electoral law has hampered the development of strong wide based parties. For instance, Vocke 
remarks that 'the Lebanese voting system is not conducive to the formation of strong democratic 
parties' (Vocke 1978,23). Again, the electoral system 'served to preserve the position of 
community notables (zu'ama) and to hinder the development of parliamentary political parties 
across communal and regional boundaries' (Rabinovich 1985,25). As such, the consociational 
32 Translated from Arabic. 
33 For similar comments, see Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's predicament. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 
p. 102; David Gilmour, Lebanon: the fractured counn. London: Sphere Books, 1987, p. 38 and Nazih Richani, 
Dilemmas of democracy and political parties in sectarian societies: the case of the Progressive Socialist Party of 
Lebanon 1949-1996. London: McMillan Press, 1998, p. 142. 
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structure of rule, with its emphasis on elitist politics, may be said to further the continuation of the 
status quo and hamper changes that political parties are likely to generate in democracies. As one 
author put it, 'in so far as representation was based on religious grounds, there was little incentive to 
establish cross-confessional ideological parties' (Rigby 2000,171). In short, the manipulation of 
communal consciousness did not only hinder the development of strong democratic parties with 
popular support. It also restricted the development of secular parties with secular agendas and 
significantly reduced popular allegiance and membership of political parties. In cases where some 
parties enjoyed some limited degree of popular support, this was as a result of party leaders having 
appealed to religious feelings in order to rally communal support. 
Substitutes for the weakness of state institutions and to the absence of effective political parties with 
socially centered agendas (rather than the existing elite or actor centered ones) in Lebanon took the 
fonn of a notorious and sophisticated patron-client network. Before addressing clientelism in 
Lebanon, a few words should be said about administrative modernisation in a weak state with 
archaic and underdeveloped institutions subject to political intervention. Dournit argues that the 
four components or characteristics of consociational. democracy, that is, grand coalition, mutual 
veto, segmental autonomy and proportionality, 'have quite profound consequences for the kind of 
bureaucracy that is likely to serve such a society' (Dournit 1988,16): 'Consociationalism proved a 
crippling restriction on administrative modernisation, in response to changing social needs and 
improved technology' (Dournit 1988,235). Here, it should be pointed to the central role of the elites 
in consociational democracies, for it is almost solely in their capacity to induce changes in state 
administration. As Chalouhi aptly put it, 'planning as an instrument of modernization can only be as 
effective as the political leaders permit it to be' (Chalouhi 1978,174). 
In the light of 'the inability or unwillingness of successive Lebanese leaders to build up the 
institutions of the state' (Denoeux 1993,83), it is most probable that the elite is largely held 
accountable for the archaic character that the Lebanese administration exhibited. Indeed, the 
constant political intervention of elites in state administration to protect their clients and 
nurture/perpetuate the patron-client network has prevented much-needed change towards 
accountability, transparency and efficiency of state institutions. As such, pre-war consociationalism. 
proved yet again incapable of accommodating change and hence, generating stability. Indeed, the 
notorious patron-client network illustrates the difficulties for secular political parties to emerge and 
for state institutions to be developed efficiently under consociationalism. Though clientelism. can 
take many forms, a basic definition of the patron-client relationship is as follows: 'the clientelist 
34 Translated from French. 
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system of social control entails the exchange of loyalty for patronage: the client upholds his patron 
by providing his support and in return receives his patron's assistance and protection' (Khatib 1994, 
75). However, to understand the phenomenon of clientelism in Lebanon, it is useful to look at it 
from a historical and comparative context, as patron-client networks have played an important role 
since before the creation of independent Lebanon and have had stabilising as well as destabilising 
effects on the conduct of politics. Hamzeh argues that the confessional distribution of the 1861 
R6glement Organique of the Governorate and 'the absorption of prominent families generated 
conditions conducive to the emergence of the Lebanese political system, where both clientalism and 
confessionalism have become institutionalised into the system' (Hamzeh 2001,170). More 
importantly, Poole establishes a direct link between consociationalism and clientelism by stressing 
the 'way in which an elite cartel can emerge ... [and] then become adept at representing the 
particularistic interest of individuals, families and clans as well as facilitating an efficient vehicle 
for patron-clientelism based on the exchange of favours for votes' (Poole 1991 quoted in Deegan 
1996,57). 35 Indeed, Poole's observations best fit the description of the manifestations of the 
Lebanese clientelistic system, especially when it comes to the representation of family and clan 
interests, namely the few spiritual families of Lebanon that are running the country and competing 
among each other for power. Needless to say, the dominance of the patron-client system, one of the 
features of the Lebanese consociational political system, has meant that state institutions were left 
underdeveloped, inefficient and that citizens had to depend on their communal representatives for 
jobs and services that the state should normally provide. As such, the procedural aspects of the 
consociational model seem to suggest that the Lebanese political system can hardly reach political 
maturity and hence, its ability to generate democratic stability is questioned. 
Under such conditions that indirectly promote societal fragmentation, it is difficult for national, 
ideological and territorial integration to emerge. Such integration is necessary to allow the creation 
and maintenance of stability within democratic practices. Indeed, the manifestations that pre-war 
Lebanese society exhibited clearly suggest that the consociational system procedurally works in 
different ways than the theory suggests. For instance, national disintegration was a main feature of 
the system. For example, Shils writes that Lebanese society 'is not an integrated civil society in the 
modem sense of the term' pointing out that 'this situation would not have such marked significance 
for Lebanese society if it were confined to the mass of the population ... Much more important is the 
incivility of many of the members of the elite, the members of the great families, the zu'ama who 
35 For detailed accounts of the Lebanese clientelistic system, see Tom Najem, The Collapse and Reconstruction of 
Lebano 
. University of Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies- Durham Middle East Paper 59. hn: //www. dur. ac. uk/-dmeOwww/dmep V5. ht , 1998. [website visited in November 2002] and Arild Schou, 'The breakdown of conflict management in Lebanon'. Bulletin of Peace Proposals (June), Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 193-204. 
London: Sage publications, 1989, pp. 196-7. 
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dominate and speak for the primordial and religious communities' (Shils 1966,2). Indeed, Shils' 
comments make it clear that elites are not immune from the divisive impact communal 
consciousness can have on efforts at integration. Hence, it may be said that neither national popular 
integration nor elite integration/cooperation are easy to achieve under consociational structures of 
rule. While the artificial creation of Greater Lebanon cannot be expected to lead to the emergence 
of a unifying feeling, the institutionalisation of confessionalism and sectarianism contributed to the 
fragility of the country. In the words of Salibi, 'to create a country is one thing; to create a 
nationality is another' (Salibi 1988,19). 36 On the contrary, it may be said that the sudden inclusions 
of a territory occupied by Muslim Sunnis, another occupied by Muslim Chi'ites, a third by Christian 
Orthodox to Mount Lebanon occupied by Christian Maronites would make national identity 
difficult to infuse, especially in the light of the mutual fears and suspicions among such 
communities. In this respect, it is useful to look at the observations of Hobsbawm and Salam6 who 
stresses as follows: 
Nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around". 
Peoples first seek togetherness and then translate it into geographical terms, surrounding themselves with 
borders. Lebanon's predicament was that it attempted to induce nationalism without having adjusted to the 
necessities of the modem state (Salam6 1993,3). 
Indeed, Laakso writes that 'it was mainly economic factors that made the Sunnite population 
support the new Lebanon' (Laakso 1989,181). Hence, the manifestation of Lebanese unity at the 
time of independence should not be regarded as an expression of what Lijphart calls an 
"overarching loyalty". As Salam6 aptly observes, 'the meaning of Lebanese independence' which 
should have cast a unifying feeling among the Lebanese and over which there should be no 
disagreement, 'is always highly political' (Salamd 1993,4). In other words, it has a connotation of 
politically salient issues, which are in fact economic issues relating to power, interests and a 
community's position in society. Additionally, the failure of the state to deal with socially-centered 
issues, i. e., the Muslim (especially the Shi'a) economically subordinate position within society was 
to have a detrimental impact on the stability of the system. As Salibi argues, 'the fact that the 
Republic's administration, during the first decade of independence, failed to provide effective 
remedies for social ills which afflicted Moslems more than Christians did not encourage the 
Moslem loyalty to the country nor did it help Moslems to forget other loyalties' (Salibi 1966,212). 
Hence, while consociational theory assumes its ability to protect and preserve the political, social 
and economic rights of the various communal groups, the applicability of the model to the Lebanese 
case suggests that procedurally, the consociational arrangement that will result out of the effort of 
36 For an elaboration of the artificial creation of Lebanon and Syria and the different understandings of Lebanese 
identity that the various communal groups had, see Kamal Salibi, A house of many mansions: the history of Lebanon 
reconsidered. London: I. B. Tauris, 1988, pp. 27-30. 
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the various communal leaders to organise their relationship within a society will reflect the 
dominant position of some groups at the expense of others in society, rather than having an 
equitable character. Hence, consociationalism seems unable to deliver on the promise of democratic 
stability for Lebanon's plural society. 
Khazen mentions the absent role of the state in reinforcing national integration (Khazen 1987,116). 
Indeed, the present discussion has already pointed to the absence of the state in dealing effectively 
with the vital issues and interests of the polity and society. As such, its role in promoting national 
integration is naturally non-existent. Similarly, Chahine argues that consociationalism in Lebanon 
'discouraged the emergence of a single national identity' (Chahine 1998,172), hence making it 
problematic to expect, as Lijphart does, the ability of the consociational model to induce an 
overarching loyalty or what the author calls moderate nationalism. 
4. State weaknesses/the external environment 
While the inability and unwillingness of the state, that is, the successive governments, to regulate 
the political economy of the country along socially-centered lines (and rather opted to play on 
sectarian identities) were addressed before, the present discussion will focus on the minimal role of 
the state in using force when necessary and its subsequent failure to impose its presence, authority 
and maintain its legitimacy. Kliot writes that Lebanon's 'fragile state idea collapsed easily in times 
of crisis' (Kliot 1987,54-7). Indeed, and as Gates elaborates on this idea, the minimalist state 
apparatus that the leadership established 'was often immobilised by small challenges as well as 
major crises' (Gates 1998,84-5). The priority accorded by the pre-war Lebanese political system 
allocated to sectarianism and confessionalism at the expense of the development of state institutions 
(independent from political intervention) were detrimental to the emergence of a strong state and as 
such prevented the state from using force when needed and from insulating the country from 
external manipulation, intervention and external turbulence (except maybe for the Chihabist 
period). Accordingly, it would be inadequate to argue along the lines of Abukhalil who blames in 
this specific respect the extreme pluralism that Lebanese society exhibits. Indeed, Abukhalil writes 
that 'the richness of sectarian diversity subordinated the power of the state', in turn making it 
'unable in Lebanon to be more powerful than society' (Abukhalil 1988,91). Rather, the argument 
of the present discussion is that many heterogeneous societies exhibit a "rich sectarian diversity" 
without this making the state weak. Indeed, consociationalism, in terms of the primacy it allocates 
to the institutionalisation of confessionalism and sectarianism, makes it difficult, though not 
impossible, for a strong state to emerge. 
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For example, Dekmejian draws a more accurate picture, indicating that if circumscribed state power 
is 'needed to allow subcultural autonomy' under the consociational framework, 'this reluctance or 
inability of the state to use force is a major system weakness' (Dekmejian 1978,257). Dekmejian 
distinguishes between the delegation of as much decision-making as possible to the separate 
segments and the requirements for an internally stable situation, necessary to maintain a peaceful 
coexistence. Indeed, the Lebanese case demonstrates the extent to which the delegation of a 
significant amount of decision-making to the separate segments endangered the stability of the 
system state and society alike. More importantly, the ways in which segmental autonomy operated 
in Lebanon is in conformity with consociational theory, which prescribes the delegation of as much 
decision-making as possible to the segments. This appears to be done at the expense of peaceful 
communal coexistence and internal stability. As Hudson argues, 'the parochial divisions in 
Lebanon's political culture 'make the state highly vulnerable to foreign manipulation' (Hudson 
1985b, 116). As Lijphart comments, 'several of the background conditions were not favorable in 
Lebanon: foreign threats reinforced rather than weakened internal divisions' (Lijphart 1995a, 859). 
Against this background, it would be difficult to argue, alongside Lijphart, that foreign threats (that 
are perceived as a common danger) are a sustaining factor for consociationalism, as the latter fosters 
a system whereby foreign threats are more often than not a function of communal rather than 
national perception (which is difficult to come about). The recent civil war is an example since the 
causes of the war being partly an interpenetration of a number of internal and external factors. 
Additionally, there was, and continues to be, a consensus within Lebanon that a change to the 
confessional system needs to occur. However, it is not readily apparent how such a change is to 
come about. If the situation continues to remain as it is, communal groups will continue to seek 
linkages to buttress their positions in the confessional system, hence bringing the outside, in terms 
of external manipulation, intervention, as well as permeability of the country's borders to regional 
turbulence. 
It may be that the role that external, international and regional powers alike, played before and 
during the civil war in Lebanon is one of the most debatable issues when discussing consociational 
politics in the country. The contradictory aspects of the National Pact, which conforms to 
consociational understandings, inhibited clear foreign policy orientations and generally put 
constraints on attempts to neutralise and insulate the country from external interventions and 
threats. As Chahine notes, a drawback of consociationalism in Lebanon is that under the 
consociational framework, 'foreign policy too was conducted at the sectarian level' (Chahine 1998, 
172). Similarly, Khazen reveals, while commenting on the Lebanese communities, that 'differences 
among communities involve not only domestic issues as in the case of other divided societies, but 
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also foreign policy and regional politics' (Khazen 2000,32). As mentioned earlier, this was a result 
of the lack of a clear foreign policy orientation and the double identity of Lebanon, stated in the 
pact. In short, 'Lebanon's independence, based on the 1943 National Pact, did little to halt foreign 
intervention' (Abukhalil 1994,123), hence constituting a sustaining factor for the outbreak of the 
civil war. 
Additionally, the structure of consociational rule makes the emergence of a feeling of national 
identity difficult, which in return invites foreign intervention. Indeed, the lack of a feeling of 
national identity among the Lebanese can be viewed one of the major factors that facilitated outside 
intervention. For instance, Khalifah makes the point that 'the outside armed presence in Lebanon, 
i. e., the Palestinian, Syrian, and Israeli presence, as well as the continuous political and military 
interference by the superpowers, has been invited and cheered at different times by different 
Lebanese groups and sects' (Khalifah 1997,1). Hence, this is a clear indication of the processes in 
which the consociational structure of rule fails to keep the masses and even the elites in many 
instances aware of the external dangers that threaten the stability of the system. It may be said that 
elites are just as the masses not immune from manipulation. As a result, the procedural aspects of 
consociationalisin seem to suggest that democratic stability cannot easily come about. Similarly, 
Lebanon's weakness in terms of its geographical location and its small size has made the country 
somehow unable to make independent policies. Hudson for instance, notes in this respect that 
'Lebanon has always been internally weak and thus unusually dependent upon external patrons' 
(Hudson 1994,138) and Messarra, who defends Lijphart's line of thought, admits that the inability 
of consociationalism to resist external pressures is compounded by Lebanon's inability to exert any 
control over changes occurring in its regional environments. In short, outside intervention is 
facilitated by a number of internal reasons pertaining to the particular nature of Lebanese society, 
such as its size and the country's geographical characteristics. However, the lack of a clear state 
policy, as well as the tendency of communal leaders to seek outside support, both features of 
consociational structures of rule make it unclear what constitutes outside arbitration versus 
detrimental intervention, it being a perception that depends on sectarian preferences, and hence, in 
the final end, this situation does not make it easy for stability to emerge. 
F. Recapitulation: pre-war consociationalism and democratic stability 
Numerous studies have specifically addressed in great detail the reasons/origins of the outbreak of 
the Lebanese civil war in 1975, the chronological narrations of the events that led to the war and the 
various stages of the 1975-1990 Lebanese war. Thus, it is more adequate for the purposes of this 
thesis, which mainly deals with the allegedly positive relationship between consociationalism and 
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democratic stability, to explain how these external, as well as internal reasons for the outbreak of 
the war reveal the weaknesses in the internal logic of the consociational theory of democracy, 
therefore making the consociational model unable at times to function properly in generating 
stability. In other words, this thesis reveals how expressly optimistic consociational theory is in 
assuming consociationalism can prevent instability and expecting it to deliver stability. As regards 
the origins/causes of the war, this thesis sticks to the view that the interpenetration of internal and 
external events caused the collapse of the system. 37 
Notably here, one should mention the turbulent regional Arab-Israeli conflict, Palestinian military 
activism on the Lebanese-Israeli border and the intervention of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (hereafter PLO) and other Palestinian militias in Lebanese politics, since the 
detrimental impact of such events on the local Lebanese scene reveals how consociationalism can 
be seriously challenged in its ability to sustain itself in the face of regional factors that can be 
expected to have domestic repercussions. Hence, this challenges the optimistic assumptions of 
consociational theory, which assume that foreign threats can be commonly perceived (by the 
various communal groups) as dangers to the internal stability of the country. Indeed, Lebanon 
became deeply involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with Palestinian military activism against Israel 
initiated from Lebanese territory and with Palestinian involvement in the Lebanese conflit. Such 
involvement was an important cause for the outbreak of the civil war, as it constituted an additional 
burden on the operability of the pre-war Lebanese consociational formula since the Palestinian 
community (the PLO, militias as well as refugees) were not part of the Lebanese consociational 
structure of governance (which already faces difficulties in organising power and rule among the 
various Lebanese communal groups). Though Lijphart's consociational theory assumes that foreign 
threats, which are perceived as a common danger, assist consociational mechanisms of rule, this is 
not the case in practice. This perception is often the result of sectarian perception rather than 
national interest, as an awareness of national interest is difficult to achieve under consociationalism. 
Muslim support for the Palestinian cause, as opposed to Christian perception of it as a danger to 
Lebanon and its stability, best illustrates how difficult it is for a common, unified perception of 
national interest to emerge under consociational structures of rule. Hence, this questions the internal 
logic of consociational theory. 
Palestinian involvement in the war since its beginning exacerbated the nature of the conflict because 
the Christian blocs perceived Muslim Sunni Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, namely the 
37 For a very concise but explanatory account of the reasons for the outbreak of the war, see James Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics and the Middle East [5h edition]. New York/Harlow: Longman [The Longman series in 
comparative politics- Country studies], 2000, p. 100. 
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Palestinian Liberation Organisation, as a direct threat to Christian existence while the Muslim 
Sunnis widely supported the Palestinian cause, a support which may be said to be predicated on 
common religious sectarian affiliation. For instance, Lebanese Shi'i support for the Palestinian 
Sunni cause was far less pronounced than Lebanese Sunni one, as Palestinian-Shi'i fighting 
suggests. Hence, under consociational structures of rule, the permanent fragmentation of society 
along sectarian lines suggests that communal groups tend to aggregate along similar and very 
narrow identities, which do not only take into account religious affiliation, but also give precedence 
to sectarian ones, hence making the society deeply divided. 
Regarding the internal causes of the war (mentioned at varying stages of this chapter), it is most 
important to point to the detrimental impact that new politicians can have on the stability of the 
system when they channel discontent along sectarian lines to attempt to rise to power and replace 
old accommodating elites. Equally important here is the inability of traditional elites to avoid being 
sucked into the sectarian discourse, despite traditions of elite consensus and cooperation. 
Additionally, and also very importantly, it should be mentioned that traditional elites, despite their 
willingness most of the time to prevent sectarian fighting and sectarian discourse, were unable to 
contain their clienteles (sometimes simply out of fear of losing their position and other times as a 
result of ideological mass mobilisation, such as Sunni support for Nasserism). Furthermore, such 
traditional elites were unable at many times, to control their henchmen, who engaged in sectarian 
squabbling with other henchmen from other communal groupings (many times in order to rise to 
power). Finally in terms of elite behaviour, it is very important to mention the detrimental impact 
that intra-elite competition had on the stability of the system. Indeed, intra-sectarian elite 
competition can be said to have been more detrimental to the stability of the system, than inter- 
sectarian elite behaviour, which tended to take the shape of a consensual relationship. It suffices to 
say that such procedural manifestations of elite behaviour points to the optimistic expectations of 
the theory of consociational democracy with regards to elite consensus and cooperation. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to mention that the class cleavages that pre-war Lebanon manifested 
suggested latent social instability. Namely, one can cite the poverty belt around Beirut, with the 
influx of Shi'is from the South of Lebanon. Their exclusion from the Southern patronage system 
and their inability to benefit from the Beiruti patronage system has had a detrimental impact on the 
stability of the system when they were radicalised by the fall of the Chihabist reform program of 
social justice. While other factors causing the war may also be cited, it is sufficient to deal in the 
present thesis with the most important factors that reveal the internal weaknesses of consociational 
theory and highlight the fact that the model does not always procedurally function as the theory 
suggests. In other words, such factors are useful for the purposes of this thesis only insofar as they 
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serve to invalidate the supposedly positive relationship between consociationalism and democratic 
stability. The inability of the pre-war consociational model of rule to generate democratic stability 
is a sufficient illustration that consociational theory sometimes fails to deliver on the promise of 
democratic stability. Hence, the last paragraphs of this section will provide a retrospective account 
of the nature of the main consociational elements and structures of rule in pre-war Lebanon and will 
assess their significance regarding their inability to generate stability. In the end, the chapter will 
briefly mention the vafious stages of the 1975-1990 civil war. 
As regards the role of the Lebanese Parliament in the political life of the country, as early as 1969, 
Hudson noted that 'the systemic function of the modem Lebanese Parliament is not to promote 
democratic values (although it does so to a significant extent) but to keep autonomous elements 
satisfied' (Hudson 1969,251): 'the object of every player is to make small gains without upsetting 
the structural balance. As a result, the political situation seems to be changing constantly, yet very 
little really happens' (Hudson 1969,251-2) . 
38 Hudson's comments point to the ineffectiveness of 
the Lebanese Parliament in inducing change in the political system. It may be argued that such a 
situation can be traced back 
-to 
the static nature of the pre-war consociational model and its rigidity. 
As a result, change, along other lines that reflected the modernisation process underway in Lebanon 
after 1943, could not be accommodated by the rigid political system. Hence, when the situation on 
the ground no longer reflected the dimensions of the 1943 pact, the consociational system broke 
down. 
In all constitutional arTangements (which also include informal agreement like pacts as they are 
incorporated in the constitution upon their conclusion), there should be an agreed way of 
accommodating change peacefully within the political system. For example Friedrich argues that a 
system 'which lacks arrangements for its change will become disorderly in time' (Friedrich 1963, 
342). In other words, the aim is to solve politically salient problems without resorting to violence. 
Against this background, Abukhalil's observation that the pact 'was destined to fail, as it lacked a 
mechanism for conflict resolution' (Abukhalil 1988,72) is particularly relevant. Indeed, it may be 
said that the inability of the consociational pact to reflect and accommodate the changes occurring 
within Lebanese society resulted in the collapse of the consociational structure of rule and the 
outbreak of the civil war. Similarly, Dournit observes that 'it is during a crisis that a political system 
shows its robustness or resilience. When Lebanese consociationalism was eventually brought to the 
test, it simply disintegrated into the deeply divided society it always was' (Dournit 1988,233). 
38 For similar accounts, see Sue M. Halpern, Consociational democracy and the dangers of politics as scienc . Doctoral Thesis. Oxford: University of Oxford, 1986, pp. 76-7 and p. 358. 
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McGarry, meanwhile, also comments that 'successive generations of political leaders must be 
motivated to engage in conflict regulation and sustain the consociational system. The leaders of the 
rival ethnic communities must fear the consequences of protracted ethnic war and desire to preserve 
the economic and political stability of their regions' (McGarry 1994). McGarry's observations 
point to the temporary of the pact, which was built on alliances of interests. Hence, when the 
economic situation prevailing on the ground stopped being an incentive strong enough to promote 
elite cooperation, elite political consensus over the need to preserve the stability of the system was 
reduced. It should be noted that the highly, extremely elitist character of Lebanon's pre-war 
consociational grand coalition and the procedural aspects this narrow based coalition took had a 
significant impact on the stability of the system. This is because the exclusion of communal groups 
from power and the political, economic and social inequality it entailed were more than the system 
could endure. In this respect, consociationalism's substitution of effective institutions of governance 
by communal leaders and institutionalised confessional formulas of representation is a major 
hindrance to the creation of stability. As Ahmed and Tindigarukayo put it: 
Lebanon did not develop its institutions, and hence they do not reflect the real Lebanese community. 
Furthermore, these institutional bodies being a matter of shape and not of substance, opened the door wide to an 
unlimited crisis (Ahmed 1986,101). Lebanon has the form of a state but lacks effective state institutions, 
because of the absence of the infrastructure that goes into the making of a nation (Ahmed 1986,102). In most 
post-colonial states, however, political regimes are primarily personal and discretionary rather than institutional 
and procedural. That is, neither the behaviour of political leaders nor the entire political conduct in these states is 
governed by impersonal institutional rules. Instead, they are governed by personal authorities and power 
(Tindigarukayo 1989,53). 
Indeed, the real Lebanese institutions of governance under the existing pre-war consociational 
structure of rule were the elites. As they are human institutions, they are not always able or willing 
to preserve the stability of the system and create a system of governance that would generate 
democratic stability, hence questioning the internal logic of consociational theory. 
The war events (1975-1990) meant the breakdown of law and order as there was no system, 
(consociational or otherwise), in place. However, they changed the balance of power among the 
various warring factions, hence suggesting the nature of the consociational compromise that would 
emerge in the end. Effectively, the fifteen-year civil war started in 1975 with a deteriorating 
economic situation that threatened social stability, clashes between the Lebanese army and the PLO 
and a violent conflict between the Maronites and the Palestinians. The Maronite president of the 
Lebanese republic requested Syrian support to counterattack Palestinian military activism against 
the Maronite faction. Syria, to protect its borders and the Maronites from Muslim attack, intervened 
by sending its troops into Lebanon in order to stabilise the Lebanese front as an unstable Lebanon 
meant a likely (and in fact eventual) Israeli invasion into Lebanon that may well have spill-over 
149 
effects on Syrian stability. Inter as well as intra-sectarian fighting and ethnic decimation continued, 
suggesting as Johnson points out, that the long Lebanese war was not only about class cleavages. 
Indeed, Johnson writes that class differences 'cannot on their own be used to explain how a class 
struggle over socio-economic conditions became a war' (Johnson 2001,197). Indeed, the horrific 
nature of intra-sectarian fighting, violence and killing lend support to this argument and point to the 
salient impact of ethnicity on system stability and the important role it played in the war events. The 
Maronite-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 created a new set of alliances. Israel's ability 
to neutralise and expel the PLO (to Tunisia) left the Sunni militias in a much weaker position. 
However, the inability of Israel to establish a government of its own in Beirut and its subsequent 
withdrawal in 1983 meant that the Maronites' position was weakened and suggested that they had, 
in a way, lost the war, though there is no ultimate winner or loser in the Lebanese civil wars. 
Violence, decimation, kidnappings and killings continued, and were fuelled by and linked to proxy 
wars (the cold war, the Iraq/Iran war ... ). Intra-sectarian fighting and 
killings centered also around 
economically salient Strategic points such as the Beirut airport, the ports along the coastal cities, the 
drugs and arms traffic. This was demonstrated by the looting that took place and the attempts by 
sectarian new leaders (who became the warlords of the Second Republic) to regionally/locally 
control the war economy became commonplace. The multi-national force sent in 1982 composed of 
the U. S., France, Britain and Italy) left Lebanon in 1984 and the various Shi'i militias (such as 
Amal and I-Lzbollah) started gaining control over various areas in South Lebanon and Beirut. 
Hence, this suggested that the formula that would end the war would have to take into account the 
relative power and position of the Shi'i Muslims, hence putting an end to the Maronite-Sunni 
dominant position on the Lebanese political scene. Indeed, the role of the Shi'i Muslims in the later 
years of the war events pointed to the changing balance of power among the various contending 
groups, with a weakening of the previously dominant political position of the Maronites. Alongside 
the war events, numerous peace-making efforts were conducted (discussed in the Chapter 5) and 
their minutes can be considered a reflection of the warring situation on the ground. In other words, 
such efforts reflected the changing balance of power and hinted to the nature of the agreement that 
would end the war in two ways. First, they reflected that the nature of the formula that would be 
able to end of the war may well be a consociational one. Second, they reflected the scope and 
content of this formula, i. e., the dominant position of some new groups versus others, as a result of 
the changing balance of power (itself a result of the fighting events). In 1990, Syria ended the war 
and imposed peace. With the help of Syrian troops, law and order started to be restored and a 
revised consociational formula, that reflected the new changing realities on the ground (military, 
economic, demographic, communal), was put into place. 
150 
To sum up, the conflicts in Lebanon have shown that the pre-war consociational practices in 
Lebanon were a failure. This is because they did not generate democratic stability, and hence 
questioned the supposedly causative relationship between consociationalism and democratic 
stability. The literature on consociational theory and Lebanon has raised questions concerning the 
ability of the consociational model to generate and maintain democratic stability in multi-communal 
and unstable states. At the same time however, the particular balance of internal and external forces 
in 1989 led to a strategy that resulted in a consociational proposal for a possible solution that 
effectively brought the war to an end. The new formula came as a response to meet regionally 
turbulent conditions of crisis and internally new economic, social, demographic and political 
realities. Despite many other conflict-regulation attempts, it was the only one that all parties 
involved considered to be acceptable. Indeed, the new arrangement re-affirmed and strengthened 
the consociational aspect of the country. This gives credibility to consociational theory, in that 
consociationalism tends to be resorted to as a result of temporary conditions of crisis, but at the 
same time indicates the necessity to examine the new consociational formula. Chapter 5 will 
explain the revised consociational arTangement, examine the conduct of politics in the post-war era 
and the features that post-war Lebanese society exhibits. It will also attempt to draw conclusions 
concerning the ability of the new revised model to generate prospects for democratic stability for 
post-war Lebanon. 
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Chapter 5 Consociationafism and the post-war Lebanese political system 
In post-war Lebanon, the various communal groups are of unequal size and power. The 
adjusted consociational mechanism of rule introduced salutary reforms (through the Ta'if 
Agreement), intended to lead to a viable system of governance able to create and generate 
democratic stability. While this chapter addresses in great detail the Ta'if Agreement, it suffices to 
start the discussion by mentioning that it gives more powers to the Sunni prime minister and the 
Shi'i speaker. As a result, Lebanon is now ruled by a triumvirate composed of the Maronite 
president, the Sunni pren-iier and the Shi'i speaker, who represent, together, the three largest 
communal groups. Additionally, the enlarged parliament now guarantees an equal fifty-fifty percent 
ratio of representation between Christians and Muslims, instead of the pre-war six to five ratio 
favouring Christians. Equally important however for the purposes of this chapter is the context of 
the Ta'if Accord (i. e., the local and regional contexts as well as mediation efforts and war events 
that led to the signing of the Ta'if Agreement) as this context sheds led on the reasons why a 
consociational system (albeit improved) was put into place at Ta'if. Indeed, such a context explains 
why and under what conditions consociationalism is opted for, therefore suggesting that improved 
structures of consociational governance and elaborations of the consociational model have a better 
chance of making the model work as the theory suggests and increasing the utility of the theory. 
Hence, after outlining a number of observations regarding the current relative stability of the 
country, the chapter will address the above-mentioned issues before it moves to a detailed 
discussion of the Ta'if Agreement. 
After more than a decade of implementing the new revised consociational structure of rule, the 
latter has not so far generated democratic stability for Lebanon's plural society, as consociational 
theory assumes. However, the country enjoys a certain degree of stability, and this has prevented 
the outbreak of communal conflict, despite a number of security and political incidents that have led 
to a questioning of the current stability of the country. Political assassinations, government 
crackdowns on peaceful protests and the closure of ideological establishments (such as the popular 
opposition station, MTV), amongst other incidents, have cast doubt on the internal stability and 
security of Lebanon, thereby questioning Lebanon's official attempt to strengthen the re-emerging 
international trust in the country. A number of political assassinations have taken place despite the 
serious efforts of Syria and the successive post-war governments and regimes to control the security 
of the country and portray the impression that Lebanon is a stable country. In the words of Krayem, 
6 such events give the impression that the security situation in Lebanon is still volatile, and that the 
country is still a potential forum that could host conflicts and assassination attempts' (DSO, 5 
August 2003). 
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Indeed, the functioning of the current consociational system in Lebanon suggests that in practice, 
there is a societal context in which a tenuous understanding of accommodation exists among 
different groups of unequal size and power within a particular balance of power among these groups 
and with the permanent intervention and backing of a third party, Syria. This fragile environment is 
revealed through the extraordinary weaknesses' exhibited by successive post-war Lebanese 
governments, very possibly suggesting that the instability of the Lebanese state lies in the 
consociational political structure of the country, which institutionalises and fosters sectarianism and 
its divisive consequences. Yet, if one were to try to change the balance of forces that already exists 
(in order to annihilate the divisive effects incurred by consociationalism, prevent the politicisation 
and manipulation of communal identity and minimise the risks of conflict outbreak), this would 
only entrench the insecurity within society and increase the instability in the country. 2 This 
Lebanese dilemma illustrates the central question of this thesis (the allegedly causative relationship 
between consociationalism and democratic stability). In this light, the present chapter examines in 
detail the features and more importantly, the workings of the current post-war consociational model, 
and sheds light on the various factors that explain the relative stability of the country for more than 
a decade. This stability started institutionally speaking, in 1990, when the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, 
officially known as the Document of National Accord or National Reconciliation, was incorporated 
into the Lebanese Constitution and introduced major amendments to the latter. 
From the outset, and quite apart from the fact that the new consociational formula was largely 
imposed from the outside, it should be pointed out that it was, in some respects, the only formula 
that effectively ended the Lebanese fifteen-year civil war, and sustained the relative stability of the 
system, thereby highlighting the need to re-evaluate the ability of the model to act as a conflict- 
regulation mechanism within plural societies. Indeed, as noted above, any change of the 
consociational political system seems prone to generate political instability, which would have a 
detrimental effect on societal stability. This in itself does not undermine the importance of the 
consociational theory. However, after more than a decade of implementing the new accord, there is 
little reason to believe that adjustments made in the consociational model in post-war Lebanon will 
be effective in preventing conflict. 3 Indeed, the relative stability of the Lebanese political system 
1 Briefly, the Lebanese state is weak, in that the government has difficulty in arriving at domestic policies, has difficulty 
in organising itself to implement policies, and has difficulty in dealing effectively with international relations. 
2 When the opportunity for system change presented itself during peace-making efforts in the late 1980s, Syria was 
willing to postpone a fundamental change in the governance of Lebanon and went along with a modified consociational 
form that had broadly failed in the past. This was so in the light of the past experiences and history of Lebanon as well 
as Israel's failed attempt to establish a government of its own making in Beirut. 3 The fact that the Ta'if Accord has readjusted/recalibrated the power configuration among the various communal 
groups without altering the nature of the political system has led Sa'egh to question the relevance of referring to the 
1989 constitutional amendments as the birth of the Second Lebanese Republic. For more on this issue, see Dawoud el 
Sa'egh, Al Nizim a] Loubnani fi thawAbitihi wa tahawoulatihi', Beirut: Dar An-Nahar lil Nachr, 2000, pp. 42-46. 
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owes much to Syria's continuous twin-backing of the Talf Agreement (which is consociational in 
nature) and of its implementation. 
However, Lebanon still faces major problems and challenges that will be dealt with in the present 
chapter. Writing in 1999, Norton observes that 'unfortunately, nearly ten years after the agreement 
to end the war was signed in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon is still wracked by problems' (Norton 
1999,41) that undermine the stability of the country. This suggests that democratic stability is 
unlikely to emerge internally and be maintained under the prevailing political, economic and social 
conditions. Indeed, were it not for continuous Syrian intervention, with some American 
acquiescence, the country may not be able to hold together. Hudson questions as follows: 'Is it any 
wonder then, that, while Syria's "hegemonic" role is widely resented in Lebanon, even some 
Lebanese who resent it wonder, whether Lebanon would retain its post-Ta'if stability without iff 
(Hudson 1999b, 33). In other words, the new consociational system alone does not seem to have 
fulfilled its objective of creating political stability within democratic practices. Rather, the Syrian 
role seems crucial in assisting it. Hence, this re-activates the debate concerning the ability of the 
consociational model alone to generate democratic stability. 
The chapter will begin by a concise historical chronology of the major events since 1990 until the 
present day. Then, it will situate the context of the 1989 Ta'if Agreement. The discussion will 
subsequently examine the impact of the favourable regional and local situations on the peacemaking 
efforts in 1989. Then, the chapter will describe the new provisions of the Ta'if Agreement which 
introduced amendments and changes to the Lebanese Constitution, and hence, to the workings of 
the Lebanese political system. Subsequently, the discussion will examine how the new revised 
political formula and the post-war Lebanese political system relate to the model of consociational 
democracy. Afterwards, the chapter will discuss the lingering problems in the post-Ta'if era. 
Finally, the discussion will recapitulate the main findings of the present chapter. 
Historical chronology 
After fifteen years of war, peace was imposed by Syria. Lebanon saw the creation of the Second 
Republic with the ratification of the Ta'if Agreement. In 1989, Parliament elected Mouawad as the 
President of the Republic. He was assassinated shortly after. President Hrawi was then elected for 
an initial six-year term that was later extended for two more years (through an amendment of the 
Constitution). Hence, President Firawi's term lasted from 1989 until 1998. During Hrawi's 
presidency, intra-Christian fighting ended with the exile of General Aoun. In 1991, all militias, 
apart from Hizbollah, were disarmed and the task of rebuilding the shattered infrastructure (roads, 
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telephone lines and power supply) started. In 1992, Premier Karami was forced to resign after 
rampant inflation. Hariri, a billionaire, became the Prime Mnister and started his over-ambitious 
reconstruction project, which created jobs. The 1992 parliamentary elections had the lowest 
turnover ever. Nabih Berri was elected as Parliament Speaker, mainly because of his pro-Syrian 
stance. In 1996, the parliamentary elections reflected a higher turnover, despite continuous 
Christian boycott. The first municipality (local) elections were held for the first time since the 
beginning of the 1975 war in 1998. Christian participation in the elections increased and the 
elections reflected a positive mood in the country, as they represented a move towards 
decentralisation (one of Ta'if's provisions). Before his term in office expired, President Hrawi 
attempted to introduce an optional civil marriage law. However, he was faced by mounting 
opposition from religious clerics from all confessions, traditional politicians (who did not want to 
lose their clienteles or upset religious clerics) and surprisingly, Lebanese youth (hence reflecting 
heightened religious and sectarian hostility). 
In 1998, Lahoud, the previous army commander, was elected President of the Republic and Salim 
al-Hoss became prime minister. Hoss founded a government of austerity composed mainly of 
technocrats. The economic situation worsened from 1998 until 2000, partly as a result of a number 
of Israeli strikes. However, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon in 2000, apart from its continuous 
occupation of the disputed Sheb'aa farms. As a result of this, Hizbollah's popularity increased and 
the party won majority Shi'i seats in the parliamentary elections of the summer of 2000. The 
electoral law was designed to promote the election of pro-Syrian candidates and the stifling of the 
opposition. Also, as a result of the deteriorating economic situation, Hariri and his cross- 
confessional allies, won all the seats in Beirut's constituency, ousting traditional notables such as 
Salarn and Hoss from Parliament. In other words, votes were bought. Post-war Lebanon witnessed 
the emergence of a consociational system of rule, exemplified by the troika, i. e., the Maronite 
President, the Sunni Prime Minister and the Shi'i Parliament Speaker, who, together, represent the 
three largest communities in Lebanon. As such, the regime of the Second Republic remains, just 
like the pre-war one, actor-centered rather than institution-centered, despite some efforts of Premier 
Hoss to rebuild state institutions. However, while the coming to power of Lahoud saw some steps 
towards the effective control of internal peace and security, and an attempt to build a stronger state 
and insulate it from the control of the traditional political and economic elites, Hariri's continuous 
attempts to avoid reforming the state resulted in serious personality as well as ideological clashes 
between the president and the prime minister. As a result, Syria continues to control the security 
situation in Lebanon and to ensure that consociational constitutional structures of rule are applied, 
in cases of clashes among the troika and the top office holders (i. e., the various poles of power, 
which include Druze leader Walid Junblat). 
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B. Situating the context of the 1989 Ta'if Agreement 
During the war years, numerous negotiation efforts were undertaken. Indeed, 'there were many 
attempts to settle the conflict (conferences at the local and regional levels, mediation efforts by 
foreign powers)' which 'ranged in form and substance from unilateral to multilateral, formal to 
informal, short to long-lived and piecemeal to comprehensive' (Faris 1994,21). The Ta'if 
Agreement succeeded in providing a formula capable of ending the fiftcen-year Lebanese civil war 
because it was the product of two simultaneously converging efforts, one carried out at the local 
level and another at the regional level. The 1989 efforts were successful only because the regional 
and internal situations were favourable to peacemaking. That is, they somehow imposed effective 
peacemaking. Here, Krayern points out that 'internal changes coincided with developments on the 
regional and international levels that also favored a political settlement in Lebanon' (Krayem 1997, 
419). 
1. Mediation efforts 1975-1989 
From 1975 to 1985, there were some unsuccessful attempts to resolve the civil war in which the 
main militia leaders were involved. Although none of the Militia forces were happy with the 
situation as it stood, they could find no way out, so the war continued. Syria initially sent a force 
into Lebanon to support the Christian forces against Muslim attack. This was at the request of 
President Franjiyeh in 1976. Later, the Arab League legitimised Syria's presence in Lebanon as part 
of an Arab peace keeping force. Between 1982 and 1984, there was a multinational force (U. S., 
France, Britain and Italy). There were sporadic attempts at mediation. However, these attempts 
would get the leaders of the three main militias to try to find a way out of the situation. As a result 
of the limited scope of representation as well as the illegitimate character of these attempts at 
mediation (i. e., the main or "significant" militia leaders who do not constitute the legitimate 
representatives of Lebanon), none of the latter succeeded. 
The failure of mediation efforts to bring about peace can be traced back to two main reasons. First, 
at a local level, and at the beginning of the war, there was no serious commitment on the side of any 
of the warring factions to end the conflict. This is because they refused to compromise on difficult 
and sensitive issues. The Christian bloc mainly rejected Muslim demands for a more equitable 
distribution in political representation, as based on the existing demographic map. Meanwhile, the 
Muslims insisted on these demands as a condition for ending the conflict. Thus, fighting coupled 
with the prospect of victory took precedence over peacemaking. It was only later on that traditional 
leaders realised that no one side could win the war. By that stage, efforts at ending the war lacked 
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effective implementation mechanisms. At other times, these efforts were met by internal violence 
and regional turbulence, thereby preventing successful peacemaking and in some cases, preventing 
the possibility of meeting amidst violence. 
The second reason behind the failure of such efforts was Lebanon's fragile social and political 
makeup, its size and geographical location. These factors make it very difficult for the country to 
remain immune from outside influence and intervention. Turbulent regional and international 
developments have repercussions locally on the Lebanese domestic political scene. For instance, 
Krayem writes that 'the Lebanese conflict had always been linked in significant ways to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict' (Krayem 1997,419). Thus, Lebanon's peace was linked to a stable regional 
situation and the consent of the world's leading powers. Here, Khalaf argues that the popular 'no-s 
winner, no-loser' Lebanese formula resulted in Lebanon never being able to 'freely will its entry in 
or exit from war' (Khalaf 1994,274-5). This formula suggests that the inability of any group to 
dominate over others, and by the same token, its inability to reach consensus with others, requires 
and invites outside mediation, often conducted along the lines of the interests of the outside 
mediator. 
In contrast, successful peacemaking became possible in 1989 because the regional situation was 
more favourable to peace, as events within this context were less turbulent, thereby permitting Arab 
diplomatic efforts. At the same however, Israel's dominant military position in the region provided 
a fundamental impetus for Syria to end the Lebanese war. In this sense, the Ta'if agreement, which 
should not be mistaken for the manifestation of a Lebanese overarching loyalty, came about as a 
result of a compromise mainly imposed by Syria in the light of conditions of crisis. At a local level, 
the warring factions inside Lebanon had become more committed to peacemaking, and convinced 
of the need to make compromises in order to stop the fighting. Also, Arab insistence on the need to 
reach consensus, coupled with the legitimate and at the same time broad scope of representation of 
the Ta'if negotiations contributed significantly towards reaching an agreement acceptable to the 
parties involved in the conflict. 
Referring to the efforts of the National Dialogue Committee (25 September- 24 November 1975), 
Faris writes that 'a close reading of the committee minutes indicates that neither side had the intent 
of breaking the deadlock: each was convinced that it would prevail on the battleground' (Faris 
1994,22). It is important to note that during the early war years, each party involved in the conflict 
believed in the idea that the war would lead to victory over the other parties. Thus, at that stage, the 
efforts of the National Dialogue Committee failed to bring about an arrangement acceptable to all 
the parties involved in the conflict. Faris also cites another effort at peacemaking, the Constitutional 
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document (14 February 1976): 'Although never enshrined in law, the constitutional document 
established the direction and parameters for a future agreement' (Faris 1994,23). However, the 
author points to the facts that the document had no 'credible mechanism for enforcing its 
provisions' and that it was rejected by some parties to the conflict (Faris 1994,23). More 
specifically, the document could not end the war, mainly because not all parties to the conflict 
accepted it. 
Concerning the Riyadh-Cairo Arab summit conferences (October 1976), Faris writes that 'although 
the summits called on the Lebanese to reconcile their differences, they did not offer any substantive 
recommendations' (Faris 1994,24). In particular, the author recalls that the events that followed 
ended all hope of implementing the summit. He argues that from 1976 to 1982, internal and 
regional events and conflicts made consensus difficult. At this time, the Lebanese war was raging 
in a turbulent regional context. According to Faris, the Geneva meeting (31 October- 4 November 
1983) 'was stalemated. The meeting's only accomplishment was the definition by consensus of 
Lebanon's identity as an independent and sovereign Arab state' (Faris 1994,25). While the meeting 
did not provide a fon-nula capable of ending the war, it was nonetheless important in that it clarified 
the controversial, elusive identity of Lebanon provided by the 1943 National Pact, which stated that 
Lebanon was a country with 'an Arab character, rather than an Arab country. Thus, the meeting is 
seen as an initial, although insufficient, step towards agreement on a widely contested and 
controversial issue, namely the spirit and identity of Lebanon. The Ta'if Agreement later specified 
that Lebanon is of Arabic affiliation and identity. In the Lausanne Conference (12-20 March 1984), 
Faris remarks that although the leading political figures were present in person, and were close to an 
agreement, they 'failed to reach a consensus and divided along religious lines when it came to the 
necessary reforms'. In other words, at the local level, the Lebanese leaders refused to 'accept' and 
admit the necessity of compromise over sensitive issues. 
The Damascus Tripartite Agreement (28 December 1985) differed from previous peacemaking 
efforts. Indeed, 'its main features were the transitional abolition of sectarianism in the three highest 
offices, the legislative, executive and judiciary branches of government and the distinctive relations 
with Syria' (Faris 1994,26). Furthermore, Faris points out that this meeting was important in the 
sense that 'the plan's two new elements (phased abolition of sectarianism and special relations with 
Syria) became key issues that any future settlement would have to address' (Faris 1994,26). 
Although compromise was hard to reach among the parties to the conflict, however, it would be 
safe to say that despite the failure of the agreement to provide an effective peacemaking formula, it 
was a prelude, or antechamber, to successful peacemaking that would follow four years later, in 
1989. That is, it was a clear indication that the sort of pact that would result in the end would reflect 
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the dominant position of the forces and actors/players on the Lebanese and regional scenes, and 
hence, would lay out the structures of governance that reflected such domination. 
2. The regional context 
As has been mentioned above, Lebanon's peace is directly linked to the stability of the region. 
Here, Krayem's comment that 'the cause of the Lebanese civil war was neither exclusively internal 
nor exclusively external nor was its settlement' (Krayem 1997,412) takes on an unprecedented 
significance for the present discussion. Krayem elaborates on this by observing that 'the civil war 
came to an end at a specific historical juncture when movement toward internal reconciliation 
coincided with favorable regional and international developments' (Krayem. 1997,412). By 1989, 
regional and international developments were more favourable to peace, and this permitted Arab 
diplomatic efforts towards solving the conflict with the consent and blessing of the world's leading 
powers. As Krayem points out, 'the U. S. was interested in curtailing the crisis in Lebanon so as not 
to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process ... The U. S. supported the 
Ta'if negotiations and lent its 
support both in Arab circles and vis-A-vis Syria toward the successful completion of those talks' 
(Krayem. 1997,420). A further example relating to this discussion, and one that that best illustrates 
the link between Lebanon and the region, is the 1991 Gulf war. It is believed that Syria's President 
Assad was given a free hand to bring about order and stability to war-tom Lebanon in return for 
joining the war in Kuwait. In effect, the Syrian Arab Republic sent a full-annoured division to the 
Saudi border, without however participating in the hostilities. Thus, it is said that the Bush 
administration gave Assad a tacit green light, or at the very least, turned a blind eye, to Syria's being 
a major player on the Lebanese domestic scene. In the end, the regional effort manifested itself in 
many respects, first in bringing the legitimate parties to the negotiation table, second in an 
insistence on the need to reach an agreement, and third in providing a mechanism for implementing 
the Accord, and later on, in Syrian military and political participation towards implementing it. 
First, Arab efforts to put an end to the war were conducted through many channels in order to bring 
together to the negotiating table all the concerned parties. Here, Kassir observes that the end of the 
civil war was not the result of a pure Lebanese decision, by pointing out that the Taif Agreement 
does not emanate from the Lebanese alone. It was launched on an Arab initiative, mandated by the 
Arab League, taken up by the special envoy, Lakhdar lbrahimi and given birth to by Saudi Arabia's 
diplomacy, mainly through Rafic Hariri (Kassir 2000,7). 4 Thus, synchronised efforts of many Arab 
channels were successful in bringing the parties to the negotiating table. These efforts were the fruit 
4 Translated from French. 
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of previous attempts beginning on the 23d May 1989 with an emergency summit meeting of Arab 
leaders in Casablanca, Morocco. This led to the formation of a Tripartite Arab Committee, 
comprising Mng Hassan of Morocco, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and President Chathli of Algeria. 
Second, Arab, and mainly Saudi Arabia's categorical uncompromising insistence on the need to 
reach an agreement on highly controversial matters is especially conspicuous. This is mainly 
because the controversial matters at play were crucial issues for the traditional political leaders. One 
observation that illustrates that the Ta'if Agreement was imposed by conditions of crisis is Norton's 
comment that 'it is striking that foreign diplomats exude more enthusiasm for the Ta'if process than 
the Lebanese themselves. They remain sceptical, if hopeful' (Norton 1991,473). The comments by 
former Prime Nfinister Hoss may best illustrate the overall picture and Norton's observation cited 
above. Hoss points out that 'the most important thing about the agreement of Ta'if is that it is an 
agreement' (Reinkowski 1997,507). Thus, the need to reach an agreement took precedence over the 
nature and details of such an agreement, since this need was imposed through conditions of crisis. 
One such controversial issue addressed at Ta'if was the issue of Lebanese-Syrian relations. Ta'if's 
clauses relating to this issue illustrate the fact that Ta'if was imposed by conditions of crisis and 
therefore, reflected the dominant position of Syria in relation to Lebanon. This was particularly the 
case on account of the fragility of the regional situation and the repercussions it would have on 
Lebanese stability, as well as the fragility of Lebanon's socio-economic and political makeup and 
its likely local and regional repercussions. Maila points out that the Ta'if clauses related to Syro- 
Lebanese relations were all pre-written and only minor wording differences were permitted. The 
author argues that the Lebanese Deputies had little maneuver and margin of freedom, and could not 
venture far from the original text (Maila 1994,38). Indeed, Mansour, who is one of the architects of 
the Ta'if Accord and who participated in its "making", reveals in his 1993 book, The coup against 
Ta'if, that the outstanding majority of the deputies who came to Ta'if were not aware of the original 
version of the text and of the amendments that were made to it prior to their coming. Mansour 
furthermore writes that it is crucial to point to the limited freedom that was given to the deputies in 
terms of their ability to discuss and amend the text, since it was made clear to them that discussing 
and amending the text should not translate into refusal, failure and hence the continuation of the war 
and the threat of a possible inexistence of Lebanon as a country (Mansour 1993,39). 5 Similarly, 
Khalaf reveals that 'it was clear that some of the conferees were acting under duress. Although they 
were freely elected participants, the charged atmosphere imposed constraints on how far they could 
have ranged beyond some of the pre-prepared texts and agendas. They were left with a limited 
5 Translated from Arabic. 
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margin to maneuver or to work out alternative schemes and proposals' (Khalaf 2002,299). For 
example, concerning the provision that 'Lebanon was prohibited from becoming a source of threat 
to Syria's security and a passageway or place d'armes for any force, state, or organization that 
might endanger it', Barak notes that 'it is noteworthy that this concluding section was the result of 
prior agreement between the Tripartite Arab High Commission and Syria, and the Lebanese 
Deputies were unable to alter it' (Barak 2000,35-6). Similarly, Krayem, in refer-ring to the Ta'if 
Agreement, mentions 'a document that had already largely been prepared by the Arab Tripartite 
Committee after much consultation with Syria, the United States and various Lebanese leaders' 
(Krayem 1997,421). 
Later, comparable accounts confirmed such practices as some delegates to Ta'if or close family 
members of ma or delegates to Ta'if publicly revealed the extent of external involvement, giving 
examples of such involvement in the "making" and wordings (such as word replacements) of the 
Ta'if Accord. Such comments and practices stress those arguments in this thesis, namely that 
consociationalism. tends to prevent the political system from reaching political maturity, i. e., it does 
not readily allow the elites the ability to be aware of what constitutes national interest and be 
capable of creating and maintaining stability along the lines of national interest. Thus, 
consociationalism tends to involve a heavy dose of external arbitration as a remedy for this 
internally conflictual situation. Additionally, these practices at Ta'if seem to indicate that 
consociationalism, as a system of rule, is often chosen as a last resort. This indicates the many 
shortcomings it may generate as well as a tendency for it to be imposed, rather than freely chosen. 
Third, the Accord, through Arab efforts, provides an Arab mechanism to 'help Lebanon in its 
transition to peace' through 'an Arab commission that will serve as an intermediary during 
Lebanese-Syrian negotiations over the duration and size of the Syrian troop presence in Lebanon'. 
Maila argues that this Arab guarantee reassures parties hostile to Syria (Maila 1994,37). However, 
his observation that the Accord highlights the conflict's 'very strong regional dimension' (Maila 
1994,37) is equally insightful. More importantly, it may be said that the Accord highlights the very 
strong regional dimension of the solution to the conflict, and not only of the conflict itself. Thus, 
Ta'if reflects the dominant, broker role Syria plays to ensure a proper running of consociational 
mechanisms and a stable (although far from smooth) operability of consociational principles and 
consociational politics. 
In terms of implementing the Ta'if Agreement effectively, it is safe to say that the Accord alone 
was not sufficient to end the war. Kassir writes that it is the expulsion of General Aoun from the 
presidential palace that ended the war and points out that this step also was not purely and solely 
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Lebanese (Kassir 2000,8). 6 In actual fact, Syrian air and ground troop operations around the 
presidential palace and in the area controlled by General Aoun forced the latter's expulsion. This 
was one of numerous steps that Syria took to restore consociationalism. Thus, Syria appears to be 
the major institutional structure in ensuring that consociational mechanisms are adhered to. 
3. The local context 
Although peacemaking efforts at the local level started months after the beginning of the Lebanese 
civil war, they however lacked an essential criterion for success, namely a serious commitment 
among the warring factions on the ground to compromise in order to put an end to the conflict. This 
commitment meant an agreement on the need to introduce political reforms and naturally, an 
agreement on the nature and content of political reforms. Some observers of Lebanese politics argue 
that the Lebanese civil war was a continuation of consociational politics by other means. For 
instance, Messarra writes that during the war, the consociational law regulated violence and 
fighting. According to Messarra, the aim was to achieve 'strategic and mutual parity in killing', 
which could be taken to mean what Messarra refers to as consociational law. Still according to 
Messarra, the aim was not to achieve any military target but only to demoralise the opponent, even 
though all parties concerned knew that this opponent was impossible to eliminate or conquer 
(Messarra. 1986,107). It is crucial to point out here that Messarra's argument seems problematic, as 
the civil war involved more than an attempt to demoralise opponents. Rather, it was a bloody and 
violent inter- as well as intra-sectarian affair, which resulted in the mutual decimation of a 
significant number of families belonging to the same sect. It also involved a loss of awareness 
among the warring factions as well as a socio-econon-dc conflict fuelled by class inequalities. 
Hence, Messarra's argument that the war was a continuation of consociational politics by other 
violent means seems problematic. Although Lebanese consociational politics tended to involve a 
certain dose of elite competition and adversarial behaviour that sometimes led to conflicts involving 
violence, these were manifestations of the consociational model in action that point to the internal 
flaws of the theory. However, the elites were aware of how much the stability of the system could 
afford such adversarial behaviour. In the case of the civil war however, elite awareness was 
shattered and consensus broke down. By the same token, the collapse of the system revealed the 
structural problem in the organisation of pre-war Lebanese political rule. If the historical, bloody 
war events are anything to go by, the degree and nature of violence seem to suggest that no 
consideration was given to the consociational rules of the game, as Messarra holds. 
6 Translated from French. 
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It is useful to discuss Kabbara's critiques of the arguments advanced by Messar-ra. The first is 
Messarra's insistence on consociationalism as the best option for the Lebanese political system and 
the second one being 'his continual attempt to fix the confessional identity as the main, if not the 
only reality of the social fabric of the country' (Kabbara 1991,346). Furthermore, Kabbara writes 
that: 'in one argument, Messarra sees consociational democracy as the product of the balance of 
force among the two communities and the incapacity of any of them to annihilate the other. And in 
another theoretical tum, a new argument was presented in which consociational democracy became 
the outcome of common values and perceptions shared by the Lebanese people' (Kabbara 1991, 
350). Kabbara's observation is particularly relevant. This is because it is inadequate to view 
consociational democracy as 'the outcome of common values and perceptions shared by the 
Lebanese' as Messarra writes. Messarra portrays consociational democracy as an end in itself that 
the Lebanese aim for. Rather, it would be more appropriate to say that this model represents, for the 
Lebanese elites, the most feasible means for them to preserve their dominant position within the 
system through the manipulation of communal consciousness and the patron-client system to avoid 
dealing with class inequalities and block the emergence of a class-based consciousness that cuts 
across communal groups. Additionally, and quite apart from the regional dimension discussed 
above, resorting to the consociational model illustrates elites' common rejection of partition 
schemes, which are economically unviable. In other words, the consociational model can be 
considered more of a way of preserving the status quo that Lebanese elites benefit from, rather than 
an end in itself based on a tradition of elite accommodation, as Messarra maintains. 
During the early years of the war, each side was convinced it was going to prevail on the 
battleground. It is only much later that the warring factions realised no side could win the war. 
Otherwise, had there been an early awareness by the warring factions of the futility of the conflict, 
as Messarra argues, successful peacemaking would have been achieved earlier. It would certainly 
not have taken fifteen years to achieve this. Rather, for many Lebanese parties involved in the 
conflict, the war was a self-defence mechanism, as they perceived some of their Lebanese rivals as 
a direct threat to their existence and position within society, coupled with an acute sense of 
communal and class consciousness. Thus, violent inter and intra sectarian fighting among the 
Lcbanese militias (notably intra-Maronite and intra-Shi'ite family/clan fighting and killing) took 
precedence over peacemaking. 
Later on into the war years, 'there was general acceptance that none of the waning factions could 
decisively win the war, and that there was no alternative to a new compromise ensuring the 
continuity of Lebanon as an entity having a united central political system' (Krayem 1997,418). 
Thus, this can be considered a turning point of the civil war in the sense that it gave way to two 
163 
important developments. First, it led to an enhanced awareness of the real nature of Lebanese 
society and politics and thus, to a more serious commitment towards putting an end to the conflict. 
Second, it narrowed down the choices available to Lebanese leaders in order to end conflict, 
precisely because the enhanced awareness of the nature of the conflict led to a more adequate 
understanding of the possible solutions. Just like the 1958 civil war 'showed that whatever the 
shortcomings of the existing system, the alternatives were still less attractive' (Rabinovich 1985, 
29), the on-going 1975 civil war showed that a return to a consociational structure was the most 
feasible and realistic option. Rabinovich adds that 'whatever the system's obvious deficiencies, it 
did not seem that any other could preserve the Lebanese state as a pluralistic polity' (Rabinovich 
1985,26). 
For instance, unrealistic scenarios such as partition, assimilation and federalism, which did not 
attract much enthusiasm in the first place, whether at the elite or mass levels, were ruled out: 
'Indeed, during the years of civil war there had been many indications that the majority of ordinary 
citizens and many social, cultural, and popular organizations were against the separation of citizens, 
regions and cities. They expressed their desire for unity many times, confronting the militias... ' 
(Krayem 1997,418). Equally, 'public intolerance for the continuation of the civil war and support 
for a quick settlement grew rapidly' (Krayem 1997,418). As to the impracticality of partition, this 
procedure was not refused because of the often-held argument of Lijphart and MessarTa, which 
attribute such refusal to a Lebanese tradition of political accommodation and compromise (which is 
actually based on economic and clientelistic motivations that result in a temporary political 
consensus). Rather, partition was refused precisely for economic reasons, as it is economically less 
viable. Indeed, while partition was considered as a peacemaking attempt, it was ultimately rejected. 
Moreover, with regard to the ShFis, their geographical location in the South (on the Israeli border 
on the one hand and engulfed in a predominantly Sunni regional map on the other) makes it difficult 
for them to accept partition. Another reason is as one economist puts it: 
Lebanon is a small nation, with no suitable economic space or natural resources needed to develop the 
production forces and the accumulation of capital. Reducing Lebanon to cantons within the framework of a 
decentralized political system would undermine the basis for healthy economic development and the possibility 
of integrating Lebanon into the international market... Such an alternative would also eliminate the bourgeoisie's 7 sources of revenue, not to mention the income and revenue of the working class (Hamdan 1991,95). 
7 For a historical account of the reasons why the Pope has tended to refuse Maronite scenarios of 'partition or other 
schemes such as federation, cantonization', see DSO, 22 April 2003. For Arab, Syrian and international rejection of such 
conflict-regulation schemes, see Oren Barak, The hardships of consociation. the perils of partition: Lebanon. 1943-1990 
[Davis Occasional Papers, N. 86, November 2000]. Israel: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem [The Leonard Davis 
Institute for International Relations], 2000, pp. 29-30 
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Thus, as the civil war events unfolded and dragged on, elite awareness of the nature of the conflict, 
and hence its solution, have somehow been enhanced. Despite the subsequent adoption of a revised 
consociational formula, this is not to say that this thesis considers, as Lijphart, Messarra and 
Dekmejian do, the consociational model as the best form of rule for Lebanon. Indeed, the above- 
mentioned authors have tended to argue that Lebanon's inflexible institutionalisation of 
consociational principles resulted in the outbreak of the war and have suggested that the solution to 
Lebanon's problem lies in the introduction and adoption of principles that conform precisely to 
consociational theory. Rather, this thesis considers the failure of consociational democracy in pre- 
war Lebanon as a natural, in-built flaw of consociational theory. 
Arguing during the war years against the appropriateness of the consociational model in the 
Lebanese context, Hudson writes that 'the consociational prescription actually exacerbated 
instability and fostered the eventual breakdown... I am not convinced that consociational democracy 
in the sense of prescriptive constitutional engineering will do much for Lebanon or for other divided 
societies' (Hudson 1988,230-33). Importantly, these dilemmas were instigated by two contradicting 
factors, the breakdown of the pre-war Lebanese political system on the one hand and the 
unfeasibility of other forms of government (for many reasons) on the other. This explains why the 
Ta'if Accord had a consociational character and 'contained no surprises [as] it was based on the 
established consociative principle of the need to share power in order to regulate the conflict of 
interest between the various sects' (Rigby 2000,176). As Maila puts it, 'Ta'if's lack of surprises is 
certainly understandable given that, like all intercommunal agreements, it was the product of a 
compromise, and that the number of possible compromise solutions is limited' (Maila 1994,38). 
In sum, the Arab League decided to convene a congress in the province of Wit Saudi Arabia, from 
the 30'h of September until the 22 nd of October 1989, where what was left of the Lebanese 
Parliarnent discussed a possible solution to the war. Unlike the previous attempts at mediation, 
which involved militia forces (who were at each other's throat during the Ta'if negotiations), an 
attempt was now made to bring the legitimate political elements of the society to consider the 
matter. Effectively, 'sixty-two Lebanese Deputies (those still alive of the ninety-nine originally 
elected in 1972)' (Krayem 1997,421) worked out, under Arab and mainly Syrian guidance, the 
1989 Ta'if Agreement, which is the major amendment to the Lebanese Constitution. The 
negotiations involved twenty-two days of intense discussions. The aim of the Ta'if Agreement was 
to bring out a revised political formula for war-torn Lebanon, one that would be acceptable to all 
parties involved. This agreement built up yet another form of consociational agreement to put the 
country back together. Indeed, it re-affirmed, institutionalised and strengthened the consociational 
aspect of the country. Despite all the Accord's deficiencies, the Ta'if Agreement has Lebanese 
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legitimacy, although not all of the Deputies from the 1972 Chamber were alive when it was signed 
8 (Kassir 2000,7). Indeed, the Deputies that signed the 1989 Ta'if Agreement and who form around 
two thirds of the Chamber, were elected to the Chamber seventeen years earlier, without this 
however questioning the Chamber's legitimacy. In the end, the Document of National 
Reconciliation was signed on 24 October 1989 (Hudson 1995,734) by fifty-eight of the sixty-two 
Deputies attending the session. This suggested that there was significant support for the accord. 
Subsequently, the accord was 'approved by the Lebanese Parliament on August 21,1990, and 
signed into law by [the first acting post-war President of what is referred to as the Second Republic] 
President Elias Hraoui on September 21,1990' (The Beirut Review 1991a, 121). This broad scope 
of representation at Ta'if and the legitimate support given to the accord deserve attention, and will 
be discussed in the following section. 
C. The 1989 Talif Agreement 
The Lebanese civil war involved a number of forces, engaged in a conflict where no one was able to 
predominate and no one saw any future in the continuation of the conflict. In the civil war, Syria has 
acted at times in a seemingly arbitrary manner. Thus, the war could only end when a third party 
would end it and would ensure that the peace that is made will prevail. Indeed, if the history of civil 
wars is anything to go by, third parties in pursuit of their own interests become involved and 
establish order in the warring country. In Lebanon's case, it was basically Syria and it may be said 
that regional powers, such as Syria, have conducted their foreign policies for their own interests and 
smaller nations only benefit when such interests happen to coincide with theirs. With Syria's role in 
Lebanon being fundamentally important and hence intended to create stability in both countiies, 
Syria's efforts to restore Lebanon's stability are noteworthy. For instance, Barak writes that 'Syria's 
effort to restore order in Lebanon while preserving its unity, received regional and international 
support and were accorded legitimacy' (Barak 2000,37). 9 Hence, the Lebanese experiment with 
consociationalism has shown the need for external arbitration, coupled with military presence if 
need be, so as to ensure the effective (though not smooth) operation of consociational mechanisms 
of rule. Since the Lebanese consociational political institutions of rule are the elites, such a system 
of governance frequently prevents the country from reaching political maturity, in that it is difficult 
for elites to be aware, and to be able to perceive what constitutes national interest, and more 
importantly to act on it. With Syria being the major player in Lebanon, stability comes mainly from 
Syria. Indeed, in line with the definition of stability as used in the present research when it comes to 
8 Translated from French. 
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the Lebanese case, the system may be said to be stable where local elites alone are able to maintain 
political, social and economic stability within the divided society, without recourse to external 
arbitration. 
1. The scope of the Talif Agreement 
First, it is useful to consider the scope of representation of the Ta'if Agreement, specifically its 
capacity as a conflict-regulating peacemaking pact, drawing on the discussions of pacts undertaken 
in Chapter 3 and 4. From the outset, the broad scope of representation at Ta'if, namely the 
legislative branch (i. e., the Chamber that has popular legitimacy as it is elected) should not be taken 
to mean that the Ta'if Accord enjoys popular support among the Lebanese. Rather, the present 
discussion argues that the 1943 National Pact, devised by the Lebanese grand coalition, i. e., the 
executive branch (Khoury and Solh), laid out the real and effective structures of rule of Lebanon. 
Then, the Ta'if Accord strengthened such consociational structures, without really changing the 
character of the political system, which remained consociational. 10 In other words, the Ta'if Accord 
only readjusted the National Pact to suit the changing political, economic, social, demographic and 
regional realities. However, the fact that the legislative branch, accountable as it is to the public, 
institutionalised and approved a structure of rule laid out by the pre-war executive branch, (i. e., the 
ruling elitist grand coalition), seems to indicate Syria's willingness to block an effective striving for 
political change in Lebanon. For instance, Syria's rejection of any real change when the opportunity 
manifested itself, coupled with the fact that the accord does not establish a time frame for the 
abolition of confessionalism, " indicate Syria's willingness to permanently institutionalise 
confessionalism in the Lebanese political system. This permits it to permanently stabilise the 
Lebanese front, and to give the new pact a legal, binding and more broadly-based character. It 
would be safe to say that Syria has shown unequalled resistance to other forms of government in 
Lebanon, for reasons that promote the stability of both countries in the light of regional turbulence. 
9 For similar comments, see Eric V. Thompson, 'Will Syria have to withdraw from LebanonT. Middle East journal 
(Winter) Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 72-93,2002, p. 86 and Roger Owen, State. power and politics in the making of the modem 
Middle East, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, 2000, p. 247 
10 For similar comments, i. e., the revised formula that remained consociational, like the pact, see Ussama Makdisi, 
'Reconstructing the nation-state: the modernity of sectarianism in Lebanon'. Middle East Repo (July-September), No. 
200, pp. 23-6,1996, p. 26; Maurus Reinkowski, 'National identity in Lebanon since 1990'. grigni Vol. 38, No. 3, 
(September), pp. 493-515,1997, p. 500 and p. 507; Augustus Richard Norton, 'Lebanon after Ta'if. Is the civil war 
over? '. Middle East Journal (Summer), Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 457-73,1991, p. 461; Michael Hudson, 'Trying again: power- 
sharing in post-civil war Lebanon'. International Negotiatio Vol. 2, No. l, pp. 103-22,1997, p. 113; Michael C. Hudson, 
'Lebanon after Ta'if. another reform opportunity lostT. Arab Studies Quarterl (Winter), Vol. 21, No. l, pp. 27-40, 
1999b, p. 27 and Joseph Maila, 'The Ta'if Accord: an evaluation'. In Deirdre Collings, eds. Peace for Lebanon? From 
war to reconstruction, pp. 31-44. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, p. 3 1. 
" In this respect, it is important to point out that the 1943 National Pact was also thought of as a provisional agreement. 
Quoting Henry Pharaon, one of the principle Lebanese negotiators then, Hanf writes that 'the confessional distribution 
of offices of state, let alone of civil service posts, was not intended to last forever. It was thought of as provisional' 
(Hanf 1993,73), hence suggesting that it may not be readily possible to presently do away with the confessional system. 
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The Chamber's endorsement of an elitist grand coalition pact (despite refining it) indicates that this 
was one way Syria could deal effectively with the Lebanese problem once and for all, by getting the 
legitimate representatives of Lebanese society to legitimise a revised pact that was previously 
concluded by two leaders (Khoury and Solh) who can not be said to be the legitimate 
representatives of Lebanese society. Thus, what is often referred to as the Document of National 
Accord being endorsed by the Chamber (that has legitimacy) does not mean that the Ta'if Accord 
enjoys popular support. Indeed, the 1943 National Pact did not gather the necessary popular support 
at that time. Hence, there is little reason to believe that an amended pact that fails to alter the nature 
of the political system would enjoy popular support. Additionally, the fact that the Ta'if Agreement 
was conducted among all the legitimate representatives of Lebanese society (as opposed to pacts 
concluded by few elites) should not be taken to mean that the Ta'if Accord enjoys popular support. 
Indeed, this broad scope of representation should not obscure the fact that popular support depends 
on the scope of representation as much as on the nature of the decisions taken. Hence, the Ta'if 
Accord being an imposed and revised National Pact, elitist in nature and rejected by the masses, it is 
safe to assume that this does not translate into popular support. In sum, it is sufficient to say that 
there was serious pressure on the Lebanese Deputies to accept the provisions of the Ta'if Accord. 
Here, Maila's observations that the Ta'if Accord does not 'represent real constitutional and political 
progress' and that Lebanon's political system is not based on a constitution but on temporary 
accords that fail (Collings 1994,7) are noteworthy, and illustrate the fact that constitutional 
provisions do not always translate into literal application. 
In the end, a revised consociational solution was suggested and somehow imposed from the outside 
to deal with a domestically unstable situation that had regional repercussions. Israel provided a 
fundamental impetus for Syria to end the Lebanese war, i. e., a condition of crisis. As a result, the 
consociational Ta'if Agreement should not be mistaken for the manifestation of a Lebanese 
overarching loyalty. Against this background, Syria seems to provide the background factor for re- 
establishing consociationalism within Lebanon. Drawing on the Lebanese case, it may be said that 
the proper functioning of the consociational model (as an effective conflict-regulation mechanism 
as assumed by consociational theory) requires the assistance of additional conflict-regulating 
practices from the conflict-regulation literature, namely arbitration. McGarry's comments below 
(that the discussion will return to later) illustrate Syria's role in post-war Lebanon: 
From a normative perspective, arbitration is less attractive than accommodation worked out by the protagonists 
themselves, such as consociationalism or agreed integration or assimilation. Certain forms of external arbitration 
can be paternalistic, colonial and undemocratic in nature. However, arbitration is very much preferable to the 
one-sided methods of conflict regulation on offer, such as genocide, coercive assimilation, forced population 
transfers and hegemonic control; and if developed constructively, it can be the prelude to an agreed system of 
conflict regulation (McGarry 1994). 
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At this stage, it is useful to closely examine the Ta'if reforms. The Ta'if provisions relate to 
political and other reforms (administrative and court reforms, electoral law, education ... ) as well as 
the sovereignty of the Lebanese state over the entire Lebanese land and the liberation of Lebanon 
from Israeli occupation and Lebanese-Syrian relations. This next section examines to what extent 
the revised formula of the Ta'if Agreement relates to the consociational model of democracy, by 
presenting the 1990 Constitutional Amendments that relate to the four consociational principles. 
2. Grand coalition 
The 1990 Constitutional Amendments touch upon the consociational principle of grand coalition in 
three main respects. First, the powers of the Presidency, i. e., the Maronite President of the Republic, 
were reduced. Second, the powers of the Council of Ministers and the Sunni Prime Minister were 
increased. Third, the powers of the Shi'i Speaker of Parliament and of Parliament itself were also 
increased. These three amendments were aimed at readjusting the balance of power between the 
major Lebanese communal groups, and tend to reflect the actual position and power of each of the 
communal groups on the ground. 
In the light of the pre-war politically dominant position of the Maronites, the previous 
consociational model brought with it a fragile accommodation structure skewed in favour of the 
Maronites. In other words, Chapter 4 argued that the procedural aspects of consociational theory in 
action did not result in a consociational model of rule (as the theory assumes will happen), but 
rather, a presidential one. Ta'if thus touches directly on, and alters, the principle of the grand 
coalition. To be more specific, the original article of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution, Article 17 (as 
modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 2) stated that 'executive power shall 
be entrusted to the President of the Republic who shall exercise it assisted by the Ministers in 
accordance with conditions laid down in this constitution' (Krayem 1997,424). In practice, this 
meant a 'usually pliant Council of Ministers' (The Beirut Review 1991a, 120). In the Ta'if 
Agreement, Article 17 'which had become the emblematic basis of the Maronite predominance, was 
amended so that the executive branch of government was devoted to the Council of Ministers as a 
whole' (Salamd 1989,104). According to Article 17 of the amended constitution, 'executive 
authority was removed from the President and vested in the Council of Ministers' (Salem 1998,15): 
indeed, 'executive power shall be entrusted to the Council of Ministers, and the Council shall 
exercise it in accordance with conditions laid down in this Constitution' (Krayem 1997,424). 
Specifically, Krayem points out that 'the new confessional formula was based on reducing the 
prerogatives of the President of the Republic and transferring the executive authority to the Council 
of Ministers as a collegial body' (Krayem 1997,424). While this should mean that the new 
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executive grand coalition of post-war Lebanon should be the collegial body, i. e., the Council of 
Ministers, procedural manifestations of post-war consociational politics do not reflect such changes, 
as will be shown in the next section. Hence, the executive grand coalition of Lebanon reflected the 
"less dominant" position of the Maronites in the post-war power configuration of Lebanon, as a 
result of Maronite cooperation with Israel and the Maronites losing out in the war with Israeli 
withdrawal. Theoretically, the amendment of Article 17 can be said to have corrected the previous 
procedural deviation of the pre-war system from a presidential one towards a consociational one. 
As Davis puts it, 'the 1990 Constitutional Amendments reflect a significant departure from the 
National Covenant of 1943 in that executive powers are now vested with the Cabinet (instead of the 
President in consultation with his Nfinisters)' (Davis 1997,139). However, while this correction 
was theoretical, the procedural aspects of post-war consociational politics suggest that the 
Presidency, (in effect the President of the Republic) still enjoys power and exercises it more than 
the Ta'if Accord allocates to the Presidency. 
Second, as Krayem narrates the second alteration of the pre-war grand coalition by Ta'if- 
The position of the Prime Minister, a traditionally Sunni post, as the President of the Council of Ministers, was 
strengthened; similarly, the power of the Ministers as members of the Council increased. The Prime Minister 
presides over the Council of Ministers; he is to be nominated by the President who conducts mandatory 
parliamentary consultations and shares the results with the Speaker of Parliament (Krayem 1997,424). 
Again, it should be noted that the revised aspect of the grand coalition reflects the dominant 
position of the Sunnis in the power configuration of post-war Lebanon in relation to the Maronites 
and the ShFis. Theoretically, the Council of Ministers takes its decisions by consensus, and in the 
absence of consensus, decisions are taken by voting. They are taken by the simple majority of 
attendants, except for major issues, which require the consent of two thirds of the Council's 
members. The following subjects are considered major issues: the imposition and lifting of a state 
of emergency, war and peace, general mobilisation, international treaties and agreements, the 
national budget of the State, comprehensive development and long range plans, the appointment of 
the employees of the first category and its equivalent, a reconsideration of administrative divisions, 
the dissolution of Parliament, elections law, naturalisation law, personal statute laws and the 
dismissal of Ministers. Thus, drawing on the above, it seems to be the case that the revised formula 
aims at improving or strengthening the coalitional aspect of consociational politics by granting the 
Council of Ministers a significant amount of power. However, procedurally speaking, this has not 
been the case and the conduct of post-war consociational politics reflects the dominant position of 
the Prime Minister in his capacity as the President of the Council of Ministers, in relation to the 
Council. Additionally there is a tendency for the President of the Republic to exercise more power 
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than Ta'if s provisions dictate. Both the Maronite President of the Republic and the Sunni Prime 
Mnister tend to bypass the power allocated to the grand coalition, i. e., the Council of Ministers, and 
tend to act as the real grand coalition of Lebanon (together with the Shi'i Parliament Speaker). 
The third aspect of the revised grand coalition concerns the enhanced role of Parliament and the 
Speakership. As Krayern notes: 
In Parliament, the position of the Speaker, a traditionally Shi'a post, has gained importance because the 
Speaker's term of office was extended to four years. In addition, Parliament has been reinforced because the 
number and type of cases under which the executive authority can dissolve it were set out and were limited to 
three rare ones (Krayern 1997,424). 
Here, it should be noted that these amendments have effectively broadened the scope of the ruling 
executive grand coalition (to include all significant segments, as Lijphart's consociational theory 
prescribes) and beyond any doubt, reflect the demographic reality on the ground, as the Shiis are 
the single largest group in Lebanon. In this sense, the broadened grand coalition has dealt somewhat 
satisfactorily with Shi'i disenfranchisement and group exclusion, which were procedural features of 
the pre-war consociational model. This improvement may be said to have had a positive impact on 
prospects for societal stability. Hence, the grand coalition of post-war Lebanon conforms to 
Lijphart's concept of the grand coalition, including as it does all the significant segments of the 
plural society. However, the conduct of consociational politics in post-war Lebanon reflects the 
power of the Speaker in relation to Parliament. Thus, post-war Lebanon is actually governed by the 
Maronite President, the Sunni Prime Minister and the Shi'i Speaker, while Ta'if's provisions speak 
of a government by two institutions: the Council of Ministers as an executive institution of rule and 
the Parliament as a legislative institution. 
3. Proportionality 
With regard to proportionality, the Ta'if Agreement, for some commentators, provided a fairer 
representation formula of the major Lebanese sects in light of the demographic realities and new 
power configuration on the ground. As Hudson writes, 'Ta'if in theory restores a consociational 
sectarian order, albeit with salutary alterations in the power sharing formula' (Hudson 1999b, 33). 
While the theory of consociational democracy does not specify exact quotas for the distribution of 
power among the different communities, the principle of proportionality, as defined by Lijphart, is 
despecially important as a guarantee for the fair representation of minority segments' (Lijphart 
1995b, 278). As mentioned in Chapter 4, 'the confessional system as operated in Lebanon was set 
on a 6: 5 ratio of Christian to Muslim; as such, it was always biased in favour of the Christian sects 
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much to the chagrin of the Muslim community' (Deegan 1993,13). The Ta'if provisions remedied 
this situation by distributing power among the Lebanese communal groups. First, this distribution 
was equal between Christians and Muslims, and second, it was proportional among the sects of each 
of the two categories and finally it was proportional among the region. According to Krayem, 'the 
intention of this agreement was to eradicate the dominant position of the Maronites as it was 
ensured by the old formula and to allow for equitable participation of Christians and Muslims in the 
Cabinet' (Krayem 1997,424). Specifically, Krayem writes that 'this parity may be observed in the 
system of distribution of seats in Parliament and in Grade One posts, and their equivalents in public 
service jobs' (Krayem 1997,424). Thus, the old formula was amended to give way to an equal 
representation system. With the new fine-tuning, that is, the allocation of top offices and civil 
service appointments by parity of representation, the system conforms more adequately to the 
consociational formula in terms of proportionality, when compared with the previous formula. 
However, the new formula precipitated scholarly criticism with regard to two main points. First, 
Salem points out, in drawing on the 1989 reforms, 'while the first tier of distribution of seats 
between the two religious communities is clearly defined, the second tier is rather obscure and open 
to different interpretations' (Salem 1991,131 quoted in Ofeish 1999,105). Second, these 
amendments led some to argue that the new formula fosters an overrepresentation of minority 
segments, such as the Christian and Druze communities, because the demographic map is skewed in 
favour of the Muslim communities, especially the Shi'ites. Thus, the principle of parity, while 
regulating and taking precedence over proportionality, can be seen as incompatible with the form 
that proportionality takes. 
For instance, as Sirriyeh writes: 'The Maronites would have to accept the fact that, on the basis of 
the present population balance, the Muslims could claim at least an equal (if not a major) share of 
power in the political and economic system as well as a role for the ShFites consistent with their 
new status as the largest single community' (Sirriyeh 1989,64). Irrespective of the underlying 
motives behind such statements, scholars arguing in this fashion implicitly point to the necessity of 
examining closely the definition of the consociational principle of proportionality. According to 
consociational theory, the principle of proportionality should guarantee 'the fair representation of 
minority segments' (Lijphart 1995b, 278). In light of this definition, the above-mentioned argument 
is particularly relevant since the new formula overrepresents rather than fairly represents minority 
segments. In other words, scholars who criticise the new model argue that just as the pre-war 
system was disproportionate in terms of representation, that is, the underrepresentation of Muslims, 
the post-war system continues to be disproportionate in terms of representation, i. e., 
overrepresentation of Christians. Thus, the model is seen by many as incompatible with the 
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principle of fair proportional representation. It is important, here, to draw attention to a number of 
features that impose certain limitations, and hence explain "twisting" or "bending" the 
proportionality principle a second time in 1989. As argued in Chapter 3, the form of government 
that a society develops is related to a large extent to the particular circumstances within that society. 
First, the pre-war system being, in many respects, presidential, it is inadequate to assume that 
successful peacemaking would have been possible in 1989 had the Muslims groups insisted on a 
strictly fair proportional system that reflects demographic realities. As mentioned in the first section 
of this chapter, the local and regional contexts within which Taif took place did not allow for such 
radical changes. The urgent need to reach an agreement took precedence over the detailed form and 
nature of such an agreement. One cannot assume that the Christian conferees present at Ta'if would 
have accepted such an abrupt change, that is, from overrepresentation and presidential 
predominance to a fair proportional representation. Therefore, in light of this complex and tense 
context, strict proportional representation was not feasible, and indeed, may not have allowed 
successful peacemaking to take place. 
Second, the above-mentioned argument takes on an unprecedented significance because although it 
is a known fact that Muslims constitute around sixty per cent of the total Lebanese population, the 
first and last official population census was conducted in 1932. Since then, successive governments 
have all refused, through a policy of avoidance until 1999, to carry out another census, precisely 
because this is one of the most "sensitive" issues in Lebanese society. 12 As Norton and Schwedler 
comment: 'implicitly, the accord rejects the idea that parliamentary seats need to be reallocated 
periodically to adjust for disparate rates of population growth among the major confessional groups' 
(Norton & Schwcdler 1994,47-8). Similarly as Nassar writes: since 1932, 'the lack of a subsequent 
census update is partly due to Maronite opposition who feared that a new census would legitimize 
Muslim demand for reform. Estimates now reverse the order of the top three communities giving 
the Shiites the largest numbers with the Sunnis as second and the Maronites third' (Nassar 1995, 
249). 
Moreover, although the Lebanese communal groups are usually narrowed down to two major 
groups and sometimes to seven major communities and two 'secondary' groups, Lebanon remains a 
multi-communal state with seventeen plural ethnic groups with crosscutting conflicting affiliations. 
This makes it difficult to allocate a proportional distribution of seats. Additionally, the literature on 
12 After 1999, this issue was brought up many times and the government provided a straightforward explanation of this 
by stating that it was "bad timing" to conduct an official census due to the "sensitive" nature of such a step. This issue 
will be examined in section D. 2. of the present chapter. 
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representation systems tends to suggest that representation methods are extremely complex methods 
and formulas, and that no particular formula can be ideal. As regards Lebanon, parity in 
representation seems to have been a more practical, feasible approach. The conferees at Ta'if, 
especially the Shi'ites, could hardly argue for a proportional representation system, nor were they 
given the latitude to do so. 
Third, the Maronites emerged with the feeling that they had lost the war although it is known that 
there is no "absolute winner" in the Lebanese civil war. Hence, they realised they had to end up 
with less power in the political configuration of Lebanon. This was due largely to the fact that they 
collaborated with the Israeli invasion and occupation. Later in 1982, Israel was forced to withdraw 
and the Maronites can be said to have lost the war. However, there was an overwhelming agreement 
that it was in the best interests of the country as a whole to put the past behind and try to reconstruct 
the country. This could best be achieved by proclaiming Lebanon a final homeland for all of its 
citizens, a unity of people, land and institutions founded on social justice and equality in rights and 
in duties among all citizens, without discrimination or distinction and without the segregation of 
people on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever. To that extent, the principle of parity was more 
compatible with the above-mentioned goals and without any doubt, had more appeal and feasibility 
than a fair and proportional representation formula. Norton and Schwedler write that 'the principle 
of parity provides the basis of a historic compromise meant to underscore the fact that Lebanon is a 
country shared by Christians and Muslims' (Norton & Schwedler 1994,47-8) and in other words, to 
alleviate Maronite perceptions and fears (whether founded or not) of being engulfed in a largely 
Sunni area. 
Having dealt with the complexities of the principle of representation of the Lebanese communal 
groups, it is useful at this point to draw one further distinction between the original article dealing 
with representation and the amended one. The amended article, Article 95, goes one step further 
than the original one. As with the original article and as mentioned earlier in the present chapter, the 
new article states that political sectarianism is intended as a provisional, transient measure and calls 
for its eventual elimination or abolition. Indeed, Richani comments that the 1989 Ta'if Agreement 
re-affirmed and reinforced the consociational aspect of the country to such an extent, that 'it may be 
argued that the accord laid the foundation for a sectocracy and overlooked the basic groundwork 
needed to build a democracy... In effect, the new regime creates a sense of d6jý-vu, because Article 
95 of the previous Constitution also stipulated that sectarian representation was only a temporary 
measure to guarantee a "just" distribution of power among sects' (Richani 1998,146). Indeed, and 
as Gates stresses, 'though the 1943 National Pact called for the elimination of confessionalism, the 
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Khoury-Solh alliance actually permitted the institutionalisation of a sectarian system' (Gates 1998, 
84). 
However, the new article suggests a mechanism for eliminating political confessionalism. Indeed, it 
calls on Parliament to form a national commission headed by the President and containing political, 
intellectual and social personalities in addition to the head of Parliament and the Prime Minister. 
The commission's purpose is to study and recommend ways of eliminating confessionalism and 
presenting them to Parliament and to the Council of Ministers, as well as following up the 
implementation of the transitional plan. Until late 2003, such a step has not yet been taken. 
Although the article does not suggest a time frame for abolishing political confessionalism, it may 
be said that this constitutes one of the main lingering problems in the post-Ta'if era, and will be 
addressed in the next section. Suffice it to say that this is one of the most "sensitive" issues for 
Lebanese society as a whole. More importantly, however, Syria's way of getting the Lebanese 
Parliament to Ta'if, as well as getting the former to approve of the Taif formula and later to 
endorse it officially in the Lebanese Constitution seem to suggest that Syria effectively added 
legitimacy and binding authority to the sectarian confessional system of representation in order to 
strengthen the institutionalisation of that system. Hence, while the Ta'if Agreement was flexible 
enough to contain the instruments of change, i. e., provisions relating to the abolition of 
confessionalism (which may be implemented if the regional situation permits it), the Accord's 
vague wordings clearly do not commit Lebanon or Syria to any change in political system at any 
point in time. In other words, though a consensus on interim rule was constitutionally established, 
the consensus on a future order in Lebanon was couched in general terms, leaving room for each 
negotiator to see prospects for his particular perspective on the future order in Lebanon to prevail to 
some reasonable extent. It may be said that Taif did not offer a closed solution to the political 
problems of Lebanon around which discontent could easily rally. In that sense, the very regional 
dimension of Lebanon's future stability, the country's vulnerability to regional turbulence, its 
weakness in relation to its neighbours and the complex and diverse interests/objectives involved in 
this process are illustrated by the dynamics involved in the developments of events since the signing 
of the Ta'if Accord and explain why the Ta'if Agreement took a revised consociational form, that 
has failed in the past. 
4. Segmental autonomy 
As with the 1926 Lebanese Constitution, the Ta'if Agreement also touches upon the principle of 
segmental autonomy. While some authors argue that Ta'if's dealing with segmental autonomy 
springs from a concerned effort to preserve the social, cultural and religious rights of the various 
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communal groups, it should be said that while this may well be the case, such societal 
differentiation procedurally promotes separatism and tend to foster permanent fragmentation of 
society along communal lines, hence hindering the emergence of a class-based consciousness. The 
new accord states that the Lebanese Republic is founded on the respect of public liberties, the 
foremost of which are the freedom of opinion and belief. Additionally, the accord mentions the 
need to protect private education and emphasises the right of all citizens to freedom of education in 
accordance with the laws and regulations. More specifically, with regard to personal status codes 
such as religion, education, inheritance laws and the like, it is useful to look at Ofeish's discussion 
of Article 19 of the amended Lebanese Constitution. The original article, 'Article 19 (as modified 
by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 50)' states that: 'In order that a law may be 
promulgated, it must have been voted by the Chamber' (Bustros 1973). According to the new 
amended article, 'religious heads of sectarian communities are, except for the three top state leaders 
and ten unspecified members of Parliament, the only parties allowed to petition the Council on legal 
matters related to personal status, freedoms of belief, religious practice and religious education' 
(Ofeish 1999,105). 
The Ta'if Agreement emphasises that in order to safeguard the principle of harmony between 
religion and state, religious heads of the Lebanese communal groups shall have the right to consult 
with the Constitutional Council with regard to personal statutes, the freedom of belief and practice 
of religious rites and the freedom of religious education. In other words, the amended article seeks 
to preserve the consociational principle of segmental autonomy. More importantly, however, the 
article seems to be one way of allowing a heavy dose of involvement of religion in politics, not only 
when it comes to politically salient, but also socio-cultural issues. In the end, the amended article 
can be clearly seen as a way for religious leaders to keep the various communal groups under 
control by manipulating religious and sectarian identities, and hence a consociational tool to keep 
the society deeply divided along communal lines. 
This hampers the secularisation attempts by civil society individuals as well as other parties and 
interest groups concerned, driven as they are by secular non-communally based issues. Ofeish adds 
here that the above-mentioned parties (religious heads of communities, the three top state leaders 
and ten unspecified members of Parliament), 'were provided an exclusive opportunity to influence 
decisions on such vital matters. Such an opportunity was not extended to civic associations or 
individuals, who may have a comparable interest in petitioning the Council on such matters' 
(Ofeish 1999,105). Indeed, Ofeish's arguments are particularly relevant with regard to the 
argument that the application of the principle of segmental autonomy tends to foster societal 
separatism. Additionally, Zalzal reveals that although 'the Lebanese legislation that recognises 18 
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religious groups also states that whoever does not follow one of them can follow a civil code that 
will be developed for personal status, [however], the civil personal status code however, was never 
developed' (Zalzal 1997,37). This can be seen as violating the constitution in an attempt to prevent 
the emergence of groups along lines other than communal ones. 13 
5. Mutual veto 
Concerning the fourth principle of mutual veto, the Ta'if Agreement states as follows: 
Any authority which contradicts the pact of communal coexistence was deemed illegitimate, emphasizing that 
the agreement of the various communities to live together and share power among them was the source of 
legitimacy for authority in Lebanon, and implying that any authority challenging the Ta'if Agreement ... would be 
removed by force (Barak 2000,34). 
In other words, there is no legitimacy for any authority that contradicts the charter of cohabitation: 
'important decisions cannot be taken by simple majority, they require consensus and compromise' 
(Hanf 1993,73). Indeed, the above discussion of the political reforms points to the inability of 
simple voting over a significant number of issues described as 'major', which require two-thirds 
voting. It may be said that the undertaken political reforms make it impossible for any party to take 
a unilateral decision. This brings to mind the issue often addressed in this thesis, namely ensuing 
governmental paralysis as a result of discord. With regard to mutual veto, post-war Lebanese 
politics are similar to pre-war Lebanese politics. 
In theory, post-Ta'if Lebanon became a parliamentary democracy. Particularly noteworthy is the 
emphasis of the system on the principle of separation of powers, their balance and their cooperation, 
which has led several observers of Lebanese politics to argue that Lebanon is a parliamentary 
democracy with a semi-presidential system. For instance, Krayem. writes that 'due to these 
constitutional amendments, one may say that the political system in Lebanon has become more 
parliamentary although the continuation of some of the prerogatives of the President means a 
continuation of a semi-presidential system' (Krayern 1997,424). This distinction that Krayern 
draws will be critically examined in the following section dealing with elite behaviour (elitism and 
troika rule) in the post-Ta'if era. 14 
13 For instance, the heated debates as to the matter of the optional civil marriage lends support to this argument. 
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A Consociational politics 1990 onwards: lingering problems of consociationalism 
The pre-war Lebanese experiment with consociationalism has revealed the need to introduce 
additional mechanisms outside the realm of consociationalism to assist the latter. In the Lebanese 
case, these mechanisms take the form of external arbitration. Indeed, peace, when it came, 
undoubtedly had a major and ongoing political commitment and military input from Syria. In post- 
war Lebanon, arbitration, through the clauses of the Ta'if Agreement relating to the link between 
Syria and Lebanon's stability, takes the form of Syrian arbitration. Syria not only effectively ended 
the war in Lebanon. Once the peace agreement was made, Syria, the third party, has had the interest 
and the capability of enforcing it. This has taken the form of Syrian assistance in the organisation of 
the post-war governments, both in shape and in substance. Indeed, it is strategically important to 
Syria that the Lebanese front be maintained calm, so as to ensure stability on the Lebanesc-Israeli 
border and internal stability. Hence, since the consociational structure of rule (which procedural 
aspects reveal that a perception of national interest is difficult to come about), prevents the political 
system from reaching political maturity, Syria has had to play the role of the broker in post-war 
Lebanese politics. 
1. Troika rule and elitism 
Post-war Lebanon is a sectarian parliamentary democracy with a semi-presidential system and a 
dominant Prime Minister. In practice, the conduct of consociational politics suggests that Lebanon 
is actually governed by three leaders, i. e., the Maronite President, the Sunni Prime Minister and the 
Shi'i Speaker, hence the troika, who are the representatives of all the significant or major Lebanese 
communal groups and are backed by Syria. Thus, executive decision-making in post-war Lebanon 
conforms to Lijphart's principle, definition and form of grand coalition. Hudson's comment that 
'Ta'if in practice deviated significantly from Ta'if in theory' (Hudson 1999b, 28) deserves attention 
as the author notes that 'executive and legislative power in post-Ta'if Lebanon is concentrated in 
the troika' (Hudson 1997,119-20). Similarly, Khazen argues that 'in the assessment of key 
architects of Ta'if, notably former Speaker Husayn al-Husayni, Ta'if has been fundamentally 
derailed. Husayni saw little resemblance between the original text of Ta'if and the reality that 
emerged a few years later. Ta'if's new balancing act is inherently off-balance' (Khazen 2001,45). 
Indeed, such comments cannot be truer. While, in fact, the Ta'if Agreement speaks of a grand 
coalition in the form of a collegial Ministerial body, the conduct of politics suggests that 
procedurally, Lebanon is governed by the troika backed by Syria. For instance, Salem points out 
14 See section D. 1. in this chapter. 
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that the power of the troika 'came, in the post-war period, to dominate the political process and to 
overshadow the institutional roles of the Chamber of Deputies and the Council of Ministers as 
collegial bodies' (Salem 1998,16). This is not to say however, that this broad-scope collegial 
Ministerial body and that each Minister do not have any executive power. Rather, Ministers and the 
Council of Ministers might as a body act in many instances as the effective grand coalition of 
Lebanon, when the troika permits this, and are able to influence decision-making insofar as they are 
able to channel decision-making in a way that reflects a less elitist system than the pre-war 
consociational system. 
For instance, the constitutional inability of the President of the Republic to effectively block a 
government decision that he does not approve of has often resulted in the President's ability to 
voice his position on the matter, and to see that it is effectively taken into consideration through 
some of the serving Ministers in office who are close to him. As a result, while there has often been 
paralysis at the governmental level, 15 Syria's insistence that the Lebanese troika resolve their 
differences according to Ta'if's constitutional provisions has meant that a certain degree of 
executive power is frequently returned to its legitimate holders, i. e., the Council of Ministers, who 
have been able to channel paralysis towards a consensus of some sort on politically salient issues 
over which there is disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister. For instance, a 
recent statement by a high-ranking Syrian official read that 'any attempt to drag Syria into the small 
details of Lebanon's political life would fail' (DSO, II July 2003). In sum, Lebanon is governed by 
a troika, and to some extent, a Council of Ministers, both backed by a third broker party, Syria, 
which continuously makes efforts to assist in the implementation of consociational principles of 
conflict-regulation. Against this background, post-Ta'if consociationalism does not seem to be able, 
alone, to bring about and maintain stability in post-war Lebanon, let alone democratic stability. 
Rather, the consociational system of rule is held together, albeit tenuously, hence the oft-voiced 
argument that Lebanon is a country held-together rather than being a country that is holding 
together. Indeed, a number of political problems suggest that the consociational model does not 
work once it goes into action as consociational theory suggests, and hence, is unable to deliver on 
the promise of democratic stability. Some political issues which contributed to the collapse of the 
pre-war system remain "sensitive" issues, and thus, were not addressed, or were inadequately 
addressed, through a policy of avoidance, at Ta'if and afterwards. 
15 In one case, one minister defended his frequent absence from Cabinet meetings by saying that: 'I am not absent but 
the government is. If the President and the Prime Minister are not in harmony, only secondary issues are discussed. And 
if they are in agreementý we just watch and hope they remain on good terms [adding that] ministers were categorised 
between those supporting the President and those supporting the Prime Minister, or they were lost somewhere between 
the two' (DSO, 8 September 2003). 
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Although elite rule in post-Ta'if Lebanon has procedurally turned into troika rule, this may be seen 
as a positive manifestation only when compared to the pre-war system, which procedurally brought 
accommodation to the politically dominant position of the Maronite President and remained 
extremely elitist when compared to the current elitist system of rule. Hence, the broadened coalition 
of the new system in scope and in substance suggests a better organisation and division of power 
and rule. However, the conduct of politics reveals a number of political problems. First, the fact that 
legislative power, in terms of Parliament has been strengthened does not automatically translate into 
the effective ability of Parliament to exercise its powers. Indeed, the present discussion has shown 
that such power was brought to the dominant position of the Speaker within Parliament. 
Additionally, while the Speakership belongs to the Shi'i community, it cannot be said that the 
Speakership in effect represents the interests of the majority of the Shi'i community, as most critics 
argue. Rather, the Speaker tends to use his dominant position within the political system to 
represent and preserve the interests of his close associates (who are most often but not always 
Shi'i), failing in the process to protect the interests and rights of the majority of his community. 
This is not to say however, that if the speaker was adhering to consociational politics and 
effectively representing the interests of the majority of his community, such an organisation of 
political rule would be salutary. Rather, it is to suggest that, not only is the consociational system a 
theoretically inappropriate way of organising political rule in plural societies, it is being 
implemented procedurally by the post-war Lebanese elites in an ineffective way (i. e., it is not 
working at promoting social and political stability). This applies not only to the speaker but also to 
the premier and the various top office holders or poles of power. 
Second, the fact that the executive powers of the Council of Ministers have been enhanced has not 
translated into the effective ability of the Council to use its executive powers as prescribed by the 
Ta'if Agreement. Rather, procedurally, the amount of executive power that the Council enjoys has 
been brought to the dominant position of the Sunni Prime Minister. Again, it would be incorrect to 
assume that the Prime Minister, as some critics maintain, protects and preserves the rights and 
interests of the majority of the Sunni community he belongs to. Rather, the procedural 
manifestations of consociationalism suggest that he caters effectively for the rights and interests of 
his close business associates, as the Shi'i Speaker tends to do. As a result, he fails in the process to 
cater for the rights and interests of the majority of the Sunni community. Against this background, 
Lijphart's argument regarding the ability of the grand coalition of elites to satisfactorily represent 
and protect the vital interests and rights of the various communal groups seems problematic. As 
Richani reveals, 'the sectarian system compels sects and their representatives to engage in a 
struggle for resources that keeps the polity polarized and the political process in a state of turmoil' 
(Richani 1998,146-7). This is particularly true in the light of the scarce material resources available 
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to the state. Invariably, the troika conflict is over the government's approval of a division of spoils, 
positions and funds. This results in a complete governmental paralysis, and increases mobilisation 
at the mass level. Additionally, it should be noted that even if the three heads of state attempt to 
represent the interests of the various communities they belong to, this may not necessarily translate 
into a similar treatment and dealing with these communal political, economic and social rights as 
the structure of the system suggests that these rights can only be dealt with according to the 
dominant position of a leader, and not according to the higher ideal of equal treatment. 
Third, the fact that Ta'if removed executive power from the President to the Council of Ministers 
and the Prime Minister has translated into the former's continuous attempt to enhance his position 
vis-h-vis the Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister. For instance, Mansour, (referring to 
President Hrawi though this can also be applied to the president currently in office, President 
Lahoud) notes that the President of the Republic has been reluctant, since the first day he was 
elected, to relinquish the rights that the Ta'if Agreement has already annulled and that the pre-war 
system had granted him. According to Mansour, this can be seen as an example of the President 
trying to still exercise effectively the executive powers of the unwritten elite understandings that the 
1943 National Pact speaks of (Mansour 1993,204). Indeed, Mansour's treatment of this issue 
extends throughout a four-page commentary on the president's violation of the Ta'if Agreement 
through his insistent refusal to "only" play the role that the accord has allocated to the President of 
the Republic which has resulted in political tensions that necessitate continuous Syrian intervention 
in the form of arbitration among conflicting parties (Mansour 1993,204-7). 16 Specifically, Krayem 
advances this argument by writing that 'one may mention the insistence of the President of the 
Republic on attending, and thus presiding, over every meeting of the Council of Ministers in order 
to assert that he still has control over the executive power' (Krayem 1997,427). 
According to the Ta'if provisions, the President of the Republic chairs the Council of Ministers at 
his discretion without voting however. In other words, if present, the President heads the meetings 
of the Council of Ministers. Here, Krayern remarks that, although the post-Ta'if political system is a 
parliamentary "democracy", it is also in many respects, a serni-presidential system. In this sense, the 
procedural aspects of the Presidency as an institution, i. e., the behaviour of the President, reveal that 
the behaviour of the President effectively deviates from the consociational provisions of the Ta'if 
Agreement and hence, suggests that the procedural manifestations of consociationalism allow a 
16 Translated from Arabic. Similarly to Mansour, Sa'egh more recently devotes 18 pages of his book solely to the 
insistence of the President to exercise his annulled prerogatives and stresses the tension between the constitutional 
amendments and the new customs, i. e., procedural aspects in which Ta'if is being implemented. For such an account, 
see Dawoud el Sa'egh, Al Nizam al Loubnani fi thawabitihi wa tahawoulatihi'. 'The Lebanese system in its constancy 
and transformation. Beirut: Dar An-Nahar lil Nachr, 2000, pp. 47-63. 
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deviation and violation of consensual elite behaviour, upon which the whole logic of consociational 
theory is built. As Reinkowski points out, the troika is 'an example of distorted consociationalism' 
(Reinkowski 1997,500). 
However, had this post-war elitist system, been able to ensure smooth coalitional politics and 
consensual behaviour among the troika despite being distorted, its advantages could have been 
extolled, as compared to the extremely elitist pre-war system of rule. Rather, a crucial problem in 
post-war Lebanon is the governance crisis that the political system exhibits. Indeed, the elites are 
facing problems in governing the country. Hence, the troika engages more often than not in 
adversarial behaviour, despite Syria's continuous arbitrary efforts to regulate conflicts among them 
and Syria's constant reminder that the amended constitution of the Ta'if Agreement should 
satisfactorily regulate elite behaviour according to the accord's provisions. Hence, the conflictual 
behaviour of the troika indicates that the procedural aspects of consociationalism are in no way an 
effective conflict-regulating mechanism, as the process of politics allows consociational 
constitutional provisions to be curtailed and bypassed. Haddad, for example, writes that 'instead of 
coordinating the power-sharing process and ensuring a proper implementation of the constitution, 
the three top political officials in the country monopolize decision-making in the country and 
representation of their respective communities' (Haddad 2000,467). 
More importantly, the fact that the procedural aspects of post-war politics allow conflict to emerge 
frequently among the top executives (despite the salutary conflict-regulating role the Council of 
Ministers has played at times) indicates the need for additional conflict regulating mechanisms, as 
the internal logic of consociationalism (which hinges on elites) appears inherently flawed. In the 
case of Lebanese consociationalism, this takes the form of external arbitration, another form of 
conflict-regulation mechanism for plural societies in the conflict-regulation literature. Looking at 
the troika relationship in the successive post-Ta'if governments, it would be more appropriate to 
speak of Syrian imposed and forced cohabitation between the senior players (top leaders) rather 
than peaceful coexistence (which indicates a semblance of stability). Hence, consociationalisin is, 
as Halpern notes, an expressly hopeful theory, and requires additional mechanisms to function 
properly. Describing post-war elites, Khashan writes that they first 'lack the pertinent training and 
predisposition. Second, they are largely corrupt' and 'third, the elites are not sincere about 
attenuating the differences among the Lebanese' (Khashan 1992,172). Indeed, looking at the 
behaviour of the troika, Faour notices that 'periodically, disputes rage between any two of the ruling 
triumvirate known in Lebanon as the "troika". As a result, operations at some public agencies 
and/or the Parliament become paralyzed, raising doubts about the durability and strength of 
cooperation among the leaders of the three major religious sects' (Faour 1998,53). 
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Under such a system of rule, what are the prospects for Lebanese consociationalism to deliver on 
the promise of democratic stability? The stability of the system depends largely on the level of 
entente and cooperation between the three top state leaders. On a comparative basis, while the 
stability of the system in pre-war Lebanon depended on the President of the Republic, with 
executive power lying in his hands, the stability of the post-war system depends on troika 
cooperation, where executive decision-making lies. Thus, while Sirriyeh's observation that 'at 
present, the stability of this relationship is contingent upon the personalities of the three top leaders 
just as the success of the National Pact depended upon the working relationship between Bishara al- 
Khoury and Riad al-Solh' (Sirriyeh 1997,114) is particularly relevant, three other dimensions 
should be taken into consideration in order to assess the ability of the present model to generate 
democratic stability. 
First, Ta'if, by reorganising the division of power among the grand coalition, has broadened the 
latter in substance and in shape. Indeed, the executive power of the Council of Ministers contributes 
to a certain extent to stability as the grand coalition may be said to have been broadened in scope 
and in power. Second, the procedural power that the Speaker has acquired, coupled with the fact 
that he rules together with the other two top leaders, represent more adequately the position of the 
significant Lebanese communal groups, as opposed to the pre-war system. Third, Syria's 
continuous commitment and support to keep Lebanon stable, Syria's power to restrain the 
procedural attempts by the various top leaders to enhance their positions at the expense of others 
(which effectively brings the troika to respect constitutional provisions, hence returning executive 
power to its legitimate holders, the Council of Ministers) and Syria's constant reminder to the elites 
as to what the national interest is about all contribute to keeping Lebanon stable. 
On the other hand however, Hoss's argument that 'the attempt of each President, as a representative 
of his confessional community, to enhance his position and his prerogatives' so as to pursue narrow 
sectarian and economic interests has involved the emergence of 'many different interpretations of 
the way to implement the Agreement' (Krayern 1997,426). In this respect, Sirriych writes that: 
On the political level, there is a need to reestablish a clear basis for a more stable relationship between the three 
top leaders of the country... A clear statement of the powers of each post and their limitation is still needed in 
order to guarantee the stability of the relationship over the longer term... The stability of this relationship is 
probably more important than that of the Cabinet because the three leaders represent the three most important 
confessional communities in the country, whereas disagreements in the Cabinet are likely to occur as in coalition 
governments of parliamentary systems (Sirriyeh 1997,114). 
One criticism to mention relating Siniyeh's observations is that conflicts in the Cabinet are almost 
always a reflection of the ongoing disagreement between the President and the Prime Minister, with 
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each Minister taking one of the two sides or refraining from attending a futile Cabinet meeting, 
which would not adopt any decision so long as the President and the Prime Minister are in 
disagreement. Hence, while this illustrates the President's violation of Taif's provisions, it also 
suggests that procedural aspects allow such a violation, by stripping the Council of Ministers from 
its executive powers. In any case, disagreements in the Cabinet that Sirriyeh mentions are occurring 
precisely because the President and the Prime Minister are having difficulty reaching agreement, 
and would probably not occur had consociationalism contained the effective institutional structure 
that would prevent the President from violating consociational rules. In the end however, no attempt 
in that direction, namely the establishing of a clear basis for the three leaders' relationship, has been 
made since this issue, because of its sensitivity for the Maronite President and his close associates 
and to some extent the Maronite community (including the Maronite Patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir), is 
likely to lead to political turmoil. 
Tbus, successive governments continuously adopt a policy of avoidance with regard to this matter 
and Syria has also been keen to avoid any attempt to clarify the Ta'if provisions so as not to 
antagonise the Maronite President. Rather, Syria, had it wanted to, would have been able to provide 
and lay down a clear basis for the troika relationship within the Ta'if provisions. However, because 
of the sensitivity of this matter, this author argues that the provisions were purposefully left open to 
interpretation so as to allow a flexible adoption of consociational practices to suit Syrian interests 
and hence, justify deviations from the consociational model that may arise as a result of new 
conditions imposed by a crisis situation. Indeed, Syria wanted to avoid an inflexible formula, such 
as the inflexible pre-war institutionalisation of consociational principles that led to the collapse of 
the system. 
Therefore, the level of entente or "m6sentente" among the three Presidents is possible because of 
the absence of effective state institutions. Indeed, the fact that, just as in pre-war consociational 
Lebanon, the post-Ta'if institutions of governance are human institutions seems to suggest that elite 
confrontational behaviour is possible, at the Cabinet level, the presidential level and in Parliament, 
hence heightening sectarian tensions and increasing mobilisation at the mass level, hence making it 
difficult for Lebanese consociationalism to generate democratic stability. Put more aptly by 
Krayem, 'in practice, the understanding among these three Presidents as individuals has come to 
mean that the three institutions, as institutions, have paled in importance. This contradicts the 
fundamental purpose of the Agreement, which was to replace the rule of the individual (the 
President), by the rule of the institutions' (Krayem 1997,426). 
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In the end however, the troika continues to weaken and relegate to second degree the role of state 
institutions, despite the emergence of new political institutions in post-war Lebanon. As a result, the 
latter remain weak and subject to sectarian manipulations by traditional leaders. This gives the 
impression that the government is not hanging together. For instance, Salarn writes that 'central 
government fragmentation cripples state authority' stating that the 'Ta'if troika is the best example' 
(Salarn 1993,77). 17 Additionally, troika predominance in governing the country violates the 
principle of separation of powers. According to the (amended) Article 5, the system is founded on 
the principle of separation of powers, their balance and their cooperation. Here, Sleiman points out 
that the troika system currently dominating Lebanese politics 'is incompatible with the separation of 
powers principle and leads to a double paralysis of Parliament and Cabinet at the same time' 
(Sleiman 1994,83). 18 
2. Confessional representation 
While the section dealing with proportional representation under the new revised consociational 
system has indicated the difficulty of devising representation structures that satisfy and adequately 
represent the various sectarian groupings in Lebanon, and has indicated that the literature on 
representation systems tends to point to this difficulty, the discussion also stresses that the new 
representation system is more adequate and fair than the previous pre-war system. However, this is 
not to say that the present representation system is more able to contribute towards the prevention of 
the outbreak of communal conflict. Rather, the Maronites and the Shi'is, as well as the Armenian 
communities continuously voice their resentment and perceived feelings of marginalisation as to the 
representation system in place. Whether such grievances are legitimate or not is difficult to 
determine, as consociational theory speaks of the fair representation of communal groups. Indeed, 
representation systems almost always fail to satisfy everyone because it is not clear whether 
representation should reflect demographic strength or power on the ground, and more importantly, 
because the first and last population census was conducted in 1932. However, it is important for the 
present discussion to mention such grievances, irrespective of their legitimacy, because societal and 
communal resentment as a result of such feelings is bound to disturb the stability of the so-called 
consociational "peace". Additionally, combined with the fact that successive post-Ta'if 
governments have used and manipulated electoral laws to ensure the election of traditional sectarian 
notables, the resulting societal and communal resentment may be seen as a significant source of 
17 Numerous scholars addressed this particular issue. For the most notable critiques, see Mahmood Monshipouri, 
Democratisation. liberalization and Human Rights in the Third worl . London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p. 33 
and Michael C. Hudson, 'Lebanon after Ta'if. another reform opportunity lost? '. Arab Studies Quarterl (Winter), 
Vol. 2 1, No. 1, pp. 2740,1999b, p. 3 1. 18 Translated from French. 
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societal instability. Moreover, one feature illustrating the fragility of the confessional consociational 
system currently in place is the reluctance of all pre-war and post-war governments to conduct a 
population census, so as not to stir the fears and anxieties of demographically weak minority groups 
and prompt demographically strong majority groups to demand a change in the representational 
system in place. 
Thus, the consociational system, through a considerable degree of separatism and societal mutual 
distrust that it generates among the communal groups reduces prospects for stability. More 
importantly, the consociational system makes it difficult for the government to undertake one of the 
most basic functions of any government. Indeed, by placing so much emphasis on confessional 
representation, the workings of the Lebanese consociational system suggest that it is difficult for the 
political system to reach political maturity. This is illustrated by successive government policy of 
avoiding dealing with sensitive issues. As to the sensitive character of the population census, 
Maktabi writes that 'the political unwillingness of making an official updated census to the last one 
in 1932 represents some important factors that defy basic principles of democratic governance' 
(Maktabi 1998). Indeed, successive governments since 1932 have unanimously declined to conduct 
a population census. Between 1932 and 1975, this can be seen as understandable, since the pre-war 
system was presidential. In other words, the Maronite President was in a sufficiently dominant 
political position to afford to ignore Muslim grievances, as a population census would illustrate 
Muslim demographic preponderance. Thus, it would question the appropriateness of the 6: 5 ratio of 
confessional representation, which favored the Christians. Therefore, in the light of continuous 
Muslim demands to redress confessional representation, the dominant position of the President led 
to the avoidance of a population census. Indeed, as Salibi stresses, the idea of a census 'was 
unacceptable to the Christians in power', even if it were a census for reform and development 
planning without classifying the population by religion and sect. This was made possible because 
, 'by controlling the vital registration system, Maronite public officers were able never 
to disclose or 
publish data on the birth and death rates of the various sects. Nor have they released the number of 
citizens registered by religion' (Faour 1991,631). Faour furthermore writes that several other steps 
have been taken by Maronites, dominant in state administration, not to make public the 
demographic data regarding religious groups. In such a way, Muslim demands could be ignored 
since there would be no official data on which they could base their demands. 
As a result of this situation, 'various religious groups collected and published data of dubious value 
because of the intention of each group was to exaggerate its size for political purposes' (Faour 
1991,632-3), a situation that largely exists today. While during the war, numerous private 
institutions and research centres conducted different studies to determine the new demographic 
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realities, it is obviously inadequate to conduct an official population census in the midst of violence 
and killing, communal displacement and massive migration. After the war, however, the continued 
governmental policy of avoidance does not seem to fulfil any relevant objective, especially since it 
is no secret that the demographic balance is skewed in favor of the Muslims, mostly the Shi'ites. 
Additionally, the fact that 'the [currently adopted] principle of parity provides the basis of a historic 
compromise meant to underscore the fact that Lebanon is a country shared by Christians and 
Muslims' (Norton & Schwedler 1994,47-8) should alleviate Christian fears of being politically 
engulfed in a predominantly Muslim area. The principle of parity should alleviate Christian fears, 
especially the Maronites, since it clearly preserves minority rights and overrepresents minority 
groups in the system through constitutional provisions. Thus, despite the fact that in the Second 
Republic, as far as the power relations that exist in the process of rule, the Maronites have lost out 
in the Taif Accord, the constitutionally preserved principle of parity should alleviate Maronite fears. 
However, this is not the case as Maronites continuously express their fears and feelings of 
alienation from the system. On a comparative basis, Maronite fears seem ill-founded, as Maronites 
are represented at the troika level by the President of the Republic, who is still exercising some of 
the pre-war prerogatives that the Ta'if accord has cancelled. For example, and in comparison to the 
Maronites, the Christian Orthodox seem to feel less fearful and less alienated although they are not 
represented at the troika level. Indeed, the highest public office position allocated to the Orthodox 
communal group is at the level of Deputy Prime Minister. Thus, Maronite fears can be traced back 
to their pre-war politically dominant position and their separatist and isolationist tendencies, as they 
significantly contributed towards giving an identity to Lebanon. As Haddad writes: 'the Maronites 
closely associated themselves with resistance ... By contrast, the Lebanese Greek Orthodox ... believe 
the survival of their community could best be ensured by a variety of means of accommodation, 
including strong support for secular politics' (Haddad 1985,9). 
In sum, the principle of parity appears to be the most stable and equitable mode of representation. 
Moreover, although the pre-war govemments avoided conducting a population census, the balance 
of the First Republic was upset when the civil war broke out, partly because of demographic 
changes and Muslim demands for an equal share of power were ignored. Thus, avoiding conducting 
a population census in pre-war Lebanon will not help maintain the balance of the Second Republic 
and does not fulfil any particular objective. This is reasonable as average estimates of the current 
demographic realities are known. Indeed, a number of private institutions recently conducted 
statistical surveys relating to social and economic issues in order to implicitly unveil the new 
demographic realities. Against this background, the reluctance of the post-Ta'if governments to 
undertake a population census illustrates their extraordinary weaknesses in implementing domestic 
policies. For instance, while Shil's observation that 'even curiosity to know the truth about the 
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confessional composition of the population must be kept in check in order to avoid the provocation 
of group rivalries and the anxieties which these would stimulate' (Shils 1966,4) goes back to the 
1960s, the situation is pretty much the same today, hence illustrating government weakness. 
Additionally, in the process, the absence of an official population census has allowed 'political 
manipulation by leaders of both communities [Christian and Muslim]' (Halpern 1984,123). This 
fosters mutual fear and suspicion and hampers the emergence of a socially-based movement based 
on class-consciousness, rather than communal consciousness. In sum, governmental avoidance, 
coupled with the outdated character of the Lebanese administration, points to the weakness of state 
institutions. As with earlier governmental policies, the assumption of the ruling grand coalition is 
that ignoring the problem will lead to its elimination. However, conducting a census would help 
different groups come to terms with the new demographic map and attempt to deal with the changed 
demography constructively and realistically. Currently, the governmental policy of avoidance 
encourages separatism, contributes to dividing the Lebanese, reveals the weakness of the state and 
allows communal identities to be manipulated and politicised. Against this background, the post- 
war consociational structure of rule, as with the pre-war one, is unlikely to generate democratic 
stability. 
E. Consociational politics 1990 onwards: manifestations of Lebanese society 
The previous discussion has shown that Lebanon still faces many political problems that have a 
direct bearing on economic and societal stability. Here, it is crucial to mention that these problems 
are not necessarily a new manifestation of the revised Ta'if formula. Rather, they existed before the 
breakdown of pre-war Lebanese political system in 1975 and contributed to the outbreak of the civil 
war. To put it simply, they only took on a different form under the new formula of the post-war 
system. The re-establishment of consociational principles and the conduct of consociational politics 
seem to suggest the presence of a certain degree of societal and economic instability. This has the 
effect of casting doubt upon the ability of the consociational model to work as consociational theory 
suggests, in that democratic stability can only emerge with difficulty in present-day Lebanon. 
Ofeish writes as follows: 'the new regime has not yet resolved the lingering causes of the civil war 
as promised in the 1990 preamble to the Constitution' (Ofeish 1999,113). 19 Put more aptly in the 
words of Khalaf, Ta'if 'rests on a grievous delusion: that recutting the political pie will cause 
economic disparities and sociocultural differences to disappear' (Khalaf 1994,276). Indeed, post- 
19 For similar comments, see Samir Khalaf , 'Culture, collective memory and the restoration of civility'. In Deirdre 
Collings, eds. Peace for Lebanon? From war to reconstructio , pp. 273-86. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, 
pp. 275-6 and Latif Abul-Husn, The Lebanese conflict- looking inwar . London: Lynne Rienner [Canberra Studies on 
Peace Research and Conflict Analysis], 1998, p. 13 1. 
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war Lebanese society has a number of features that result from political instability. The discussion 
will now turn to the detrimental impacts that political instability causes to societal stability. 
1. Socio-cuItural constraints 
Despite 'much good will and nationalistic fervor' (Ayoub 1994,241); the resilience of civil society 
in Lebanon (demonstrated during the long civil war); the Syrian commitment to stabilise the 
Lebanese front; a salutary revised consociational formula; and an emergent, significantly 
unanimous and publicly-stated desire of the Lebanese to coexist together peacefully within the 
current internationally-recognised boundaries of Lebanon, national integration is still an unfulfilled 
objective, there is no agreement as to what national interest constitutes, clientelism and corTuption 
are widespread, elites are still deeply divided seeking outside protection to buttress their position 
locally, sectarian divisions have sharpened in post-war Lebanon, the Lebanese continue to view 
themselves firstly as members of communal groups rather than citizens and have so far failed to 
develop a popular class-based consciousness. Khalaf goes as far as arguing that the Lebanese are 
now going through a phase of retribalisation. Thus, the ability of the post-war consociational system 
to generate democratic stability is seriously questioned. 
When it comes to heightened sectarian divisions, observers of post-Ta'if Lebanese politics point to 
the presence of a communal malaise in post-war Lebanon. Asmar, Kisirwani and Springborg reveal 
in their study that 'political attitudes and behaviour do appear to be diverging on the basis of sects' 
(Asmar, Kisirwani & Springborg 1999,61). In another study, Daff, Esber and MaYla write: snever 
has confessional behaviour been so widespread. Political communal cleavages have increased and 
are reinforced. Epidemic mistrust exists between communities' (Daff, Esber & Maila 1996,73). 20 
Here, it is important to say that the consociational model, however adequate the new formula is in 
terms of representation and however salutary outside support is (i. e., Syrian arbitration), 
significantly contributes to this communal malaise. Reinkowski, for instance, observes that 'the 
main danger is that the consociationalist model confessionalises even conflicts that are in 
themselves originally not confessional at all' (Reinkowski 1997,506). Indeed, almost all issues in 
Lebanon, ranging from political representation to issues that are not politically salient such as sports 
competitions, are a matter of sectarian perception and have the potential to ignite communal conflict 
20 Translated from French. Similar accounts have emerged in the literature on post-Ta'if Lebanon. For such accounts, 
see Michael Hudson, 'Trying again: power-sharing in post-civil war Lebanon'. International Negotiatio Vol. 2, No. 1, 
pp. 103-22,1997, pp. 116-117; Eyal Zisser, Review article: 'The silent revolution in Lebanon: changing values of the 
youth'. Middle Eastern Studies (July), Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 211-3,2001, p. 212; Nawaf A. Salam, 'Deconfessionalizing the 
call for deconfessionalization'. Beirut Revie (Fall), Vol. 6, pp. 75-8,1993, p. 76 and Augustus Richard Norton, 
'Lebanon's malaise'. Survival (Winter), Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 35-50. London: Brassey's for International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 2001, p. 43. 
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that may develop into violent conflict. As a result, Reinkowski's arguments that 'consociational 
democracy prevented democratic practices within the confessional groups and neglected the 
potential plurality and flexibility of the Lebanese society' (Reinkowski 1997,506) are particularly 
relevant for the present discussion. Such observations have questioned the argument made by 
modernisation theorists that a considerable impetus for change is usually found in the modemisation 
processes underway and have led to research on this matter by observers of Lebanese politics. 
Hudson's comment that 'in Lebanon, modernization does not mean destroying the old but simply 
adding the new' (Hudson 1969,255) is pertinent, and has recently been echoed by a number of 
sociologists and experts on Lebanese politics. 21 For instance, Haddad points out that 'the Lebanese 
are remarkable in their ability to modernize their approaches to all forms of business and 
professional practices, but equally remarkable in their resistance to modernization of political and 
administrative practices' (Haddad 1985,150-1). Most worrying however is the inability of the 
Lebanese to identify along class-lines, despite rampant poverty and the gradual eradication of the 
Lebanese middle class, which forms the basis of social stability. As early as 1989, Humphrey 
notices that 'the civil war failed to redefine political allegiance radically from sect to class, or even 
a secular-nationalism' (Humphrey 1989,5). Today, more than a decade later, this situation is pretty 
much the same. 
Indeed, despite the war, the new formula has not provided the Lebanese with a sense of citizenship. 
Writing in 1996, Salam6 stresses Edmond Rabbath's concept of the Lebanese as 'individual 
subjects', 'confined in their confessions' and 'forbidden to exist politically outside their 
confessional groups' (Salamd 1996b, 99). Similarly, Daff, Esber and Malfla argue in 1996 that 'the 
confessional community has become a tribe' (DaYf, Esber & Malfla 1996,68), hence bringing to 
mind Khalaf's concept of retribalisation that the Lebanese are going through. Here, it should be 
noted that the grand coalition and the elites in general are manipulating circumstances that lead to 
cooperation among the various communal groups. The grand coalition does not have any 
willingness to help in the emergence of any manifestation of national unity, as this will lead to the 
emergence of a class-based social movement that will seek to challenge the existing elitist system of 
rule. At the same time, the elites themselves are not immune from such manipulation as they 
continuously seek outside protection and intervention to buttress their position within the system. 
DaJani, in his study of Lebanese media concludes that his examination 'points out that state 
legislation in the area of television broadcasting were aimed at allowing government officials and 
21 For the results of such studies, see Hudson, Michael C. (1969). 'Democracy and social mobilisation in Lebanese 
politics'. Comparative Politics Vol. 1, pp. 245-63,1969, p. 255; Hassan al Khatib, The general factors for the collapse of 
democracy in Lebano Hassan al Khatib Eds, 1994, p. 119; Wadi Haddad, Lebanon: the politics of revolving doors, (the 
Washington Papers/114). Washington D. C.: Praeger with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
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the ruling political bosses to exploit this medium for their own political goals' (Dajani 200 1). 22 
Needless to say, such a governmental organisation of society lends support to the argument that the 
elites are manipulating and politicising communal loyalties. This thus suggests a permanent 
fragmentation of Lebanese society along communal, sectarian, ideological and 
territorial/geographical lines. 
When it comes to education, this takes on an unprecedented importance, and plays a crucial role in 
moving a country towards national fusion and democratic enlightenment. In the Lebanese context, 
the pre-war Lebanese system, in conformity with the consociational principle of segmental 
autonomy, encouraged the emergence of multiple belief-systems, by institutionalising the rights of 
the different communal groups to run their own schools and ideological, educational and cultural 
instruments. This worked at sharpening the polarisation among the communal groups. For instance, 
Mot writes that 'one of the greatest failures of the Lebanese society was its inability to establish a 
unifying educational and cultural belief-system. The Lebanese educational and cultural system 
encouraged sectarian schisms and separatist trends among the various religious communities' (YJiot 
1987,58). The Ta'if Agreement clearly indicated the need for education reforms, and stipulated a 
number of provisions in this regard that the present discussion will address (The Beirut Review 
1991b, 165). First, the Accord states that education should be put at the disposal of people and made 
obligatory, at least at the elementary stage. Other objectives relate to emphasising the freedom of 
education in accordance with the laws and regulations, protecting private education and 
strengthening state control over private schools and the school textbook. Equally important are the 
aims of reviewing and developing the curricula in a manner that strengthens national cohesiveness 
and fusion and spiritual and cultural openness, as well as unifying the textbook in history and civil 
education courses. In addition, the Accord calls for a rehabilitation of formal, vocational and 
technical education, to strengthen it and develop it in such a manner as to fulfil and to suit the 
developmental and constructive needs of the nation. Finally, the Accord stipulates the principle of 
rehabilitating the Lebanese University and supporting it, especially in its applied faculties. Thus, the 
Ta'if Accord provisions are commendable. 
However, the implementation of the Ta'if provisions here is deficient. First, Inati argues that in light 
of the important role that education plays in shaping political and social ideas, one reform that the 
government undertook has the disadvantage of heightening communal tension. As Inati writes, 'the 
[Georgetown University], 1985, pp. 150-1 and Samir Khalaf, Civil and uncivil violence in Lebanon. A history of the 
internationalization of communal conflic . New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, pp. 26-8. 22 For similar accounts also regarding the failure of the post-war emergence of a 'broadcasting system which can both 
reunite Lebanese society whilst reflecting its diversity', see S. A. Maarabouni, 'Ideological diversity and the 
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new [public] system does not promote the teaching of religion at any level' (Inati 1999,63), 
whereas private schools have the freedom to provide religious teaching. The author argues that: 
The Lebanese government seems to have the idea that, if religion is not taught, religion will go away and 
therefore, the "sectarian problem7' in Lebanon will evaporate. But keeping people ignorant about their religion 
and that of their compatriots will not help create more understanding than keeping them informed, and will 
therefore not facilitate but worsen communication among them (Inati 1999,64). 
Indeed, Inati's argument is particularly relevant, especially now that student enrollment in public 
schools has increased exponentially because of the deteriorating economic situation. Second, with 
regard to the history textbook designed to promote the unification of the Lebanese, this matter was 
subject to controversial debate. It is only very recently that the book in question was written and 
made public, after more than a decade of intense deliberations. Second, heated academic and at the 
same time sectarian-oriented discussions during its writing continuously postponed the process of 
unifying the history book. Third, these discussions escalated into conflicts at the elite level. Minor 
wording differences led to complete governmental paralysis. As a result, the book mainly provides a 
censored, vague account of the Lebanese war's causes and events. In addition, most private schools 
have refused to include the unified history book in the curricula while this is not the case in public 
schools. Clearly, this contributes to keeping the divided society more divided, hence hampering 
prospects for democratic stability. Here, Walzer suggests that 'consociations can teach a minimalist 
curriculum, one that is focused on an often sanitized history of communal coexistence and 
cooperation and on the institutions through which these are realized' (Walzer 1997,72-3). Walzer's 
description does not appear to promote the socio-cultural unification of divided societies. Rather, 
where applied to Lebanon, Walzer's suggestions clearly advocate avoiding the real causes of the 
Lebanese war, and hence, keeping society divided along sectarian lines. Thus, they do not seem 
commendable. Finally, the social fragmentation of the Lebanese along communal identities is 
illustrated by the Christian, and particularly the Maronites' initial refusal to allow the government to 
unify the Lebanese University within one campus that geographically/territori ally unites all 
Lebanese, hence pointing out the considerable degree of communal divisions at the student body 
level. In sum, it can be said that prospects for societal stability are hampered by the divisive 
character of the educational system in Lebanon, which, like the pre-war schooling system, 
contributes to keeping Lebanese society more divided. More importantly, it clearly highlights the 
weakness of the state in promoting and imposing a unification strategy. Educational matters are 
subject to sectarian and religious interventions, thus curtailing any role for the state, however 
minimal. 
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Indeed, there is a wide scholarly consensus that neither the fifteen years of civil war nor the new 
constitution have brought about, whether at the elite or mass levels, national reconciliation, crucial 
for the emergence of a national identity. Norton writes here that 'reconciliation, despite 
commendable initiatives, is as yet, only a slogan' (Norton 2001,43). According to Kassir, the 
present leaders of post-Ta'if Lebanon avoid any discussion of the war in order to maintain 
themselves in power (Kassir 2000,15). 23 Indeed, the elites avoid making efforts towards the 
emergence of national reconciliation, so as to keep the society divided. In times of minor crises, the 
elite in post-war Lebanon claim that national reconciliation can best achieved by forgetting and 
ignoring the issues that divide the Lebanese. Thus, instead of irretrievably addressing the real 
problems that led to the civil war, the elite continuously suggest that national reconciliation can be 
achieved when the Lebanese think only of the issues that bring them together. This best illustrates 
the continued policy of avoidance discussed in previous parts of this thesis. 
Here, it should be acknowledged that the issues uniting the Lebanese help fostering national 
reconciliation, a requirement for the emergence of Lebanese nationalism. However, the issues 
dividing the Lebanese are equally important in hampering the reconciliation process, especially if 
they continue to be avoided. Although addressing such issues constitutes a potential threat to the 
stability of the system, especially for the Maronites, leaving them unresolved further complicates 
the reconciliation process. For instance, Young warns that 'at some stage however, this may lead to 
a breakdown in internal cohesion in Lebanon vis-A-vis the region, much in the same way it did in 
1958 and after 1967' (Young 1993,119). Similarly, Salibi believes that 'without an honest 
recounting of its history ... Lebanon will lack the social solidarity necessary 
for it to be a viable state' 
(Norton 1990,318). Kassir, meanwhile, suggests that Lebanon should engage in a truth and justice 
mission as South Africa did. Hence, if such issues are adequately addressed as a national concern, 
rather than brought up in times of crises to justify narrow sectarian interests, this might move 
forward the reconciliation process (especially among the Maronites and the Druze) and foster the 
emergence of a national identity. As a result, socio-cultural constraints, coupled with the emphasis 
that post-Ta'if consociational system puts on confessionalism, contribute to hamper the emergence 
of democratic stability in Lebanon. 
2. Socio-economic constraints 
Perhaps most damaging for the prospects of the emergence of democratic stability are the socio- 
economic inequalities that post-war Lebanese society suffers from. Likewise, economic prosperity, 
Keele University, 199 1. 
23 Translated from French. 
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if possible and readily available, would act as a significantly positive factor with regard to the 
stability of the country, in the sense that it would assist the existing consociational mechanisms in 
delivering on the promise of democratic stability. In the words of the noted Saidi, 'economic 
recovery and growth can act as the single most important unifying force in restoring Lebanon's 
battered national fabric' (Saidi 1994,195-6). By the same token, class-based inequalities are more 
damaging to the stability of the system than is the case with socio-cultural constraints. Not only do 
such inequalities block prospects for democratic stability, they seriously threaten societal stability 
and may very possibly lead to the outbreak of conflict. However, any serious attempt to assess the 
danger that socio-economic inequalities pose on the stability of the system cannot be undertaken 
without first looking in detail at the political economy of post-Ta'if Lebanon, i. e., the persisting 
strong linkages that exist among the economy and political structure of Lebanese society. From the 
outset, one positive manifestation of post-war Lebanese society, as per the distribution of economic 
power within it deserves attention, as this new trend suggests a salutary move towards a more 
homogeneous and integrated society. Nasr notes that in 1960: 
75 percent of the economic upper class in Lebanon had been Christian and only 25 percent Muslim [while in 
post-war Lebanon], a very significant number of the entrepreneurial class is Muslim, with a vested interest in the 
stabilization of the system and in the development of its economy, [and this] may thus be taken in a more 
positive light (Nasr 1993,73). Another promising byproduct of this burgeoning Christian-Muslim re- 
equilibration in the upper economic strata is the increased number of associations between Christian and Muslim 
capital (Nasr 1993,74). 24 
While this situation is seen as a salutary step towards the homogenisation of society, it should not, 
however, translate into an optimistic scenario for prospects of Lebanese stability. Faour, in 
mentioning this increasing re-equilibration or balancing of economic power among Christians and 
Muslims, concludes that 'yet most of them [the economic entrepreneurial class] are supporters or 
friends of one or more of the ruling triumvirate' (Faour 1998,61). Indeed, Faour's statement cannot 
be truer in the light of the strong linkages that have traditionally existed, and continue to exist, 
among the economic and political elite of Lebanon. For example, Hamdan points out that 'political 
economy is so dependent on sectarian economy' (Hamdan 2000,79)25 and the noted Conn writes: 
'the governments of National Unity that have been in power since the end of 1990 have forged an 
economic alliance between wealthy Lebanese contractors ... and the new wealthy political 
establishment ... Given the new business elite's strong 
influence on and considerable participation in 
the government, there is now minimal control over whether the large and powerful private sector 
distorts to dangerous levels the distribution of income across society' (Conn 1998b, 119). 
24 For similar and more recent accounts, see Muhammad Faour, The silent revolution in Lebanon: changing values o 
the youth. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1998, p. 61. a 
"' Translated from French. 
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However, compared with the pre-war system where Muslims, mostly the Shi'is, were 
underprivileged in relation to Christians, the new post-Taif situation seems better equipped to 
prevent the outbreak of communal conflict. Hence, despite the relevance of Hudson's comment that 
in Lebanon, 'acute economic crises can explode into sectarian political conflicts' (Hudson 1999b, 
36), the balancing of economic power among the various communities represents a salutary step 
towards the integration of society. Indeed, this situation may encourage the emergence of a class- 
based socially-centered movement that significantly cuts across communal sectarian groups, since 
both the economic elite and the underprivileged mass contain adherents from different communal 
groups. 
Next, it should be noted that the provisions of the Taif Agreement, in terms of the need to 
implement economic reforms, stipulate that the balanced, cultural, social (read religious) and 
economic growth of the regions is a principal pillar of the pillars of unity of the state and of stability 
of the system. Therefore, the Accord recognises the threat to the system that uneven growth can 
generate, without offering prospective solutions. Indeed, it is useful to consider the argument that 
the Accord did not provide the framework for the introduction of much-needed reforms. According 
to this view, Abul-Husn holds that the accord resolved the political aspect of the problem, rather 
than its social origins, pointing out that the underlying origins of the conflict 26 have not been 
addressed directly (Abul-Husn 1998,131). Similarly, Sirriyeh writes in 1997: the fact that Ta'if has 
been 'mute' concerning the economic problem 'indicates that the state is not in a position to deal 
with it, possibly due to its economic and political circumstances' (Sirriyeh 1997,115). 27 Both 
arguments illustrate the abovc-mentioned governmental policy of procrastination and paralysis (the 
latter a result of consociationalism). For example, the creation of the Economic and Social 
Development Council, endorsed by the 1989 Taif Accord had to wait ten years. It was only 
established in 1999, despite its advisory, and thus non-binding, nature. In sum, governmental 
procrastination over the need to tackle the internal dimension of Lebanon's economic problems had 
a major detrimental effect on the economy itself, and needless to say, on societal stability. 
In practice, the development and capital investment in the capital, Beirut, at the expense of the 
semi-peripheral and peripheral regions have been a major manifestation of the reconstruction drive 
of post-Ta'if governments. Thus, post-Ta'if Lebanon manifests significant regional economic 
disparities, which does not positively predispose the country to stability. Particularly worrying is the 
lack of government spending in the southern suburbs of Beirut and in the South of the country 
26 Mainly socio-economic disparity, sectarianism and political representation among others 
27 Guilain Denoeux & Robert Springborg echo similar views. 'Hariri's Lebanon: Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa 
of the Levant? '. Middle East Policy 1998, (October), Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 159. 
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(which are generally speaking Shi'i populated) as well as the government's manifest neglect of the 
previously Israeli-occupied Southern areas, which exhibit significant underdevelopment, socio- 
economic marginalisation and incredibly high unemployment rates. This is particularly troubling, as 
the recession in Lebanon has largely contributed to the erosion of the middle clasS, 28 considered by 
many the basis of political stability. Indeed, A 2002 UNDP estimate finds that 'a third of the 
population lives in relative poverty' (UNDP 2002,23). Added to rising inequality, high levels of 
unemployment in Lebanon have also contributed to migration. 
A recent study argues that education in Lebanon 'has proved to be a mixed blessing, because too 
many graduates do not find jobs in the local markets and are forced to leave the country or become 
underemployed. Lebanon ... is experiencing a massive brain drain' (Tabbara 2002). This is also 
worrying as the real wealth of Lebanon lies in its people. 29 For instance, the 2003 Global Human 
Development Report ranks Lebanon's Human Development Index [hereafter HDI] at 83 out of 175 
countries (DSO, II July 2003) . 
30 Hence, migration and brain drain as a result of unemployment 
suggest that social and economic stability could be better enhanced by the government, especially 
as Christian migration is significantly more pronounced than Muslim migration and also because 
the Christian population is shrinking in numbers, compared to the Muslim one. Indeed, Christian 
fears have been voiced out with regard to the marginalisation of the Christian communities. 
Irrespective of whether these concerns are legitimate or not, they affect social stability and are seen 
as undesirable. 
Hence, post-war Lebanon exhibits more or less the same socio-economic ills of pre-war Lebanon. 
Due to the weakness of the state, of state institutions, and the lack of an effective national economic 
recovery programme, among other factors, clientelism is still a procedural manifestation of the post- 
war societal order. Faour reveals that the patronage system 'is common in politics, business, 
extended family, parochial associations, and even in voluntary associations that assume a modem 
appearance' (Faour 1998,56). Hence, the post-war Lebanese political system, in its retaining of 
confessionalism as a system of representation, continues to exhibit a complex network of patron- 
client relationships. For instance, Hudson argues that the preoccupation of the troika leaders 'with 
clientelistic concerns over public policy appears to account for the government's lacklustre and the 
uneven governmental performance' (Hudson 1997,119-20). Indeed, the procedural aspects of the 
functioning of the Lebanese political system suggest that it is difficult for Lebanese elites, including 
28 For more details on the erosion of the Lebanese middle class, considerable poverty levels and the growing gap 
between the rich and the poor, partly due to the increase of taxes on the poor and their decrease on the rich, see Michael 
Hudson, 1999b, 'Lebanon after Taff. another reform opportunity lostT. Arab Studies Quarter] (Winter), Vol. 21, 
No. 1, p. 32 and 36. 29 See Section C. 2. in this chapter 
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parliamentarians to refrain from lobbying for credits and developing projects for their own regions, 
districts and communities, (to satisfy their clients from which they derive their power), despite a 
shortage of resources and government pleas for austerity measures. 
For his part, Denoeux advances the notion of the constraining effects of clientelism by drawing a 
distinction between the stabilising and destabilising effects of clientelism. He observes that 'while 
informal networks usually provided the "glue" that held together mosaic-like cities in which 
institutions were relatively weak, they also could operate, at times, as channels for political dissent' 
(Denoeux 1993,9-10). Again, 'while informal networks often integrate individuals and groups into 
urban society, they also can provide paths through which alienated counterelites and marginalised 
segments of the lower classes can disrupt social peace'. Denoeux, drawing on Lebanon and Mddle 
Eastern countries in general, warns that 'the conditions under which networks can change their role 
from system-supportive to system-challenging are very important' (Denoeux 1993,9-10). In sum, 
such observations best describe the extent to which clientelism is entrenched in the Lebanese 
Political system and thus, point to its constraining impact. As argued previously, the constraining 
effects of clientelism threaten the stability of the system from many points of view, and interfere 
with merit and competence criteria in the appointment of public officials. In short, the present 
discussion of the socio-economic constraints operating in post-war Lebanese society argues that 
there is little reason to believe that the new consociational structure of rule is more adequately 
equipped to deal with the worsening economic situation. 
Furthermore, it should be said that the confessional system in Lebanon does not adhere to the 
consociational principle of proportionality solely within the realm of the public sector, i. e., in the 
administration and the govemment. On the contrary, the implementation of this principle extends 
also to the private sector. Despite the fact that the consociational model, as devised by Lijphart, 
does not prescribe the compartmentalisation of the private sector along proportionality lines, it can, 
however, be said that this is a likely consequence in such a divided context. The private sector 
becomes prone to such compartmentalisation. The fragmentation at the level of the pubic sector 
extends to the private sector as it becomes increasingly difficult to insulate the latter from 
considerations of proportionality. While this is partly due to the divided context within which the 
Private Sector operates, it is also a result of the strong linkages that exist among the economy and 
Political structure of Lebanese society. 31 For example, in his study of Lebanese business 
associations, 32 Baroudi writes: 'it is often argued that associations representing economic interests 
30 
31 
Unsurprisingly. the country's economic ranking stands at I 10 out of 175 countries. 
32 
This issue will constitute the main discussion of section E. 4. in this chapter Sami Baroudi. 'Sectarianism and Business Associations in Postwar Lebanon'. Arab Studies Quarterl , 2000b, (Fall), Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 81-107. 
197 
are essentially secular entities not bounded or permeated by sectarian considerations' (Baroudi 
2000b, 1). However, towards the end of the article, he notes that: 
A close look at Lebanon's business associations reveals the contrary (Baroudi 2000b, 1). Sectarian balances are 
present in practically all economic and professional associations in Lebanon. Lebanese businessmen, as 
businessmen elsewhere, are primarily interested in profit. But like the rest of the population, Lebanese 
businessmen have their primordial loyalties to their sect-and do keep a close watch on how well, or how poorly, 
(in their opinion) their sect is represented in major decision-making bodies... One should expect sectarian 
balances to be observed in all of the leading business associations, as well as in the less important ones... 
(Baroudi 2000b). 
Indeed, the insulation of business associations from political and sectarian decision-making appears 
difficult under the consociational framework of rule. The prevalence of this mode of governance is 
limited not only to business associations, but also extends to labour syndicates. In this respect, 
Harridan cites the 'increasing submission of a substantial number of [labour] syndicates to a 
political agenda imposed by sectarian elites connected to powerful private groups' (Hamdan 2000, 
75). 33 Hamdan's comment should be viewed within the context of Lebanon's economy. Despite the 
resilience and solidity of the Lebanese private sector, it should be observed that the Lebanese 
economy is heavily reliant on the service sector for its source of revenues. Successive post-war 
governments have long neglected the agriculture sector, while reforms to modemise it have not 
been undertaken, despite it being 'the source of income for 30-40 percent of the population' (DSO, 
21 January 2003). The modernisation of this sector, if undertaken by the government may decrease 
the economy's dependence on the tertiary sector, and in consequence, its dependence on sectarian 
considerations. The industrial sector also suffers from similar deficiencies 34 and obstacles to reform. 
In sum, the hegemonic control traditional political leaders (allied to powerful financial elites) 
exercise on the state apparatus, results in their unwillingness to develop socially-centered sectors. 35 
Rather, elites tend to concentrate on the immediate benefits of the trade and financial sectors, 
despite the latter's volatile nature due to the quick and free mobility of capital, thereby accentuating 
Lebanon's dependence on and submission to the world economy. In sum, when both private and the 
public sectors are subject to sectarian considerations when it comes to representation, allocation of 
offices and funds, it becomes increasingly difficult to build a strong state able to deal with class 
cleavages. 
The strong linkages that exist between the political and the economic elite play an important role in 
preventing reform of the public administration. The close alliances and mutual benefits that unite 
33 Translated from French. 
34 Hamdan makes the point that 'the development of the sectors of material production- agriculture and industry- has to 
be the principal objective of reconstruction, not only to absorb chronic unemployment and limit Lebanon's elementary 
and economic dependency, but also to guarantee its political independence' (Hamdan 1991,99). Similarly, he notes that 
the 'influx of international capital that was invested in Lebanon was not invested in the real economic sector, a sector 
which suffers from a lack of productive investments' (Hamdan 2000,73). Translated from French. 
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traditional politicians to powerful financial groups suggest that the political elite would be unwilling 
to attempt serious reform programme of Lebanese public administration. Hamdan notes that the 
government's objectives and priorities regulating the allocation of investments were revised, 
amended and even reversed three or four times in the span of five years, mainly for the sake of 
adjusting inter and intra-sectarian balances and for meeting the requisites of clientelist relations, 
which the various blocs in power are keen to maintain and uphold (Hamdan 2000,70). 36 This 
situation is very much unfortunate as reforms along the lines of Chihabism could have a salutary 
effect on social stability, as they would address the problem of poverty and deprivation and build a 
more economically equitable society. As Harif reminds us, the Lebanese state functioned best 
during the Shihabist era, when the state installed its power by promoting a greater measure of 
37 economic and social justice (Hanf 1990,69). Hence, one way to create prospects for democratic 
stability seems to lie in economic recovery and prosperity. For instance, Walbiner, a research fellow 
at the German Institute for Oriental Studies in Beirut recently says that the main problem that has to 
be solved is the economic situation: 'if this is solved, there will be more tolerance and there will be 
better living together' (Walbiner 2000). 
Finally and more importantly, no consensus, plan or national strategy has been devised to provide a 
role to Lebanon in the world order so that it can carve its niche and compete successfully in the 
global economy. Worse, there is no vision yet of what the role of Lebanon should be in the global 
economy. There has yet to be government interest and strategy in this end. As it stands, Lebanon's 
elite is attempting again to limit Lebanon to playing its pre-war merchant Republic role, 38 despite 
the fact that it was shown that this is rather difficult and despite the fact that this course has 
contributed to a great extent to the breakdown of the system and has manifested its failure in a very 
revealing way, through the long civil war and the dependence and hence vulnerability of Lebanon's 
economy on the world economy. In this respect, Marr writes that 'states that are not able to 
accomplish these tasks [economic restructuring, privatisation, export-oriented growth strategies] 
and compete in the new international economic market place, may face economic marginalization- 
or worse. Successful states are likely to be more stable; unsuccessful ones, part of a more disorderly 
39 world' (Marr 1998,75). 
35 This issue will be discussed in section D. 3. in this chapter 36 Translated from French. 
37 Translated from French. 
38 For scholars who argue similarly, see Diab (1999) Conclusion and Nemer H. Ramadan, Le Liban A I'are des 
"aiustements structurels": Mauvaise gouvemance et retour aux ddsdguilibres d'avant-eueffe. Montrdal: Universitd du 
Qudbec [Ddpartement de science politique- Groupe de Recherche sur l'intdgration continentale], 2000. 
39 Emphasis added. For more forceful critiques of globalisation, the renowned Edward Said paints a very dramatic 
scenario for the Middle East. See Edward Said, 'Scoundrel times indeed'. Al-Ahram weekly onlin , 23-29 December 1999, Issue No. 461. Cairo: A]-Ahram. h! M: Hweekly. ahram. orR. e&11999/461/ol22. ht 
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F. Recapitulation: post-war consociationalism and democratic stability 
The present chapter began with the notion that Lebanon's stability is significantly linked to the 
stability of the region in both ways. In other words, regional turbulence is bound to generate 
significant local political and social instability and by the same token, local events on the Lebanese 
scene, (such as a possible economic breakdown and the degree of social breakdown it will entail) 
have outside repercussions. At the same time, local developments on the Lebanese domestic scene 
depend significantly upon regional conditions, and hence, internal solutions to internal problems 
involve external regional considerations that have to do with the stability of the region as a whole. 
Two examples that illustrate the regional dimension that Lebanon's problems take are related to the 
ongoing manifestations of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, as Lebanon is home to a 
significant number of Palestinian refugees, the argument that 'an effective resolution of this issue 
would greatly contribute to Lebanon's stability' (Sirriyeh 1997,117) is important if this means the 
right of refugee return is implemented. Likewise, an eventual externally imposed naturalisation of 
the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is bound to generate a potentially explosive situation. On the 
other hand, Israel's many attempts to exploit the social makeup of Lebanon, i. e., the multi-sectarian 
Lebanese entities and its attempts to play on Lebanon's western and eastern tendencies illustrate the 
high permeability of Lebanese borders to outside manipulation and detrimental intervention. 
Against this background, consociationalism, which prevents the ability of elites and masses to agree 
on what national interest means, emerges as a significant source of instability should regional 
conditions worsen or should the strategic interests of the major players in the region shift. Indeed, 
the consociational structure of rule makes it difficult for Lebanon not to be involved in the conflicts 
raging outside its borders. Kabbara argues that under the consociational framework, 'a problem of 
confidence will always manifest itself forcing the different antagonistic camps to turn to outside 
powers to protect themselves from the others. Any of the regional or super-powers could easily 
shake the balance of force' (Kabbara 1991,350). 
Against this background, Syria's deep understanding of the detrimental complexities of 
consociational rule and its awareness of the fragility of the consociational "peace" have been crucial 
in keeping Lebanon stable. Syria's understanding that 'consociationalism has remained the lesser 
evil or the best option under the current circumstances' (Smooha and Hanf 1992,41) has been 
crucial in enabling it to play a mediation and stabilising role. Such understanding and awareness of 
the "Lebanese problem" are illustrated in the provisions of the Ta'if Agreement relating to Syrian- 
Lebanese relations, and were strengthened later in a series of agreements between both countries. 
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Ta'if states that there exists between Lebanon and Syria "distinguished relationships". Specifically, 
the Accord stipulates that Lebanon shall under no circumstances be made a source of threat to the 
security of Syria, nor Syria to the security of Lebanon. Therefore, Lebanon shall not permit itself to 
become a passageway or a dwelling to any force, state or organisation, which aims to undermine its 
security or the security of Syria. And Syria, which is keen on preserving the security, independence 
and unity of Lebanon and concurrence among its people, shall not permit any act that may threaten 
Lebanon's security, sovereignty and independence. Implicitly, the Accord states that everything will 
be done by Syria to keep the Lebanese front stable. 
Additionally, during the last decade, Lebanon and Syria signed multiple accords and bilateral 
treaties for co- operation, mainly political and military, most importantly the 1985 Damascus 
Accord and the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation, and Friendship. The latter established 
the Supreme Syrian-Lebanese Council that formalises Syrian control of Lebanese foreign and 
security policies. Thus, while Syria's role is mainly based on the premise of protecting its borders 
from Israeli penetration, Syrian influence in Lebanon has taken a hegemonial character (despite it 
being that of a broker mediating among parties), facilitated as a result of elite conflicts over the 
governance of the country. Thus, although Lebanon finds itself in a position partly of its own 
making, Syria's role in assisting and sustaining Lebanese consociational politics suggests that 
democratic stability is hard to achieve. Hence, the argument of this thesis that consociationalism, as 
a conflict-regulation mechanism, effectively and procedurally borrows additional conflict- 
regulation mechanisms (from the conflict-regulation literature) to sustain its operability in the 
Lebanese case is illustrated by the Lebanese post-Ta'if conduct of consociational politics. 
Consociationalism prevents political maturity of the political system. The political system that 
consociationalism established in the Lebanese case can be reduced to the elites, which are the real 
and effective institutions of governance. The argument that 'the President of the Republic, Prime 
Minister, members of the Cabinet, President of the Chamber, and the Deputies know very well that 
sound communication among them is essential for their successful performance in their jobs and for 
the enactment of necessary legislation' (Jabbra & Jabbra 2001,75) sums up the necessary criteria 
for the successful operation of consociational politics. And yet, the conduct of politics suggests that 
the system is not politically mature as the inability or unwillingness of these elites to compromise 
suggests. 
Against this background, it is essential to re-question the internal logic, consistency and operability 
of consociational theory. Indeed, the consociational model of democracy is a conflict-regulation 
mechanism. It was born from the need to prevent communal conflicts in divided (and deeply 
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divided) societies, that is, heterogeneous and unstable societies, by providing a system capable of 
generating and maintaining democratic stability. Throughout this thesis, it was shown that the 
model goes through cyclical crises involving violence and a collapse of the social order, if no 
attempt is made by the outside to ensure that this model functions as consociational theory purports. 
While it seems difficult for the model to generate democratic stability, its ability to prevent the 
outbreak of communal conflict, if the above conditions are met (arbitration), remains more 
adequate. 
As to the internal dangers that threaten prospects for a pluralist Lebanese democracy, Moubarak 
cites prejudices/preconceptions which lead to the failure of dialogue; flawed over-generalisations 
when it comes to inter-communal perceptions; extreme politicisation of issues; resignation and 
submission of the wider public that they cannot change the system; the inability to transcend the 
urge to seek communal lights above national interest and citizen lights; elites' refusal to 
compromise in order for their followers to perceive them as defenders of the community's rights; 
mutual elite accusations; and the inability of the communal groups to forgive and turn a page on the 
war as well as the politicisation of ethnic/communal identity (Moubarak 2002). 40 Hence, there is 
little reason to believe that adjustments made in the consociational model in Lebanon will be much 
better in preventing conflict. Despite the modified consociationalism that resulted from Taif, the 
country still remains deeply divided. The elites are still what they were in essence. 
Hence, the present discussion has raised doubts concerning the ability of the new model to generate 
political and social stability within democratic practices. While the scope and power of the grand 
coalition has contributed to the stability of the system, an elaboration of the concept of the grand 
coalition to enlarge its scope of representation and power seem more adequate in enhancing 
prospects for stability. However, this should not obscure the fact that the Ta'if Agreement appears 
to be a short-term process, rather than a definitive settlement. Indeed, the accord illustrate the 
temporarily dominant position of some leaders of some of the communal groups, bound together by 
alliances based on interests, rather than on a commitment to preserve the stability of the country. In 
his critique of Lijphart's and Messarra's work on consociationalism, Kabbara writes that 'the 
authors of the theory base their argument on certain political moments where two or more political 
identities are the dominant feature of the society in question. In order to avoid violent conflict, the 
theory tries to keep a balance between the different communal or subcultural identities under the 
umbrella of a moderate national affiliation and to turn such a balance into a permanent state of 
affairs' (Kabbara 1991,353). While Kabbara's criticism cannot be truer, it may be argued, that 
40 Translated from Arabic. 
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since 'the accord rejects the idea that parliamentary seats need to be reallocated periodically to 
adjust for disparate rates of population growth among the major confessional groups' (Norton & 
Schwedler 1994,47-8) by adopting an equal representation system of parity, the chances of survival 
within the post-war system have significantly increased. However, consociationalism being an elite- 
centered or actor-centered model, hence substituting democratic institutions of governance, 
Roberson's argument is particularly insightful: 
As regards Lebanon itself, one of the lessons in history is that if a country's political elite loses their coherence 
and fragments, the country can become a prey of its neighbours and beyond. Without this coherence of the 
Lebanese political elites, Lebanon's ability and capacity to chart its course vis A vis its neighbours is 
significantly weakened (Roberson 1998a, 4). 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
Interest in this research began with the observation that Lebanon's consociational politics 
did not bring about democratic stability to the plural society Lebanon is, as Lijphart's 
consociational theory states. Hence, this raises some questions that this thesis has sought to address. 
First, though the pre-war institutionalised Lebanese experiment with consociationalism lasted for a 
little longer than thirty years, it was subject to various breakdowns of internal stability, involving 
violence, during this period, until it completely collapsed in 1975, with the outbreak of the 
Lebanese civil war. Second, more than a decade after the end of the Lebanese civil war (1975- 
1990), and despite the "improved" consociational system, it is obvious that Lebanese consociational 
politics are highly unstable' and that Lebanon survives because Syria is making a continuous 
contribution to ensuring that to some extent a status quo exists which ensures a degree of stability, 
as it has a stake in the stability of Lebanon for a number of reasons discussed in previous chapters. 2 
The relative power of the state and the involvement of Syria constitute the degree of stability that 
exists in Lebanon today. Currently, Syria still plays an influential role in the maintenance of 
stability and order in Lebanon. In other words, the new post-war "improved" consociational system 
does not seem to have fulfilled its objective of creating endogenous democratic stability, i. e., socio- 
political and economic stability within democratic practices. As Khairallah points out, 'whatever 
semblance of non-nalcy, stability or recovery Lebanon enjoys at present is a direct consequence of 
Syria's determination. It cannot be attributed to the spirit of reconciliation among Lebanese that the 
Ta'if Accord is presumed to have produced' (Khairallah 1994,262). Hence, this observation brings 
to mind the relevance of the definition of stability (provided in Chapter 3) that this thesis adopts 
1 Beyond any doubt, political instability in Lebanon is, to a considerable extent, linked to the new power configurations 
that have emerged as a result of the civil war. For instance, the Maronites ended up with less power in the political 
configuration of post-war Lebanon. This was due largely to the fact that they collaborated with the Israeli invasion and 
occupation. Israel was forced to withdraw and the Maronites in effect lost the war. In the process, Maronite political 
power was reduced, thus contributing to political instability in Lebanon as the Maronites have been on the top of the 
political heap in Lebanon until 1975. The Maronites have a strong historical connection with Lebanon. To some 
considerable extent, they have been prominent in the definition of Lebanon. They were quite ambitious to play a prime 
role in the politics of Lebanon. Their ambitions led them to be involved in the conflicts that occurred among the 
confessional groups. Today, one can reasonably infer that they would want to regain the position they held before the 
war and the political changes that followed, however most certainly not by force. The question of force and Maronite 
failure to succeed in the civil war suggests that force might be a bankrupt policy. However, significant resentment 
among the Maronites, elites and masses alike contributes to instability. For more on the Maronites' close identification 
with Lebanon, Maronite identity, the development of Maronitism and its isolationist separatist exclusionary stance, see 
Hagopian, Elaine C. (1989). Maronite hegemony to Maronite militancy: the creation and disintegration of Lebanon. 
Third World Quarterl (October), Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 101-17, Abingdon: Carfax and Schulze, Kirsten (1996). 'Israeli and 
Maronite Nationalisms: Is a Minority Alliance NaturalT. In Kirsten E. Schulze, Martin Stokes and Colm Campbell, eds. 
Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East, pp. 158-170. London: I. B. Tauris. For 
the territorial identification of the Maronites with their "national home", see Khalifah, Bassem. (1997), The rise and fall 
of Christian Lebanon. Toronto: York Press Limited, pp. 2-4. 
2 One important reason is Israel's attempts to subvert the social order in Lebanon and its existence today as a dominant 
power in its relations with Lebanon, despite the Israeli withdrawal in the summer of 2000. Another reason involves the 
nature of the instability in the region and its impact on Lebanese political developments and domestic peace. 
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when it comes to the Lebanese context and which was taken to mean the ability of local elites alone 
to maintain political, social and economic stability in the plural society without resorting to outside 
intervention. 3 
Indeed, the functioning of the consociational system in Lebanon suggests that in practice, there is a 
societal context in which a tenuous understanding of accommodation exists among different groups 
of unequal size and power within a particular balance of power among these groups and with the 
permanent intervention and backing of a third party, Syria. This fragile environment is revealed 
through the extraordinary weaknesses 4 that the successive post-war Lebanese governments exhibit, 
quite possibly pointing out that the instability of the Lebanese state lies in the consociational 
political structure of the country, which institutionalises and fosters sectarianism and its attendant 
consequences. Such a structure of rule was discussed at length throughout this thesis. At the same 
time however, it seems apparent that if one were to try to change the balance of forces that already 
exists (in order to annihilate the divisive effects incurred by consociationalism, prevent the 
politicisation and manipulation of ethnicity and minimise the risks of conflict outbreak), this would 
5 only entrench the insecurity within society and increase instability within the country. In the light 
of Lebanon being a prime example of consociational theory in action, and in view of the dilemma of 
the Lebanese situation, 6 selecting Lebanon as a case study appears pertinent as it provides the 
opportunity for this thesis to undertake a critical investigative analysis of consociational theory and 
the ways it operates in practice. This has been achieved by juxtaposing the theory of consociational 
democracy with the case study, Lebanon, in an attempt to determine whether the consociational 
model of rule functions as the theory suggests, in that it generates democratic stability in plural 
societies. 
In other words, this thesis investigates what Halpern calls the 'uncritical acceptance of the model's 
logical warrant' (Halpern 1984,4) based on the Lebanese context. Thus, the central research 
question that this thesis addresses is the supposedly causative relationship between 
consociationalism and democratic stability. The ability of the consociational model to prevent the 
outbreak of communal conflict and generate and maintain democratic stability was tested in various 
3 For a reminder of the definition, see Chapter 3, section A. 1. 
4 Briefly, the Lebanese state is weak in that the government has difficulty in arriving at domestic policies, has difficulty 
in or anising itself to implement policies and has difficulty in dealing effectively in its international relations. 
511 Vhen the opportunity for system change presented itself during peace-making efforts in the late 1980s, Syria was 
g 
willing to postpone a fundamental change in the form of political organisation in Lebanon and went along with a 
modified consociational form that basically failed in the past. This was so in the light of the past experiences and history 
of Lebanon, Israel's failed attempt to establish a government of its own making in Beirut, the turbulent regional 
situation and the urgent need to impose peace and keep the Lebanese-Israeli front stable as an unstable one meant a 
direct threat to Syria's survival interests. 
6A situation that also existed in pre-war Lebanon in a slightly modified form. 
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chapters in this thesis through the Lebanese lens. Thus, with this objective in mind, this research 
soughtto: 
* Re-examine the claim that the consociational system of rule generates democratic stability and is able to 
maintain it in Lebanon; and 
* Based on the investigation of the above claim, re-examine the claim that the consociational model of 
democracy is a successful counteractive mechanism against the permanent political, socio-cultural and 
economic fragmentation of Lebanon's plural society and the outbreak of another communal conflict. 
Though the Lebanese political system has been the subject of numerous research that this thesis 
draws on, few studies have focused on the analysis of the politics of consociationalism in Lebanon 
in great detai 1.7 Thus, while this thesis does not claim in any measure to have settled the unresolved 
debates of Lebanese politics and Lebanon's conundrum, it does offer insights into how 
consociationalism in Lebanon is structured and how it works in practice, based on pre-war and post- 
war procedural social, political and economic manifestations of Lebanon's system and society. The 
objective of this agenda is in line with the main orientation of this thesis, namely the re-examination 
of the significance of Lijphart's claim relating to the causative (i. e., positive) relationship between 
the consociational model and the stability of the system. This re-examination has raised some 
questions and answers that can briefly summarised as follows: 
Ibis thesis acknowledges the importance of consociational theory in the light of the many countries 
of the world that adopt the model despite previous failed experiments (such as Lebanon). In 
consequence, the re-examination of the failure of the model to bring democratic stability has 
necessitated this research introducing an original elaboration of the model (throughout the thesis) 
shown to be bound to enhance prospects for stability and hence, democratic stability. This might 
thus provide a way in which consociationalism can operate without the need for a heavy dose of 
internal mediation and external arbitration to ensure a relative degree of stability. 
This chapter has so far highlighted the relevance of selecting Lebanon as a case study for the 
purposes of this thesis. It has restated the basic research question, as well as the secondary questions 
that this study has addressed. It has pointed to the existing gap in the literature and how it was 
filled, and has briefly presented the questions that were raised, the answers to them and indicated 
why and in what ways this study would be relevant. This chapter will now summarise the main 
findings and conclusions of the study. It seeks to bring the threads of analysis together, highlighting 
the significance of the arguments that arose from this thesis and the implications and contribution of 
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this thesis to current research trends. Subsequently, this chapter will suggest ideas for further 
research on Lebanon's conundrum. Lastly, it will move from the particular to the general, by 
suggesting in what ways the results of this study offer insights into the governance of plural 
societies in countries other than Lebanon. 
Since the focus in this thesis is on consociational theory as applied to Lebanon, the purpose has 
been to critically evaluate the theory of consociationalism and the utility of this theory in the 
Lebanese context. In other words, the aim has been to assess the intellectual validity of the theory 
and its application to Lebanon in order to end up with some judgement that is implied by the title of 
this dissertation. Thus, these objectives called for an examination into the internal logic of this 
theory, the assumptions and implications contained in the theory and its consistency, before its 
relations to democratic theory and its utility in the Lebanese context are tested in later chapters. 
These necessary tasks were undertaken in Chapter 2. 
The discussion in Chapter 2 has reviewed and further developed the criticisms that were offered 
against the theory, as well as the problems faced by researchers working with the theory. A number 
of conclusions arose and may be summarised as follows. Chapter 2 identified the need to develop 
definitions that were more appropriate to the context within which this thesis operates (a task 
undertaken in Chapter 3). The examinations undertaken suggest that elites are unable at times to 
prevent the outbreak of communal conflict and more importantly, for the purposes of the central 
question of this thesis, to create and maintain democratic stability. Indeed, the brief discussion of a 
number of critical case studies pointed to the inability and unwillingness of the elite, in some cases, 
to create and maintain a stable democratic system; in other cases, it pointed to the inability of the 
elite to prevent the outbreak of ethnic conflict, suggesting that additional mechanisms are needed to 
assist consociational mechanisms. The detailed discussion of the logic and internal assumptions of 
consociational theory suggests that the theory appears to be inherently flawed. This reveals the 
significant problems researchers face when working with the model, and leads to confusion 
surrounding the theory itself. Finally, the disparities between the model itself and the cases that 
have been described as consociational democracies, namely the Netherlands and Switzerland, the 
Malaysian Federation and Nigeria, limit and call into question the utility of the theory for plural 
societies. As a result, Chapter 2 identified the need to introduce an elaboration of the model 
(undertaken in Chapter 3), and examine its significance, advantages and shortcomings as based on 
the Lebanese context (tasks undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5). 
7 For instance, Jamali concludes in her recent doctoral thesis: 'Research about Lebanese democracy however is still in 
its infancy. There has been no comprehensive attempt to explore the peculiarities of the Lebanese democratic order and 
the extent to which it conforms or deviates from Arend Lijphart's consociational model' (Jamali 2001,295). 
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Indeed, the study of democracy in Lebanon was an attempt to bring greater clarity to the concept, 
using Lebanon as a case study. Like so many concepts in international relations, international 
studies and politics, there are considerable ambiguities in the notion of democracy, which is in itself 
a contested concept. However, though the idea of democracy is complex, it is an important idea in 
terms of the concerns of civil society. Where previously democracy was traditionally considered in 
institutional and procedural terms, today the emphasis appears to be on the notion of governance as 
a political process, an approach that seems very appropriate in the study of Lebanese politics. 
Therefore, after paving the way for the major discussions addressed in this thesis in Chapter One 
(Introduction) and after examining the internal logic of consociational theory (Chapter 2), Chapter 
3 has attempted to offer a critique of democratic theory that might shed greater light on the theory. 
It involved a critical discussion of the theory, drawing on a detailed exploration of the various 
aspects of the consociational model. 
Having first defined the major concepts and terms that this thesis refers to and after describing the 
complexities of the societal stage on which this thesis unfold, Chapter 3 proceeded to explain in 
detail the model of consociational democracy (its institutions and mechanisms of rule) and to 
examine its relations to democratic theory. Particular attention was devoted to the discrepancies 
between the structural aspects and the procedural processes of democracy, and to the impact of the 
latter on the form of democracy that a society manifests or practises. Indeed, the examination of the 
procedural processes of democracy pointed to the elite nature of democratic rule (i. e., the strong 
element of elite rule in democracies). This discussion is pertinent for the purposes of this thesis 
because of the determinant emphasis that consociational theory places on the cooperative role of the 
elite as a condition for system stability (and democratic stability) within plural societies and because 
the central question of this thesis is a re-investigation of the so-called positive relationship between 
consociationalism (in procedural terms, elite behaviour) and system stability. 
The discussion revealed that the consociational institutions of rule (crucially elite behaviour through 
the grand coalition) do not always provide an effective mechanism or instrument for the creating 
and maintaining order and stability within a plural society. Thus, their ability to produce democratic 
stability in such societies was called into question. Indeed, an examination of the processes of 
consociational theory has suggested that the elite does not always play an accommodative role. The 
procedural aspects questioned the effectiveness of the institutional instruments of consociationalism 
in preventing the outbreak of conflict and maintaining order in divided societies. As such, the 
consociational model sometimes fails to deliver on the promise of democratic stability in such 
societies. Thus, the significance of the claim pertaining to the causative relationship between 
consociationalism and democratic stability was seriously challenged. Indeed, the examination of the 
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limitations of the consociational model, in many respects considered essential to the definition of 
democratic stability, lends support to this argument and as a result, questions the so-called particular 
suitability and applicability of the model to plural societies. 
First, the procedural examination of the grand coalition, as devised by Ijjphart, pointed to the 
important group exclusion it engenders and to the extremely elitist and hegemonic character it 
takes, as opposed to the mainstream observations of its elitist character. In other words, 
consociationalism seems unable to form a "grand coalition", and hence the utility of the theory is 
questioned. This results in considerable societal/communal unrest and as such, Chapter 3 suggested 
an improvement in the scope of the grand coalition which would enhance prospects for stability and 
hence, the utility of the model and the consistency of the theory. Equally, because of the recourse by 
elites to the manipulation and politicisation of politically salient issues, this prevents the emergence 
of class-based consciousness. Second, procedurally, elite rule sometimes appears to protect the 
rights of the different communal groups that make up the divided society, rather than the nation 
(which is already very detrimental). At other times, however, it even fails to protect communal 
interests (as a result of scarce resources) and it is not either able to ensure a fair and adequate 
distribution of resources, privileges, power and status among the communal groups, hence 
undermining the stability of the system, and calling into question the relevance of the theory which 
appears pointless if it fails on the minimum basic requirement, the protection and representation of 
the rights of communal groups. In such cases, the elites appear to protect only their interests and 
those of their close associates and family members. Indeed, there is a tension between the functions 
that the different elites have to perform. On the one hand, they have to maintain the stability of the 
system and preserve national interest. On the other hand, they have to satisfy their respective 
constituencies, in the sense that they have to represent and protect the interests of the majority of 
their respective communities, preserve their communities' distinctiveness, identity and belief 
systems, their status as a group within society and the particular order that exists within this 
community. As such, the tensions involved within this bargaining process, in which the elites 
engage suggest that it is very difficult for a national consensus, which is a desirable outcome, to 
emerge on domestic as well as regional issues. There seems to be no sense of a national element in 
the nature of society [and a national component of politics]. Chapter 3 highlighted a frequent 
manifestation of the failure of the theory in that respect, namely immobilism in executive decision- 
making (at the governmental level) and the cyclical crises that it often goes through (sometimes 
involving violence). Thus, the maintenance of stability and order within plural society under 
consociational rule was called into question. This suggests that democratic stability is sometimes 
difficult to achieve in that complex context. 
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Against this background, the suggestion of broadening the scope of the grand coalition appears to 
be one way of avoiding group exclusion. It leads to kick-starting a system of mutual checks and 
balances within that executive body and hence, encourages the emergence of intra-alliances within 
it that might channel decision-making towards a more representative policy, rather than an 
extremely elitist one. At the very least, broadening the scope of the grand coalition preserves the 
communal groups' right to use the mutual veto, an essential feature of the consociational model. 
While this may involve deadlock, it is still seen in the present thesis as a better alternative to the 
narrow scope of the grand coalition, which leads to significant societal resentment and unrest and 
allows for procedural rule of the nation by majority segments only. These two manifestations are 
more dangerous for the stability of the system, this thesis argues, than deadlock and immobilism. 
Third, the approach of consociationalism to the organisation of society lends considerable support 
to the argument that under the consociational structure of rule, permanent fragmentation of society 
is a likely outcome. Indeed, the examination of the various aspects of the consociational model, and 
crucially, the considerable degree of segmental autonomy it prescribes (according to which a 
minimal contact between the communal groups is desirable), reveals that consociational theory 
implicitly fosters distinctiveness, discrimination and separatism. This makes inter- and intra- 
communal tolerance/toleration as well as peaceful communal coexistence difficult, and indeed, 
tends to perpetuate divisions within societies. Additionally, the discussion pointed out that it is not 
very clear how minimal contact between the groups may be achieved, especially in small states. 
This challenges the internal logic of consociational theory. Moreover, the functioning of the 
consociational model as prescribed by consociational theory has been shown to encourage groups to 
continue to seek external linkages to preserve their different value systems and buttress their 
positions in the system, bringing outside intervention and hence instability. In this respect, the 
dissertation pointed out that Lijphart's assertion that 'perceived external threats are conducive to 
democracy' lacks logical clarity, as under the consociational structure of rule, this perception is 
most often a function of communal considerations and perceptions (such as the case of Israel's 
relations with Lebanon illustrates). Consociationalism institutionalises permanent societal 
fragmentation, coupled with extreme elitism, and anticipates that this combination will work 
flawlessly in creating and maintaining democratic stability. On the one hand, elites have to maintain 
the system and groups sufficiently united to prevent an outbreak of communal conflict. On the other 
hand, they are supposed to run the country from a confessionally based approach. As a result, 
consociational theory expects that elites will be skilful in applying the right measures of unity 
versus confessionalism. Procedurally, it appears that elites do play that role. However, this comes at 
the expense of stability and allows elites to control their followers who are lost and mobilised, while 
the elites run the country together for their own interests. 
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Similarly, the examinations of the consociational principle of proportionality in terms of political 
representation and the allocation of public funds has pointed to the considerably detrimental impact 
the operation of this principle has on the stability of the system. Particular attention was given to the 
detrimental processes involved in the implementation of this principle. The examination has shown 
that the procedural aspects of this principle contribute to the politicisation of ethnicity, in the sense 
that inter- and intra-group competition over scarce political and economic power translates into 
religious rivalries, thereby undermining the stability of the system. 
Having examined consociational. theory in detail, and discussed its relations to democratic theory, 
Chapter 4 proceeded to explore why and in what ways Lebanon might be considered to fit into this 
explanation of political organisation. Focusing on the pre-war Lebanese political system, the 
discussion juxtaposed the theory of consociational. democracy with the case study of Lebanon. The 
examination and analysis of the form of democracy that has emerged in Lebanon called for this 
chapter to locate the discussion within the context of Lebanon's political and social environment 
and its history, since democracy takes many forms that depend upon the historical experience and 
the social structure of the society in question. Like all countries, Lebanon has its particular social 
and historical characteristics. Under the particular conditions that exist in the country, Lebanon has 
its own particular form of democratic governance based on consociationalism. Thus, Chapter 4 
began by providing a brief historical narrative of the major pre-war system and highlighting the 
economic, political, historical and social factors that brought about consociational democracy in 
Lebanon, as embodied in the confessional political system. This system evolved to some 
considerable extent from the millet system under the Ottoman Empire, which may indeed have been 
the origin of confessional groupings and which can be considered as an embryonic form of 
Lebanese consociationalism and confessionalism as we see today. For instance, Jamali writes that 
'the ethnic and confessional legacy of the Ottomans ... in Lebanon relates to their promotion of the 
religious community as the main unit of social organization.... Lebanon indeed witnessed the first 
formal institutionalization of communalism and sectarianism under Ottoman rule... ' (Jamali 2001, 
284). The modernisation processes underway served to politically reshape community relations 
along religious lines. Throughout the 19th century, Lebanese politics fluctuated between periods of 
peace and periodic attempts to change the system so as to have a more equitable distribution of 
political benefits among the confessional groups, as it became obvious with time that the political 
balance in Lebanon was skewed in favour of the Maronites. 8 While the 1926 Constitution 
consolidated these consociational sectarian arrangements, their translation into practice was a 
8 As Johnson points out. For more details, see Michael Johnson, All honourable men: the sociaLorigins of war in 
Lebano . Oxford: CLS in association with I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2001, pp. 37-39. 
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different matter. in other words, there was a considerable contradiction between structural aspects 
and procedural practices. 
The 1943 National Pact, a translation of the Constitution in practice, reflected the structure of 
political power and dominance in Lebanese society, namely Maronite and to some extent, Sunni 
hegemony. The agreement among a very limited number of confessional elites (two) brought some 
accommodation of the confessional groups to the dominant political position of the Maronites. As 
such, the processes and the institutions that were created did not make the 1926 Constitution an 
effective instrument for the creation and maintenance of order in society, as the outbreak of the civil 
war in 1975 suggests. Nor did they allow for peaceful change in the light of the changing realities of 
Lebanese political society and demography. The limited scope of representation of the 1943 Pact 
and its rigidity did not ensure the existence of processes and mechanisms that would order society 
and allow for peaceful change. Hence, such a situation lends support to the argument in favour of 
broadening the scope of the grand coalition. It best illustrates how the narrow scope of the grand 
coalition entailed group exclusion that eventually led to significant societal/communal resentment 
and latent unrest. In this sense, the pre-war Lebanese experiment with consociationalism illustrates 
the shortcomings of the model as devised by Lijphart, a shortcoming that manifested itself most 
starkly in the civil war. Indeed, this thesis subscribes to the view that the civil war was a 
manifestation of the failure of Lijphart's flawed consociational model, in the sense that failure is an 
inherent part of the theory itself. 
Indeed, one of the purposes of the National Pact in Lebanon was an effort to create a set of 
institutions that would respond in some measure to the needs of the various groupings in Lebanon 
and recognise the balance of power that exists among them. It was an attempt to create a set of 
institutions of governance that would recognise the diversity of Lebanese society and try to manage 
differences, whilst accommodating various interests in order to maintain order and stability. The 
outcome was a formation of a small number of political elites that participate, in a fairly democratic 
way in the governance of the plural society, in close connection with the commercial-financial 
elites. However, the outbreak of the civil war was a manifestation of the failure of 
consociationalism to ensure order and stability in the country. As demonstrated in previous 
chapters, the failure of the model to create stability is an inherent flaw within consociational theory. 
Needless to say, the examination in Chapter 4 revealed the crucial role that elite consensual 
behaviour plays in the maintenance of the system and likewise, the extent to which non-consensual 
elite behaviour plays in its breakdown. 
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Indeed, Chapter 4 has discussed in detail the numerous deviations from the consociational model in 
terms of elite behaviour and the detrimental impact these deviations had on the stability of the 
system. This clearly challenges the internal logic of the theory, whose validity rests solely on the 
behavior of the elites. It should also be noted that a more complete, pertinent answer to the 
breakdown of order and stability may be found in a detailed examination of the interaction between 
the complex nature of Lebanon's society and its mechanisms of rule. Hence, Chapter 4 proceeds to 
undertake this task, i. e., examined the extent of responsiveness of elite behavior to the complexities 
of plural society in which consociationalism is supposed to operate. 
The findings of Chapter 4 reveal that even if there is close cooperation among the elites (a 
consociational claim which was seriously challenged in previous chapters), it remains difficult to 
maintain order and stability within society. Indeed, starting with the assumption that elites try to 
reach accommodation with one another, this is because they realise that there is a comparative 
advantage they (and to a somewhat limited extent their respective communities) can derive from the 
political arrangement in place. Hence, a closer look at plural societies reveals that the factors that 
keep elites unified or brings about disunity among them are neither constant nor static. In other 
words, as the world is constantly changing, the factors that maintain cohesiveness between groups 
also change. The differences (religious, class, cultural ... ) that exist in divided societies overlap and 
cut across each other, raising doubts about the effectiveness of elite cooperation in maintaining 
stability. Against these (constantly changing) realities, the consociational model fails to provide 
effective mechanisms and institutions of governance by which groups may effectively adapt to 
these changes and maintain elite cooperation at the same time. Additionally, the consociational 
theory of democracy is challenged by many factors (such as regional turbulence and the rise of 
sectarian leaders unwilling to maintain traditions of political accommodation and hoping to rise to 
power), which make it problematic for consociationalism to sustain itself. This points to the very 
optimistic reliance of the theory on elites and to its optimistic reliance on the fact that outside 
threats will be perceived as threats by all communal groups. This is particularly troubling, not only 
for small states with no significant military power, but also because consociationalism promotes a 
divisive societal context which makes it difficult for people and to some extent, elites, to perceive 
what national interest is about. 
Hence, the utility of the model as an effective governance mechanism to ensure Lebanon's stability 
has been called into question. Indeed, the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 ]ends considerable 
support to this argument. Hence, consociationalism's ability to create and maintain democratic 
stability was questioned. However, the re-introduction of a modified consociational system of rule 
in Lebanon after more than fifteen-years of violence called for Chapter 5 to address the following 
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question: Is the new "improved" system better equipped to create and maintain democratic stability 
in Lebanon's Second Republic? The findings of Chapter 5 reveal that there is little reason to believe 
that adjustments made in the consociational model in Lebanon will be more successful in 
preventing conflict, and hence creating democratic stability. 
Despite the modified consociationalism resulting from the 1989 Ta'if Accord, the country is still 
deeply divided and the elites are still what they were in essence, unable at times to engage 
effectively in the bargaining process without endangering the stability of the system. After more 
than a decade of implementing a revised consociational formula in war-torn Lebanon that was 
designed to meet changing political and social realities and stop the fifteen-year civil war, the 
country is still not able to hold together. The Lebanese continue to live in a low-intensity civil war, 
thereby needing a Syrian presence in Lebanon to prevent a violent outbreak of communal conflict. 
The discussion in Chapter 5 has pointed to the lingering problems under the new consociational 
framework. It has focussed on government weaknesses through an examination of the executive 
decision-making branch (troika rule). Based on the inadequacies of the agreement, the discussion 
has cast doubt upon the ability of the consociational model to generate democratic stability in the 
country. The Ta'if Agreement appeared to be part of a process rather than a definitive settlement. 
Indeed, the examinations undertaken in this chapter has revealed that while the Ta'if Amendments 
introduced salutary reforms in terms of representation of the communal groups in the Lebanese 
political system, Lebanese politics are still highly unstable. This is despite the fact that the revised 
formula of the Lebanese political system relates more closely to the consociational model. While 
executive decision-making undertook significant mutation (as opposed to the pre-war Presidential 
Maronite-dominated system), hence somehow broadening the scope of the grand coalition, this is 
seen as enhancing prospects for stability, but without rendering the consociational system able to 
create and maintain a democratic system. It should be acknowledged that the Ta'if Accord 
recalibrated the amount of power among the major communal groups and the country is effectively 
run by the representatives of the three significant segments as the definition of grand coalition 
provided by Lijphart states. However, the grand coalition also refers to the Cabinet (i. e., the Council 
of Ministers), which includes representatives of almost all segments in Lebanese society. Hence, 
this broad-scope coalition is frequently able to influence and direct executive decision-making by 
the troika towards more representative and less elitist channels. As a result, a broad-scope coalition 
first solves the problem of group exclusion at the executive level. Second, while it does not translate 
into effective power and influence by the various Ministers (effective rule is still in the hands of the 
troika), it ensures that all voices are heard, leads to the emergence of temporary intra-alliances 
within the grand coalition (alliances that include minority groups together hence strengthening their 
collective position and bargaining power as a unified opposition group to the ruling troika) and 
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somehow puts a limit to the disagreements between the troika. Indeed, disagreements among the 
troika are frequent as all three leaders realise they can afford to disagree, as each represents a 
significant segment. As such, the Cabinet often acts as an internal mediator between them in cases 
of disagreement, hence solving ciises. Additionally, it often is a reminder to the three leaders that if 
their respective power and influence allow them to disagree, the fragile stability of the country does 
not allow that. Moreover, this broad coalition has been able to represent the interests of the 
President, which is salutary in this context, not because he is the representative of the Maronite 
community (his popularity among the Maronites is rather weak), but because the Cabinet has often 
been seen as surrendering to the Prime Minister (who is not interested in reform) and because the 
President appears to be keen to kick-start the reform process. 
At the same time however, directly related to this discussion are the processes through which the 
fifteen-year conflict was resolved and the processes through which relative stability is being 
maintained. Thus, Chapter 5 reviewed the mediation efforts undertaken during the Lebanese civil 
war. Particular attention was given to the important role that the regional and international contexts 
played in 1989, which resulted in the ending of the war. The discussion pointed to the influential 
role Syria played in ending the violent conflict since the peace when it came undoubtedly had a 
major input from Syria. Thus, the chapter explained the reasons why Syria preferred to postpone a 
fundamental change in the governance of Lebanon when the time for real change presented itself, 
and instead, went along with a modified consociational form that has, broadly speaking, failed in 
the past. In this respect, the argument in this thesis strongly deviates from the often-held claim 
(made by consociational theorists such as Lijphart and Messarra)9 that the consociational system 
was restored as it is the most adequate form for Lebanon's rule, and that the introduction of more 
consociational. principles will undoubtedly strengthen Lebanese democracy. 
Chapter 5 suggests that the re-introduction of consociational rule came about as a result of Syrian 
strategic considerations, as Syria was actively engaged in Lebanon's civil war since 1976, to protect 
its interests. This, combined with the fact that no one side in the civil war was able to predominate 
and impose/establish a new order based on its own perceptions as a victor. Indeed, the long war 
points to the inability of a dominant confessional group to emerge within Lebanon. As such, 
consociationalism was restored because it was the safest and least risky solution within the 
prevailing turbulent domestic context and regional circumstances. For instance, Syria has played an 
influential role in the political organisation of successive post-war governments, as it has the 
interest in, and ability to enforce the peace agreement (the Taif Accord). Undoubtedly, this points 
9 'Lijphart's line of thought is mainly defended in Lebanon by a pron-dnent political scientist, Antoine Nasri Messarra' 
(Kabbara 1991,346). 
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to the fact that the new post-war "improved" consociational system does not seem to have fulfilled 
its objective of creating political stability within democratic practices, a central question in this 
thesis. As such, the utility of the model in the Lebanese context is called into question. This is 
especially the case in the light of the permanent involvement of Syria in Lebanon in the form of 
arbitration to solve purely domestic issues. Additionally, additional mechanisms (excessive internal 
mediation and external and sometimes patronising arbitration) are needed to assist consociational 
mechanisms. The former, like consociationalism, are conflict-regulation mechanisms put forward 
by political scientists. In other words, consociationalism, as a conflict-regulation mechanism, is 
unable to solve alone the political, economic and socio-cultural problems of plural societies and that 
resorting to additional mechanisms in the conflict-regulation literature is much needed. 
The central concern of this thesis is the stability of a plural society under the consociational 
structure of rule. Thus Chapter 5 also examined in detail the factors threatening stability in post-war 
Lebanon under the existing consociational arrangement, and which constitute obstacles to 
democratic stability. Despite the existence of a degree of stability, Lebanese politics is highly 
unstable and vulnerable to the slightest and most minor disruption. The way that successive 
Lebanese governments have functioned suggests they face difficulties in administering the 
country's affairs. Indeed, the Lebanese state is weak in that the government has difficulty in 
arriving at domestic policies, organising itself to implement policies and dealing effectively with its 
international relations. However, because the grand coalition was enlarged (though the troika rules 
effectively), prospects for stability have been enhanced. Indeed, the Cabinet has been able to act at 
times as a mediator/arbitrator, hence channeling decision-making in a more representative fashion. 
At the same time there are significant post-war factors that still threaten the stability of the country. 
Lebanese political parties promote their own sectarian agenda, and may thus be said to contribute to 
the further segmentation of society, rather than to its modernisation, especially in the presence of 
socio-economic imbalances. 10 As a result, a cursory look at post-war Lebanese society points to the 
emergence of heightened sectarian tensions, retribalisation and national disintegration, all of which 
constitute formidable obstacles towards democratic stability. For instance, consociational theory 
advocates the presence of overarching loyalties to counter balance its disintegrative effects. In 
practice, the occasional manifestations of an overarching loyalty to Lebanon were brought about by 
compromises imposed by crisis conditions. These manifestations lend support to the argument that 
10 For more on the role political parties play in the Lebanese political system and its instability and the reflection of the 
intersection of class and ethnic divisions in party affiliation/membership, see Nazih Richani, Dilemmas of democrac 
and political parties in sectarian societies: the case of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996. London: 
Mc Millan Press, 1998, pp. 2-5. 
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sectarianism is antithetical to modem national development, namely that national reconciliation is 
still an objective and that there has yet to be a national ideology common to all peoples of Lebanon. 
Particularly, socio-economic constraints and their translation into the current economic crisis 
constitute formidable obstacles to stability and the democratisation of society, and contribute to the 
politicisation of ethnicity/loyalty, the persistence of the patron-client network and hence, the 
dependency of large segments of the population on the patronage system. It may be said that the 
detrimental impact of this on the stability of the system constitutes the most serious threat that faces 
Lebanon's stability. Indeed, the patron-client network contributes to the politicisation of religious 
identity, as religion becomes the basis upon which individuals can claim their share of material and 
economic benefits. Additionally, because Lebanese society, like many modem societies, is divided 
in different ways, material benefits accrue in different ways depending on the constituents of that 
society. This results in the emergence of different groupings of unequal size and power, and brings 
to mind the pre-war situation and signalling that violent conflict may very well break out again. In 
the Lebanese context, a redistribution of state funds towards the poor, a large segment of which are 
Muslim, has not yet occurred. While this issue appears to be located within the social context, it 
actually requires a political decision, which is difficult to achieve in light of the complex bargaining 
process elites engage in. 
As such, prospects for the gradual deconfessionalisation of politics and society in accordance with 
Horowitz's notion of integrative democracy (which may be a possible solution in the long-term for 
Lebanon's conundrum and a process by which the dynamics of nation building and nationhood are 
initiated)" appear dim. Indeed, it may be said that confessional elites are manipulating 
circumstances in ways that continue to damage the prospects for cooperation. Further-more, the 
divisive impact of the consociational system of rule counteracts any manifestation of national power 
and this at the mass as well as the elite levels. Indeed, there are many low rank elites that are subject 
to manipulation by their superiors. Their official positions within the Lebanese political system are 
an inherent internal flaw that threatens stability. The implications of the lack of a shared vision 
suggest a permanent fragmentation of society. As a result, the only common denominator among 
the different groupings is the survival of the system by allocating political and economic resources. 
In light of the scarcity of material benefits, stability and hence democratic stability appear difficult 
to achieve. In sum, the discussions undertaken in Chapter 5 further question the causative 
relationship between consociationalism and system stability, as well as the utility of the theory for 
Lebanon since the real institutions of democratic rule in consociationalism are actor-centered. In 
11 Along the lines prescribed by Horowitz's notion of integrative democracy discussed in Chapter 3 
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other words, the lack of cooperation among elites results from the flawed "human" institutional 
basis regulating their cooperation. 
The different chapters of this thesis, particularly the juxtaposition of the consociational model with 
the Lebanese model, have pointed to the inability of the consociational model to function as the 
theory suggests. In other words, they suggest that Lebanese consociationalism cannot bring about 
the democratic stability that is desired. However, while the various discussions in this thesis have 
focused on the aspects of consociational governance as they relate to democracy, an effort was 
made in the present research to improve on the ability of the consociational model of democracy to 
work as the theory suggests. 
Indeed, Chapter 3 argued for an elaboration of the model in terms of the inclusion of representatives 
from all communal groups in the grand coalition. Chapter 4 showed how and why the narrow-based 
grand coalition translated into a dominant hegemonic system of rule, which had a detrimental 
impact on the system that collapsed. Chapter 5, while acknowledging the salutary mutation (i. e., 
broadening) of the grand coalition on the stability of the system, pointed to its procedural 
shortcomings, namely extreme elitism. However, a salutary transition has been made from a 
hegemonic Maronite-dominated system to an elitist model (i. e., a grand coalition, representing all 
groups, however failing to effectively share executive decision-making among them all). Rather, it 
is a system of rule that effectively shares powers among its significant segments but that allows, a 
more representative system of rule, because the grand coalition is wide. 
This is not to say, however, that the system is bound to sustain itself or to break down in the future. 
Whether or not Lebanon will witness another civil war is a moot question. It may be said, however, 
that the impetus for change, in order to achieve less political instability, may emerge as a result of 
the interplay between the modernisation processes underway and economic prosperity over time, 
leading to a progressive depoliticisation and deconfessionalisation, as advocated by Horowitz. At 
the same time however, the scarcity of material resources in Lebanon suggests that this is not 
readily possible. Beyond any doubt, a careful observation of the Lebanese domestic scene calls for 
the need for the coming to power of a more representative, harmonious elite to install political 
stability. Also required is a sound, balanced economic policy that can target the protection of 
national interests, as well as provide an insulation and immunisation of the local domestic scene 
from destabilising external turbulence. Hence, while these objectives appear to be easier to achieve, 
this study is by no means an invitation to optimism. Indeed, as Khatib points out, 'democracy is a 
product of nation-state integration. Thus the mere passage of time is not enough for setting up a 
stable democracy' (Khatib 1994,316). In an environment where elites manipulate identities and 
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where religion and religious clerics continue to form part of the political game, mainly through the 
relative power the consociational model grants them (segmental autonomy), it is not clear how 
Lebanon is to move towards a deconfessionalisation of its political structure. 
Additionally, elites have been shown as lacking in legitimacy, while legitimacy is a crucial element 
in consociationalism so that the latter ensures stability. Elites are not only representatives of a very 
narrow scope of the population, that is, their own respective group, but are also representatives of a 
somewhat limited fraction within this group, its upper strata. Hence, elites legitimacy remains very 
limited. As Lipset writes, 'to attain legitimacy, what new democracies need above all is efficacy, 
particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity. If they can take the high road to economic 
development, they can keep their political houses in order. The opposite is true as well; 
Governments that defy the elementary laws of supply and demand will fail to develop and will not 
institutionalize genuinely democratic systems' (Lipset 1994,1). Against this background, 
consociationalism, through the governmental paralysis it fosters, can be said to be the very 
antithesis of efficacy, and by extension legitimacy, and this makes stability difficult. In particular, 
there is a need for a wide, socially based social contract that can encompass all sections of the 
population sharing the same economic position. There is a need for more parties with a wide 
popular support base because there is a consensus that such political parties play a crucial role in the 
political game, contributing to the stability of the system, and are one of the backbones of a 
democratic system. Crucially, and for as long as the political system remains elitist in nature, 
Roberson's comments appear very pertinent: 
Whatever the shortcomings of the Taif Agreement and subsequent treaties and other agreements to end the 
disorder in the country, and for however long the intersect system is utilized in the way that it has been to form 
the basis of the political system and government, the main confessional groups need to be engaged in the process 
of forming a consensus around which domestic, regional and international policies and strategies are being 
devised and pursued. Without this full engagement of the elite, the quality of Lebanese autonomy may be 
skewed, weakened or undermined (Roberson 1998a, 4). 
At the same time, Shils' argument (based on Lebanon) that 'no complex modem society can live 
and grow solely from its consensus; it needs governmental institutions capable of making decisions 
which consensus alone cannot make. This fact does not render consensus any the less necessary' 
(Shils 1966,4) is equally pertinent in assessing the prospects of stability in Lebanon. 12 For instance, 
while acknowledging the defective nature of Lebanon's democratic institutions, mainly in terms of 
the small change and relative flexibility they allow, Hudson writes that 'Lebanon's political 
institutions work rather well when there is little to be done, but as the work load increases the 
defects that once were tolerable become dangerous liabilities' (Hudson 1985b, 329). In the light of 
12 For authors who argue similarly, see (Owen, 2000,148) and (Barak 2000,20-1). 
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the democratisation challenges, requiring as they do a substantial workload for the political system 
and its institutions, it is highly debatable whether the country's institutions under the current 
consociational framework will be able to benefit from the opportunities democratisation has to 
offer. 
Drawing on Lebanon as a case study, this thesis has critically investigated consociational theory in 
an attempt to examine whether the model of consociational democracy rule is able to prevent the 
outbreak of conflict in divided societies and ensure that stability in such a context continues to be 
created and maintained. The research has principally aimed to re-examine and re-evaluate the 
significance of Arend Lijphart's assertion pertaining to the causative relationship between 
consociational democracy and system stability in divided societies. In the end, it was shown that the 
model does not work as the theory suggests and worse, prevents the system from reaching political 
maturity. As a result, additional conflict-regulating mechanisms (such as those of external 
arbitration and excessive internal mediation) are needed as a means of assisting consociational 
devices. 
While this thesis has attempted critically to investigate the consociational claim pertaining to the 
positive relationship between consociationalism and democratic stability, using Lebanon as a case 
study, it is not, and has not intended to be, an exhaustive study of either the theory of consociational 
democracy or the complex dynamics of the democratic process as it relates to the country. Nor does 
this thesis claim to have solved the unresolved debates of Lebanese politics. Indeed, further 
questions/issues (pertaining to consociational theory as well as Lebanon) that have not received 
enough scholarly attention deserve to be examined. For instance, in light of the classification of 
many political systems around the world as consociational and of the extensive literature on (and 
academic interest in) the dynamic globalisation process (and its inevitability), there is a need for 
further research on the nature of the relationship (i. e., the interplay) between consociationalism and 
globalisation and the impact of this interplay on the globalising consociational country. 'Such 
examinations have received little attention in the consociational. literature. Indeed, for all countries 
in the world, the reality and the pressure of globalisation are an inevitability. At the same time, for 
many of them, plural societies, such as Lebanon, it is not readily possible to do away with the 
consociational model of rule, at least for the time being. Therefore, the extent and nature of 
responsiveness of consociationalism to the reality of globalisation seems to be an interesting 
dimension that allows Lijphart's claim of democratic stability to be re-examined through a new 
lens. This is so because globalisation constraints have an important bearing on the stability of the 
globalising country as globalisation tends to create societal stresses that seem to endanger a 
country's stability. 
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Indeed, the literature on globalisation mentions that a modernising country (plural or homogeneous) 
will come across, particularly in the short term, economic and social problems that may tend to 
bring instability to the country. This is so mainly because some aspects of globalisation are 
beneficial, while some effects are adverse, some people and groups benefit by it, and others 
experience bankruptcy, poverty and unemployment. Hence, if plural societies tend to be unstable, 
and when consociationalism perpetuates such divisions, and globalisation tends to have detrimental 
social impacts on stable societies and unstable ones, what are the prospects for stability and 
democratic stability for plural societies when all of these factors come into play? Indeed, threats to 
social stability may manifest themselves in the plural societies under examination in this thesis as a 
result of uncontrolled financial liberalisation, especially as foreign investors do not take into 
consideration sensitive issues in plural societies, such as the proper balance in development, neither 
sectorally, nor regionally (read the communal-religious dimension they take). The intersection of 
socio-economic and religious divisions is particularly problematic for the stability of the plural 
society and for peaceful communal coexistence. 
If history is anything to go by, for example, the Lebanese record shows that social and class 
conflicts manifest themselves in religious clashes and tensions. As Hudson aptly puts it, 'in 
Lebanon, acute economic crises can explode into sectarian political conflicts' (Hudson 1999b, 36). 
Thus, in the Lebanese case, if a redistribution of benefits is a likely consequence of the globalisation 
process, will the prospective penetration of the much-needed DFI be delayed or hampered, as it 
might upset the existing confessionally-balanced allocation of economic power (as discussed in 
previous chapters)? It is necessary to ask whether the heavy involvement of political decision- 
making (and bickering) in such issues impedes the globalisation process due to the time it usually 
takes to reach political consensus. 13 One may question how the globalisation process of the country 
is conducted through the consociational decision making system when the elites, it is presumed, are 
looking after the interests of their own groups and how this will affect the final political decision- 
making. Will sectarian interests determine the outcome, or will national interests somehow emerge? 
In the process, will this complex governance system impede the globalisation process and delay the 
competitive integration of Lebanon's economy in the global economy? Will this lengthy process 
discourage DFI? Because of the dominance of the sophisticated patron-client system over the role 
of the state, can the government be allowed to play a regulatory role in the economy, as a successful 
globalisation process prescribes? What are the necessary reforms that the Lebanese political 
economy would have to undergo if Lebanon is to integrate its economy competitively in the world 
13 For instance, the renowned economist Kamal Hamdan mentions that the priorities of the previous three-year 
governmental economic programme were revised three times, still without having been clearly identified. He notes that, 
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economy? Can the Lebanese government undertake economic, administrative, judicial and state 
reforms (mainly in the health and education sectors)? 
The extent of political responsiveness that the Lebanese consociational system of rule exhibits in 
the face of the demands made upon it by the dynamics of the globalisation process deserves 
examination. How adequate is the consociational structure of governance, with regard to its 
adaptability or inadaptability to the imperatives of the global environment? Will the consociational. 
system impede the changes that appear to be crucial for the integration of Lebanon's economy in 
the global economy, among which can be cited structural reform, fiscal and monetary discipline, 
privatisation and an absence of political "meddling"? What are the prospects for "consociational 
globalising" Lebanon in this changing world? How well can the consociational system manage this 
type of global developments? 
Lebanon is a late globaliser and has only lately taken reasonable steps in this direction. Indeed, it is 
currently making efforts to integrate its economy into the world economy since the costs of 
Lebanon's integration in the global economy are lower than the costs of its isolation. In other 
words, the assumption here is that the Lebanese economy has to be opened more to the outside 
world, as this is better for the stability of the country. Indeed, the rather significant global changes 
that are occurring in the nature of the flows of both capital and labour and in the level, quality and 
differentiation of labour are necessary for competition in today's global markets and cannot be 
ignored by the Lebanese government. Hence, the current progression and unfolding of the 
globalisation process under Lebanon's consociational system of rule calls for the need for future 
extensive examinations and inclusive inquiries pertaining to the consociationalism/stability 
relationship, precisely because the latter appears to be increasingly elusive, when globalisation 
constraints are considered. Especially when it comes to globalisation, the fragmentary information 
available to scholars is a major limitation in formulating an adequate assessment of the implications 
of the government's economic policies on stability. Lebanese consociationalism may need to be 
developed and elaborated in order to sustain such complex and dynamic processes. Indeed, the 
considerable immobilism and rigidity exhibited by the consociational model and the ensuing 
governmental paralysis raise questions whether the consociational model can cope adequately with 
exponential changes in the world order and approaching challenges of globalisation. Hence, further 
research should be undertaken into ways of elaborating on the consociational model so as to suit the 
globalisation reality. Indeed, one way of counterattacking such fragility and difficulties is to 
continuously elaborate the consociational model to suit the challenges and opportunities of 
on the contrary, they have been revised a number of times to meet inter-sectarian and clicntelist relations (Hamdan 
2000,70). 
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globalisation and the particularities of plural societies. In short, there is a need for research in this 
particular field to gain greater insight into the political governance challenges facing consociational 
globalisers. 
Throughout this thesis, the discussion of the utility of the consociational. model in the Lebanese 
context suggested that the consociational model of democracy was, in the absence of workable 
alternatives, the most likely form of government for Lebanon at least for the time being, in the sense 
that it emerges as a realistic response to what is possible to achieve within the prevailing domestic 
and regional situation. A question that arises is: In the light of the findings of this study, can one 
prescribe such a model for divided/deeply divided societies other than Lebanon? 
Indeed, in the 21" century, all societies seem divided societies; many are deeply divided societies. 
Lebanon is one of them, a very complex society existing in a region with complex politics. In order 
for the consociational model to be applied to plural, unstable societies other than Lebanon, the 
findings of this thesis cast doubts as to the ability to move from a descriptive to a prescriptive 
realm, i. e., prescribing the Lebanese consociational model, as it is in its present form, to other 
divided/deeply divided societies, which are surely likely exhibit their own constraining features. For 
instance, Traboulsi has made the observation that 'Lebanon's political system is criminal because it 
constantly renews itself by dividing the Lebanese' (Traboulsi 2002). Similarly, Khazen has pointed 
out that 'Lebanon's sectarian democracy was designed to suit Lebanon's communal particularities. 
It was, so to speak, made for internal consumption and not for export' (Khazcn 2000,390). 
However, this is not to say that other plural (heterogeneous, divided and unstable) societies cannot 
benefit from the twin experiments of Lebanon with consociationalism. Indeed, just as Ubanon 
provides a rich testing field for the operability of the model, it likewise represents by extension a 
rich lesson field for the applicability of the model elsewhere. 
As regards Iraq's plural society, this thesis argues that international, regional and local decision- 
makers can learn from Lebanon's lessons and experiences with consociational democracy. 14 Indeed, 
there is wide consensus that the previous Iraqi regime was far from democratic, and its den-dse is 
seen as a salutary step. Against such a background, the likelihood of having a consociational system 
of rule appears to be very high, though far from being an ideal situation. Rather, it is seen as a 
realistic alternative when compared to the perils of majoritarianism. This appears understandable, as 
the long-term repressive Iraqi government has contributed to a great extent to the persistence of 
14 For similar recent journalistic opinions, see Wissam S. Yafi, 'Democracy 101, lessons from Lebanon'. DSO, 26 April 
2003; Paul Salem 'Lebanon's democratic lessons, part 1'. DSO, 17 June 2003; Paul Salem 'Designing democracy for 
Iraq, part 2. DSO, 18 June 2003 and David Ignatius, 'Adopt Ghassan Salameh's plan'. DSO, 8 September 2003. 
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sectarian and ethnic loyalties as a result of group exclusion and oppression. Yafi advocates that Iraq 
should keep the executive positions as a free-of-sectarianism and institutionalising sectarianism in 
Parliament as a compromise (YaFi 2003). Salem, meanwhile, argues the opposite, suggesting that 
Parliament should be kept free of sectarian composition, while institutionalising communal 
representation at the decision-making level (Salem 2003a, Salem 2003b). Based on the Lebanese 
experiment, this thesis argues against the institutionalisation of any sort of communal 
representation, as this would encourage the politicisation of identities, which may otherwise recede. 
However, it seems that Salem's scenario appears wiser than Yafi's as issues of conflict will be 
particularly threatening to the stability of the country if executive decision-making includes group 
exclusion. This should not, however, mean that this should be institutionalised in the system 
through constitutional measures. Rather, it seems wiser to try to encourage the emergence of 
groups, according to Lijphart's recently introduced concept of self-determination. Indeed, the Iraqi 
situation presents an ideal opportunity to test the operability of Lijphart's self-determination 
approach to govemance. In the end, it is hoped that this study of how Lebanon is govemed will be 
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